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Abstract
The information revolution has transformed both modem societies and the way in 
which they conduct warfare. This thesis analyses the status of computer network 
attacks in international law and examines their treatment under the laws of armed 
conflict. A computer network attack is any operation designed to disrupt, deny, 
degrade or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the 
computers and networks themselves.
The first part of the thesis deals with a States right to resort to force and uses the 
U.N. Charter system to analyse whether and at what point a computer network attack 
will amount to a use of force or an armed attack, and examines the permitted 
responses against such an attack.
The second part of the thesis addresses the applicability of international 
humanitarian law to computer network attacks by determining under what 
circumstances these attacks will constitute an armed conflict. It concludes that the 
jus in bello will apply where the perceived intention of the attacking party is to cause 
deliberate harm and the foreseeable consequence of the acts includes injury, death 
damage or destmction.
In examining the regulation of these attacks under the jus in bello the author 
addresses the legal issues associated with this method of attack in terms of the 
current law and examines the underlying debates which are shaping the modem laws 
applicable in armed conflict. Participants in conflicts are examined as increased 
civilianisation of the armed forces is moving in lock-step with advances in 
technology. Computer network attacks also present new issues for the law relating to 
targeting and precautions in attack which are addressed; objects subject to special 
protections, and their digital counterparts are also examined. Finally the thesis 
addresses computer network attacks against the laws relating to means and methods 
of warfare, including the law of weaponry, perfidy and the particular issues relating 
to digital property.
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Chapter 1 - The World in Which We Live and Fight
On the 16 May 1943, one of the most famous missions of the Second World War, the 
‘Dambusters’ raid, took place. Nineteen Lancaster bombers modified to carry 
weapons at the cutting edge of technology flew over most of Southern Germany to 
attack three hydroelectric dams supplying electricity to German industrial 
installations in the Ruhr valley. Two of the three targeted dams were breached 
causing significant damage,1 however eight bomber crews were lost during the 
mission. Fifty-five years later, a twelve year-old boy hacked into the control system 
of Arizona’s Roosevelt Dam, gaining control of its massive floodgates and the 489 
billion gallons of water which it contains. Although the boy was unaware of the 
fact, federal authorities stated that he could have released the 489 billion gallons of 
water contained by the dam downstream causing massive amounts of damage. Such 
an incident demonstrates the power and possibility of computer network attacks if 
utilised in an armed conflict; it also illustrates the vulnerability of States who are 
dependent on information infrastructures not adequately protected against this new 
method of attack.
This thesis examines the law governing the use of force and humanitarian law as it 
applies to computer network attacks. It represents a systematic analysis of the laws 
of armed conflict, both jus ad bellum and jus in bello, as they relate to one of the 
newest forms of warfare. Computer network attacks (CNA) are “actions taken 
through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy 
information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and
1 In the MOhne and Ruhr valleys 11 factories were totally destroyed, 114 seriously damaged, 25 road 
and rail bridges were destroyed and throughout the region power, water and gas supplies were 
seriously disrupted. Communications by road and canal were severely disrupted and for the remainder 
of the war the Germans had to divert an additional 10,000 troops to guard the dams. National 
Archives, Dambusters: The Legacy <http://www.nationalarchives.gov.uk/dambusters/legacy.htm> 
(last accessed 21 August 2008).
2 Barton Gellman, 'Cyber-Attacks by A1 Qaeda Feared', Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 27 June 
2002, A01. Note that there is debate over the veracity of some of the facts of this case, including the 
year and severity of the attack and the age of the hacker which are detailed in Appendix 1. However, 
the example illustrates the point being made here of the change in the method of warfare to achieve 
the same effect.
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networks themselves”; computer network attacks form a subset of information 
operations.4
The thesis is divided into two parts. Part one addresses the jus ad bellum; it examines 
computer network attacks as a prohibited act and the permitted responses to such 
acts under international law. Chapter 2 looks at the qualification of computer 
network attacks as a use of force contrary to Article 2(4) of the UN Charter and 
examines the theoretical underpinnings of the prohibition against force in 
international law in order to address some of the specific characteristics of computer 
network attacks. Chapter 3 considers when an attack will rise to the level of an 
armed attack, thus triggering the right of self-defence. The chapter also examines 
the issue of attribution of attacks which is a particular problem for a method of 
warfare that generally relies on anonymity. The chapter also addresses other possible 
responses to computer network attacks, namely counter-measures against an 
unlawful act and collective measures authorised by the Security Council against a 
threat to the peace.
Part two of this thesis examines the jus in bello and works systematically through 
those areas of the law of armed conflict for which computer network attacks raise 
issues. Chapter 4 begins by examining the concept of armed conflict and assessing 
under what circumstances the law of armed conflict will apply to computer network 
attacks. The following chapters examine the themes of participants in conflict, 
targeting and legitimate military objectives, precautions in attack and defence, 
measures of special protection, the protection of cultural property during armed 
conflict, and means and methods of warfare (including the law of weaponry).
The thesis is not, however, limited to a point-by-point analysis of the current laws of 
armed conflict. The rise of computer network attack as a means and method of 
warfare is bom out of, and in turn has influenced, many different societal and 
military trends; any attempt to analyse how the laws of armed conflict should affect
3 U.S. Department o f Defence, Dictionary o f  Military and Associated Terms, Joint Publication 1-02 
(2001) <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/doddict/index.html> (last accessed 22 April 2008).
4 The U.S. DoD dictionary defines ‘Information Operations’ as “The integrated employment of the 
core capabilities of electronic warfare, computer network operations, psychological operations, 
military deception, and operations security, in concert with specified supporting and related 
capabilities, to influence, disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and automated decision making 
while protecting our own”. Ibid.
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this form of warfare must, therefore, take these trends into account or risk becoming 
outdated as soon as it is completed. Indeed, with much of the current capacity for 
computer network attacks remaining classified and the exponential growth of 
computing and transmission power,5 any attempt to limit a thesis to present capacity 
and ignore trends would be foolhardy at best. The thesis also takes account of the 
ongoing debates between experts taking place in relation to the laws applicable in 
conventional armed conflicts. These debates, such as the current discourse on direct 
participation in hostilities, the use of civilian contractors, the applicability of the laws 
of armed conflict to counter-terrorist operations, and targeting of dual-use facilities, 
to name just a few, all form the background to the discussion of the law as it applies 
to computer network attacks.
Raymond Ku has noted that with each controversy involving the Internet, the law is 
forced to confront cyberspace on two levels.6 The first is a consideration of what real 
space rules and legal regimes should apply to cyberspace. At this level we are asked 
to translate where possible our existing values and legal principles into values and 
legal principles applicable to cyberspace. On a second level, providing new laws for 
cyberspace forces us to examine our pre-cyberworld rules as well as our commitment 
to the values that form the foundation for those laws.8 Ku’s dual analysis can be 
applied to the interpretation and promulgation of laws to govern armed conflict using 
computer network attacks. First, it is necessary to examine the current legal 
regulation of armed conflict and consider how it can be applied to computer network 
attacks. However in order to do that effectively, it is necessary to return to the 
underlying principles for those laws and determine whether the values they seek to 
protect are the same for the societies dependent on information technology who are 
the victims of such attacks. For example, the laws of armed conflict offer protection 
to civilian property as a consequence of the principle of distinction. Therefore it is 
necessary to revisit the reasons why we protect civilian property, to determine 
whether those principles should still apply with respect to digital property, in light of
5 Moore’s Law states that computing power will double approximately every two years; Nielson’s law 
states that bandwidth for high-end users will double in the same period.
6 Raymond Ku, 'Foreword: A Brave New Cyberworld' (2000) 22 T Jefferson L Rev 125,128.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 129.
societies’ changing conceptions of property as a whole and the importance of digital 
property to the functioning of information societies.
This need to re-address principles comes at a time when the law of armed conflict, 
even as it relates to conventional armed conflict, is under greater scrutiny than it ever 
has been in the past. Increased media attention and the proliferation of non­
governmental actors involved in conflict, whether as participants or observers, has 
resulted in the inherent tensions and ambiguities in the laws of armed conflict being 
forced into stark relief. Ku argues that before we can consistently apply existing law 
to the challenges posed by cyberspace, we must resolve conflicting values and 
clarify the latent ambiguities that justify existing legal rules.9 However while that 
may be an ideal solution for application to domestic law issues, the laws relating to 
the use of force and the conduct of armed conflict owe their existence to a state of 
perpetual tension between conflicting values; most obviously in the case of the laws 
of armed conflict, the balance between humanitarian principles and military 
necessity. Further, it is the very ambiguities that Ku is determined to resolve, that 
allow public international law to function -  in some cases consensus may only be 
reached by allowing for differing interpretations. Simply put, the application of the 
law to cyberspace in this case computer network attack technologies, cannot be 
dependent on the resolution of those conflicts and ambiguities that form an integral 
part of the functioning of the international system. Some of the tensions that are now 
becoming apparent are the result of the changing character of warfare, the context in 
which it is waged, and the societies in which it is conducted. This thesis sets out the 
competing approaches and examines their validity for the application of the law to 
computer network attack where these areas of disagreement occur.
The trends affecting modem armed conflict are happening at a societal level as well 
as at a military and strategic level, thus an understanding of these developments is 
required in order to understand the legal complexities arising from this new type of 
warfare. In fact, Alvin and Heidi Toffler point out: “What is known as the 
[revolution in military affairs] therefore, is extremely important, but it is,
9 Ibid., 127. citing Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws o f  Cyberspace (Basic Books, New York, 
1999), 119.
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nevertheless, just one facet of the larger civilisational shift, and it needs to be 
understood in that context”.10 This view is shared by British military historian 
Jeremy Black:11
. .the material culture of war, which tends to be the focus of attention, is less 
important than its social, cultural and political contexts and enablers. These contexts 
explain the purposes of military action, the nature of the relationship between the 
military and the rest of society, and the internal structures and ethos of the military.”
That is to say, that the context of warfare defines it more than the military
technology it utilises. That same context will be reflected in the laws that govern
warfare through the application of the general principles which underpin it. In
particular, the laws of armed conflict represent the point of balance or compromise
between two dynamic forces, the requirements of humanity on the one hand, and
military necessity on the other. It is the dialectical relation between these two forces,
in the light of historical experience, which determines the contents, contours and
10characteristics of the law of armed conflict at any moment in time. The following 
sections outline and examine some of the trends that are influencing both society and 
the military, and hence the legal context in which future armed conflicts will take 
place. This chapter places the emergence of computer network attacks as a means 
and method of warfare in its broader context, both in terms of the revolution in 
military affairs and its wider societal context, in order to understand the drivers of 
modem armed conflict and the values which the laws of armed conflict seek to 
protect.
10 Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, 'Foreword: The New Intangibles' in J Arquilla, et al. (eds), In 
Athena's Camp: Preparing for Conflict in the Information Age (RAND, Santa Monica, 1997) xiii- 
xxiv, xiv.
11 Jeremy Black, War in the New Century (Continuum, London, 2001), 114. cited in Colin S Gray, 
Another Bloody Century: Future Warfare (Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 2005), 84.
12 Georges Abi-Saab, 'The Specificities of Humanitarian Law' in C Swinarski (ed) Studies and Essays 
on International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour o f  Jean Pictet (Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, Geneva, The Hague, 1984) 265-280,265.
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1. Societal Trends Generally
1.1. The Information Revolution & Digitisation
The information revolution is one of the defining characteristics of the current age.
Advances in information technology are affecting almost every segment of business,
11society and government in many, if not all, regions of the world. Information has 
changed the entire structure of society: governmental leadership, national identity, 
production values, organisational structures and even domestic attributes such as 
family and religion have all been affected with a speed and global impact on a scale 
never seen before.14 In examining the effects of this phenomenon on conflict, four 
main factors must be taken into account: the ubiquity of information technology, the 
increasing amount and decreasing cost of information, societies’ changing attitudes 
to, and because of, access to information, and finally, the effects of increased 
information on organisational structures within both domestic and international 
society.
1.1.1. Ubiquity
As more and more information becomes digitised and bandwidth expands,15 societies 
have become increasingly reliant on networked and electronic information. 
Information technology is being integrated into everything from appliances and 
vehicles to business processes and control systems.16 More importantly, computer 
systems regulate air traffic control and other transportation networks, oil and gas 
pipelines, electricity generating systems and networks, sewerage and water treatment 
facilities, emergency response services, hospital systems and many other systems
13 Richard O Hundley, et al., The Global Course o f the Information Revolution: Recurring Themes 
and Regional Variations (National Defense Research Institute, RAND, Santa Monica, 2003) 
<www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1680/index.html> (last accessed 16 March 2008).
14 See generally, Alvin Toffler and Heidi Toffler, War and Anti-War: Survival at the Dawn o f  the 21st 
Century (Warner Books, London, 1994).
15 Digitization refers to the encoding, transformation, and transmission of all information -  whether 
audio, video, graphics or text -  into a series of binary numbers i.e. Is and Os. See Stephen Saxby, The 
Age ofInformation: The Past Development and Future Significance o f  Computing and 
Communications (Macmillan, London, 1990), 3.
16 Dorothy E. Denning, 'Cyber-Security as an Emergent Infrastructure' in R Latham (ed) Bombs & 
Bandwidth: The Emerging Relationship between Information Technology & Security (Manas 
Publications, New Delhi, 2004) 25, 33.
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considered part of the critical infrastructure of modem States. Dorothy Denning 
notes that this trend to ubiquitous computing affects information security in two 
ways; First there are more targets and more attackers, and secondly attacks can have 
real world consequences.17 The first point is fairly self explanatory, the more systems 
that are networked and run by information technology, the more targets that are 
vulnerable to attack. The more those systems are networked, the more open they 
become, and greater numbers of attackers have access to try and crack the system. 
Denning’s second point regarding the real world consequences of such actions is a 
basic but important one. When computer network attacks were first raised as a 
possible threat, many were sceptical of their merits, seeing them as purely ‘nuisance’ 
attacks of no real consequence for everyday life.18 This attitude is slowly being 
revised in the face of increasing domestic incidents of computer network attacks and 
the beginnings of their introduction for use in armed conflict, both of which illustrate 
their utility in the real world.19
One of the key systems responsible for the cross-over between virtual and real world 
consequences of information technology are the control systems which regulate most 
critical infrastructure systems of technologically advanced societies; these systems 
control power plants, water systems, dams, gas pipelines, chemical plants and 
reactors to name a few. Supervisory control and data acquisition (or SCAD A) 
systems, distributed control systems (DCS) and other control systems regulate most 
of the critical infrastructure and have proven particularly vulnerable to attack. In 
March 2007, researchers from the Idaho National Laboratory launched an 
experimental cyber attack, hacking into a replica of a power plant’s control system 
and changing the operating cycle of a generator.20 The attack sent the generator out 
of control and ultimately caused it to self destruct, alarming the federal government
17 Ibid.
18 See for example Frontline, Interview with James Lewis fo r Frontline: Cyber War! (Interview 
Conducted on 18 February 2003)
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/interviews/lewis.html> (last accessed 16 
March 2008).
19 However see Mark Trevelyan, 'Security Experts Split on "Cyberterrorism" Threat', International 
Herald Tribune (Paris), 16 April 2008,
<http://www.iht.eom/articles/reuters/2008/04/16/europe/OUKWD-UK-SECURITY- 
CYBERSPACE.php> (last accessed 19 April 2008).
20 Jeanne Meserve, 'Staged Cyber Attack Reveals Vulnerability in Power Grid', CNN.com 26 
September 2007, <http://edition.cnn.eom/2007/US/09/26/power.at.risk/index.html> (last accessed 20 
February 2008).
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and electrical industry about what might happen if such an attack were carried out on 
a larger scale.21 One of the earliest known incidents of this kind of computer attack, 
the so-called ‘Farewell Dossier’ incident, took place in 1982 during the Cold War. 
Following the theft of technology from Western powers by the Soviet KGB, the CIA 
of the United States and a Canadian software supplier planted malicious code in the 
software for a gas pipeline control system which a KGB operative had been sent to 
steal:22
"[T]he pipeline software that was to run the pumps, turbines and valves was 
programmed to go haywire, after a decent interval, to reset pump speeds and valve 
settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to the pipeline joints and 
welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion and fire ever 
seen from space.”
SCADA systems were again compromised in the 1998 Arizona Roosevelt Dam 
example cited previously. In another example, in 2000 Vitek Boden hacked the 
control system of the water and sewerage treatment plant in Queensland, Australia. 
Over a two month period the disgruntled former employee had accessed the system 
46 times gaining complete control of the sewerage and drinking water systems for 
the region and dumping putrid sludge into the area’s rivers and parks. Incidents 
such as these have made States increasingly aware of the amount of critical 
infrastructure that is controlled by computers and their resultant vulnerability to 
computer network attacks. Cyber attack has now been listed as one of the major 
threats to both the U.S. and U.K. critical infrastructure in recent reports.24 
Although they are the most obvious, control systems are not the only link between 
computers and the physical world which may be affected by computer network 
attacks. For example, civilian vehicles and air traffic controls are increasingly 
equipped with navigation systems relying on GPS satellites, the same satellites
21 Ibid. Footage of the generator is available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJyWngDco3g.
22 Thomas C. Reed, At the Abyss: An Insider's History o f  the Cold War (Presidio, New York, 2004),
269.
23 R v Boden (2002) QCA 164, Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Australia); 
Gellman, 'Cyber-Attacks by A1 Qaeda Feared'.
24 U.S. Department o f Homeland Security, National Infrastructure Protection Plan, U.S. Department 
of Homeland Security, (2006) <http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/NIPP_Plan.pdf> (last accessed 28 
April 2008); U.K. Cabinet Office, The National Security Strategy o f  the United Kingdom: Security in 
an Interdependent World, U.K. Cabinet Office, Cm 7291 (2008).
which control U.S. military positions and precision guided missiles. This trend will 
only continue as the global information environment continues to develop at pace 
with the development of next generation Internet providing broadband, always-on 
connection from multiple devices in every aspect of personal, business and public 
life.
1.1.2. Amount
As information technology pervades more of daily life, the sheer amount of 
information available is increasing at a phenomenal rate. In 1993, there were about 
fifty websites in the world; by the end of the decade that figure had surpassed five 
million. One study has estimated that the total amount of new information 
produced in 2002 was approximately five exabytes, in print, film magnetic and 
optical storage media; 92 percent of which was stored on magnetic media, mostly in 
hard disks, and only 0.01 percent was stored on paper.26 The amount of new 
information produced has more than doubled from the estimated two exabytes 
produced in 1999. The same study estimates that the amount of information available 
on the surface of the World Wide Web (i.e. fixed web pages) is 170 terabytes, and in 
depth (i.e. including database driven websites that create web pages on demand) is 
91,850 terabytes.27 Further, the relative cost of transmitting information has 
dramatically decreased, removing barriers to entry and allowing almost anyone to 
add information or utilise available information systems.
1.1.3. Societal Change
It is axiomatic to say that the information revolution is fundamentally changing 
societies. The dramatic change in the linked technologies of computing and 
communications, sometimes called the third industrial revolution, is changing the
25 Douglas McGray, "The Silicon Archipelago" (1999) Spring Daedalus 147-76 cited in Joseph S. 
Nye, Jr, The Paradox o f  American Power: Why the World's Only Superpower Can't Go It Alone 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), 42.
26 Five exabytes (5 xlO18 Bytes) is equivalent to half a million new libraries the size of the US Library 
of Congress print collections; see Peter Lyman and Hal R. Varian, How Much Information?, 
University of California at Berkley (2003) <http://www.sims.berkeley.edu/research/projects/how- 
much-info-2003/> (last accessed 9 November 2007).
27 Ibid. Note that this figure does not include email (440,606 Terabytes) or instant message (274 
terabytes) information sources.
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nature of governments and sovereignty, increasing the role of non-state actors, and
OSenhancing the importance of soft power in foreign policy. Indeed some academics 
argue that the change in the mode of communication has a substantial effect on the 
distribution of power within society, on social evolution as a whole and on the values 
and beliefs of that society.29 While all of these societal changes will effect the 
application and interpretation of the law relating to armed conflict in varying
O A
degrees, two in particular deserve further examination here.
First, individuals may turn from traditional sources of national identity to competing 
social identifications based on ethnic, religious, or other ties which are not dependant 
on geographical location. This may have a fragmentary effect, amplifying existing 
divisions in society to the point of armed conflict.
Secondly, increased access to information allows people to see events happening 
around the world. This may lead to an increased humanitarian consciousness . 
regarding human rights abuses and an increased awareness of actions carried out in 
the public’s name. The result is the so-called ‘CNN effect’, the influence of media 
footage on foreign policy. With the advent of live satellite feeds and citizen 
journalism into the global communications market, the harsh realities of conflict can 
be beamed into the homes of citizens who see the violence committed in their name. 
This effect has provided both a powerful tool for governments and a constraint on 
their behaviour.31 The events surrounding the shooting down of the U.S. Black Hawk 
helicopter crew and subsequent television footage of the treatment of the body of one 
of the crew members in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, illustrated the powerful effects
28 Nye, Paradox, 43.
29 For an exposition of ‘medium’ theory and its effects on the information revolution see Ronald J. 
Deibert, Parchment, Printing, and Hypermedia: Communication in World Order Transformation 
(Columbia University Press, New York, 1995).
30 The increasing importance of intangible property will be examined in the section on the knowledge 
economy in section 1.3 infra.
31 See generally Steven Livingston, Clarifying the CNN Effect: An Examination o f  Media Effects 
According to Type o f  Military Intervention, The Joan Shorenstein Center on the Press, Politics and 
Public Policy, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, R-18 (1997) 
<http://www.hks.harvard.edu/presspol/research_publications/papers/research_papers/R18.pdfi> (last 
accessed 16 April 2008); Margaret H. Belknap, The CNN Effect: Strategic Enabler or Operational 
Risk?, Strategy Research Project, U.S. Army War College (2001)
<http://www.iwar.org.uk/psyops/resources/cnn-effect/Belknap_M_H_01.pdf> (last accessed 16 April 
2008).
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of the new communications environment.32 The U.S. Government announced a 
withdrawal from Somalia shortly after the events of October 1993, in large part due 
to the overwhelming public pressure following the airing of this distressing 
footage.33
1.1.4. Organisational Change
What is certainly clear is that the information revolution is favouring and 
strengthening networked forms of organisation, often giving them an advantage over 
hierarchical forms.34 This enables power to migrate to non-state actors, as they are 
more easily able to organise themselves into sprawling networks, where every node 
can communicate with every other node, far more readily than can traditional
o r
hierarchical state actors. Brian Nichiporuk and Carl Builder argue that two
O f
different processes are at work in weakening the traditional hierarchical structure. 
First, in businesses engaged in information intensive enterprises, those organisations 
structured as networks are proving more competitive than traditional hierarchies.
The second process weakening hierarchies is the shift from relative poverty to 
abundance in information, permitting individuals to bypass hierarchies that have -
00
deliberately or inadvertently -  controlled or limited information.
Globalisation and the information revolution enjoy a symbiotic relationship, each 
enhancing the other’s effects and capabilities. The advances in technology, 
particularly information technology, allow cross border integration of 
communications, taxes, movement of money, goods, services and people, by
32 In October 1993, U.S. Delta Force & Army Rangers launched a mission against Somali warlord 
General Aideed. Two U.S. Black Hawk helicopters were shot down and the resulting fire-fight and 
mob action left several U.S. servicemen dead. Following these events, CNN (and other media outlets) 
aired footage of the body of one of the servicemen being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu to 
the cheers of the gathered crowd.
33 The decision to place U.S. troops in Somalia in the first place was also seen by many to be in 
reaction to footage of starving refiiges shown in the media.
34 John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'The Advent of Netwar (Revisited)' in J Arquilla and D Ronfeldt 
(eds), Networks and Netwars (RAND, Santa Monica, 2001) 1-24, 1.
35 Ibid.
36 Brian Nichiporuk and Carl H. Builder, 'Societal Implications' in J Arquilla and D Ronfeldt (eds), In 
Athena's Camp (RAND, Santa Monica, 1997) 295, 297.
37 Tracy Kidder, The Soul o f a New Machine (Little, Brown, Boston, 1981), cited in Nichiporuk and 
Builder, 'Societal Implications', 298.
38 Nichiporuk and Builder, 'Societal Implications', 297.
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reducing or removing the regulatory barriers. Conversely, globalisation is shaping 
the world in which in the information revolution is playing out.39 These cultural and 
societal effects are taking place, for good and ill, across an increasingly networked 
and interdependent world. Thus the information revolution has spawned the most 
complex and rapid of interconnectedness and interdependence in history.40
1.2. Globalisation, Interdependency and the Changing World Order
If the information revolution is one of the defining characteristics of the modem age, 
the current era of globalisation must surely be a second. Globalisation takes many 
forms and effects the economic, political and societal structures in which we live. 
Much has been written about its effects on the causes of conflict; from a resurgence 
of nationalist or tribal groupings, rebellion against perceived cultural imperialism, 
inadequate living and working conditions created by the race-to-the-bottom in the 
global labour market, to the recent food riots, globalisation has been cited as a 
causative factor in the resulting unrest. Although far from a fixed definition, 
globalisation is generally understood as referring to the expansion of networks of 
interdependence spanning national boundaries that follows the increasingly rapid 
movement of ideas, money, goods, services and people across these borders 41
In the economic sector, globalisation has meant increased transnational production of 
goods,42 decreased state control over such bastions of sovereignty as national 
currency, and the rise of an economy based on knowledge and other intangible 
assets. To take one example, currency value was once the sole preserve of the nation 
state. Before the 1970’s, national central banks had substantial control over the 
prices of most major goods through their ability to manipulate interest rates and 
intervene in foreign currency markets.43 However the 1997 ‘Asian Flu’ illustrated the
39 Hundley, et al., Global Course, 4.
40 As Colin S. Gray points out, this is not the first era of globalisation in history, the Huns, Alexander 
the Great and the empires of the Romans and the Byzantines were highly interconnected. See Gray, 
Another Bloody Century, 78-79.
41 Hundley, et al., Global Course, 49.
42 For an example of transnational, cross-border production of goods, see Thomas Friedman, 'Global 
Is Good', The Guardian (London), 21 April 2005,
<http://www.guardian.co.uk/g2/story/0„l464454,00.html> (last accessed 27 May 2005).
43 Nichiporuk and Builder, 'Societal Implications', 302.
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increased interdependency of the global foreign currency market as economy after 
economy felt the effects of a currency collapse in Thailand and other parts of South 
East Asia. Daily turnover on the foreign exchange market now exceeds US$3.2 
trillion,44 leaving state control of currency negligible, and in some cases forcing 
national governments to adjust their financial and monetary policies to prevent 
currency devaluation 45 Commodities and product markets have also gone global and 
are no longer heavily subject to the policies of national governments or even cartels 
of national governments.46 For example in 2001, multi-national corporations 
accounted for twenty-five percent of world production and sales equated to almost 
half of the world’s GDP.47 The effects of globalisation are also seen in new business 
models which have been enabled by the information revolution, such as outsourcing, 
network production chains and networked internal business models. Outsourcing 
allows companies to leverage cost savings in countries where the costs of labour are 
far cheaper than in the parent company’s State. While larger companies have bought 
and maintain their own companies offshore, the concept has allowed smaller players 
to increase wealth creation by creating networks with other small companies, each 
concentrating on their niche product to provide customer focused solutions. 
Internally, the new business models are also changing the architectural organisation 
of companies, often from vertical integration to horizontal networks 48 This 
networked structure, usually based on processes, provides great internal flexibility, 
an advantage in an environment driven by connectivity and speed, and thus translates 
into a direct competitive advantage.
If economic globalisation is the principle driving force behind contemporary 
globalisation, it is its effects on the political landscape, namely the form and context 
of state power, which is of interest in this instance. Globalisation has empowered
44 Bank for International Settlements, Trienniel Central Bank Survey: Foreign Exchange and 
Derivitaves Market Activity in 2007, Bank for International Settlements (2007) 
<http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfxf07t.pdf> (last accessed 17 April 2008).
45 Nichiporuk and Builder, 'Societal Implications', 302.
46 Ibid., 304. Although as Nichiporuk and Builder point out, this is not the case with extremely rare 
resources such as diamonds.
47 UNCTAD, 2001 cited in David Held and Anthony McGrew, 'Introduction' in D Held and A 
McGrew (eds), Governing Globalisation: Power, Authority & Global Governance (Polity Press, 
Cambridge, 2002) 1-21.
48 Hundley, et al., Global Course, 26.
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new actors and placed some traditional forms of governance beyond the reach of 
national governments.49 In a world linked by almost instantaneous communication 
without regard to national borders, political associations have taken on new 
allegiances, authority and forms. As Held and McGrew point out, “the intimate 
connection between ‘physical setting’, ‘social situation’ and politics, which 
distinguished political associations from premodem to modem times, has been 
ruptured; the new communication systems create new experiences, new modes of 
understanding and new frames of political reference independently of direct contact 
with particular peoples, issues or events”.50 Thus, disparate groups of individuals or 
small collectives are now capable of exercising political power across the globe by 
exploiting the communications networking power of the information revolution. A 
prime example of the new power of these networks is the recognition of the 
International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) in bringing about the 
implementation of the 1997 Ottawa Convention.51 The empowerment of these new 
actors is also happening at multiple levels. Intergovernmental organisations such as 
the World Trade Organisation, IMF and World Bank wield considerable power 
through structural adjustment programs; the European Union and other regional 
alliances now shape policies for their members; international non-governmental 
groups such as the ICBL, as well as criminal and terrorist organisations such as A1 
Qaeda increasingly effect the global agenda. Correspondingly, the number of these 
organisations has increased dramatically. At the beginning of the twentieth century 
there were just 37 intergovernmental organisations and 176 international non- 
governmental organisations, by 2006 that number had grown to 970 
intergovernmental bodies and 11,859 non-governmental bodies.
49 In addition to the financial and economic governance outline above, States have also lost their 
power as the major arbiter of information in society, and in many cases much of their control over the 
movement of goods and people across borders, the EU is an example.
50 Held and McGrew, 'Introduction', 6.
51 ICBL was the joint Nobel Peace Prize winner in 1997; another NGO, M^decins Sans Fronti6res, 
won the Nobel Peace prize in 1999.
52 UIA Yearbook o f  International Organisations (Brussels: Union of International Associations, 1997) 
cited in Held and McGrew, 'Introduction', 7.
53 UIA Yearbook o f  International Organisations 2003, Appendix 3, Table 1, Available at 
http://www.uia.org/statistics/organizations/types-oldstyle_2003.pdf (last accessed 14 June 2005).
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Globalisation and the interdependence of States has also contributed to matters 
which had traditionally remained in the purview of the State becoming widely 
accepted as part of the international community’s concern (most notably human 
rights abuses), thus making the maintenance of closed societies almost impossible. 
The interdependence between States is also highlighted by environmental 
globalisation. The actions of many States feed into the effects of phenomena such as 
global warming, the effects of which will decrease arable land and fresh accessible 
water which is essential to the survival of all States, not just those with agrarian 
economies. Increasingly, the availability of water will become a significant cause of 
conflict.54
1.3. The Rise of the Knowledge Economy
The third societal trend of note is the rise of knowledge based economies and the 
resultant change in attitudes towards intangible property. Alvin and Heidi Toffier 
argue that at the heart of the information revolution lies a shift in the relationship 
between tangible and intangible methods of production, and as a corollary, methods 
of destruction.55 Although knowledge, in its broadest sense has always been a factor 
in the economy, in recent decades it has moved from the periphery to a central 
position.56 So much so, that the 1998 World Development Report stated that “For 
countries in the vanguard of the world economy, the balance between knowledge and 
resources has shifted so far towards the former that knowledge has become perhaps 
the most important factor determining the standard of living -  more than land, than 
tools, than labour”. Indeed the dilemma of measuring and quantifying the 
knowledge assets of a nation, and hence its capacity for socio-economic growth, is 
something that academics, economists and accountants have struggled with, because 
it is treated as a ‘residual’, something that does not fit the category of tangibles,
54 Egypt has already threatened military force on a number of occasions when its privileged position 
on the Nile River has been threatened by upstream riparians. In 1978 Egypt threatened air strikes 
against a planned scheme for Ethiopia to take water from the Blue Nile, again in 1995 Egyptian 
President Mubarak threatened a “response beyond anything they can imagine” when Sudan suggested 
it might seek to amend the 1959 Nile Waters Agreement. Michael T. Klare, Resource Wars: The New 
Landscape o f  Global Conflict (Metropolitan Books, New York, 2001), 158.
55 Toffier and Toffier, 'The New Intangibles', xiv.
56 Ibid.
57 World Bank, World Development Report: Knowledge for Development, World Bank (1998).
25
either industrial or agricultural.58 However this residual category accounts for more 
than 70% of most developed nations’ economies.59 This resultant change in the 
status of knowledge or information assets has been troubling for the legal community 
as well. Intellectual property rules, the most likely body of law for managing 
intangible property, are insufficient to deal with all intangible property dilemmas.
For example, New Zealand found it necessary to amend its Crimes Act to allow 
electronic transfers of money to be ‘things capable of being stolen’ following a case 
in which the Court of Appeal considered that a fraudulent electronic transfer of funds 
was not theft.60
Despite these difficulties, one of the defining characteristics of this age is the 
conception of intangible assets having hard monetary value, both as product itself 
and as part of the production chain. With this assignment of value our corresponding 
perceptions of property have also changed. Intangible property, at least for 
knowledge economies, has become as important as tangible property for the survival 
of the national economy. The movement of such intangibles to the fore is not 
restricted to the wealth-making sections of society; the information revolution 
reflects a ‘civilisational shift’ which can be seen in all facets of society, not least of 
which is the military.61 This shift will also be reflected in our concept of what must 
be protected during armed conflict.
2. Military Trends
Georges Abi-Saab notes that the requirements of the principle of military necessity 
are defined by the evolution of military technology and strategic thought, and it is in 
the balance between these objective forms and the subjective requirements of
58 Yogesh Malhotra, 'Measuring the Knowledge Assets of a Nation: Knowledge Systems for 
Development' (Paper presented at the United Nations Advisory Meeting of the Department of 
Economic and Social Affairs, Division for Public Administration and Development Management, Ad 
hoc Group of Experts Meeting - Knowledge Systems for Development, United Nations Headquarters, 
New York, 4-5 September 2003).
59 Ibid.
60 R v Wilkinson (1999) 1 NZLR 403, Court of Appeal (New Zealand).The Court held that the simple 
electronic transfer of funds from one account to another did not amount to theft. The Court reasoned 
that electronic funds were not a thing "capable of being stolen" as they were not a tangible thing, 
being merely an acknowledgement of a debt owed by a bank to the account holder. The problem was 
corrected by the Crimes Amendment Act 2003.
61 Toffier and Toffier, 'The New Intangibles', xiv-xv.
26
humanity that the laws of armed conflict find their form and content.62 Both 
technology and strategy have changed dramatically in Western militaries in recent 
years as the trends affecting society previously outlined have also affected the armed 
forces. Alvin and Heidi Toffier have long argued that the way in which a society 
makes war reflects the way it makes wealth; thus as society progresses from 
agricultural to industrial to knowledge based economies, so too do the technologies 
and forms of warfare available to the armed forces of that State.63 Thus, the 
character of warfare is a reflection of the societal, economic and technological state 
of the society from which it comes.64 The current revolution in military affairs, this 
sea-change in the way the military thinks about carrying out its primary function, and 
indeed the way it defines its primary function, broadly reflects the transformation 
that is taking place in society as a whole.
Although it is axiomatic that technology has transformed modem militaries in recent 
years, it is not so much the advances in weapons technology, impressive as they have 
been, which have had the most impact. It is the linking of those highly precise 
weapons to advanced sensor arrays and the joining up of multiple facets of 
technological advance in command and control systems that have made the modem 
military so formidable. Precision munitions are made more formidable by the GPS 
and other sensor systems available to them. Technology has also evolved the ability 
to wage war to the point where the concept of a line marking the heart of the battle 
no longer makes sense;65 battlefields have become multidimensional and entire 
countries have become the battlespace.66 Like the civilian sectors of society, the 
military is downsizing its operational staff and outsourcing non-essential, or in some 
cases, even core functions to civilian contractors. Organisational structure is 
becoming more decentralised with the onset of advanced command and control 
technology and improved infrastructure. The adoption of network centric warfare as
62 Abi-Saab, 'Specificities', 265.
63 This progression can be seen in the basic weapons of agrarian societies to the industrialised warfare 
of mass-produced tanks and guns, through to the high-tech weaponry seen on some of the more 
advanced militaries of the world. See, Toffier and Toffier, War and Anti-War, 57-80.
64 Gray, Another Bloody Century.
65 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Asymmetrical Warfare and International Humanitarian Law' in W Heintschel 
von Heinegg and V Epping (eds), International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges: 
Symposium in Honour o f Knut Ipsen (Springer, Berlin; New York, 2007) 11-48, 16.
66 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Targeting and Humanitarian Law: Current Issues' (2004) 34 Israel YB Hum 
Rts 59, 59.
27
a framework has enabled militaries to utilise the power of networking to provide 
better battlespace knowledge and the related doctrine of effects based operations 
allows the conduct of faster and more effective operations.67 Increased situational 
awareness has also led to the ‘pushing down’ of strategic decision making so that 
even unit commanders in the battlespace are able and required to make strategic 
decisions.68
2.1. A Change of Purpose
General Sir Rupert Smith contends that the purpose of warfare has changed. In 
industrialized war, political objectives were attained by achieving strategic military 
objectives of such significance that the opponent conformed to the attacker’s will -  
the intention being to decide the matter by military force.69 Thus, Oppenheim states 
in his treatise on International Law “[w]ar is a contention between two or more 
States through their armed forces, for the purpose of overpowering each other and
7ftimposing such conditions of peace as the victor pleases”. Smith argues that instead
71we now engage in armed conflicts:
“to establish a condition or conceptual space in which the political objective can be 
attained by other means and in other ways. We seek to create a conceptual space for 
diplomacy, economic incentives, political pressure and other measures to create a 
desired political outcome of stability, and if possible democracy.”
This move towards compellance or coersive campaigns reflects a more nuanced and 
complex use of military force in international relations. Michael Schmitt notes that 
Operation Allied Force serves as a classic example of a coersive or compellance 
campaign, as the intent was never to defeat President Slobodan Milosovic’s army;
67 An example of the ‘speeding’ effects of knowledge sharing in the battlespace can be seen in: Joshua 
Davis, 'If We Run out of Batteries, This War Is Screwed' (2003) 11(6) Wired June 2003 
<http://www.wired.eom/wired/archive/l 1.06/battlefleld.html> (last accessed 29 April 2008).
68 The need for unit commanders to make strategic decisions was raised by Charles C. Krulak, 'The 
Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three Block War' (1999) 28(1) Marines Magazine January 1999 
28-34.
69 Rupert Smith, The Utility o f  Force: The Art o f  War in the Modern World (Penguin, London, 2005),
270.
70 Hersh Lauterpacht (ed) Oppenheim's International Law (7th ed, Longmans, Green & Co., London, 
1952), 202.
71 Smith, Utility o f  Force, 270.
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rather it was to compel a return to the bargaining table and end the systematic and 
widespread mistreatment of the Kosovar Albanian population.72 This change in the 
purpose of warfare affects the relevant doctrine to be adopted to best effect its aims.
2.2. Network Centric Warfare & Effects Based Operations
Changes in the military are not restricted to the weaponry available to them. The 
organisational changes which have occurred in the commercial sector are now being 
implemented to yield the same benefits to the military. This move towards network 
centric warfare enables militaries to utilise power from the effective linking or 
networking of their forces.73 In traditional platform centric warfare each component, 
be it a tank formation, battleship or aircraft, has its own mission and directives, albeit 
sometimes working in coordination. However, network centric warfare uses the 
network itself to provide a combat advantage through increased situational 
awareness and collaboration between the components of the network, thus increasing 
the speed at which the forces can operate and enhancing mission effectiveness.74 The 
speed of decision-making required in order to fully utilise network centric warfare 
has also resulted in decision making capabilities being pushed down the chain of 
command. The true value of the network centric warfare framework in the new 
environment however, is in the application of effects based operations.
The operationalisation of both the change in purpose of armed force and the move 
toward network centric warfare can be seen in the doctrine of effects based 
operations which has become dominant in Western military thinking. Effects based
72 Schmitt, 'Asymmetrical Warfare', 37.
73 Network centric warfare principles have been adopted by several militaries under various rubrics: 
network enabled capability in the U.K.; network based defence in Sweden; ubiquitous command & 
control in Australia.
74 See generally David S. Alberts, John Garstka and Frederick P. Stein, Network Centric Warfare: 
Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority (2nd ed, National Defense University Press, 
Washington, D.C., 1999).
75 Andrew M. Dorman, Transforming to Effects-Based Operations: Lessons from the United Kingdom 
Experience, Strategic Studies Institute (2008) 18.
76 Effects-based operations are not a new concept however their application in light of network centric 
warfare are interesting. Effects-based operations are coordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the 
behaviour of friends, foes and neutrals in peace, crisis and war. Edward A. Smith, Effects Based 
Operations: Applying Network Centric Warfare to Peace, Crisis, and War (DOD-CCRP, Washington, 
DC, 2002), 108.
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operations are co-ordinated sets of actions directed at shaping the behaviour of 
friends, foes and neutrals in peace, crisis and war.77 In traditional attrition warfare, 
reduced to its basics, the enemy is defeated by progressively weakening its military 
forces.78 This fits neatly with the preambular principle set out in the St Petersburg 
Declaration of 1868 which states that the only legitimate object which States should
7 0
endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy. 
However, effects based operations utilise selective targeting and choice of means and 
methods of warfare to achive a desired effect.80 As Michael Schmitt has noted, 
although effects based operations have the potential to foster international 
humanitarian law by systemising the search for alternative targets, they may also 
lead to the temptation to strike at targets which are not military in nature in order to 
coerce specific behaviours from opponents who may not value their military 
capability as highly.81 This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 6 on targeting.
2.3. Outsourcing & Civilianisation
The increasing civilianisation of conflicts is another trend impacting on the 
application of humanitarian law to modem conflict. It is taking place through a 
number of processes, including the escalating prominence of internal armed conflicts 
in which the majority of war fighters are civilians. In addition, modem militaries 
increasingly outsource support and even core functions to contractors -  some of 
whom, like private military or security firms, are engaged in armed tactical roles.
In the three and a half centuries since the Treaty of Westphalia, the Nation State has 
been the defining actor in international relations, and has held the monopoly on 
power and military force. The emergence of transnational armed groups, the 
increasing number of non-intemational armed conflicts and the expansion of the
77 Ibid., xiv.
78 Schmitt, 'Targeting', 60.
79 29 November/ 11 December 1868, Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time o f  War, o f  Explosive 
Projectiles under 400 Grammes Weight (St Petersburg Declaration), Preamble.
80 Ultimately, the process addresses the causality between actions and their effects; concentrates on 
desired effects, both physical and behavioural; models the enemy as a system of systems; and 
considers timing because the desirability of specific effects depends on the context in which they are 
created. Schmitt, 'Asymmetrical Warfare', 36-37.
81 Ibid., 37-38.
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battlespace to encompass entire territories have meant that civilians are involved in 
conflicts, both as participants and victims, more than ever.
Militaries are also facing growing pressure to downsize and reduce budgets. As part 
of this trend, civilian contractors and employees are increasingly used to augment the 
defence forces as an easy and flexible way to maintain military strength according to 
constantly changing needs. Further, as weapons and equipment become more 
technologically advanced, civilians are recruited to provide essential maintenance 
and support functions, sometimes from the “factory to the foxhole”. Civilians are 
an easy and less expensive way of maintaining access to the latest technical 
expertise;83 they can be hired when needed and discharged when the need is no 
longer urgent. Likewise they do not require the ongoing provision of 
accommodation, catering, healthcare and the myriad of other services which are 
required to support members of the armed forces. Nowhere has the use of private 
military firms been more extensive and controversial that in Iraq. In March 2005 
there were more than 20,000 foreign (non-Iraqi) private military contractors in Iraq; 
6,000 of these in armed tactical roles.
Civilianisation of conflict is also occurring with the growing interconnectedness of 
systems and the increase of dual-use objects. Cost considerations also make the 
military more likely to rely on civilian facilities such as airfields, ports, and other
O f
communications centers. For example, military communications often utilise
Of
civilian networks, particularly where they travel over satellites. Enhanced 
interconnectedness also means that knock-on effects of attacks are more likely to 
affect more civilian systems than in previous conflicts.
82 Michael E. Guillory, 'Civilianising the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubicon?' (2001) 51 
AFL Rev 111, 125. citing an example of Apache Helicopter support technicians deployed during 
Desert Storm.
83 Outsourcing allows allows militaries to take advantages of the competitive advantages of the 
contracting process.
84 P. W. Singer, 'Outsourcing War' (2005) 84(2) Foreign Affairs 119.
85 Michael N. Schmitt, The Impact o f  High and Low-Tech Warfare on the Principle o f  Distinction, 
Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard University (2003) 8 
<http://www.hpcr.org/publications/papers.php> (last accessed 18 December 2007).
86 Arkin puts the figure at 95% of military communications travelling over civilian satellites in 1995.
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3. Terminology & Definitions
While an effort has been made to avoid computer jargon, of necessity this thesis uses 
technical terms and computer terminology. The author has endeavoured to provide 
definitions and explanations in the text, however a glossary of computing and 
technical terms has been included in the appendices for the reader’s convenience. 
Writers in this area have also used a changing lexicon as the field has evolved. While
R7Russian experts are still pushing for an official declaration of definitions, most 
writers in the field have gradually adopted the U.S. Department of Defense terms 
and definitions. In the beginning most legal analysts wrote in terms of ‘information 
warfare’, basing their definitions and analysis on the framework provided by Martin 
Libicki's seminal work.88 Over time this term came to refer to a specific subset, 
namely the propaganda and misinformation aspects, of a wider field called 
information operations (10), and the most recent U.S. Joint Publication on 
Information Operations removes the term information warfare entirely from its 
lexicon.89 Computer network operations are further divided into computer network 
attack, the subject of this thesis, computer network defence and related computer 
network exploitation. This definition has been adopted by the United States joint 
forces and remains the standard to which most authors now subscribe.
3.1. Computer Network Attacks
The defining feature of the computer network attack is the fact that both the weapon 
and the target of the attack is the network itself and the information contained on 
such networks. This feature distinguishes computer network attacks from forms of 
electronic warfare, which may also seek to destroy a network, but instead use 
electromagnetic energy, usually in hardwired weapons such as electromagnetic pulse
87 See for example, Anatolij Streltsov, 'Threat Analysis in the Post Cold-War Order' (Paper presented 
at the International Expert Conference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability of 
International Humanitarian Law, Stockholm, 17-19 November 2004) 21-27,21.
88 Martin C. Libicki, What Is Information Warfare? (Center for Advanced Concepts and Technology, 
Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 1995). Martin Libicki’s original definition 
of information warfare is generally compatible with the currently accepted definition of Information 
Operations in that it is an umbrella term which comprises seven subcategories.
89 U.S. Department of Defence, Information Operations, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Publication 3-13 
(2006) iii.
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(EMP) generators to achieve their aims.90 A CNA uses computer code to effect its 
damage and is capable of causing a myriad of effects depending on the target 
system’s function. Although some authors have taken issue with the definition,91 on 
the whole it appears that these concerns stem from a narrow interpretation of the 
concept of ‘information’ in the context of the definition.92 Information in terms of 
computing, is any data that reduces uncertainty in the state of a system. It includes 
rather more than the traditional definition of facts and knowledge required by human 
beings to change or form an opinion. Indeed the U.S. military definition of 
information is "facts, data or instructions in any medium or form".94 Thus the 
operating code of a computer, its automated processes and applications, as well as 
the files and data it contains are all information. Once one grasps this extended 
definition, the range of possible effects of a computer network attack become greatly 
expanded.
Computer network attacks may come in isolation, but will more probably be used in 
conjunction with a conventional attack, either to ease the way for the conventional 
attack or to amplify its effects. In the battlespace they may be used to disable the 
advance warning systems of an air defence network allowing an attacker’s air force 
to advance unseen into enemy territory. This happened during Israel’s penetration of 
Syrian air defences on 6 September 2007 in order to bomb a suspected nuclear site at 
Dayr az-Zawr, without being engaged or even detected.95 That attack combined
90 Other forms include other uses of the electromagnetic spectrum such as radar, radio, optics (laser 
and infrared devices), high powered microwaves as well as warning and counter action systems. 
Techniques include signal interception, passive listening, electronic surveillance, radar and radio 
traffic deception as well as jamming and electronic interference. Roland HeickerO, 'Electronic 
Warriors Use Mail Order Equipment' (2005) Framsyn Magazine April 2005 
<http://www.foi.se/FOI/templates/Page 4554.aspx#> (last accessed 21 September 2007).
91 See for example, Yoram Dinstein, 'Computer Network Attacks and Self-Defense' in M N Schmitt 
and B T O’Donnell (eds), Computer Network Attack and International Law (Naval War College, 
Newport, RI, 1999) 99-119, 102.
92 Multiple conceptions of the term ‘information’ appear in the literature surrounding the information 
revolution, see generally: John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, 'Information, Power and Grand Strategy: 
In Athena's Camp - Section 1' in J Arquilla and D Ronfeldt (eds), In Athena's Camp: Preparing for  
Conflict in the Information Age (RAND, Santa Monica, 1997) 141-171, 144.
93 For a full definition see 'Information' A Dictionary o f  Computing (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2004).
94 U.S. Department of Defence, Dictionary o f  Military and Associated Terms.
95 David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall and Amy Butler, 'Israel Shows Electronic Prowess' (2007)
Aviation Week and Space Technology 25 November 2007
<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awll2607p 
2.xml&headline=Israel%20Shows%20Electronic%20Prowess> (last accessed 9 May 2008).
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electronic attack techniques in the form of brute-force jamming, precision missiles to 
eliminate the facility itself, and most interestingly for this thesis, computer network 
attack techniques. The ability of nonstealthy Israeli aircraft to penetrate without 
interference rests in part on technology, carried on board modified aircraft, that 
allowed specialists to hack into Syria’s networked air defence system.96 “Network 
raiders can conduct their invasion from an aircraft into a network and then jump
• 07from network to network until they are into the target’s communications loop”.
Israel is not the only State to have developed this technology. The U.S. has 
developed ‘Suter’ network-invasion capability which uses the EC-130 electronic 
attack aircraft to shoot data streams, laced with sophisticated algorithms, into enemy
Q O
antennas. The U.S. version of the system has at the very least been tested 
operationally in Iraq and Afghanistan in the last year, most likely against insurgent 
communication networks.99
Alternatively computer network attacks may also be used to switch off or re-divert 
calls to an emergency response number after a conventional attack causing further 
damage and destruction as emergency responders are grounded. An attack against a 
satellite control centre or other mission critical facilities could severely affect a 
State’s war effort, as could intrusion into a system which sends supplies to the 
frontline. These examples are a few of the more commonly cited, many more are 
possible.
3.2. New Laws for Old?
The primary assertion of this thesis is that although computer network attacks raise 
challenging issues for the current laws of armed conflict, for the most part, existing 
laws are capable of adapting to the new technology. Indeed, the Martens Clause was 
drafted with exactly this eventuality in mind. Despite some calls for there to be a 
new convention which addresses the issues raised by computer network attacks and
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid.
99 David A. Fulghum and Douglas Barrie, 'Israel Used Electronic Attack in Air Strike against Syrian 
Mystery Target' (2007) Aviation Week & Space Technology 8 October 2007
<http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/awl00807p 
2.xml> (last accessed 10 October 2007).
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other information operations,100 the present author feels that this is unnecessary. The 
general principles of the laws of armed conflict are aimed at ameliorating the 
essential nature of conflict which remains unchanged. Human life remains the 
fundamental value to be protected. The St Petersburg Declaration was founded on a 
common agreement to fix the technical limits at which the necessities of war ought 
to yield to the requirements of humanity.101 The Parties were agreed:
That the progress of civilization should have the effect of alleviating as much as
possible the calamities of war;
That the only legitimate object which States should endeavour to accomplish during
war is to weaken the military forces of the enemy;
Those who call for a new convention generally subscribe to the idea that cyberspace 
represents a fundamentally different conceptual space in which to fight. However, 
their approach, illustrated by Brown’s assertion that “Cyberspace is nowhere” is 
simply not reflective of state practice in relation to other areas of Internet law. There 
does not exist some ‘matrix-like’ realm of cyberspace which bears no connection to 
the ‘real-world’. Actors still act in physical space, hardware and networks (even 
wireless and virtual ones) still require physical constructs. However, that is not to 
argue that computer network attacks fit neatly into the humanitarian law paradigm 
that has developed over the last century. But it is not the advent of cyberspace, per 
se, that is the problem.
As described above, the information revolution has transformed society 
fundamentally and on multiple levels. Where the cultural and societal ground shifts, 
the underlying concepts on which our laws are based may also change; for example, 
the attributes of physical property that have bound predecessors to the tangible world 
in their formulations and interpretations of law. Laws, like wars, reflect the 
principles and values of the societies which draft them. Georges Abi-Saab has 
commented that the ‘requirements of humanity’ are subjective, depending on the 
dominant moral ideas and degree of community feeling obtained among the main
100 See for example, Davis Brown, 'A Proposal for an International Convention to Regulate the Use of 
Information Systems in Armed Conflict' (2006) 47 Harv Int'l U 179; Duncan B. Hollis, 'Why States 
Need an International Law for Information Operations' (2007) 11(4) Lewis & Clark L Rev 1023.
101 St Petersburg Declaration.
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contenders in society.102 Those principles can be altered by something as momentous 
as the information revolution, to the point where conceptions of value are 
fundamentally changed. Thus, when reviewing the general principles of the laws of 
armed conflict, this shift in values must be taken into account and the reasoning 
behind the statements of principle explored. In addition, some of the specific laws 
which relate to particular means and methods of warfare may need reinterpretation as 
discussed infra.
It must also be borne in mind that while the move toward high-tech warfare in 
developed nations is on the increase, warfare in many States remains for the most 
part brutal, physical and violently immediate. It can be easy to lose track of the 
purpose of these laws when one is dealing with the abstract world of bits and bytes 
and when targeting can be set up from the safety of an office block half a world 
away from the battle space. It is imperative that any attempt to interpret the laws of 
armed conflict to apply to computer network attack, must remain applicable to the 
traditional forms of kinetic violence for which they were first envisaged.
3.3. Methodology
It may be clear from the forgoing that this thesis utilises many of the tools of modem 
101positivism, however as whole, the author has adopted a hybrid approach to 
international law as it applies to computer network attack. Throughout this thesis the 
author has attempted to delineate carefully between lex lata and lex ferenda.
However where the technology does not fit easily with existing law, a closer 
examination of the general principles is required. As Judge Higgins (as she then was) 
points out in her dissenting opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case:104
Humanitarian law is very well developed. The fact that its principles are broadly 
stated and often raise further questions that require a response can be no ground for 
a non liquet. It is exactly the judicial function to take principles of general 
application, to elaborate their meaning and to apply them to specific situations”.
102 Abi-Saab, 'Specificities', 265.
103 For an exposition of modem positivism see the American Journal of International Law Symposium 
on Method in International Law article by Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus, 'The Responsibility 
of Individuals for Human Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View' (1999) 93 AJ1L 302.
104 Legality o f  the Threat and Use o f Nuclear Weapons (1996) ICJ 226, International Court of Justice, 
(dissenting opinion of Judge Higgins), para 32.
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It is this approach that the thesis adopts when discussing the application of the 
general principles of humanitarian law to computer network attacks - reasoned 
development of authoritative starting points consistent with the object and purpose of 
the law of armed conflict. The author subscribes to the view that principles based on 
values, such as ‘the dictates of humanity’, are necessarily subjective and will change 
over time in accordance with the prevailing view of the societies from which they 
come,105 but these general principles are already incorporated into the laws of armed 
conflict either through treaty obligations or as prescriptions of customary 
international law.
Humanitarian law represents a carefully constructed balance between military 
necessity on the one hand and humanitarian principles on the other. To introduce a 
further level of humanitarian or sociological interpretation to principles of which 
States and more importantly, individuals, may be held in violation, is disingenuous 
to the carefully negotiated drafting process which will often rely on minimal 
consensus and may deliberately ignore the underlying interpretive or conceptual 
debates in order to achieve a measure of protection. Further, as Judge Cassese has 
commented: “[A] policy-oriented approach in the area of criminal law runs contrary 
to the fundamental customary principle nullum crimen sine lege”.106 
On the other hand, where this thesis finds the law lacking in detail, or references lex 
ferenda, a more policy-oriented approach is called for. However it is the guiding 
principles of the laws of armed conflict which are to be referenced; that is, those 
principles which form the basis of, and are incorporated into, humanitarian law 
instruments, such as those prohibiting unnecessary suffering, distinction between 
civilian and military targets or requiring proportionality. These general principles of 
humanitarian law are aimed at the unchanging nature of war itself. While we have 
specific laws, most obviously certain of the Hague Regulations and subsequent 
weapons conventions, which are aimed at the specific character of war (the 
technologies employed and the strategies involved), taken back to first principles and 
conscious of the reasons for which they were adopted, the general principles of the 
laws of armed conflict will apply regardless of the technology utilised.
105 Abi-Saab, 'Specificities', 265.
106 Prosecutor v Drazen Erdemovic (1997) IT-96-22-A, International Criminal Tribuanl for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, (separate & dissenting judgement o f President Cassesse), para 
11.
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3.4. A Word About Examples & Hypotheticals
This thesis deals with a method of warfare which is still in its infancy. Further, most 
computer network attack tools remain classified in order to protect their usefulness.
If the details are known by the adversary, they may be guarded against, thus making 
the tool ineffective.
Throughout this thesis, examples have been taken from domestic and peacetime 
computer network attacks and incursions to illustrate points. The aim is not to use 
them for their precedent value in any direct application to international humanitarian 
law, an approach which would obviously be incorrect, but rather to act as practical, 
real-world illustrations of the types of attacks and incursions which are currently 
taking place. Further, they serve as an indicator, where possible, of the current state 
of legal analysis of the concepts underlying computer network attacks and digital 
property.
The present author does not have security clearance and all examples used are those 
gleaned from publicly available sources and domestic instances of computer network 
attacks which indicate how such an attack could work if carried out by a party during 
an armed conflict. Although the facts of each example are provided in the text, a 
timeline and summary of each attack with its significance for the development of the 
technology is provided in Appendix 1 for the convenience of the reader. Where 
hypothetical examples are used, they have been checked with computer engineers 
and network specialists for their general viability. In so far as is possible without 
compromising security, the details of specific hypothetical attacks have been 
checked with those with first hand knowledge of the supposed target. The author is 
grateful for their kind assistance with these matters, and the fault for any errors 
remains entirely with the author.
It will also be apparent that this thesis is fairly U.S. centric in its use of examples.
This is for the simple reason that the United States has the most publicly available 
English language information and analysis of this field; where possible the author 
has attempted to include examples from other jurisdictions.
4. Conclusion
There are several main themes running through this thesis which have been set out 
and explained in this introductory chapter. By way of summary, they are repeated
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here. First, despite the advent of new technology, the essential nature of armed 
conflict remains the same - it is the advancement of political objectives by organised 
violence.107 Secondly, the style and character of warfare reflects the society which 
wages it. And finally, the underlying principles of the laws of armed conflict are 
aimed at the fundamental nature of war. The exact content and contours of these 
principles are determined by the prevailing values of the society affected. Thus, 
computer network attacks are a product of, and are the greatest threat to, those 
societies which place a high value on information.
When research for this thesis began there was no comprehensive analysis of the laws 
of armed conflict as they related to computer network attack. Although some 
attempts had been made at uncovering the law which might apply, the studies were 
more descriptive than analytical.108 During the course of writing, computer network 
attack has become a fashionable topic of debate and numerous articles have been 
written on how computer network attacks will be governed under discrete areas of 
the law of armed conflict. Most suffer broadly from one of two faults; those that 
understand the technology involved have tended to focus on the new aspects of the 
technology to the detriment of the general principles underlying the law. Secondly, 
those that are specialists in the law do not necessarily understand the nuances of the 
technology being utilised. In addition, with the notable exception of a series of 
articles written by Michael Schmitt, none offer a systematic analysis based on a 
complete underlying framework. This thesis aims to fill that gap.
Despite adopting a comprehensive approach, a few ommisions have had to be made 
in the interests of length. This thesis does not examine the laws of neutrality, nor 
does it look in any detail at the implications of computer network attack for naval 
warfare or as an internationally wrongful act short of a use of force.
107 Carl von Clausewitz, J. J. Graham and F. N. Maude, On War (new and rev. ed, Kegan Paul,
Trench, Trubner & Co., London, 1940); Gray, Another Bloody Century.
108 See Walter G. Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use o f Force (Aegis Research Corp., Falls Church, VA., 
1999); Thomas C. Wingfield, The Law o f  Information Conflict: National Security Law in Cyberspace 
(Aegis Research Corp., Falls Church, VA, 2000).
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PARTI 
Jus ad Bellum
Chapter 2 - Computer Network Attacks as a Use of Force in
International Law
In May 2007, Estonia became the victim of a prolonged series of denial of service 
attacks which brought the banking system, many government services and much of 
the media to a halt.1 Although no critical infrastructure was compromised, for a 
highly technology dependent State like Estonia that depends on the Internet for 
everything from parking to banking to voting, the attacks caused serious disruption 
and caused an estimated tens of millions of euros worth of damage. Despite earlier 
explicit accusations that Russia was behind the offensive, the Estonian government 
backed away from directly accusing the Kremlin of launching the attacks,3 but 
requested assistance from its NATO allies under the terms of that alliance. Although 
no official statement regarding the cyber attacks was released by NATO, one of the 
clearest indications of State views on computer network attacks came from Estonian 
defence minister Jaak Aaviksoo who raised the matter with NATO:4
“At present, NATO does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This 
means that the provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other 
words collective self-defence, will not automatically be extended to the attacked 
country... Not a single NATO defence minister would define a cyber-attack as a 
clear military action at present. However this matter needs to be resolved in the near 
future”
1 A Distributed Denial of Service attack (DDoS) uses many compromised computers to flood a target 
system with requests for information until it collapses under the strain. The compromised computers 
are usually ones that have been recruited to a botnet (usually without their owner’s knowledge) and 
are controlled by a master computer.
2 Ian Traynor, 'Web Attackers Used a Million Computers, Says Estonia1, The Guardian (London), 18 
May 2007, International 30.
3 Ibid. Russia categorically denies any involvement and no concrete evidence has been found to 
substantiate those claims. While technical data shows that some of the attacks came from IP addresses 
allocated to the Russian Government, there is no evidence that these computers were involved in 
initiating the attacks, or that they had not been compromised or spoofed.
4 Ian Traynor, 'Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia', The Guardian (London), 
17 May 2007, Home 1 <www.guardian.co.uk/print/0„329864981-103610,00.html> (last accessed 20 
August 2007).
This attitude is perhaps not surprising given the general reluctance of States to 
consider acts of indirect aggression as armed attacks,5 however the incident is 
significant in that it represents the first time one State has accused another of 
intentionally launching a computer network attack against it. The incident has bought 
to the fore important issues for the law regulating the use of force in international 
relations. While controversies surrounding the rule prohibiting the use of force have 
mainly focused on issues such as the conditions for self defence or the existence of a 
right to humanitarian intervention,6 the advent of computer network attacks has 
renewed a far more fundamental question: what is the meaning of ‘force’ in the 
twenty-first century?
The prohibition of the use of force is one of the cornerstones of international law and 
is expressed in Article 2(4) of the UN Charter. However, the prohibition is not 
restricted to the Charter; it represents “not only a principle of customary international 
law but also a fundamental or cardinal principle of such law”. In the Wall case the 
International Court of Justice relied on the Nicaragua (Merits) case to affirm that 
“the principles as to the use of force incorporated in the Charter reflect customary
o
international law”. It is also important to note that the threat or use of force is 
abolished in Article 2(4) only in the ‘international relations’ of Member States; 
intrastate clashes therefore are out of reach of the Charter’s provision.9
5 See generally, Chapter 3 infra.
6 Olivier Corten, 'The Controversies over the Customary Prohibition on the Use of Force: A 
Methodological Debate' (2005) 16 EJIL 803.
7 Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v 
United States o f  America) (Merits) (1986) ICJ 14, International Court of Justice, para 190. The 
International Court of Justice also recalled that the ILC had considered this provision to have the 
character of jus cogens.
8 Legal Consequences o f  the Construction o f a Wall in Occupied Palestinian Territory (2004) ICJ 
136, International Court of Justice, para 87.
9 Yoram Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense (3rd ed, Cambridge University Press, New 
York, 2001), 85.
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1. Force Defined as Armed Force
The prohibition of the use of force is a cornerstone of the United Nations Charter.10 
Article 2(4) states:
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.
However the Article, and the exact meaning of the word ‘force’, has been a source of
debate since its enactment. The drafters of the Charter did not define the term, nor
has the International Court of Justice or the General Assembly done so since. The
debate has centred on whether ‘force’ is limited to armed force, or includes other
forms of coercion such as political and economic measures. The issue of inclusion of
political and economic coercion as uses of force prohibited by Article 2(4) of the
Charter has been raised repeatedly, particularly by developing and former Eastern
Bloc countries, since the San Francisco conference.11 Although no definitive
conclusions have been drawn, the prevailing and commonly accepted view put
forward by scholars is that the force referred to in Article 2(4) is limited to armed 
1 ^
force. As computer network attacks can result in a myriad of outcomes, the 
contours of the prohibition must be fleshed out in order to ascertain when attacks 
will be proscribed under Article 2(4) and the corresponding customary law relating 
to the use of force in international law. The following discussion looks at the 
arguments from a textual analysis of the Charter wording, travaux preparatories, 
historical background and academic analysis.13
10 Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory o f  the Congo (Democratic Republic o f  the 
Congo v. Uganda) (2005), International Court of Justice, para 148.
11 Albrecht Randelzhofer, 'Article 2(4)' in B Simma (ed) The Charter o f the United Nations: A 
Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002), 118.
12 See for example, Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 86; Randelzhofer, 'Article 2(4)', 
117.
13 Art. 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 sets out the core interpretative 
principles that a treaty should be interpreted in “good faith” and in accordance with “the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light o f its object and 
purpose”. Interpreters of a treaty may include in the context: the preamble, any treaty or instrument 
made in connexion with the treaty, subsequent conduct and practice of the parties and any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties. Art. 32 states that recourse 
may be made to supplementary means o f interpretation, including the preparatory work of the treaty 
and the circumstances of its conclusion. The following sections consider each of these in turn.
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1.1. The Charter Wording
The text of the United Nations Charter refers to force as an unqualified term twice in 
the entirety of the document, in Article 2(4) and Article 44. The use of the term in 
Article 44 appears in the context of Chapter VII, and supports a restrictive definition 
of ‘force’ by placing it in close conjunction with the qualified term ‘armed force’, 
clearly suggesting that the force contemplated by the unqualified term is armed. 
Article 44 states:
When the Security Council has decided to use force it shall, before calling upon a 
Member not represented on it to provide armed forces in fulfilment of the 
obligations assumed under Article 43, invite that Member, if the Member so desires, 
to participate in the decisions of the Security Council concerning the employment of 
contingents of that Member’s armed forces.
The decision to use force refers to the preceding Articles 41 and 42 of the Charter, 
which permit the Security Council to authorise actions necessary to maintain or 
restore international peace and security, including the use of force. Article 41 relates 
to measures not involving the use of “armed force” which may include “complete or 
partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, 
radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic 
relations”.14 Article 42 allows the Security Council to “take such action by air, sea, 
or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and 
security” and is the article under which the Security Council mandates the use of 
armed force in international law under the phrase ‘all necessary means’.15 Thus the 
use of the termed ‘armed force’ in Article 41, suggests that the force referred to in 
Article 44 and hence in Article 2(4) is also armed force.
Further support for this view can be found in paragraph seven of the preamble of the 
Charter which states that “armed force shall not be used, save in the common 
interest”. Michael Schmitt points out that the articles of the Charter are designed to
14 Note that this would tend to indicate that none of these measures would be considered breaches of 
Article 2(4) were they to be taken unilaterally by individual States, whether they were effected by 
computer network attacks or by more conventional means.
15 The list o f actions includes “demonstrations, blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land 
forces”.
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give effect to its preambular aspirations.16 Accordingly, if Article 2(4) were intended 
to extend beyond armed force, then presumably the preamble, for reasons of internal 
consistency would not have included the term ‘armed’. This paragraph accords with 
the relationship apparent between Article 2(4) and Chapter VII of the Charter, in 
particular Article 42 relating to Security Council authorisation of armed force, as 
discussed above.
Albrecht Randelzhofer has also put forward a teleological interpretation of the 
Article wording. Randelzhofer argues that were Article 2(4) to extend to other forms 
of force, such as economic and political coercion, States would be left with no legal
17means of exerting pressure on States that violate international law. Such a 
consequence would be unacceptable to the international community in an age where 
the organs of that community are unable to effectively ensure compliance with 
international law.
1.2. Travaux Preparatoires and Historical Background
The preparatory materials of the Charter do not contain any specific discussion 
regarding the precise meaning of the term force. However, the travaux preparatoires 
of Article 2(4) detail a proposal by the foreign minister of Brazil to specifically 
extend the prohibition to the threat or use of ‘economic measures’ which was
1 ftrejected. Although Randelzhofer has cited this as evidence that military force is the 
only intended concern of the prohibition, David Harris states that it is unclear from 
the texts whether the rejection of the Brazilian amendment is proof that the Article 
was not intended to prohibit economic force, or that the term force in Article 2(4) 
was thought sufficient to cover it without specific mention.19 The latter view appears 
to stem from the Belgian delegate’s comments regarding Brazil’s proposed
70amendment and the phrase ‘or any other manner’. Despite this, writers have
16 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Computer Network Attack and the Use of Force in International Law: 
Thoughts on a Normative Framework' (1999) 37 Col J  Tram L 885, 904.
17 Randelzhofer, 'Article 2(4)', 118.
18 “Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of Committee 1/1” Doc. 215,1/1/10, 6 UNCIO (6 May 
1945) 334, 559 (rejected by 2 votes in favour, 26 against).
19 D. J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law (6th ed, Sweet & Maxwell, London, 2004), 
890.
20 The Belgian delegate suggested that the delegate o f Brazil had underestimated the effect of the 
modifications made in the original text, calling attention particularly to the phrase “in any other
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generally concluded that the better view is that Western States were not prepared to 
admit anything other than armed force.21 While third world States have tried to raise 
the issue of prohibiting use of economic and political coercion on other occasions, 
each time it has received a negative vote from Western powers.
It also is interesting to note the discussion following from a proposed amendment to 
Article 2(4) that required members collectively to resist the use of aggression against 
Member States.22 One of the main objections to the amendment was the lack of 
definition of the term aggression, which resulted in the following comment from the 
United Kingdom representative when discussing the issue:23
“Apart however from the difficulty in defining aggression and therefore of knowing 
what the nations were pledged to resist, the use as a standard of an inexplicit word, 
such as aggression, instead of something explicit such as ‘force’ would give an 
opportunity to a state to engage in an act of aggression while calling it by another 
name”
It is apparent from this statement that the term force was considered an explicit term. 
As Bond has pointed out, such a characterisation of the term at that time was not 
questionable; it was clear that force meant military or armed force, and in 1945 that 
meant traditional weapons employed in traditional ways.24 Further, in the same 
discussion a representative of the United States pointed out that in the future there 
would be many kinds of aggression and that these would be covered in the Charter
manner”; and also recalled that the subcommittee had given the point about “economic measures” 
careful consideration and for good reasons decided against: “Summary Report of Eleventh Meeting of 
Committee I / l”Doc. 784,1/1/27, 5 June 1945, 6 UNCIO (1945) 334.
21 However the Western States were prepared to admit, as stated by the UK representative that “that 
was not to say that all forms of economic and political pressure which threatened the territorial 
integrity and political independence of another state were permissible, they might well constitute 
illegal intervention”.
22 “Summary Report of Twelveth Meeting of Committee 1/1” Doc. 810,1/1/30, 6 UNCIO (6 June 
1945) 342. The New Zealand amendment reads as follows: “All members of the Organisation 
undertake collectively to resist every act of aggression against any member”. The amendment was 
rejected by a vote of 26 in favour and 18 against, for failing to receive a two-thirds majority.
23 “Addendum to Summary Report of Twelveth Meeting of Committee 1/1” Doc. 866,1/l/30(a), 8 
June 1945, 6 UNCIO (1945) 356.
24 James Bond, Peacetime Foreign Data Manipulation as One Aspect o f  Offensive Information 
Warfare: Questions o f  Legality under the United Nations Charter Article 2(4), Naval War College 
(1996) 57 <http://handle.dtic.mi1/100.2/ADA310926> (last accessed 18 September 2007). It should 
also be noted that these discussions took place prior to the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki.
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by the words “threat to the peace”.25 This indicates that at the time the discussions 
surrounding Article 2(4) and its proposed amendments were taking place, the 
perception of force was as a specific (armed) threat and all other incidents which 
would require flexibility of drafting would be covered by the more general phrase 
‘threat to the peace’.
The historical background to the Charter also illustrates its development against a 
background of international efforts to eliminate unilateral recourse to armed force, 
and provides some insight into the intentions of the drafters of Article 2(4). Edward 
Gordon has argued that the problems of interpretation of Article 2(4) arise because it
is a “legal rule located in the text of a multilateral treaty which requires adaptation to
11changing circumstances”. As Gordon points out, the challenge becomes one of 
remaining faithful to its core meaning without thereby sacrificing the flexibility 
required in interpreting constitution norms. The historical antecedents of Article 2(4) 
are the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. The former 
(as amended), states that ‘any war or threat of war’ is a matter of concern for the 
whole League,28 and that members of the League will preserve the ‘territorial 
integrity and existing political independence’ of members of the League against
IQexternal aggression. The genetic roots of the present Article 2(4) are clearly visible 
in the wording. In the years between the adoption of the Covenant of the League of 
Nations and the adoption of the Kellogg-Briand Pact in 1928, the League Assembly 
passed unanimous resolutions condemning wars of aggression as international
25 “Summary Report of Twelveth Meeting of Committee 1/1” Doc. 810,1/1/30, 6 UNCIO (6 June 
1945) 344.
26 See generally, Edward Gordon, 'Article 2(4) in Historical Context' (1985) 10 Yale J In t'l L 271.
27 Ibid., 273.
28 Art. 11, Covenant of the League of Nations reads as follows:
Any war or threat of war, whether immediately affecting any of the Members of the League or not, 
is hereby declared a matter of concern to the whole League, and the League shall take any action 
that may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of nations. In case any such 
emergency should arise the Secretary General shall on the request of any Member o f the League 
forthwith summon a meeting of the Council.
29 Art. 10, Covenant of the League of Nations reads as follows:
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the 
territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members o f the League. In case of any 
such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon 
the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.
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crimes. Indeed, the Pan American conference in 1926 considered such wars to be 
crimes against the human species.
Under the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact States parties “condemn the recourse to war for
the solution of international controversies, and renounce it as an instrument of
31national policy in their relations with one another”. However the precise scope of 
the prohibition on war contained in the treaty has never been whether the treaty 
prohibits armed force short of war as well as war. Professor Ian Brownlie suggests 
that the best guide to the meaning of the Pact is to be found in the subsequent actions 
of the contracting parties.33 He concludes that there leaves little room for doubt that 
it was understood to prohibit ‘any substantial use of armed force’.34
1.3. Subsequent Iterations of the Rule
As can be seen from the foregoing, the rules of the Charter relating to force are brief 
and cannot constitute a complete code, a fact acknowledged by the International 
Court of Justice in the Nicaragua (Merits) case. Almost from the time that the 
Charter was drafted, States have tried to elaborate the prohibition on the use of force 
in General Assembly resolutions to provide greater clarity. However, each of the 
attempts has left the central issue of the essential nature of ‘force’ unresolved. It 
appears that the ambiguity of the wording has been the price of international 
consensus.37
Two other international instruments drafted around the time of the United Nations 
Charter, the Charter of the Organisation of American States (OAS) and the North
30 W Bishop Jr International Law: Cases and Materials 1010 (3ed) (1971), cited in Gordon, 'Article 
2(4) in Historical Context', 274.
31 Art. 1, General Treaty for the Renunciation of War 1928, UKTS 29 (1929), Cmnd, 3410; 94 LNTS 
57.
32 Harris, Cases & Materials, 861.
33 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use o f Force by States (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
1963), 87.
34 Ibid. Cf. D. W. Bowett, Self-Defence in International Law (University of Manchester Press, 
Manchester, 1958), 136.
35 Christine D. Gray, International Law and the Use o f  Force (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 2004), 6.
36 The Court stated that the UN Charter by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of force 
in international relations. Nicaragua (Merits), para 176.
37 Gray, Use o f  Force, 8.
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Atlantic Treaty (forming NATO) also use the term force without qualification. 
Perhaps unsurprisingly given their status as collective defence organisations, neither 
provides any support for the inclusion of economic or political coercion as force. The 
North Atlantic Treaty uses the terminology of the UN Charter and although Article 2 
separately addresses economic concerns it does not refer to economic coercion.
The Charter of the OAS (as subsequently amended) refers to the prohibition on use 
of force in other treaties in Article 22, however force is used as an unqualified term 
and no guidance is given as to its meaning. However, when discussing such 
measures for the purposes of its own obligations, Articles 19 and 20 of the OAS 
Charter avoid using the term force without qualification by using ‘armed force’ and 
‘coercive measures of an economic or political character’ as separate terms. Michael 
Schmitt notes that this is perhaps unsurprising given Brazil’s attempt at amending 
Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter and their membership of the OAS.40 It is clear that 
the language employed by the OAS Charter is meant to be interpreted far more 
broadly that the “use of force” language of Article 2(4). However, as a number of 
commentators have pointed out, the language is so broad as to be legally 
unenforceable;41 if read literally, it outlaws diplomacy.42 
The issue was addressed again 25 years later in the 1970 General Assembly 
Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Co-operation Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations 
(hereinafter Declaration on Friendly Relations).43 The section on the principle of the
38 Art. 2 states that the parties “will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies 
and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them” 4 April 1949, North Atlantic 
Treaty, 34 UNTS 243 (entered into force 24 August 1949).
39 Art. 22 states that “The American States bind themselves in their international relations not to have 
recourse to the use o f force, except in the case of self defense in accordance with existing treaties or in 
fulfilment thereof’ 30 April 1948, Charter o f the Organisation o f American States, 119 UNTS 3 
TIAS No 2361.
40 Schmitt, Normative Framework', 906. citing OAS Charter.
41 Richard W Aldrich, 'How Do You Know You Are at War in the Information Age?' (2000) 22 Hous 
JIn t'l L 223, 254. Nicaragua attempted unsuccessfully to rely on this broad language in its case 
against the United States; however the Court found that it had no jurisdiction to consider either the 
U.N. Charter wording or articles of the OAS Charter.
42 Tom Farer, 'Political and Economic Aggression in Contemporary International Law' in A Cassese 
(ed) The Current Legal Regulation o f  the Use o f Force (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1986) 121-132, 
121. Threats, more or less subtle, have always been an important feature of the intercourse of States.
43 Declaration on Principles o f  International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter o f  the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV) UN GAOR 
Supp., 25, 18 122, UN Doc. (1970).
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use of force does not clarify the matter as it merely refers to ‘force’. This was the 
result of disagreement between the Western States, who argued that the prohibition 
only related to armed force, and the Soviet Bloc, European and developing States 
who argued that “all forms of pressure, including those of a political and economic 
character, which have the effect of threatening the territorial integrity or political 
independence of any state” were prohibited.44 However the Western States were 
prepared to admit, presciently in the light of the Arab oil boycott of 1973 and 1974, 
that “that was not to say that all forms of economic and political pressure which 
threatened the territorial integrity and political independence of another state were 
permissible; they might well constitute illegal intervention”.45 The Declaration deals 
separately with political and economic coercion under the heading of the ‘Principle 
not to Intervene’, thus indicating that as far as the Declaration is concerned, force is 
restricted to armed coercion, and that forms of political and economic coercion were 
to be considered intervention.
The International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua (Merits) case held that the 
Declaration was indicative of the opinio juris of the international community, and 
showed the customary nature of the prohibition as stated in Article 2(4) of the 
Charter.46 Although the judgement does not directly address the question of the 
status of economic or political coercion under the use of force doctrine, the Court 
does not include such measures in citing the acts which may be considered ‘less 
grave’ forms of the use of force. The Court quotes from the sections of the 
Declaration dealing specifically with the principle of the non-use of force, but also 
from the principle of non-intervention. In citing the latter, the Court leaves out the 
opening sentence of the paragraph dealing with political and economic coercion, and 
only quotes the second sentence relating to armed groups.47 This is despite 
Nicaragua’s submissions that the country had been subjected to economic coercion 
at the hands of the United States 48 This omission and the failure of the Court to
44 UN Doc. A/AC. 125/SR. 114 (1970) cited in Harris, Cases & Materials, 863.
45 UK representative (Mr Sinclair), UN Doc A/AC125/SR25 (1966), cited in Ibid., 863-864.
46 Nicaragua (Merits), para 188.
47 Ibid., para 192.
48 It should be noted however that Nicaragua did not attempt to argue that the economic coercion 
involved was sufficient to count as the threat or use o f force. Although the Court stated later in the 
judgement that it would not rule on legal arguments not put forward by the parties (in relation to the 
prohibition against intervention), the fact that the submission was not even mentioned is significant.
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consider Nicaragua’s submissions in that regard when discussing Article 2(4) and the 
associated customary law, indicates that the Court does not include such measures in 
the definition of force as used in customary international law and the U.N. Charter.49 
Since the Nicaragua (Merits) case, the international community has once again 
affirmed the prohibition against force in the 1987 Declaration on the Non-Use of 
Force.50 As with previous General Assembly resolutions, the Declaration separates 
the concepts of armed intervention and economic and political coercion, however it 
leaves the main controversies between developed and developing States unsettled.51
2. Definition of Armed Force
The international jurisprudence indicates that while the definition of force is to be 
limited to armed force, the definition of armed force itself is to be interpreted widely. 
In particular, a direct application of armed force by a State is not necessary for the 
State to fall foul of Article 2(4), nor have States been able to successfully circumvent 
the prohibition by arguing that an incident does not affect the territorial integrity or 
political independence of a State.
The latter argument was raised by the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel Case, 
however the International Court of Justice dismissed such a narrow interpretation of 
force by holding that the British action of sending warships to clear mines from the 
Corfu Channel against the express wishes of Albania amounted to a ‘policy of force’ 
such as had given rise to “most serious abuses and such as cannot... find a place in 
international law”. The British claimed that their actions were not in breach of 
Article 2(4) as they were not directed against the territorial integrity or political 
independence of Albania.54 Interestingly, despite this argument being dismissed by
49 It should be noted that the definition of force as used in Art. 2(4) of the Charter was not at issue in 
the case as the United States has a non-binding clause to multi-lateral treaties.
50 Arts. 7 & 8, Declaration on the Enhancement o f the Effectiveness o f  the Principle o f  Refraining 
from the Threat or Use o f  Force in International Relations GAOR 42nd sess, 73rd plen mtg, UN Doc. 
A/Res/42/22 (1987).
51 The remaining differences between developed and developing States are summarised at A/40/41: 
Gray, Use o f  Force, 9.
52 Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v Albania) (Merits) (1949) ICJ Reports 4, International Court of Justice, 
13.
53 Ibid., 35.
54 The U.K. were attempting to collect the mines as evidence of Albania’s mining operation and 
classified ‘Operation Retail’ as an act of self-help. Ibid.
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the Court in the Corfu Channel Case, Belgium raised the same argument in its 
pleadings on provisional measures following the NATO intervention in Kosovo in 
1999.55
The International Court of Justice’s broad interpretation of the scope of the term 
force can also be seen in the Nicaragua (Merits) case where the Court clarifies that 
some indirect forms of support are included in the prohibition against force. The 
Court’s judgement affirmed that acts which breach the principle of non-intervention 
“will also, if they directly or indirectly involve the use of force, constitute a breach 
of the principle of non-use of force in international relations”.56 In that case, the 
Court accepted that the provision of assistance to rebel fighters “in the form of the 
provision of weapons or logistical or other support” could constitute a threat or use 
of force, or amount to intervention in the internal or external affairs of a State. 
However not all forms of indirect action, or assistance were to be so considered. In 
particular, the Court found that “the mere supply of funds to the contras, while 
undoubtedly an act of intervention in the internal affairs of Nicaragua”, would not 
breach the prohibition of force as contemplated by Article 2(4) and the
co
corresponding customary law. In a controversial discussion, the Court distinguishes 
between the gravest forms of the use of force, those that constitute an armed attack 
or aggression, and other uses of force, referred to by the Court as “less grave 
forms”.59 The Court used the Declaration on Friendly Relations to elucidate these 
lesser forms of force and determine the legal rules that may apply to them.60 In 
particular, the Court emphasised the following paragraphs of the Declaration:
55 Belgium’s Oral Arguments Legality o f  Use o f Force (Yugoslavia v. Belgium) (Request for  
Provisional Measures), CR99/15, 12, stating that NATO has never questioned the political 
independence and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and claiming that Article 
2(4) covers only intervention against political independence and the territorial integrity o f a State. The 
Court did not address these arguments and refused provisional measures on the basis that it lacked 
prima facie jurisdiction on the merits of the case.
56 Nicaragua (Merits), para 209.
57 Ibid., para 193.
58 Ibid., para 228.
59 Ibid., para 191. Much criticism has been directed at the Nicaragua (Merits) decision based on this 
elucidation of various levels of force, particularly from American authors. See for example the panel 
discussion reported at American Society of International Law, 'The Jurisprudence of the Court in the 
Nicaragua Decision' (1987) 81 ASIL Proc 258.
60 Nicaragua (Merits), para 191.
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Every State has the duty to refrain from the threat or use of force to violate the 
existing international boundaries of another State or as a means of solving 
international disputes, including territorial disputes and problems concerning 
frontiers of States.
Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples 
referred to in the elaboration of the principle of equal rights and self-determination 
of that right to self-determination and freedom and independence.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing or encouraging the organization 
of irregular forces or armed bands, including mercenaries, for incursion into the 
territory of another State.
Every State has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or 
participating in acts of civil strife or terrorist acts in another State or acquiescing in 
organized activities within its territory directed towards the commission of such acts, 
when the acts referred to in the present paragraph involve a threat or use of force.
States have a duty to refrain from acts of reprisal involving the use of force.
There are two points that may be taken from this extract.61 First, the Court considers 
that the Declaration codifies the international community’s opinio juris that certain 
acts of indirect aggression are capable of being a use of force prohibited by 
international law, albeit a lesser form. This is significant as many of the arguments 
raised against computer network attacks being considered a use of force relate to the 
fact that the results of a computer network attack are often indirect.63
61 Again the Court’s approach in using the Declaration has been controversial. Some authors argue 
that the Court has used the Declaration as a source of law, a position which the States Parties to the 
resolution would never have intended. Authors have also criticised the Court for using the text of the 
Declaration as indicative o f opinio juris of the international community without also fully examining 
the actions of States: see generally, American Society of International Law, 'The Jurisprudence o f the 
Court in the Nicaragua Decision'.But cf. Lori Fisler Damrosch, 'Politics across Borders: 
Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence over Domestic Affairs' (1989) 83 AJIL 1, 8.
62 This is in accord with the drafting history of Article 3g of the Definition o f Aggression which 
rejected a proposal to include several of the broad range of activities listed as indirect aggression in 
the Declaration on Friendly Relations. See Pierluigi L. Zanardi, 'Indirect Military Aggression' in A 
Cassese (ed) The Current Legal Regulation on the Use o f  Force (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1986) 
111-119,116.
63 The indirectness of computer network attacks is addressed in section 3.1.1 infra.
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Secondly, the Court included intangible assistance such as ‘encouragement’. While it 
is reading too much into the judgement to treat this as evidence of a prohibition 
against intangible force, the words “armed intervention and all other forms of 
interference” imply intent to reach at least some kinds of nonforcible activities. The 
reports of the special committee delegated the task of drafting the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations indicate that the participating States had little shared notion of 
what sort of non-forcible conduct would fall under the proscriptions in the 
Declaration.64
Although ‘encouragement’ may take many forms, some tangible and some not, the 
inclusion of ‘organisation or encouragement’ would suggest that an intangible form 
was envisaged as well. It is interesting in this regard to compare the Court’s 
treatment of the encouraging statements made by the Ayatollah Khomeini in the 
Tehran Hostages case.65 Although the case did not consider the Declaration on 
Friendly Relations, the Court considered that such statements were not sufficient to 
impute state responsibility for the initial actions of student militants in overrunning 
the U.S. Embassy in Tehran. However, the Court did hold that such statements were 
sufficient to turn the continued occupation of the embassy and detention of the 
hostages into acts of the State. The Court did not consider whether the continuing 
occupation (or the initial attack)66 constituted a breach of Article 2(4) of the Charter 
which had been argued by the United States and dealt with the matter solely with 
respect to the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunity.
While some commentators have argued that the Nicaragua (Merits) case extends the 
definition of force into things that begin to resemble economic and political 
coercion, the current author considers that the better view is that force is still 
restricted to military (or paramilitary) action, however such force may be imputed
64 Damrosch, 'Politics across Borders', 10.
65 Case Concerning the United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v Iran) 
(1980) 74 AJIL 746, International Court o f Justice, para 59. In that case the Ayatollah had made 
several public declarations inveighing against the United States and holding the U.S. responsible for 
the trouble besetting that country. On 1 November the Ayatollah had made a statement declaring it 
was “up to the dear pupils, students and theological students to expand with all their might their 
attacks against the United States and Israel, so that they may force the United States to return the 
deposed and Criminal Shah, and to condemn this great plot”. Further, congratulatory statements from 
the Ayatollah following the attack and other statements o f official approval were also made.
66 Presumably because of the lack of imputability to a State party.
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through indirect means such as agency. The extension provided by the Court remains 
tied to armed force, whether in person or by proxy.
The Court in the Nicaragua (Merits) case regarded the Charter provisions as 
dynamic rather than fixed, and thus as capable of change over time through state 
practice.67 Although the Court accepted the parties’ position that the Charter 
provisions represented customary law, it also accepted the possibility of the 
development of new law on forcible intervention allowing a new exception to the 
prohibition on the use of force in Article 2(4). In setting out the area covered by the 
prohibition against force the Court stated that Article 2(4) of the Charter represented 
only part of the customary international law relating to the use of force and stated 
“The U.N. Charter ... by no means covers the whole area of the regulation of the use 
of force in international relations”.68 The Court pointed out that the right to self 
defence stood alongside the Charter and that the Charter text did not go on to 
regulate all of the aspects of that rule. Bearing that in mind we need now to turn to 
state practice and the theories of force propounded by other academics.
2.1. State Actions
Given the classified and covert nature of most computer network attacks, a survey of 
state practice in relation to this type of incident is problematic at best. To date there 
have not been any computer network attacks that are conclusively attributable to a 
State outside of traditional conflict scenarios, however some States have made 
statements regarding the use of computer network attacks and other analogous 
information operations. As has been stated one of the most difficult issues 
surrounding computer network attacks is positive attribution of an attack to the 
perpetrator, as a matter of fact, as well as a matter of law. Most of the incidents 
detailed below and in the Appendix have suffered from this difficulty, thus making 
statements of limited use. However, although they must be used with care, the 
statements, actions and reactions of States also form part of the interpretative 
framework of Article 2(4).
The most recent and clearest indication of state practice with regard to a specific 
computer network attack is the international response to the attacks against Estonia
67 Gray, Use o f  Force, 7.
68 Nicaragua (Merits), para 176.
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in 2007. As noted previously, the attacks did not affect critical infrastructure, 
damage physical property or cause human injury and it appears that States were not 
prepared to make definitive public statements regarding the attacks as a use of 
force.69 NATO Member States were not prepared to accept that the attacks amounted 
to an armed attack which would initiate the collective self-defence provisions of the 
North Atlantic treaty, however a NATO spokesperson commented that the attacks 
were a security issue which concerned NATO.70 Russia denied all accusations of 
computer network attacks and stated that the Kremlin comes under attack many 
hundreds of times a day.71 In the past, Russia has stated that they will view the 
effects of a computer network attack as similar to that of the use of weapons of mass 
destruction and that:
“[f]rom a military point of view, the use of information warfare means against 
Russia or its armed forces will categorically not be considered a non military phase 
of a conflict, whether there were casualties or not.. .Russia retains the right to use 
nuclear weapons first against the means and forces of information warfare, and then 
against the aggressor state itself.”
However, this statement has not been reflected in Russia’s response to computer 
network attacks in the recent conflict over South Ossetia where reportedly Russian 
and South Ossetian sites have come under attacks from Georgian hackers.73 
China has often topped the lists of States engaged in or developing computer 
network attack capabilities.74 China has been accused of hacking attacks against 
government computers in the U.S., France, Germany, the U.K., Australia and New
69 For example U.S. called the attacks “unacceptable” and “pressure on a independant country” but 
stopped short of calling the attacks force: 'Rice Condemns Ongoing Cyber-Attacks as Estonian 
Embassy Siege Ends', earthtimesorg 4 May 2007.
70 AFP, 'Cyber Attacks on Estonia Are Security Issue: NATO Chief, The Age (Melbourne), 26 May 
2007.
71 'The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia', BBC News 17 May 2007,
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/6665195.stm> (last accessed 21 September 2008).
72 V Tsymbal quoted in T Thomas, 'Russia's Information Warfare Structure: Understanding the Roles 
of the Security Council, Fapsi, the State Technical Commission and the Military' (1998) 7 European 
Security 156, 161.
73 Kim Hart, 'Longtime Battle Lines Are Recast in Russia and Georgia's Cyberwar', Washington Post 
(Washington D.C.), 14 August 2008, D01 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2008/08/13/AR2008081303623.html> (last accessed 26 August 2008).
74 See for example, McAfee, Virtual Criminology Report, McAfee Inc. (2007); Symantec, Symantec 
Global Internet Security Threat Report, Symantec, Vol XIII (2008).
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Zealand.75 The Chinese government has denied any involvement in such attacks and 
despite the problems of attribution it is clear that these States have not considered the 
access and theft of information a use of force and are content to deal with them as 
cases of espionage. China has also claimed that it has sustained ‘massive’ and
7 fk‘shocking’ losses of State and military secrets via the Internet. Although they are 
non-international examples, Tibet and Taiwan have repeatedly come under attack 
from alleged Chinese hackers, suspected to have the backing of the Chinese 
government. The Chinese government has denied all such claims stating that “the
77Chinese government always opposes the activities of hackers”. In September 2002 
China announced that it had developed five new information warfare institutes to 
develop information warfare patterns/weapons/ described as “technological aircraft 
carriers” and the official news agency Xinhua stated that Chinese military leaders 
hoped to overcome their military weaknesses, largely outdated hardware, by
70
attacking a technologically superior foe with electronic warfare.
The United States has formally stated that it is their policy to respond to cyber
70attacks by any means appropriate, including military action. Further, in July 2002, 
President George W. Bush signed a secret directive ordering the government to 
develop, for the first time, national-level guidance for determining when and how the
QA
United States would launch cyber-attacks against enemy computer networks. The
75 See for example Roger Boyes, 'China Accused of Hacking into Heart of Merkel Administration', 
The Times (London), <http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/europe/article2332130.ece> (last 
accessed 26 August 2008); John Leyden, 'France Blames China for Hack Attacks', The Register 
(London), 12 September 2007, <http://www.theregister.co.uk/2007/09/12/french_cyberattacks/> (last 
accessed 26 August 2008).
76 Leyden, 'France Blames China for Hack Attacks'. Edward Cody, 'Chinese Official Accuses Nations 
o f Hacking', Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 13 September 2007, A 16.
77 See for example 'China Denies Hacking Dalai Lama Computer', CNN 25 September 2002, 
<http://europe.cnn.com/2002/TECH/intemet/09/25/dalailama.hacking.ap/> (last accessed 28 
September 2002); George V. Hulme, 'Taiwan Accuses China of Launching Cyberattack' (2004) 
Information Week 16 June 2004
<http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=22100221> (last accessed 15 
September 2007).
78 'Military Eyes Electronic Warfare', Associated Press, South China Morning Post 28 September 
2002, <http://china.scmp.com/chimain/ZZZH3UK2F6D.html> (last accessed 30 September 2002).
79 Dan Verton, 'The Prospect of Iraq Conflict Raises New Cyber Attack Fears' (2002) Computerworld 
Hong Kong 30 September 2002 <http://www.idg.com.hk/cw/readstory.asp?aid=20020930004> (last 
accessed 30 September 2002).
80 Bradley Graham, 'Bush Orders Guidelines for Cyber-Warfare', Washington Post (Washington 
D.C.), 7 February 2003, <http://www.washingtonpost.eom/wp-dyn/articles/A38110-2003Feb6.html> 
(last accessed 21 February 2001).
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United States have also revealed limited attempts to use computer network attacks 
offensively within the scope of the Kosovo campaign; according to newspaper 
reports the U.S. attempted to divert funds from Milosevic aligned businesses in an 
attempt to bring pressure to bear on the Serbian leader.81 Such attempts were limited 
in scope and ended early due to concerns about the legitimacy and legality of such 
tactics.82
Such reactions and policy statements indicate that States are cautious about labelling 
computer network attacks as a use of force. Although both the United States and 
Russia have reserved the right to respond with force against computer network 
attacks they have not made any comments indicating that any computer network 
attacks reported to date should be viewed in this manner. To date, with the exception 
of the ‘Farewell Dossier’ incident, no computer network attack conclusively
O'!
attributable to another State has caused physical damage or human injury.
2.2. Theories of Force - Scholastic writings
Although they are in agreement over the customary nature of the prohibition on the 
use of force, commentators remain deeply divided over the content of the rule. 
Theories of force and discussion of Article 2(4) of the Charter have come mainly 
from two different schools of legal theory, those adopting a restrictive approach and 
those adopting a more expansive one.84 The first, tending to come from the positivist 
school, provides a definition o f ‘force’ and determines whether a particular incident 
falls within the accepted definition. The extensive approach tends to focus more on 
custom and the context of force. However it can be seen that definitions proffered by 
scholars in the field from all approaches have common themes running through 
them. All appear to be united in the need for a physical or violent means which 
produce a physical outcome. Michael Schmitt refers to physical or kinetic force
81 William M. Arkin, The Cyber Bomb' in Yugoslavia', Ibid. 25 October 1999, 
<http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/dotmil/arkin.htm> (last accessed 21 September 
2008).
82 See for example, William M Arkin and Robert Windrem, 'The Other Kosovo War', MSNBC News 
29 August 2001, <http://www.msnbc.com/news/607032.asp7cpHl> (last accessed 12 April 2005).
83 Because of their clandestine nature computer network attacks are perfect fodder for rumours and 
misinformation; for example, Chinese hackers were inaccurately blamed for causing a massive 
blackout in the northeastern United States in 2003.
84 For an extensive analysis of the methodological debates over the the prohibition on the use of force 
see Corten, 'Controversies'.
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applied by conventional weaponry.85 Ian Brownlie uses a two-part definition 
requiring the use of a weapon which is employed for the destruction of life and 
property.86 Bowett refers to the possible resort to a violent weapon which inflicts 
human injury.87 Likewise, Randelzhofer requires acts of violence committed by
oo
militarily organised groups.
The need for physical means and the requirement of a weapon came to the fore with 
the advent of chemical and biological weapons. Ian Brownlie addressed this question 
in his 1963 work International Law and the Use o f Force by States, considering 
whether weapons “which do not involve any explosive effect with shock waves and 
heat involves a use of force” prohibited by Article 2(4) of the Charter.89 In 
concluding that these weapons should indeed be considered force, Brownlie gives 
two reasons. The first, is that the “agencies concerned are commonly referred to as 
‘weapons’ and as forms of ‘warfare’”.90 However, as has been seen in the preceding 
chapter, this may not be helpful in terms of categorising computer network attacks as 
force. Both the popular press and academics across disciplines have used the terms 
information warfare, cyber war and even computer network attack to refer to a vast 
range of information operations, some of which would never be considered to be 
uses of force under the Charter.91 Further the terms ‘war’ and ‘weapons’ have found 
an increasingly political meaning in recent years. At the date of writing, the 
newspapers contain articles on the present conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, 
however they also contain articles on wars on terror, drugs, crime, and poverty; all 
politicised uses of the lexicon of humanitarian and international law and none of 
them aimed at invoking its protection. Used in this manner, the term war is merely 
used to signify resolve,92 a point that has been noted by legal commentators and
85 Schmitt, 'Normative Framework', 908.
86 Brownlie, Use o f Force by States, 362.
87 Bowett, Self-Defence, 184-199.
88 Randelzhofer, 'Article 2(4)', 120.
89 Brownlie, Use o f  Force by States, 362.
90 Ibid.
91 See Todd A. Morth, 'Considering Our Position: Viewing Information Warfare as a Use of Force 
Prohibited by Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter' (1998) 30 Case WRes JIn t'l L 567, 590.
92 Frgd&ic M6gret, "War'? Legal Semantics and the Move to Violence' (2002) EJIL 361.
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politicians alike.93 Thus the semantics of war and weaponry are no longer a useful 
criterion in determining whether something is a use of force.94 Further, as was seen 
in the 2001 anthrax scares in the United States and the release of sarin gas on a 
Tokyo subway train in 1985, the requirement of a weapons-based delivery system is 
not an essential requirement for a chemical or biological attack. The International 
Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion has stated that the 
provisions relating to the use of force in the Charter do not refer to specific weapons 
but rather apply to the use of force regardless of the weapons employed.95 
Brownlie's second and more convincing argument is that the use of chemical and 
biological weapons should be viewed as force because "these weapons are employed 
for the destruction of life and property".96 It is also representative of the second 
requirement of the majority of academics for a physical outcome to a computer 
network attack. In advancing his analysis, Brownlie moves the test beyond kinetic 
impact of shockwaves and heat and toward a wider, result-oriented approach. A 
purely result-driven approach raises problems of its own however, in that it reopens 
the door for arguments relating to the inclusion of political and economic coercion. 
As Cassandra LaRae-Perez points out, once a results-based perspective is adopted, 
the effects of long term, comprehensive economic sanctions of the kind adopted 
against Iraq and Cuba, which are as severe as the use of force against those States,
07can be regarded as falling foul of Article 2(4). However state practice shows that 
the international community is not ready for this to be the case. The rigorous 
economic embargo that the United States has enforced against Cuba since the early
93 See for example, Christopher Greenwood, 'International Law and the War against Terrorism' (2002) 
78 International Affairs 301, 306. Also Tony Blair’s comment “Whatever the technical or legal 
issues... the fact is that we are at war with terrorism” See, BBC News “Britain at War with 
Terrorism” 16 September 2001 (available at http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/uk politics/154541 l.stm); 
“Powell Very Pleased with the Coalition-Building Results” 13 September 2001 (available at 
http://www.usinfo.state.gOv/topical/pol/terror/01091366.htm)
94 Although some of the more populist articles refer to information warfare techniques as weapons of 
mass disruption, obviously a play on the ‘mass destruction’ terminology applied to nuclear, chemical 
and biological weapons, such terms have not achieved widespread usage.
95 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 39.
96 Brownlie, Use o f  Force by States, 362.
97Cassandra LaRae-Perez, 'Economic Sanctions as a Use of Force: Re-Evaluating the Legality of 
Sanctions from an Effects-Based Perspective' (2002) 20 BUInt'l L J 161.
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1960’s has not been considered to be a use of force; likewise, neither has the Arab
no
embargo of Israel.
Similarly, Yoram Dinstein argues for a results-based approach when discussing 
computer network attacks in the context of an armed attack, recognised by the ICJ in 
the Nicaragua (Merits) case as a subset of the use of force." He argues that violent 
consequences are the key to fulfilling the definition of armed attack:100
“From a legal perspective, there is no reason to differentiate between kinetic and 
electronic means of attack. A premeditated destructive [Computer Network Attack 
(CNA)] can qualify as an armed attack just as much as a kinetic attack bringing 
about the same or similar results -  the crux of the matter is not the medium at hand 
(a computer server in lieu of, say an artillery battery), but the violent consequences 
of the action taken. If there is a cause and effect chain between the CNA and these 
violent consequences, it is immaterial that they were produced by high and not low 
technology”
Dinstein’s realist argument focuses solely on the consequences of an attack. As 
shown above, a purely consequence-based approach in an area that lacks the 
tangibility of traditional military/armed force blurs the distinction with the grey area 
occupied by political and economic.coercion. Thus a theory of force which requires 
only a particular outcome is insufficient to cover the concerns raised by forms of 
coercion which the international community is agreed (for the most part) are not to 
be included as uses of force. However it is also equally clear that the requirement 
and current analysis with regard to weaponry cannot stand as it is and must be 
revisited if it is to take into account changes in technology.
Michael Schmitt has argued that not only is a purely consequence-based approach 
extraordinarily difficult to quantify or qualify,101 it would also constitute a new 
normative standard altogether and as such would prove a difficult case for adoption
i mby the international community. Schmitt is an adherent of the second school of
98 Bond, Peacetime Foreign Data Manipulation, 59. Interestingly, in the latter case the United States 
was in the position o f the weaker state and argued that the economic coercion by the more powerful 
Arab states should be considered to be a use of force, a reversal of its position in the Cuban embargo.
99 Dinstein, 'CNA and Self-Defense', 103.
100 Ibid.
101 Schmitt, Normative Framework', 911.
102 Ibid., 917.
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legal theory writing on the subject of force, the more expansive contextualist 
approach epitomized by the New Haven school writers such as Michael Reisman and 
Myers McDougal.
In his work Law and Minimum World Public Order, Myers McDougal has argued 
that force is merely a degree of major coercion and violence on a trans-national 
scale.103 McDougal thus places all forms of coercion on this scale and addresses the 
problem of the characterisation of the particular coercion as permissible or non- 
permissible from variables based on past actions, extrapolated forward in accordance 
with those variables’ probable consequences upon the goal values of the kind of 
world order the scholar prefers:104
“From this perspective, the basic intellectual task is one of characterising the 
variable contextual factors and policies which relate to the distinction between 
permissible and impermissible coercion for the guidance of differing particular 
decision makers”.
Developing the theory further, Michael Reisman sets out seven categories where the 
use of force in international law has achieved some form of international legal 
authority.105 He argues that in determining whether a particular act of coercion is 
lawful or not, the question to be answered is whether a particular act (whatever its 
justification otherwise) enhances or undermines world order.106 That is, the critical 
question is not whether coercion has been applied, but whether it has been applied 
(a) in support of or against community order and basic policies and (b) in ways in 
which the net consequences include congruence with community goals and 
minimum order.107 However, the contextualist position has fundamental difficulties. 
Olivier Corten points out, there exists no ‘objective law’ that expresses social
103 Myres Smith McDougal and Florentino P. Feliciano, Law and Minimum World Public Order: The 
Legal Regulation o f  International Coercion (Yale University Press, New Haven, 1961).
104 Ibid., 153.
105 These categories are self defence, self determination and decolonisation, humanitarian 
intervention, intervention by the military instrument to replace an elite in another state, uses of the 
military instrument within spheres o f influence and critical defence zones, treaty sanctioned 
interventions within the territory of another state, use of the military instrument for the gathering of 
evidence in international proceedings, use o f the military instrument in enforcing international 
judgements, and countermeasures such as reprisals and retorsions. W Michael Reisman, 'Criteria for 
the Use o f Force in International Law' (1985) 10 Yale JIn t'l L 279,281.
106 Ibid., 282.
107 Ibid., 284.
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necessities or the solidarity mechanisms that characterise the international 
community; it is the interpreter and the interpreter alone who gives sense to what is
i n s  .required in a particular case by those necessities or that solidarity. The idea that 
the fundamental goals of the community must prevail over any particular rule of law, 
namely the rule prohibiting armed force, would remove all certainty from 
international relations, leaving the outcome of any diplomatic encounter highly 
uncertain as to its legality. And ultimately, that uncertainty is a greater threat to 
communal values and goals. This methodological schism permeates the debates on 
the legality of computer network attacks as a use of force and divides commentators 
on the correct approach to take to this emerging form of warfare.
3. Computer Network Attacks as a Use of Force
As noted above, two main theories of force have emerged out of the current writing 
in relation to the prohibition against force. The first is the more restrictive, positivist 
approach which looks at the rules formulated by the international community, in this 
case the prohibition against force, and argues that anything falling outside that 
prohibition is legal. Authors adhering to this school include Ian Brownlie, Yoram 
Dinstein, Christine Gray and, in respect of computer network attacks, James Bond. 
The second is the more expansive contextualist approach which contends that all 
coercion falls along a continuum and the position along the continuum is the result of 
several factors which affect the minimum world order. The contextualist approach 
can be seen in the work of Michael Schmitt and Michael Reisman.
As we have seen above a results-based approach to the question as to whether a 
particular attack contravenes the prohibition against ‘armed force’ leads towards an 
erosion of the economic and political coercion exclusion. Michael Schmitt has 
suggested that the use of force proscription is based on the desire of the international 
community to foster and advance the aspirational values set out in the preamble to 
the Charter. The prohibition on ‘armed’ force is a kind of instrumental shorthand 
way of restricting those acts that are most likely to endanger these objectives and 
aims. Thus, the international community is not concerned so much with the 
instrumentality of the coercion but rather the consequences of its use.109 However,
108 Corten, 'Controversies', 814.
109 Schmitt, 'Normative Framework', 911.
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given that the range of possible consequences of any given kind of attack (i.e. denial 
of service, virus, intrusions etc) range along a continuum, assessing the 
consequences of an attack can be a Sisyphean task, making the criteria for placement 
upon that continuum extremely difficult.
“The difficulty in looking to consequences themselves as criteria for calculating 
lawfulness led the Charter drafters to use prescriptive shorthand to achieve their 
goal. Because force represents a consistently serious menace to intermediate and 
ultimate objectives, the prohibition of resort to it is a relatively reliable instrument- 
based surrogate for a ban on deleterious consequences. It eases the evaluative 
process by simply asking whether force has been used rather than requiring a far 
more difficult assessment of the consequences that have arisen”110
However as seen above with reference to economic and political coercion, it cannot 
be the case that the only criteria to be used are the consequence-based ones. Despite 
subscribing to this view, in his article setting out a normative framework for the 
analysis of computer network attacks, Michael Schmitt has proposed several 
consequence-based factors which are to be taken into account when determining 
whether an attack will constitute a use of force: severity of the damage, immediacy 
of the consequences of the attack, directness, invasiveness of the act into the target 
state, measurability of the damage, and presumptive legitimacy.111
A previous paper by Schmitt considers by whom, and against whom, any attack is 
effected, what form the attack takes and its aims, when any attack, and specifically, 
any response to an attack occurs and whether the attack occurs within a State’s 
sphere of influence or critical defence zone.112 Additional factors are the reason for 
the attack and the consequences of any attack.
The Court in the Nuclear Weapons advisory case stated that in order to apply the 
Charter law on the use of force and the law applicable in armed conflict, it was
1,0 Ibid.
111 Ibid., 914.
112 Michael N. Schmitt, 'The Resort to Force in International Law: Reflections on Positivist and 
Contextualist Approaches' (1994) 37 AFL Rev 105.
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11^essential to take account of the unique characteristics of nuclear weapons. The 
same approach may adopted in respect of computer network attacks.
3.1. Characteristics of Computer Network Attacks
The problem with defining computer network attacks as a use of force under current 
international law is an obvious one. The contemporary prohibition on the use of 
force (both as treaty law and as customary law) has its roots firmly in the text of 
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter. However at the time that the Charter was 
drafted, the science of computing had not advanced to such a state where it could be 
considered to be any sort of threat, and indeed in 1945 the breakthrough towards 
modem computing was just beginning.114
The problems that arise from considering a computer network attack as a use of force 
stem from the fundamental characteristics of such attacks. Despite the wide range of 
attacks which fall under the heading of computer network attack, it is possible to 
distil four characteristics of a computer network attack which distinguish it from its 
conventional counterparts: indirectness, intangibility, locus, and result. Some of 
these characteristics do not raise significant issues in contemporary international law 
on the use of force and are easily solved within the existing framework, however 
other characteristics raise more difficult issues. This section examines each of these 
characteristics and the arguments that have been advanced to militate against such 
attacks falling within the definition of force. As will be seen, most arguments can be 
dealt with under existing law.
3.1.1. Indirectness
Although direct computer network attacks are certainly possible, for example the 
infiltration of a dam’s control system to send water downstream, a large number of 
possible attacks will manipulate one system to achieve a knock-on effect from 
something else. Examples of such indirect attacks include a manipulation of GPS
113 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 36.
1,4 Notwithstanding the important role the Colossus machine played in the British/Allied war efforts 
at Betchley Park in breaking the ciphers used by the highest level Germans for strategic commands. 
See http://www.turing.org.uk/turing/scrapbook/electronic.html for an account of the claim to 
invention of the computer by Alan Turing and the Virtual Betchley Park for details of the role of 
electronic code breakers during World War II http://www.codesandciphers.org.uk/virtualbp/ (last 
accessed 14 December 2002).
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satellite systems to send an opposing force’s missiles off target, manipulation of 
hospital blood type data resulting in the wrong blood type being given to enemy 
soldiers, or disabling air traffic control systems. These examples all involve an action 
which requires further action to be taken by a second actor or object to achieve the 
desired result. Indirectness, per se has not been an issue for the international 
community. As seen above the International Court of Justice in the Nicaragua 
(Merits) case has held that indirect assistance can be a use of force contrary to 
international law. The Court based its reasoning as follows:
The elem ent o f  coercion, which defines, and indeed forms the very essence of, 
prohibited intervention, is particularly obvious in the case o f  an intervention which 
uses force, either in the direct form o f  military action, or in the indirect form o f 
support for subversive or terrorist armed activities within another State. As noted 
above (paragraph 191), General Assembly resolution 2625 (XXV) equates 
assistance o f  this kind with the use o f  force by the assisting State when the acts 
com m itted in another State 'involve a threat or use o f  force'.115
However it should be noted in these cases that the further action to be taken has 
involved a traditional use of armed force. Where the subsequent action does not 
constitute a ‘threat or use of force’ such as the example of the hospital records, it 
seems unlikely under present interpretations of the law that the action could be 
considered a use of force. Further, not all assistance given to the rebels was 
considered to be contrary to the prohibition against force, mere supply of funds to 
the contras did not in itself amount to a use of force.116 Therefore the causal nexus 
between an act of a State and a violent physical effect on the victim State will be of 
critical importance.
Another issue arises where the party who is being ‘assisted’ has no wish or intention 
to cause damage but is being used as the unwilling agent of the attacking actor. This 
is the case where computers are ‘recruited’ to botnets and used to launch distributed 
denial of service (DDoS) attacks against a target computer. Attackers in Estonia 
reportedly enlisted botnets in their attack, including one with in excess of 1 million 
computers.
115 Nicaragua (Merits), para 205.
116 Ibid., para 228.
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An early precursor is the 1998 ‘Floodnet’ denial of service attack launched by the 
Electronic Disturbance Theatre (EDT), an activist group tied to the Zapatista rebels 
in Chiapas, Mexico, against a computer network at the Pentagon. The group was 
responding to alleged U.S. support for the Mexican government. When users logged 
on to an EDT website, the Zapatista Floodnet software was downloaded to their 
computer. As with most DDoS attacks, the software is designed to initiate automatic 
and repeated requests to reload an IP address, in this case the Pentagon’s website 
DefenceLink. As Floodnet performs automatic reloads of the site, it slows or halts
11 naccess to the targeted server and clogs bandwidth. What makes the example 
significant for this thesis was the reaction of the Pentagon who responded in kind, 
sending a java applet back to the initiating computer and disabling the browser of the 
computer initiating the attack.118 The action caused a storm of controversy on the 
Internet as it involved an offensive attack on civilian computers. Following the 
incident the Pentagon established a legal team to steer the Joint Taskforce on 
Computer Network Defense through the difficult legal issues. The taskforce is 
“prohibited from engaging in offensive information warfare operations like the 
episode of Sept. 9”.119 It appears likely that for the most part the 80,000 plus
190computers utilized in the attack were used with the consent of the owner. However
such software can be downloaded to a computer without the knowledge of the user. 
Where a state-owned computer is used in this manner, the effect may appear to be a 
state-sponsored attack of another State’s systems.121 This appears to be the case in
117 The Electronic Disturbance Theatre views this act as performance art, hence the term theatre in 
their title and classifies the FloodNet action as virtual or electronic civil disobedience. Coco Fusco, 
'Performance Art in a Digital Age: A Conversation with Ricardo Dominguez', 25 November 1999.; 
see also Karl J Shawhan "Vital Interests, Virtual Threats: Reconciling International Law with 
Information Warfare and United States Security" (2001) School of Advanced Airpower Studies, Air 
University, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama
<http://www.maxwell.af.mil/au/aul/aupress/SAAS_Theses/Shawhan/shawhan.pdf> (last accessed 4 
April 2003).
118 Brian Friel, 'DoD Launches Internet Counterattack' (1998) Government Executive 18 September
1998 <http://govexec.com/dailyfed/0998/091898bl.htm> (last accessed 7 August 2008). According to 
the EDT only 2 computers of the 80,000-plus who participated were crashed by the DoD 
counterattack.
119 George I. Seffers, 'Legalities Cloud Pentagon's Cyber Defence' (1999) DefenceNews 25 January
1999 3,26., cited in Shawhan "Vital Interests, Virtual Threats", 37
120 Fusco, 'Performance Art in a Digital Age'. According to EDT, the FloodNet system advises the 
user that their IP address may be ‘harvested’ by the government in any action, and that damage may 
occur to your machine. The code has now been released as shareware on the Internet and it is likely 
that the warning messages may be altered or dispensed with altogether by future users.
121 The problem of attribution of attacks is examined in Chapter 3 infra.
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the attacks against Estonia in 2007. Although computers inside the Kremlin were 
used in the attacks, those computers could have been compromised. The incident 
resulted in Estonia accusing Russia of instigating the attacks, the first time a State 
had been accused of launching an attack against another State.
3.1.2. Intangibility
The second major characteristic of computer network attacks is the intangibility of 
the attack; both in terms of the method of warfare and the consequences of an attack. 
While it may be possible to point at a single piece of malicious code that has caused 
the problem, legally speaking the problem of intangibility exists on three levels.
First, the target of the attack may not exist in the physical world other than as 
information held on a server. Secondly, the ‘weapon’ itself is intangible, a piece of 
binary coding which may cause catastrophic effect. Thirdly, the type of damage the 
attack causes might also be intangible. A computer network attack that does not 
touch the physical sphere may nevertheless cause mayhem; the oft-cited hypothetical 
example is an attack on the New York stock exchange that causes mayhem and panic 
in the United States. This last aspect of intangibility will be examined in section 
3.1.4 infra.
Target Intangibility
Computer network attacks, by definition, target information and information 
systems. However, they may be divided into those which target information systems 
in order to affect hardware and other physical aspects and those which target 
information as its own end. Where the target of an attack is a physical entity the 
effects of a computer network attack fit more easily with current experience. The 
more difficult issue arises where the target of the attack is information itself. 
Particularly, where the effect of the attack is not to destroy the information, but to 
degrade the information target to the extent that it cannot be relied upon. An extreme 
example of such an attack would be a situation where the medical records of serving 
military sent to a staging ground in preparation for a conflict were tampered with by 
altering the blood type records held for those soldiers. Note that the attack has 
occurred before the traditional conflict has started, the rules of jus in bello do not yet
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apply, and at the time of the attack the soldiers are not yet hors du combat. In the
hypothetical situation described above, a complicating factor arises as to whether the
massing of troops in a staging ground constitutes a threat or use of force contrary to
Article 2(4) of the Charter in any event, thus raising the question whether such a
1 ^computer network attack would be a proportionate response to a threat. However 
leaving such questions aside for the time being, we must determine whether such an 
act constitutes a use of force in and of itself.
Under the results-based theory proposed by Dinstein, the fact that the attack results 
in serious harm and possible loss of life, places it clearly within the purview of a use 
of force contrary to Article 2(4). There is a clear chain of causation between the 
attack and the loss of life - change in data leads to wrong blood being given to 
soldier, which leads to death by incompatible blood transfusion. And yet gut instinct 
tells us that this cannot be a correct use of Article 2(4), although almost certainly 
being contrary to Geneva Conventions. Why not? The fact that the action was carried 
out prior to the physical consequences of the attack is not a useful distinction. 
International law recognises that the laying of mines in both territorial and 
international waters may be an act of force, even though the violent consequences of 
the act may take place a significant period of time later.124 The test promulgated by 
Brownlie also talks about damage to property. In this circumstance the property that 
is damaged is intangible, vis a database. In the event that no loss of life occurs, the 
only damage which has occurred is to the information or data contained in the 
database. Is this sufficient property damage to satisfy Brownlie’s test of a use of 
force? Note that under New Zealand and UK intellectual property law at least, data 
in a database is not considered intellectual property. Therefore it cannot be the case 
that such damage on its own without further evidence of destruction is sufficient to 
fall foul of Article 2(4).
As seen above, Brownlie’s theory of force also requires a weapon and computer 
network attacks do not conform to our traditional perception of weapons.
122 This latter point may well be moot because the effective timing of the attack may well be the point 
at which it causes it damage. At which point the soldiers are likely to be hors du combat if they are 
requiring blood.
123 State and juridical practice is divided on the matter. The ICJ has held that military manoeuvres 
carried out by United States troops near the border of Nicaragua were not sufficient to constitute a use 
o f force: Nicaragua (Merits), para 227.
124 See Ibid and Corfu Channel Case respectively.
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Weapons Intangibility
The second question that arises is whether a bitstream of malicious code is 
sufficiently militaristic or weapon-like to meet the required definition of ‘armed’ 
force. As noted previously, Schmitt argues that the instrument-based distinction is a 
‘prescriptive shorthand’ for a set of consequences which affect community values. 
Thus he argues that:125
“Armed coercion is not defined by whether or not kinetic energy is employed or 
released, but rather by the nature of the direct results caused, specifically physical 
damage and human injury. Instrumentalities that produce them are weapons. There 
is little debate about whether the use of chemicals or biological agents falls within 
the meaning of armed force, even though the means that cause the injury or death 
differ greatly from those produced by kinetic force.”
That is, a weapon is anything that directly causes physical damage and human injury. 
Jacobson has argued that ‘armed’ simply means equipped with weapons of war, and
10Athat weapons are tools designed to accomplish a specific mission.
Brownlie’s approach was to fit the new technology to the definition. Given that a 
purely results-based approach does not provide the appropriate distinction between 
armed and other forms of coercion, the means of producing the results are still 
significant.
If a computer network attack does not meet some form of weapons criterion then it is 
likely that the use of such attack techniques will fall within the levels of coercion 
currently occupied by political and economic coercion. Obviously in the event that 
these attacks take place during an armed conflict, such acts will be seen as part of the 
ongoing conflict, and will be judged accordingly; however it is worth emphasising 
that in this instance, these issues are raised in relation to the exercise of such force by 
an actor of the State before the commencement of traditional military action.
The definition of weapon in the Oxford English Dictionary is a “thing designed, 
used, or usable for inflicting bodily harm” or secondly, a “means for gaining
125 Schmitt, 'Normative Framework', 913.
126 Mark Jacobson, 'War in the Information Age: International Law, Self Defence and the Problem of 
'Non-Armed' Attacks' (1998) 21(3) Journal o f  Strategic Studies 1.
70
advantage in a conflict”. While the first definition fits with a traditional use of 
kinetic violence it is the second definition that may provide the answer for 
information warfare attacks. As seen above however it must be used with some 
caution as many tactics, which may gain an advantage in a conflict situation, would 
not be considered weapons. James Bond gives the example of spy satellites which 
pass over the territory of States and yet are not considered weapons and whose use is 
not considered a use of force. He reaches this conclusion on the grounds that 
satellites merely process data rather than having a direct capability of producing 
death or physical destruction of property. Bond thus extrapolates this to other pieces 
of equipment which do nothing but process data and concludes that most, if not 
nearly all, instances of data manipulation would not equate to employing a weapon 
and would not constitute the use of force.128
The question of weapon intangibility may not be of much use in determining 
whether new methods of warfare are uses of force prohibited under international law. 
An analogy with the domestic criminal law of murder is useful in this regard. Murder 
weapons come in all shapes and sizes and what may be a permissible and useful tool 
in one regard, for example a wrench, can be transformed into an instrument of death 
in an instant. The key factors that determine its use as a weapon is not the nature of 
the object itself, but rather how the object was used, against whom and why.129 
The problem is compounded by a failure to distinguish between a particular piece of 
malicious code as a weapon and identifying the computer as a weapon. The weapon 
of choice for a computer network attack is a series of digits (or bitstream) which 
comprise a set of instructions. A computer network attack is, therefore, perhaps a 
perfect example of the principles of domestic criminal law indicated above which 
interpret a weapon as something being used to injure persons or property. Thus in the 
example above, a wrench in the hands of a mechanic may be merely a tool of the 
trade or an instrument of destruction depending on his or her intent. The binary 
coding required for a computer network attack contains the instructions for the attack 
and hence represents an almost pure expression of the intent of the attacker.
127 Bond, Peacetime Foreign Data Manipulation, 83.
128 Ibid.
129 See also Ibid., 86.
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3.1.3. Locus
Another argument raised against computer network attacks as a use of force concerns 
the problem of the locus of the attack and the locus of the target. The locus of the 
attack was raised early on in the literature with some commentators claiming there
1 inwas no cross-border action involved in the attack. However this argument is ill- 
founded. While a border violation may be evidence of a use of force, international 
law does not require cross-border action to occur before a use of force has been 
found. For example, an act against a visiting foreign minister or head of state of a 
country has always been considered an act of force by the host State.131 Further, the 
actions of the United Kingdom in the Corfu Channel case were held to be a policy of 
force even though the strait concerned was of the “class of international highways
1 'VJthrough which passage cannot be prohibited”.
The main issue with the locus of the attack is that it can be very difficult to establish 
with any degree of certainty where the attack was actually generated. Current 
technology allows attackers to conceal their identity and route any attack through a 
number of servers based around the globe prior to hitting the target system. For 
example, the 1998 ‘Solar Sunrise’ attacks, in which a number of U.S. DoD networks 
were compromised, appeared to be coming from multiple servers in the U.S. as well 
as the United Arab Emirates, Israel, France, Germany and Taiwan. While this attack 
is purely a matter of transnational criminal law, the possibilities for a state-sponsored 
version of the same style of attack exist. The ‘Titan Rain’ series of intrusions routed 
stolen data through servers in South Korea, Hong Kong or Taiwan before sending 
them to computers in Guangdong province in mainland China.133 Although most 
analysts believe the Chinese government to be behind the espionage attacks, China 
has denied all involvement and the attribution cannot be proved. From a law 
enforcement point of view it may be almost impossible to determine where the attack
130 See for example, Sean P Kanuck, 'Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International 
Law' (1996) 37 Harv I n t ' l U l l l , 286.
131 See for example the 1993 missile attacks launched by the U.S. in response to an assassination 
attempt against former President H.W. Bush.
132 Although part of the northern Corfu Channel forms part of the territorial waters of Albania and 
Greece respectively, however the international character of the waters and the rights o f passage in 
international law through such waters illustrate the point at hand. Corfu Channel Case, 29.
133 See generally, Nathan Thornburgh, et al., 'The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (and the Man 
Who Tried to Stop Them)' (2005) 166(10) Time 34.
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originated, and whether the attack was launched as the first blow in a conventional 
interstate conflict, terrorist attack, domestic crime or accident.134 Distributed Denial 
of service attacks maybe even more difficult to trace as attacks come from multiple 
computers recruited to a botnet -  tracing the controlling computer can be a time- 
consuming and difficult job. The attacks launched against Estonia in 2007 and 
Georgia in 2008 are a case in point.
Other scholars have taken issue with the fact that the target of any such attack is
located in the information realm i.e. cyberspace, and have argued that this area is not
1
regulated by the current laws of armed conflict. There are two answers to this
question and which one is applicable is dependant on the mode of attack. The first
answer to concerns over the locus of the target is a practical one. As discussed in
Chapter 1 supra, data does not exist in the ether of cyberspace; it must reside on a
server that is actually present in the physical domain. Although the location for a
target with military significance is likely to be hosted on a State’s own systems it is
also possible that important functions could be located elsewhere, possibly even in a 
1foreign State, so while geographical boundaries are not important, the target is 
still embedded in a geographic location. This physical location has been the basis for 
international consensus on jurisdictional laws relating to cyber crime and electronic 
transactions and it is hard to see any reason why this should hinder international law
1 ^ 7in the area of force and humanitarian law.
The other answer is closely related to the following section on the results of a 
computer network attack which does not affect the physical sphere and is dealt with 
below.
3.1.4. Result
Computer network attacks incorporate many different techniques from simple denial 
of service to direct data or system manipulation and the possible results span the
134 Emily Haslam, 'Information Warfare: Technological Changes and International Law' (2000) 5(2) 
JC&SL 157, 162.
135 See for example, Kanuck, 'Information Warfare: New Challenges for Public International Law', 
287.
136 For example following their virtual declaration of independence, the website of East Timor was 
hosted on Servers in the Republic of Ireland.
137 See for example the U.N. model laws on electronic commerce and computer crime.
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• 1spectrum from mere inconvenience to catastrophic damage to life and property. 
Indeed, the flexibility and wide range of possibile results is one of the reasons that 
such weapons are attractive to the armed forces. However the indeterminate result of 
a computer network attack is also the characteristic that causes the most uncertainty 
in applying the legal requirements of force and the laws of war.
First, while a computer network attack may result in death or damage to physical 
property, it need not do so. The purpose of the attack may simply be to shut off a 
particular service or function; for example, shutting off a particular
110telecommunications system to force an opponent to use a more insecure method. 
Alternatively, the main purpose of the computer network attack may be the denial, 
corruption or exploitation of the information target itself. For example, the Israeli 
attacks against the Syrian air defence radar system which allowed their fighters to 
remain undetected during their raid on a suspected nuclear facility in 2007.140 
Given the character of these attacks, should these results be dealt with in a legal 
manner in the same manner as conventional uses of force, or should they fall into the 
category of other means of coercion?
As the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff have stated:141
“Information Warfare can make an important contribution to defusing crises; 
reducing the period of confrontation and enhancing the impact of informational, 
diplomatic and military efforts, and forestalling or eliminating the need to employ 
forces in a combat situation.”
In terms of the prohibition against force however, the Brownlie and Dinstein models 
of force require that the result of a use of force is fatality or damage to property, 
however no analysis has been undertaken to determine whether such damage to 
property would include damage to intellectual or other intangible property. Of 
course, it has always been legitimate in warfare to steal or corrupt the opponent’s 
information, supply them with disinformation and sabotage their weaponry as long
138 For example the ‘Farewell Dossier’ incident resulted in the “most monumental non-nuclear 
explosion ever seen from space”. Reed, At the Abyss, 269.
139 Schmitt, 'Normative Framework', 888.
140 See Appendix 1 for details of this attack. Fulghum and Barrie, 'Israel Used Electronic Attack in Air 
Strike against Syrian Mystery Target'; Fulghum, Wall and Butler, 'Israel Shows Electronic Prowess'.
141 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Warfare: A Strategy for Peace... The Decisive Edge in War, 
(1996) 5 <http://handle.dtic.mi1/100.2/ADA318379>, cited in Schmitt, Normative Framework', 892.
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as such acts do not constitute perfidy. However this presupposes an armed conflict is 
already under way between the opposing States. Where such acts take place prior to 
the commencement of a traditional attack, the permissiveness of these acts in 
wartime may militate against the question of whether these acts cross the threshold 
of ‘force’ in peacetime. Needless to say however they may still have the character of 
internationally wrongful acts imputing state responsibility for reparations.
Secondly, at the present time it is very hard to determine what the effects of any 
particular attack may be. One of the consequences of the interconnectivity of 
electronic resources is that military systems are often using civilian networks. In fact 
one report estimates that in 1995 ninety-five percent of all U.S. military 
communications traffic flowed over civilian networks.142 As well as posing a 
targeting dilemma, the problem becomes one of accurate mapping of the networks in 
order to determine what the consequences of each type of attack may be. An attack 
designed to electronically incapacitate a command and control centre and early 
warning systems may inadvertently disable critical equipment in a hospital 
connected via a node on a related network. The unpredictable nature of the results is 
one of the major problems in assessing the legality of this new form of warfare.
4. Conclusion
The present author considers that where a computer network attack, directly or 
indirectly, results in a physical consequence, namely destruction of physical 
property, injury or loss of lives, it will constitute a use of force under Article 2(4). 
This appears to be clear from interpretation of the relevant legal instruments despite 
the intangibility of the weapon used; as seen from the discussion above, the weapon 
criteria is losing its relevancy in today’s world. However, where the result of a 
computer network attack does not manifest itself in the physical sphere (that is, it 
affects information only), or its physical results are too minimal or too removed from 
the chain of causation (i.e. the results were not a foreseeable consequence of the act), 
the attack does not fall clearly within the traditional test for Article 2(4) and will not
142 Richard W Aldrich, 'The International Legal Implications of Information Warfare1 (1996) 
Airpower 99, 105. Citing Science Applications International Corporation, “Information Warfare: 
Legal, Regulatory, Policy and Organizational Considerations for Assurance,” research report for the 
chief, Information Warfare Division (J6K), Command, Control, Communications and Computer 
Systems Directorate, Joint Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 4 July 1995.
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constitute a use of force. However, the fact that a computer network attack does not 
rise to the level of a use of force does not imply that it is therefore permissible. It is 
likely that any computer network attack severe enough to raise this question will be 
considered an unlawful interference in the affairs of a State, and may in all 
likelihood amount to a threat to the peace.
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Chapter 3 - Armed Attack & Self-Defence in the Digital
Age
Having looked at computer network attack as a prohibited act in the previous 
chapter, this chapter will look at the exceptions to the prohibition, the permissible 
response to the prohibited act. Other than collective measures, the only exception to 
the prohibition on force set out in the Charter of the United Nations is the inherent 
right of collective or individual self-defence in international law, which is codified in 
Article 51 of the Charter.1 The application of the right of self-defence in the case of 
computer network attacks is particularly complicated, for a number of reasons.
First, it is difficult to see at exactly what point a computer network attack will rise to 
the level of an armed attack. As seen in the previous chapter, traditional international 
law focuses on personal injury, fatality and damage to physical property as measures 
of the seriousness of an attack. This approach is favoured by most commentators 
writing on the subject to date, however many catastrophically damaging computer 
network attacks will not cause any of these deleterious consequences. Further, it is 
likely that any attack using information operations will not come as a single instance 
of attack, but as a series of events which, taken separately, may not be sufficient to 
qualify as an armed attack. This raises the question of the right to respond to ‘pin­
prick’ attacks with a single use of force, a concept which has had a chequered history 
in international law. The likelihood that computer network attacks will be used in 
conjunction with, or as a precursor to, a conventional attack may also raise a right to 
respond to such attacks under the auspices of the controversial doctrine of 
anticipatory self-defence. For example, will mere intrusion into an air defence
1 Article 51 reads “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the 
Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.
Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported 
to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to 
maintain or restore international peace and security.”
2 See Horace B. Robertson, 'Self-Defense against Computer Network Attack under International Law1 
in M N Schmitt and B T O'Donnell (eds), Computer Network Attack and International Law (Naval 
War College, Newport, RI, 2002) 122-145,136, for examples of authors adopting the consequence- 
based approach.
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network be sufficient evidence of an imminent attack following the 2007 Israeli raid 
on the alleged Syrian nuclear site.
The second major difficulty with computer network attacks as opposed to traditional 
kinetic attacks is the difficulty of attributing an attack to its original perpetrator. The 
length of time required to trace an attack makes questions of the necessity of force to 
repel a computer network attack difficult to satisfy. Questions of proportionality also 
arise in determining whether it would ever be proportionate to use armed force in 
response to a computer network attack.
This chapter examines these questions in light of current international law, the 
definition of armed attack and considers in what circumstances force may be used in 
self-defence against a computer network attack.
1. Armed Attack
Self-defence is a customary law right, inherent in the sovereignty of States, which 
has been codified for the most part by Article 51 of the U.N. Charter. The customary 
status of the right has been confirmed by the Nicaragua (Merits) case. Article 51 of 
the Charter allows self-defence in response to an “armed attack” (in French 
“aggression arm6e”). The Nicaragua (Merits) and Oil Platforms decisions confirm 
that nothing short of an armed attack (with the possible exception of an anticipated 
armed attack) will trigger the right of self-defence under international law.4 The Oil 
Platforms case also established that the State using force in self-defence must prove 
that it has been subjected to an armed attack.5 However, as with the term ‘force’, the 
United Nations Charter has not provided a definition of ‘armed attack’. Further, the 
term was not referred to in the Kellogg-Briand Pact or in the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, both of which conventions used the term aggression as the opposite of 
self-defence and hence all attempts at definition were focused on that term.6 The 
drafting history of the Charter provides evidence that discussions took place on the 
difference between an attack and an armed attack (based on the fact that the United
3 Nicaragua (Merits), para 176.
4 Ibid.; Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic o f  Iran v United States o f  America) (2003), 
International Court of Justice, para 51.
5 Oil Platforms Case, para 57.
6 Stanimir A. Alexandrov, Self-Defense against the Use o f Force in International Law (Kluwer Law 
International, The Hague; London, 1996), 95.
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States draft of May 11 contained both terms) and although no definitive conclusion 
was reached, the term was replaced by armed attack only.7 Professor Ian Brownlie 
has pointed out that it is likely that the records of the San Francisco conference 
contain no definition of the phrase ‘armed attack’ because the term was considered 
“sufficiently clear” and “self evident”.8 That was certainly the case in the drafting of 
the North Atlantic Treaty as evidenced by the comments of the Foreign Relations 
Committee of the United States Senate which noted that the phrase “armed attack” in 
Article 5 “is ordinarily self evident” and “there is rarely, if ever, any doubt as to 
whether it has occurred or by whom it was launched”.9 However, since the decision 
of the Court in the Nicaragua (Merits) case, it is clear that an armed attack is a 
subset of the term ‘force’ in Article 2(4) and therefore those actions which have been 
discussed in the previous chapter as falling outside the ambit of the definition of 
armed force, will automatically fail to qualify as an armed attack. Conversely, not 
every use of force will meet the criteria of an armed attack, thus resulting in a gap 
between those actions which constitute a use of force, and those which are an armed 
attack.
The Nicaragua (Merits) decision does not provide any clarification of the definition 
of armed attack, merely stating that “[t]here appears now to be general agreement on 
the nature of the acts which can be treated as constituting armed attacks”.10 However 
the Court fails to reiterate what that agreement may be, merely citing an example as 
follows:11
“In particular, it may be considered to be agreed that an armed attack must be 
understood as including not merely action by regular armed forces across an 
international border, but also 'the sending by or on behalf of a State of armed bands, 
groups, irregulars or mercenaries, which carry out acts of armed force against 
another State of such gravity as to amount to' (inter alia) an actual armed attack 
conducted by regular forces, 'or its substantial involvement therein'. This 
description, contained in Article 3, paragraph (g), of the Definition of Aggression
7 Foreign Relations of the United States 1945 (Washington, 1967) Vol 1, 674, as cited in Ibid., 98.
8 Brownlie, Use o f Force by States, 278.
9 Report of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in the North Atlantic Treaty, June 6, 1949, 
cited in Alexandrov, Self-Defense, 96.
10 Nicaragua (Merits), para 195.
11 Ibid.
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annexed to General Assembly resolution 3314 (XXIX), may be taken to reflect 
customary international law.”
The Court goes on to consider which actions do not constitute an armed attack, but 
fall within the gap between acts constituting a use of force and the threshold for an 
act to qualify as an armed attack.
“But the Court does not believe that the concept of'armed attack' includes not only 
acts by armed bands where such acts occur on a significant scale but also assistance 
to rebels in the form of the provision of weapons or logistical or other support. Such 
assistance may be regarded as a threat or use of force, or amount to intervention in 
the internal or external affairs of other States.”12
“As stated above, the Court is unable to consider that, in customary international 
law, the provision of arms to the opposition in another State constitutes an armed 
attack on that State.”13
Thus it would appear that under current international law the definition of ‘armed 
attack’, as held by the majority of the Court in Nicaragua (Merits), is still dependent 
on the “scale and effects” of an attack which must be sufficient to elevate such 
actions beyond “mere frontier incidents”.14 This view that an armed attack must be 
of “relatively large scale and with substantial effect”, is reiterated by several leading 
scholars,15 and is in agreement with the de minimis rule for small scale attacks set out 
in Article 2 of the Definition of Aggression adopted by the UN General Assembly, 
the example given by the Court in the Nicaragua (Merits) case.16
12 Ibid. This position was strongly criticised by Judges Schwebel and Jennings in their dissenting 
opinions, Schwebel holding that the term substantial involvement in the Definition o f Aggression 
meant that an armed attack could include financial and logistical support.
13 Ibid., para 231.
14 Ibid., para 195.
15 See for example Albrecht Randelzhofer, 'Article 51' in B Simma (ed) The Charter o f  the United 
Nations: A Commentary (2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 788, 796. (with 
accompanying citations).
16 The Security Council may determine whether actions falling under the examples given in Article 3 
do not constitute ‘acts of aggression’ owing to their lack of gravity. Definition o f  Aggression, Article 
2, as cited in Ibid.
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Yoram Dinstein argues that the existence of the gap conveys that the use of force 
must be of sufficient gravity before armed attack is in progress, no matter that it be 
of small magnitude.17
As stated above, the Court confirmed that armed attack is a narrower term than force, 
stating that it is necessary to distinguish “the most grave forms of the use of force
1 ft(those constituting an armed attack) from other less grave forms”. The resultant 
gap between force and armed attack results in the peculiar situation where an illegal 
use of force not tantamount to an armed attack may be launched by one State against 
another, leaving the victim State unable to respond in self-defence. Logically and 
pragmatically the gap has to be quite narrow, inasmuch as “there is very little 
effective protection against States violating the prohibition on the use of force, as 
long as they do not resort to an armed attack”.19 Michael Schmitt has commented 
that this distinction makes sense in light of the Charter’s central purpose to ‘maintain 
international peace and security’, and argues that this creates a rebuttable 
presumption against the resort by States to violence.20 “Thus it is logical to interpret 
the prohibition on the use of force expansively, but characterise exceptions that lie 
outside the community decisional architecture, such as self-defense, narrowly” 21 
Other commentators have argued however that it makes no logical sense to prohibit a 
State from forcibly defending itself or permitting its allies to come to the State’s
O')defence where it is the subject of an unlawful use of force. Any fears of an 
unwarranted escalation of an incident can be dealt with under the existing rules 
pertaining to proportionality. Despite such debate, following the Nicaragua 
(Merits) and Oil Platforms cases it is now established in international law that a gap 
exists in the laws relating to armed force and armed attack. However, the thresholds
17 Dinstein, 'CNA and Self-Defense*, 100.
18 Nicaragua (Merits), para 191.
19 Dinstein, 'CNA and Self-Defense', 100. Randelzhofer, 'Article 51', 661, 664.
20 Michael N. Schmitt, Bellum Americanum Revisited: US Security Strategy and the Jus Ad Bellum 
(28 February 2003), transcript available in 176 Mil L Rev 364-421.
21 Ibid.
22 See for example John Hargrove, 'The Nicaragua Judgment and the Future of the Law of Force and 
Self-Defense' (1987) 81 AJIL 135,141.
23 See for example Rosalyn Higgins, Problems and Process: International Law and How We Use It 
(Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993), 242.
of each of these concepts, and the responses which each allows are yet to be 
established with any certainty.
This uncertainty makes the classification of any computer network attack particularly 
difficult. As noted previously, the possible effects of computer network attacks “span 
the spectrum of consequentiality”,24 thus making classification based on the type of 
computer network attack impossible. It seems certain however that where a 
computer network attack causes destruction and fatalities on a par with a 
conventional attack, a State will have a right to respond in self-defence. This is the 
conclusion reached in a report by the Office of General Counsel of the U.S. 
Department of Defence which concluded:
“ [I]f a coordinated com puter network attack shuts down a nation’s air traffic control 
system along w ith its banking and financial systems and public utilities, and opens 
the floodgates o f  several dams resulting in general flooding that causes widespread 
civilian deaths and property damage, it may well be that no-one would challenge a 
victim  nation if  it concluded that it was the victim o f  an armed attack, or o f  an act 
equivalent to an armed attack.”
However the report fails to separate and analyse the attack in its component parts, 
combining those components which directly cause death and destruction with less 
severe attacks. Schmitt focuses on the consequences of the attack rather than on the 
object of the attack or on the intentions of the attacker; the exception being where the 
intentions of the attacker are specifically to cause physical damage to tangible 
objects or injury to human beings, in which case Schmitt considers the resort to 
armed force is permitted. He argues that self-defence should be limited to 
operations which are de-facto armed attacks, or imminently preparatory thereto; the 
net result being a limitation on both sides to resort to CNA techniques which might 
threaten global stability and on individual responses which might themselves prove
ondestabilizing.
24 Schmitt, 'Normative Framework', 912.
25 Office o f General Counsel, An Assessment on International Legal Issues in Information Operations, 
United States Department of Defense (1999) <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod-io-legal/dod- 
io-legal.pdf> (last accessed 30 January 2007).
26 Schmitt, 'Normative Framework', 928.
27 Ibid., 886. This is accord with his generally contextualist analysis discussed in Chapter 2, infra.
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In contrast, Walter Sharp, one of the early authors on the subject, argues that any
intrusion into systems containing information which is critical to the national
security of the victim State should be considered an armed attack capable of
triggering the right to respond with force.28 However Sharp’s view has not been
borne out by state practice which to date has recognised such intrusions as simple
espionage, an act which is not prohibited under international law.
Another approach to self-defence is Yoram Dinstein’s concept o f ‘interceptive’ self-
defence.29 While Dinstein rejects the notion of anticipatory self-defence,30 he
incorporates actions taken in advance of an actual attack by moving the timing of the
beginning of the attack. Dinstein argues that the beginning of an armed attack is not
linked to the first shot but rather to the moment of irrevocable commitment to the
attack. Once the die has been cast, the armed attack can be said to have commenced
1and the victim state need not “wait impotently for the inescapable blow”. This 
concept has echoes in the ‘target locking’ arguments of some States in respect of 
modem precision-guided missiles. For example, the U.S. argues that an armed attack 
begins when the radar guiding the missile is locked on and ready to fire, and the 
rules of engagement of their armed forces reflect this approach.32 While Dinstein’s 
approach may prove a useful halfway house between traditional self-defence 
analyses and anticipatory self-defence for kinetic attacks, given the immediate nature 
of computer network attacks and the fact that an attack can be launched in seconds, it 
does not seem useful in assessing individual computer network attacks as armed 
attacks in their own right. Where a computer network attack is launched in 
conjunction with a traditional attack, the concept may prove more useful. For 
example, had the 2007 Israeli intrusion into the Syrian air defence radar system been 
detected, would such an intrusion be sufficient to trigger the right of self-defence, or 
would Syria need to wait until the system was actually being manipulated in 
preparation for an air strike? As Micheal Schmitt notes, the question is does the
28 Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use o f Force, 129.
29 Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 187.
30 See section 1.1 infra on anticipatory self-defence.
31 Dinstein, 'CNA and Self-Defense', 111.
32 Gray, Use o f  Force, 108, nl48. For example, in 1998 U.S. aircraft in the no-fly zone over Iraq fired 
at a missile battery when its radar had locked on to the planes patrolling the zone. Although there was 
controversy over whether the radar had locked on, the idea that the armed attack had started when the 
radar locked on was apparently accepted by Iraq and other States: Keesings (1998) 42368.
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CNA appear merely preparatory, or is it more likely an irreversible step in the final 
chain of events.
Michael Schmitt has proposed a three-prong test for determining when a State may 
respond forcefully in self-defence to a computer network attack (CNA) that does not 
in and of itself constitute an armed attack:34
1) The CNA is part of an overall operation culminating in armed attack;
2) The CNA is an irrevocable step in an imminent (near-term) and probably 
unavoidable attack; and
3) The defender is reacting in advance of the attack itself during the last possible 
window of opportunity available to effectively counter the attack.
Schmitt is careful to point out however that the self-defence is not in response to the 
computer network attack but rather the attack as a whole, including the computer 
network attack component. The wording used by Schmitt of the ‘last possible 
window of opportunity’ is similar to Yoram Dinstein’s reinterpretation of the 
beginning of an attack as the attacker “embarks upon an irreversible course of action, 
thereby crossing the legal Rubicon”.
1.1. Anticipatory Self-Defence
It is likely that computer network attacks will be used in conjunction with, or as an 
prelude to, a traditional armed attack. Such attacks designed to ‘prepare the battle 
space’ can come in a myriad of forms, including the disablement of intelligence 
gathering sensors such as satellites and radar posts via computer network attack, 
disruption of military communications networks leaving units isolated and unable to 
be scrambled, or on the civilian level, disablement of emergency response networks
33 Schmitt, Normative Framework’, 932.
34 Ibid., 933. See also, nl30 noting that Michael Walzer has suggested a similar line of reasoning: 
“The line between legitimate and illegitimate first strikes is not going to be drawn at the point of 
imminent attack but at the point of sufficient threat. That phrase is necessarily vague. I mean it to 
cover three things: a manifest intent to injure, a degree of active preparation that makes that intent a 
positive danger, and a general situation in which waiting, or doing anything other than fighting, 
greatly magnifies the risk.” Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars: A Moral Argument with 
Historical Illustrations (2nd ed, Basic Books, New York, 1992), 81.
35 Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 172. Although as noted, Dinstein does not advocate 
anticipatory self-defence, he argues for “interceptive” self-defence, distinguished by the requirement 
that the attacker has committed itself to an attack in an irrevocable way.
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may be launched in anticipation of more traditional kinetic action to follow. It is 
certainly clear that States are considering how a combination of electronic and 
traditional attacks might be used in the future. For example, the U.S. actively looked 
for computer network solutions prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, and China is 
openly looking for an ‘assassin’s mace’ to address the perceived asymmetry of the 
Chinese military against the U.S. in conventional conflicts, widely believed to 
incorporate computer network attacks.36 As Robertson points out, in modem warfare 
the electronic battlefield will play a crucial role, and any steps that a prospective 
attacker can take to neutralise or destroy its enemy’s command and control, 
intelligence, communications, or weapons-control networks prior to a traditional 
attack would gain an enormous advantage. This advantage was seen in the 2007 
Israeli attack on the suspected Syrian nuclear site where the air defence radar did not 
detect the attacking planes until they were disappearing back over the border.38 
While such attacks may not be sufficient to amount to an armed attack in and of 
themselves, as preparatory moves in a conventional attack, they may be sufficient to 
justify the use of force under the doctrine of anticipatory self-defence.
1.1.1. Doctrinal Debate and Imminent Attacks
Anticipatory self-defence is one of the most contentious legal doctrines regarding the 
use of force. There is no consensus in international legal doctrine over the point in
-IQ
time from which measures of self-defence against an armed attack may be taken.
The debate centres on whether anticipatory, self-defence survived the implementation 
of Article 51 of the UN Charter which states that nothing in the Charter “shall impair 
the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs”. 
Those arguing for a restrictive interpretation of the clause interpret this to mean that 
the right of self-defence is now only available to member States who are the object 
of an actual armed attack. Gray, Kelsen and Brownlie are some of the leading 
proponents of this view which is based on the premise that the Charter forbids any
36 David A. Fulghum, 'Frustrations and Backlogs' (2003) 158(10) Aviation Week & Space Technology 
10 March 2003 33. According to reports these attempts were never put into action due to the 
interconnectedness of the target systems with foreign owned networks.
37 Robertson, 'Self-Defense against CNA', 139.
38 See Fulghum, Wall and Butler, 'Israel Shows Electronic Prowess'.
39 Randelzhofer, 'Article 51', 803.
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use of force on the part of individual members except for the right of self-defence 
against an armed attack.40
Those arguing for a more expansive approach point out that Article 51 specifically 
reserves the ‘inherent right’ of self-defence, and the customary right includes the 
right to respond to an imminent armed attack.41 Although ultimately disagreeing with 
the position, Bothe points out that many authors acknowledge that a threat may be so 
direct and overwhelming that it is just not feasible to require the victim to wait to act 
in self-defence until the act has actually started.42 The standard to be applied was set 
out by U.S. Secretary of State Daniel Webster in his letter regarding the Caroline 
case that the right of self-defence only arises where there is “a necessity of self- 
defence, instant, overwhelming, leaving no choice of means, and no moment for 
deliberation”.43 As Greenwood notes, the Caroline test was applied by the 
international military tribunals at Nuremburg and Tokyo, suggesting that a right of 
anticipatory self-defence against imminent attacks was part of the customary law 
right preserved by Article 51 of the Charter.44 The preservation of an inherent right 
of self-defence and the existence of customary rights outside the Charter wording is 
also recognized by the Court in the Nicaragua (Merits) case which noted that the 
Charter does not contain all the rules pertaining to self-defence, notably a definition 
of armed attack and the requirement of necessity and proportionality in any 
response.45 The Court expressly did not comment on the lawfulness of a response to
40 Bowett, Self-Defence, 188. See also Brownlie, Use o f Force by States, 275; Ian Brownlie, 
International Law and the Use o f Force by States: Revisited (Europaeum, Oxford, 2001); Dinstein, 
War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 183; Randelzhofer, 'Article 51', 803-804; Gray, Use o f Force,
130.
41 Authors subscribing to this expansive view include Bowett, Self-Defence, 187-192; Robert Y. 
Jennings and C. Arthur. H. Watts (eds), Oppenheim's International Law (9th ed, Longman, Harlow, 
1992), 421; Thomas M. Franck, Recourse to Force: State Action against Threats and Armed Attacks 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002), 97; Christopher Greenwood, 'International Law and 
the Pre-Emptive Use o f Force: Afganistan, Al-Qaida, and Iraq' (2003) 4 San Diego In t'lL J l,
42 Michael Bothe, 'Terrorism and the Legality of Pre-Emptive Force' (2003) 14(2) EJIL 227,231.
43 In that incident, U.K. forces captured, fired and sent over the Niagara Falls a merchant vessel called 
the Caroline which was being used by Canadian rebels and their American forces in attacks against 
passing British Ships. At the time of the U.K. attack the ship was moored in an American port and 
two U.S. nationals were killed. One of the British officers, Lieutenant McLeod, was later arrested in 
the United States on charges of murder arising out of the incident. The British government, seeking 
McLeod’s release, maintained that its forces had acted in self-defence, to which U.S. Secretary of 
State Daniel Webster replied in what has become the accepted statement of self-defence doctrine at 
the time. The Caroline Case (1837) 29 BFSP 1137-1138, 30 BFSP 195-196.
44 Greenwood, 'Pre-Emptive Use of Force', 13.
45 Nicaragua (Merits), para 176.
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an imminent armed attack as it was not required on the facts of the case.46 This 
approach has been followed in the Wall and Armed Activities cases, with the ICJ 
avoiding the difficult questions of self-defence and expressly stating no view on 
anticipatory self-defence.47 Two recent U.N. reports have not been so reluctant 
however. The 2004 report of the U.N. Secretary-General’s High Level Panel 
concluded that there was an existing right of anticipatory self-defence against 
imminent attacks basing their conclusion on customary international law. Likewise 
the Report of the Secretary-General the following year expresses the view that 
responses to imminent threats are fully covered by Article 51 of the Charter.49
1.I.2. State Practice
The content of any customary right of anticipatory self-defence must be examined in 
light of state practice since the inception of the Charter. While state practice is far 
from conclusive on the matter, two instances in particular tend to indicate that the 
doctrine has survived. The first is the Israeli-Arab war of 1967. Following escalating 
tensions between Syria and Israel, Egypt requested the removal of the U.N. 
emergency force from Egyptian territory, reinforced troops in the Sinai and 
dispatched troops to Jordon. Egyptian President Nasser also closed the Straits of 
Tiran to Israeli shipping (an act that Israel had previously made clear it would 
consider as an act of war) amid statements indicating his intention to eliminate Israel. 
In response to these actions Israel launched strikes against Egypt’s airbases, 
completely destroying the Egyptian air force.50 Although Israel initially justified its 
actions by claiming that it had been attacked first, it later stressed both the character 
of the Egyptian blockade as an act of war and the very dangerous situation that it 
found itself in immediately prior to the Israeli attack.51 Gray rejects this incident as
46 Ibid., para 194.
47 The Wall Case; Armed Activities Case, para 143.
48 United Nations, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility Report o f  the Secretary- 
GeneraTs High-Level Panel on Threats Challenges and Change, United Nations, UN Doc. A/59/565 
(2004) 63, para 188.
49 UN Secretary General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for  
All, United Nations, UN Doc. A/59/2005 (2005) para 124.
50 For a full exposition of the facts of this incident see A. Mark Weisburd, Use o f  Force: The Practice 
o f  States since World War II  (Pennsylvania State University Press, University Park, Pa., 1997), 135.
51 Ibid., 137, citing (1967) UN Yearbook, 175, 195-196.
87
evidence of an acceptance of anticipatory self-defence stating that “whatever 
position is taken on the facts of the outbreak of the Six Day War, the point of 
importance here is that Israel did not claim to be acting in anticipatory self- 
defence”.52 However Franck notes that Israel’s “words and actions clearly asserted a
C'i
right of anticipatory self-defence against an imminent armed attack”. Franck 
comments:54
“M ost states, on the basis o f  the evidence available to  them, did however conclude 
that such an armed attack was imminent, that Israel had reasonably surmised that it 
stood a better chance o f  survival if  the attack were pre-empted, and that, therefore, 
in the circumstances, it had not acted unreasonably. This does not amount to an 
open-ended endorsement o f  a general right to anticipatory self-defense, but it does 
recognize that, in demonstrable circumstances o f  extreme necessity, anticipatory 
self-defense may be a legitimate exercise o f  a State’s right to  ensure its survival” .
This accords with the decision of the International Court of Justice in the Nuclear 
Weapons case, which indirectly commented on the situation when the majority of 
judges were unable to conclude that the first-use of nuclear weapons would 
invariably be unlawful if the very existence of the State were threatened.55 
In comparison, when Israel attacked and destroyed the Tuwaitha Research Centre 
and Osarik nuclear reactor near Baghdad, Iraq in 1981, the action was “strongly 
condemned” by the Security Council,56 and in general States’ reactions to the 
bombing were condemnatory of Israel. In most cases the reaction was based on a 
conclusion that Israel had failed to demonstrate that there was an imminent threat 
from Iraq and has thus failed to satisfy the Caroline requirements for anticipatory
cn
self-defence rather than a general dismissal of a right of anticipatory self-defence.
As Greenwood points out, the emphasis on this failure to demonstrate the existence 
of the imminent threat tends, if anything, to confirm the existence of a right of self-
52 Gray, Use o f  Force, 131.
53 Franck, Recourse to Force, 103.
54 Ibid., 105.
55 Legality o f the Use by a State o f  Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflicts (1996) ICJ 26, International 
Court of Justice, 265, para 105(262)E.
56 SC Res 487, U.N. SCOR, 2288th Mtg, UN Doc. S/Res/487 (1981).
57 Franck, Recourse to Force, 105.
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defence in cases where such an imminent threat was shown to exist. He goes on to 
cite Rosalyn Higgins who notes:59
“[I]n a nuclear age, common sense cannot require one to interpret an ambiguous 
provision in a text in a way that requires a state passively to accept its fate before it 
can defend itself. And, even in the face of conventional warfare, this would also 
seem the only realistic interpretation of the contemporary right of self-defence. It is 
the potentially devastating consequences of prohibiting self-defence unless an armed 
attack has already occurred that leads one to prefer this interpretation -  although it 
has to be said that, as a matter of simple construction of the words alone, another 
conclusion might be reached.”
In assessing what will constitute an imminent attack, Greenwood argues that there 
are two additional factors which must be taken into account which did not exist at 
the time of the Caroline incident:60
The first is the gravity of the threat. The threat posed by a nuclear weapon, or a 
biological or chemical weapon, if used against a city, is so horrific that it is in a 
different league from the threats posed (as in the Caroline) by cross-border raids 
conducted by men armed only with rifles. Where the threat is an attack by weapons 
of mass destruction, the risk imposed upon a State by waiting until that attack 
actually takes place compounded by the impossibility for that State to afford its 
population any effective protection once the attack has been launched, mean that 
such an attack can reasonably be treated as imminent in circumstances where an 
attack by conventional means would not be so regarded. The second consideration 
is the method of delivery of the threat. It is far more difficult to determine the time 
scale within which a threat of attack by terrorist means would materialize than it is 
with threats posed by, for example, regular armed forces. These would be material 
considerations in assessing whether, in any particular case, an attack should be 
treated as imminent.
It is the view of the present author that a right of self-defence against an imminent 
attack is established in international law. The impact of computer network attacks as 
imminent threats is discussed in section 1.1.4, infra.
58 Greenwood, 'Pre-Emptive Use of Force', 14.
59 Higgins, Problems and Process, 242.
60 Greenwood, 'Pre-Emptive Use of Force', 16.
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1.1.3. The ‘Bush Doctrine ’ o f Pre-Emptive Self-Defence
In recent years the United States has released two national security strategy 
documents containing a highly controversial attempt at enlarging the right to self- 
defence to include the use of force to pre-empt an attack which is merely threatened 
but not imminent. The 2002 National Security Strategy is a carefully worded attempt 
to extend the concept of anticipatory self-defence by redefining the concept of 
imminence so as to take into account the exigencies of modem terrorism:61
Legal scholars and international jurists often conditioned the legitimacy o f 
preemption on the existence o f  an imminent threat— m ost often a visible 
m obilization o f  armies, navies, and air forces preparing to attack.
W e must adapt the concept o f  imminent threat to the capabilities and objectives o f 
today’s adversaries.... The greater the threat, the greater is the risk o f  inaction—  and 
the more compelling the case for taking anticipatory action to defend ourselves, 
even if  uncertainty remains as to the time and place o f  the enem y’s attack. To 
forestall or prevent such hostile acts by our adversaries, the United States will, if  
necessary, act preemptively.
The sentiments of the 2002 report are repeated in the National Security Strategy 
2006.62 While at first glance, this may appear to extrapolate logically based on the 
contingencies of modem weaponry, it compromises the basic premise of anticipatory 
self-defence laid down in the Caroline and the evidence of state practice which has 
evolved the doctrine since. Greenwood has noted, far from removing the requirement 
of imminence “.. .practice also shows that the right of anticipatory self-defence is 
confined to instances where the armed attack is imminent.”63 He goes on to state “In 
so far as talk of a doctrine of ‘pre-emption’ is intended to refer to a broader right of 
self-defence to respond to threats that might materialize at some time in the future,
61 White House, The National Security Strategy o f  the United States ofAmerica, White House (2002) 
15 <http://www.whitehouse.gov/nsc/nss.pdf> (last accessed 21 February 2004).
62 White House, National Security Strategy o f the United States ofAmerica, White House, (2006) 
2330 August 2008). Although Gray notes the striking absence of any express reference to 
international law, the 2006 report does state that “the United States will, if necessary, act pre­
emptively in exercising our inherent right of self-defense” most likely an implicit reference to Art. 51 
of die Charter: Christine D. Gray, 'The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy 
of the USA' (2006) 5(3) Chinese Journal o f  International Law 555, 561.
63 Greenwood, 'Pre-Emptive Use of Force', 15.
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such a doctrine has no basis in law.”64 Certainly state practice to date has not 
indicated widespread support for the doctrine and both U.N. reports on security have 
rejected any wider right of pre-emptive self-defence, indicating it is for the Security 
Council to take pre-emptive action.65
1.1.4. Computer Network Attacks and Anticipatory Self-Defence
There are two situations where anticipatory self-defence may be implicated in the 
information warfare context. First, where a computer network attack serves as an 
imminent threat of a conventional attack and secondly, where electronic activity 
indicates a severe computer network attack (which rises to the level of an armed 
attack) is imminent.
As with any assessment of an imminent attack the context of a computer network 
attack must be taken into account. Where a computer network attack is launched as a 
precursor to conventional attack, the target will be important. If an attack targets 
early warning systems, radar posts or satellite feeds, military communications, or 
emergency response systems it is more likely that a State will judge a traditional 
attack to be imminent. The Israeli attack against the Syrian air-defence network is a 
case in point. Had Syria become aware of the intrusion and manipulation of its air- 
defence radar prior to the attack, they would have been entitled to use force in 
response. The disruption of electrical power grids or financial systems on the other 
hand is unlikely to be sufficiently indicative of a subsequent conventional attack 
when viewed in isolation. Thus when Estonia was subject to distributed denial of 
service attacks against its banking, media and governmental sites, there were no 
realistic fears that this signalled the beginning of a traditional armed attack. The 
additional variables, such as positive attribution to a particular actor and possible 
motivation, are too many and too varied. However, when such attacks are viewed in 
conjunction with other contextual indicators, States may conclude that conventional 
attack is imminent.
64 Ibid.
65 United Nations, A More Secure World, para 189-192; UN Secretary General, In Larger Freedom, 
125. See generally Gray, The Bush Doctrine Revisited: The 2006 National Security Strategy of the 
USA'; Christian M. Henderson, The 2006 National Security Strategy of the United States: The Pre- 
Emptive Use of Force and the Persistent Advocate' (2007) 15 Tulsa J  Comp & Int’l 1 1. for a 
discussion of international reaction to the ‘Bush Doctrine.
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The second instance where a computer network attack may be evidence of an 
imminent armed attack is the use of computer network intrusions to prepare an 
electronic battlespace. Viruses, worms, Trojan horses and other forms of malware 
routinely infect unprotected computers with malicious code which may corrupt data, 
cause a malfunction, record keystrokes, disable virus protection and collect other 
information such as passwords and other access codes, feeding them back to a 
remote attacker. One of the most common features of these types of malware is some 
form of backdoor payload which allows the attacker to access and control the 
computer at a later date. Such malware spreads and ‘recruits’ unprotected computers 
to vast networks of compromised computers called botnets,66 which can be directed 
to send large amounts of traffic to particular IP addresses bringing them, and in some 
cases the transmission routes, to a standstill in a distributed denial of service attack. 
Botnets were utilised in the distributed denial of service attacks against Estonia in 
2007.67
The inclusion of backdoor payloads in malware raises interesting questions with 
relation to anticipatory self-defence. It is clear that a backdoor has no other purpose 
than to allow an intruder control over the infected computer (whether by direct 
intrusion or remote control) at a later date. A question which must then be addressed 
is whether a State has the right to respond in anticipatory self-defence against the 
perpetrators of a computer network attack with a backdoor payload. Although a 
backdoor can be used for attacks at any point until it is discovered and removed and 
such attacks may have far more serious consequences, including those which would 
qualify as an armed attack, in most cases, the later use is to send spam or launch 
distributed denial of service attacks causing inconvenience and causing only 
economic damage. Without further information about the purpose or target of any 
later attack, the mere creation of a backdoor by a State adversary is not indicative of 
the type or gravity of the attack to follow; indeed the creation of a backdoor may
66 The largest botnet recorded to date is the Storm botnet with the most accurate estimates claiming up 
to 80,000 infected computers. Botnets are notoriously difficult to estimate and estimates for Storm 
have been up to 50 million infected computers. Analysts are agreed however that it has shrunk from 
its peak.
67 Gadi Evron, 'Battling Botnets and Online Mobs' (2008) 9(1) GLIA 121, 124.
68 A backdoor is a piece of code which opens a hidden or undocumented access point to the 
compromised computer or system.
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merely be evidence of espionage.69 Further, the existence of a backdoor would not 
meet the ‘imminent’ criteria, as the timescale for any subsequent attack is variable; 
the attack could be launched within days or years.
Other network intrusions may more indicative, but they will be highly dependent on 
the circumstances. It should be noted however, that the method of delivery of an 
attack means that there may be little warning of an impending computer network 
attack, one of Greenwood’s additional factors to be considered when determining 
whether an attack is imminent.70 However Greenwood’s second factor, the gravity of 
threat, will depend on the individual threat; as pointed out in the previous chapter, 
one of the difficulties with assessing computer network attacks is that they span the 
‘spectrum of consequentiality’.71 While a computer network attack against critical 
infrastructure such as electricity grids, dams and oil pipelines would be devastating 
to modem society, and may result in death and property damage, the gravity of the 
threat is not comparable to that posed by a nuclear, biological or chemical weapon.
In this regard, with the very survival of the State not in question, it is unlikely that 
the threat would be assessed as imminent.
1.2. Pin Prick Attacks or Accumulation of Events Theory
Computer network attacks falling below the armed attack threshold may still trigger 
a forcible response by States. The likely strategy of computer network attacks is such 
that a single strike qualifying as an armed attack is less likely to be launched than a 
swarm of lesser attacks. In a short story written in 1998, John Arquilla has detailed 
what a sustained cyber attack might look like;72 power blackouts, followed by 
weekly vims attacks of the magnitude of the recent Nimda, Slammer or Mydoom 
viruses, oil pipeline ruptures all launched within a matter of days of one another. 
While some of these attacks may cross the threshold of use of force, it is unlikely 
that any taken on their own would be considered an armed attack under current 
international law. An analogy may be drawn with cases of repeated cross border
69 Backdoors have been found on computers allegedly compromised by Chinese hackers.
70 Greenwood, 'Pre-Emptive Use of Force', 16.
71 Schmitt, 'Normative Framework', 912.
72 John Arquilla, 'The Great Cyberwar of 2002' (1998) Wired Magazine February 1998 
<http://hotwired.wired.eom/collections/future_of_war/6.02_cyberwar_20021.html> (last accessed 9 
February 2002).
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incursions. States have claimed a right to act in self-defence against the whole series 
of incursions as collectively amounting to an armed attack. This so-called ‘pin-prick’ 
or ‘accumulation of events’ theory has been unsuccessfully claimed in the past by 
several States, including the United Kingdom,73 the United States,74 South Africa 
and Israel,75 to justify actions purportedly taken in self-defence. Although the 
Security Council has rejected claims by these States, it has done so on the grounds 
that such actions were disproportionate to the incursions and looked more like 
unlawful reprisals, rather than commenting on the doctrine of accumulation of 
events.
Likewise, the International Court of Justice has avoided discussing the question, 
although it appears willing to contemplate the possibility of an accumulation of 
events amounting to an armed attack. The Court in the Nicaragua (Merits) case 
commented with regard to the incursions by Nicaragua into the territory of Honduras 
and Costa Rica:76
“Very little information is available to the Court as to the circumstances of these 
incursions or to their possible motivations, which renders it difficult to decide 
whether they may be treated for legal purposes as amounting, singly or collectively, 
to an ‘armed attack’ by Nicaragua on either or both States”.
This statement would seem to indicate a willingness on the part of the Court to 
consider that a series of small attacks on a target may amount to an armed attack 
when viewed collectively. This is a view reiterated in both the Oil Platforms and
73 In 1964 the Southern Arab Federation (SAF) which had military links with the United Kingdom, 
complained of an armed attack by the Yemen which consisted of a “series o f aggressions”; invoking 
collective self defence at the SAF’s request, the UK launched an air strike and destroyed a fort. The 
Security Council did not accept the reasoning and issued a statement condemning reprisals as 
incompatible with the principles and purposes of the UN”. SC Res 188, 9 April 1964, as cited in Jean 
Combacau, The Exception o f Self Defence in U.N Practice' in A Cassese (ed) The Current Legal 
Regulation o f  the Use o f Force (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 1986) 9-38,27.
74 The U.S. claimed it was acting in self defence against alleged attacks by North Vietnamese naval 
vessels in the Gulf of Tonkin. Letter of 17 Febuary 1979, S/13094 (SCOR, 36th Year) cited in Ibid., 
17.
75 The Security Council has rejected claims of self-defence by Israel made to justify incursions into 
neighbouring States to attack palestininian bases, when it attacked Jordan in 1966 (SC Res 228,25 
November 1966) & 1969 (SC Res 265, 1 April 1969), and Lebanon in 1969 (SC Res 270, 16 August 
1969), 1970 (SC Res 279, 12 May 1970), 1972 (SC Res 313,28 February 1972), 1973 (SC Res 332, 
21 April 1973) & 1974 (SC Res 347, 24 April 1974). See Ibid.
76 Nicaragua (Merits), para 231. It should be noted that the Court found that there had not been an 
armed attack by Nicaragua based on additional circumstances.
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Cameroon/Nigeria cases.77 While not deciding on the point, the Court also appears 
to permit the concept of an armed attack through cumulative attacks. In both cases 
while the Court appeared to endorse the concept of a cumulative armed attack, it 
found that neither the United States nor Cameroon respectively had sufficiently 
proved the facts or imputability to the other party.78 If this concept does find greater 
authority for a forcible response to an accumulation of events, this would obviously 
apply to computer network attacks as well.
However, not all attacks which are launched from multiple computers will 
necessitate a cumulative approach to qualify as an armed attack. A distributed denial 
of service attack of sufficient scale and effect to elevate it above a ‘mere frontier 
incident’ would be considered a single attack as the attack originates from a single
*JQ
controller using a master and slave configuration. That is, although the attack 
appears to come from a series of computers, the compromised computers are 
receiving instructions from a single controlling ‘master’ which orders the
o/\
compromised computers to launch attacks on victim sites. This is merely the 
electronic equivalent of an attack using more than one soldier, or a wave of bombers 
in an air strike.
2. Attribution
One of the major problems with any computer network attack is the attribution of the 
attack to a particular actor. While the origin of some attacks becomes immediately
o 1
evident, either because the attacker identifies themselves, or because they precede 
traditional attacks that are easily attributed to a particular source,82 other attacks will
77 Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. 
Nigeria: Equatorial Guinea Intervening) (2002) ICJ Reports, International Court of Justice, para 323; 
Oil Platforms Case, para 64.
78 Oil Platforms Case, para 64.
79 For a detailed description of Distributed Denial of service attacks, see Bennett Todd, Distributed 
Denial o f  Service Attacks, (2000)
<http://www.linuxsecurity.com/resource_files/intrusion_detection/ddos-faq.html> (last accessed 29 
January 2004).
80 In traditional botnets this is generally through an Internet Relay Chat (IRC) Server. In newer peer- 
to-peer based botnets such as the Storm worm, the controller publishes commands at specific keys in 
the network to be found by infected machines, however the net result is the same.
81 For example, the ‘I Love You’ virus source code contained the ‘signature’ of the author.
82 For example, the Israeli attack on the Syrian air-defences in advance of an air strike.
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be launched anonymously. Given the common use of botnets and the frequency of IP 
spoofing that takes place in computer network attacks,83 it is difficult to state with 
any certainty that the entity which appears to be the perpetrator of the attack, is in 
fact the ultimate attacker.
IP spoofing can be used either to simply mask the origin of an attack, or in a 
deliberate attempt to place the blame for an attack on another party. An early 
example of the latter problem occured in 1999 when a denial of service attack was 
launched against the U.S. Department of Transport. The attack appeared to emanate 
from a server in Maryland run by followers of the Falon Gong movement; in fact the 
attack was designed to take down both the Maryland server and the Department of 
Transport network server leaving the Falon Gong bearing the blame. However the 
attackers had blundered and the attack was traced to a computer located at the 
address of China’s Ministry of Public Security. No information is publicly available 
regarding the U.S. response to this attack, however in 2002 Richard Clarke, then 
White House technology advisor, stated before a Senate Judiciary subcommittee 
hearing on cyber terrorism that the government had never been able to prove to their 
satisfaction that a particular government was responsible for a specific unauthorized 
intrusion.84
The proliferation of botnets also makes attribution difficult. As the 2007 denial of 
service attacks against Estonia proved, it can be very difficult to differentiate 
between attacks which originate from a particular address and those which are 
merely utilising a compromised computer. Although some attacks against Estonia 
were traced to official IP addresses of the Russian authorities, Russia claimed that 
these computers had been compromised and were being manipulated from outside
Of
the Kremlin, a claim which most security analysts believe to be the case.
Of course, problems of attribution aren’t restricted to cyberspace. Armed attacks 
following more conventional patterns are often carried out anonymously, or 
responsibility is claimed by armed groups which appear unlikely to have the
83 IP spoofing essentially forges the data identifying the sending computer in the header of a data 
packet so that it appears to originate from a different IP address, thus any response is sent to the 
forged computer.
84 Jesse J Holland, 'Bush Advisor Warns Cyberterrorists', Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 13 
February 2002, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A6846-2002Febl3.htm> (last 
accessed 30 September 2002).
85 See for example Evron, 'Battling Botnets'.
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resources required for such an attack. Further, in the case of state-sponsored 
terrorism, it is unlikely that any State will step forward to take responsibility for 
kinetic acts let alone electronic ones. Those factors aside, a victim State must still 
establish a link between the attacking group and the sponsoring State, the same 
approach must be taken with electronic attacks.86 This may be particularly difficult 
to prove where attacks are launched by groups or loose affiliations of individuals in 
conjunction with traditional State action. For example, when Russia moved troops 
into South Ossetia following the Georgian offensive in 2008, the air strikes and 
ground forces were accompanied by a series of computer network attacks against 
Georgian servers. While these attacks were certainly not serious enough to amount to 
armed attacks due to Georgia’s limited Internet connectivity, they illustrate the 
capacity for other actors to effectively ‘join-in’ a conflict with or without State 
authorisation. Several security analysts reported botnets alledgedly controlled by the 
Russian Business Network, a group known to be linked to cybercrime, launching 
denial of service attacks at Georgian servers. However denial of service attack 
software was also freely available for download to individual computers from 
Russian language website stopgeorgia.ru along with a list of targets, making joining
0*7
the cyber offensive as simple as a few mouse clicks. The Russian Government
g o
denies any involvement with the attacks, however the issue raises the difficult 
question of state responsibility for non-state actors and the degree of state 
involvement or complicity required before force can be used in self-defence against 
the State. There is not sufficient space in this thesis to address the issue in depth, 
suffice it to note that there is little agreement in the international community on the
OQ
issue in relation to conventional attacks, let alone computer network attacks. 
However, a State must not knowingly allow its territory to be used as a sanctuary for
86 Dinstein, 'CNA and Self-Defense', 112.
87 John Markoff, 'Before the Gunfire, Cyberattacks', New York Times 13 August 2008, 
<http://www.nytiines.com/2008/08/13/technology/13cyber.html> (last accessed 26 August 2008); 
Evgeny Morozov, 'An Army of Ones and Zeroes: How I Became a Soldier in the Georgia-Russia 
Cyberwar' (2008) Slate 14 August 2008 <http://www.slate.com/id/2197514/> (last accessed 2 
September 2008).
88 Siobhan Gorman, 'Georgia States Computers Hit by Cyberattack', Wall Street Journal (New York), 
12 August 2008, A9.
89 For a discussion of legal attribution and state responsibility for non-state actors’ use of force see 
generally Gray, Use o f Force.
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terrorists or armed bands bent on attacking military targets or civilian objects in 
another country.90
The difficulty of attribution also affects the victim State’s ability to engage in 
forcible counter-measures in self-defence.91 The Court in the Oil Platforms case held 
that the burden of proof rests on the State invoking the right of self-defence and that 
the United States had failed to prove that it had been subject to an armed attack by a 
particular State, vis Iran.92 “[A victim State] must not rush headlong into hasty action 
predicated on reflexive impulses and unfounded suspicions; it has no choice but to 
withhold forcible response until hard evidence is collated and the state of affairs is 
clarified, lest the innocent be endangered”.93 Such hasty reactions could lead to the 
escalation of hostilities, something the ban on force was intended to prevent. 
However, the necessity of waiting for hard evidence of responsibility also opens the 
possibility that any action taken against a perpetrator once responsibility has been 
confirmed will be classified as an armed reprisal rather than an action taken in self- 
defence. Armed reprisals are prohibited under international law.94
3. Necessity & Proportionality
All responses to attacks, whether their means of delivery are kinetic or electronic, are 
subject to the underlying principles of proportionality and necessity. The 
International Court of Justice has repeatedly confirmed that the rule “whereby self- 
defence would warrant only measures which are proportional to the armed attack and 
necessary to respond to it” is well established in customary international law.95 
The principle of necessity in international law requires that any measures taken 
avowedly in self-defence must have been necessary for that purpose; the principle is 
strict and objective “leaving no room for any measure of discretion”.96 That is, it is
90 Ian Brownlie, 'International Law and the Activities of Armed Bands' (1958) 7 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 712, 734. cited in Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 206.
91 Sharp, Cyberspace and the Use o f  Force, 133. cited in Dinstein, 'CNA and Self-Defense', 111.
92 Oil Platforms Case, paras 57, 61.
93 Dinstein, 'CNA and Self-Defense', 111.
94 Declaration on Principles o f International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-Operation 
among States in Accordance with the Charter o f the United Nations, GA Res. 2625 (XXV).
95 Nicaragua (Merits), paras 176 & 194; Nuclear Weapons Case, para 41; Oil Platforms Case, para 
74.
96 Oil Platforms Case, para 73.
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not sufficient that force is used after an armed attack, it must be necessary to repel 
that attack,97 and non-forcible remedies must either prove futile in limine or have in 
fact been exhausted in an unsatisfactory manner.98 As Roberto Ago notes, “had [the 
State] been able to achieve the same result by measures not involving the use of 
armed force, it would have no justification for adopting conduct which contravened 
the general prohibition against the use of armed force” 99
The principle of necessity also gives rise to a related principle, namely that actions 
taken in self-defence must generally be taken without undue delay.100 Where a 
computer network attack has occurred for which there is no obvious perpetrator, the 
time taken to establish hard evidence of the identity of the perpetrator may militate 
against a finding that any subsequent action by the victim State is in self-defence. 
These criticisms were levelled at the United States of America after a delay of 
several weeks between the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Centre and the 
Pentagon and subsequent action in Afghanistan.101 Although dismissing a claim of 
self-defence on other grounds, the decision of the Court in the Nicaragua (Merits) 
case also criticised the United States for commencing activities purportedly in self- 
defence several months after the major offensive of the opposition against the 
Government of El Salvador had been completely repulsed.102 However, Dinstein 
notes that this requirement must not be construed too strictly; he points to the delay 
of approximately five months between the invasion of Kuwait and the authorisation 
of all necessary means by the Security Council.103
The principle of proportionality requires the weighing of the response against its 
permitted purpose of halting and repelling the attack, or in the case of anticipatory 
self-defence, preventing it from happening. Individual analysis of the principle will 
be dependant on the facts of the circumstances, however the action must not be 
retaliatory or punitive, its lawfulness cannot be measured “except by its capacity for
97 Greenwood, 'Pre-Emptive Use of Force', 23.
98 Dinstein, 'CNA and Self-Defense', 109.
99 Roberto Ago, 'Addendum to the Eighth Report on State Responsibilty' (1980) II UNYB Int'l L 
Comm'n 13, 69 para 120.
100 Ibid., 69; Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 210.
101 For a discussion on the weakness of this argument, see Greenwood, 'Pre-Emptive Use of Force',
23.
102 Nicaragua (Merits), 237.
103 Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 210.
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achieving the desired result”.104 This raises the question of whether it will ever be 
proportionate to use traditional armed force against an electronic attack. The answer 
must surely be yes. Proportionality does not restrict the defending State to the same 
weapons or the same numbers of armed forces as the attacking State; nor is it 
necessarily limited to action on its own territory.105 Therefore it would be open to the 
victim of an electronic attack to use whatever weapons it has at its disposal to repel 
an electronic attack, as long as the response is proportionate to the threat posed. As 
Ago notes:106
In the case of self-defence, it was essential to avoid the error of thinking that there 
should be some proportionality between the action of the aggressor and the action of 
the state defending itself. Proportionality could be judged only in terms of the 
objective of the action, which was to repel an attack and prevent it from succeeding. 
No limitations that might prejudice the success of a response to attack could be 
placed on the State suffering the attack. The concept of reasonable action must of 
course enter into the matter, since self-defence could not justify a genuine act of 
aggression committed in response to an armed attack of limited proportions.
Thus, where a computer network attack is used to prepare the battlespace for a 
kinetic attack, the use of military force would be proportionate to the threat posed by 
the attack as a whole. However it should be noted that while physically bombing the 
attacking computers and their owners may be legal, it is not necessarily the preferred
107method of response. Only a few examples of State intrusion have been made 
public to date, and no large scale attacks as would justify a forcible response have 
been reported. Further, state practice in response to electronic probes emanating 
from other States have not resulted in forcible responses.108
104 Ago, 'Addendum', 69 para 121.
105 Gray, Use o f  Force, 121.
106 Roberto Ago, 'State Responsibility' (1980) Vol 1 UNYB Int'lL  Comm'n 188, para 25.
107 Eric Talbot Jensen, 'Computer Attacks on Critical National Infrastructure: A Use of Force 
Invoking the Right of Self-Defense' (2002) 38 Stan J ln t’l L 207,230.
108 To date the only forcible response to an attack on a communications network is the street fighting 
in Lebanon as a result of the cutting of an Hezbollah telecommunications network. The response was 
condemned by States. However given the non-international nature of the dispute it does not provide 
any useful indication of state practice in this regard. See generally 'Hezbollah Takes over West 
Beirut', BBC News 9 May 2008, <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/7391600.stm> (last 
accessed 10 May 2008).
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Eric Jensen has cited technological solutions designed with a “hack back” feature to 
trace an attack and reflect similar damage to the sender, or causing some other 
responsive action.109 Although much of the available technology is classified, one of 
the major difficulties to overcome with any automated response is the correct 
attribution of the attack prior to launching any destructive payload. As seen above, 
the attack on the U.S. Department of Transport that was attributed to the Falon Gong 
originated elsewhere, and routing attacks through other actors may serve as a 
political end in itself.
4. Counter-Measures against Unlawful Acts
Where a computer network attack does not rise to the level of an armed attack a State 
may still respond with proportionate counter-measures. Where forcible counter­
measures are taken in response to an ordinary breach of international law, not 
constituting an armed attack, they are unlawful.110 However the International Court 
of Justice’s treatment of the hostile acts taken by Nicaragua against El Salvador and 
the Republics of Honduras and Costa Rica in Nicaragua (Merits) case has muddied 
the waters somewhat for acts which amount to less grave forms of “illegal military 
intervention”.111 The Court held that that “proportionate counter-measures” were
permissible by the victim State (but not by any third State acting collectively in self- 
11^
defence). The Court did not venture an opinion as to what form these counter­
measures might take, or whether they could include the use of force.
John Hargrove has suggested that either the Court was saying “(a) that there are 
some acts of force that nobody, not even the victim, may resist by proportionate 
measures of force; or it was saying (b) that the victim may resist with force provided 
that it does so alone. There is little to be said in explanation of the latter proposition 
other than it is simply a second arbitrary announcement of the Court.”113 Hargrove 
argues that allowing forcible counter-measures “would in one remarkable stroke
109 Jensen, 'Computer Attacks', 231.
110 Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 226.
111 The Court held that Nicaragua did supply aid to rebels in the territories of El Salvador, but 
insufficient evidence of the nature, scale and continuance of such aid. The Court further held that 
Nicaragua was responsible for certain transborder military incursions into Honduras and Costa Rica. 
Nicaragua (Merits), paras 152,164.
112 Ibid., para 249.
113 Hargrove, Nicaragua Judgement', 141.
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manage both to impair the right of self-defense, and to weaken fundamentally the 
prohibition on the use of force by creating an open-ended and wholly new category 
of exceptions to Article 2(4) of the Charter, of unknown content and limit.”114 
However, Judge Simma in his separate opinion in the Oil Platforms case has 
commented that the Court in the Nicaragua (Merits) case cannot, in the context of 
that case, have understood that to mean mere pacific reprisals.115 He argues that the 
Court can only have meant “defensive military action ‘short o f  full-scale self- 
defence”.116
But we may encounter also a lower level of hostile military action, not reaching the 
threshold of an “armed attack” within the meaning of Article 51 of the United 
Nations Charter. Against such hostile acts, a State may of course defend itself, but 
only within a more limited range and quality of responses (the main difference being 
that the possibility of collective self-defence does not arise, cf. Nicaragua) and 
bound to necessity, proportionality and immediacy in time in a particularly strict 
way.
In the Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, the International Court 
of Justice set out a three part test justifying proportionate ,counter-measures. First the 
action must be taken in response to an internationally wrongful act of another State 
and be directed against that State. Second the victim state must have called upon the 
offending state to discontinue its wrongful conduct or to make reparation for it. And 
finally the effects of the counter-measure must be commensurate with the injury 
suffered, taking account of the rights in question.117 In this regard the test for 
proportionality differs between counter-measures and self-defence, where the 
response must be proportional to the threat, rather than the actual harm suffered. 
However the Court also stated that the purpose of the counter-measures must be to 
induce the wrongdoing State to comply with its obligations under international law,
IIO
and that the measure must therefore be reversible. In respect of a computer
114 Ibid., 142.
115 Oil Platforms Case, (per Judge Simma), para 12.
116 Ibid., per Judge Simma, paras 12-13.
117 Case Concerning the Gabcikovo-Nagymoros Project (1997) ICJ Reports 3, International Court of 
Justice, para 85.
118 Ibid., para 87.
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network attack this would seem to fit with current state practice, most attacks to date 
have merely resulted in States requesting the alleged perpetrator of the attack to 
cease their actions.119 However the nature of computer network attacks, including the 
type of attacks they make possible, and most importantly their ability to be reversed, 
makes computer network attacks particularly useful as a counter-measure against a 
previous wrongful act of a State. For example, a series of blackouts in response to an 
internationally wrongful act may be a useful coercive measure.
The 1998 Zapatista ‘Floodnet’ attacks on the Pentagon’s website by the Electronic 
Disturbance Theatre also provide a model for how electronic counter-measures 
might work against non-state actors. U.S. Department of Defence specialists created 
a program that would recognise the Floodnet applet installed on computers trying to 
access the Department of Defence website. Once the applet was identified, a 
program was sent back to the activist’s computer to shut down their web browser, 
thus ending the attack.120 Although criticisms were levelled at the Department for not 
thoroughly considering the legal ramifications of such a response,121 the United 
States decision to respond electronically in this instance, against an attack which 
they had been expecting, must be considered a proportionate counter-measure, 
particularly against a demonstrably non-violent protest group.
The danger with such an approach against States is the risk of escalation of such 
counter-measures into forcible responses. A situation which the Security Council 
would be likely to determine a threat to international peace and security, as seen in 
the following section.
5. Threats to the Peace
The other exception to the general prohibition on the use of force in international law 
is the use of collective security measures. Under Chapter VII of the Charter the 
Security Council may recommend or authorise member States to engage in 
measures, including the use of force, to restore international peace and security. 
However, before the Security Council can recommend action, it must first determine
119 Although it should be noted that in all reported cases to date the suspected perpetrator has denied 
any involvement with the attack.
120 Friel, 'DoD Launches Internet Counterattack'.
121 Seffers, 'Legalities Cloud Pentagon's Cyber Defence', 3.
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under Article 39 that a threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression
exists.122 In practice, the Council has almost exclusively exercised its powers by
finding a ‘threat to international peace and security’, even in situations where a
breach of the peace or act of aggression is obvious. Whether or not there are limits
on the Security Council’s ability to determine a threat to the peace is the subject of
debate amongst scholars,124 however the range of situations where the Security
Council has found a breach of the peace is large and includes the danger of violent
counter-measures by States to violations of international law, regardless of their
admissibility.125 The Council has found threats to the peace in internal conflicts such
1as those in Liberia, Rwanda, Sierra Leone and East Timor; violations of human
177rights and humanitarian law as in Somalia, Rwanda and Eastern Zaire; violations 
of democratic principles in Haiti and Sierra Leone;128 terrorism;129 nuclear
i inproliferation and even failure to co-operate with international prosecutions. These 
examples illustrate the broad discretion that the Security Council has to determine 
that a threat to the peace exists; however Frowein has argued that this does not mean 
that the notion of a threat to the peace has become limitless. He argues that a threat 
to the peace exists when, in a particular situation, a danger of the use of force on a 
considerable scale arises.131 Although the Security Council has not considered any
122 Art. 39 reads “The Security Council shall determine the existence o f any threat to the peace, breach 
of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be 
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security”.
123 Jochen Frowein, 'Article 39' in B Simma (ed) The Charter o f the United Nations: A Commentary 
(2nd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002) 717, 722.
124 See generally Erika De Wet, The Chapter VII Powers o f the United Nations Security Council 
(Hart, Oxford, 2004), 133-134.
125 Frowein, 'Article 39', 722.
126 See SC Res788, 19 November 1993 on Liberia; SC Res 918, 17 May 1994, SC Res 929, 22 June 
1994 on Rwanda; SC Res 1132, 8 Oct 1997, 1289 7 Feb 2000, 1306 5 July 2000 on Sierra Leone; SC 
Res 1264, 15 September 1999 on East Timor.
127 SC Res 794, 3 December 1992 on Somalia; SC Res 929, 22 June 1994 on Rwanda; SC Res 1078, 9 
November 1996 on Zaire.
128 For Haiti: SC Res 841, 16 June 1993; SC Res 917, 6 May 1994; SC Res 940, 31 July 1994 and 
most recently SC Res 1529, 29 February 2004. For Sierra Leone: SC Res 1132, 8 October 1997; SC 
Res 1270, 22 October 1999; SC Res 1289, 7 February 2000; SC Res 1306, 5 July 2000.
129 For example, SC Res 1526, 30 January 2004.
130 On nuclear proliferation: SC Res 1172, 6 June 1998; On Libya’s failure to co-operate with 
prosecution of the Lockerbie bombers SC Res 748, 31 March 1992.
131 Frowein, 'Article 39', 726.
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computer network attacks to date,132 based on this assessment it would appear that a 
computer network attack would constitute a threat to the peace where it is of 
sufficient gravity that a State is likely to respond to it with force regardless of its 
categorisation as an armed attack or not, or where the attack is of the type of attack 
which indicates further violence to follow, whether electronically or by kinetic 
means.
Once the Security Council has determined a threat to the peace, the Council may 
make recommendations, or require States to take action under Articles 40,41 and 42 
of the Charter, for the restoration or maintenance of international peace and security. 
Interestingly, once the Security Council has deemed a situation a threat to the peace, 
it ‘is free to take measures against any entity which it considers to be an obstructive 
factor in the restoration of peace’.133 Thus, having determined the situation in Angola 
in 1997 to be a threat to international peace and security, the Council then imposed 
sanctions on UNITA (Union for the Total Independence of Angola), a non-state 
entity.134 This will be of particular significance in respect of computer network 
attacks which are launched by disaffected groups ‘joining in’ conflicts, although as 
outlined supra, positive attribution will always be a factor.
Under Article 41, the Security Council will decide what measures not involving the 
use of armed force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call 
upon the Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations.135 This would also include the disruption of Internet access such 
as that demonstrated by the United States in response to the 1998 attack by the 
Electronic Disturbance Theatre and arguably would also encompass denial of service 
attacks launched against the media, banking and telecommunications infrastructure 
of a State.
132 Georgia raised the issue of alleged Russian cyber attacks in the context of the 2008 conflict with 
Russia over South Ossetia, however the point was not taken up by the other members and no 
resolution was forthcoming. S/PV.5961, 19 August 2008. As noted previously, attribution of the 
attacks is far from certain.
133 Dinstein, War, Aggression, and Self-Defense, 287.
134 SC Res 1127, 1997, cited in Ibid.
135 Art. 41, U.N. Charter.
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Where non-forceful measures have been unsuccessful or if the Council determines
that such measures would be inadequate, the Council may authorise action under
Article 42 by such air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore
international peace and security. Examples include demonstrations, blockade, and
1other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations. It 
appears unlikely that the Security Council would find it necessary to authorise force 
against a computer network attack. As pointed out earlier, force is not necessarily the 
preferred means of countering a cyber attack because of the distributed nature of 
many methods of attack. However, it should be noted that the where an attack or 
ongoing series of attacks cannot be prevented or stopped by electronic means the 
Security Council would be able to authorise the use of force
6. Conclusion
As with the previous chapter relating to the use of force, the classification of 
computer network attacks as armed attacks, sits on top of a deep doctrinal divide 
between those who would argue for a wide interpretation of the right to self-defence 
and those who would restrict it. The present author believes that in regard to 
computer network attacks, a restrictive view of armed attack and the subsequent 
right to self-defence is preferable. Given that the accurate attribution of attacks is by 
no means certain and States acting in self-defence are not restricted to responding in 
kind, the danger of computer network attacks escalating into traditional conflict is 
apparent. That is not to say that States cannot respond to computer network attacks 
that do not rise to the level of an armed attack; a State may still respond with 
proportionate counter-measures or appeal to the Security Council for a finding that 
the attacks amount to a threat to the peace.
136 Art. 42, U.N. Charter.
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PART 2 
Jus in Bello
Chapter 4 -  The Applicability of the Laws of Armed 
Conflict to Computer Network Attacks
The laws of armed conflict apply to all situations of armed conflict, whether or not 
war is declared, and regardless of whether the parties involved recognise the state of 
armed conflict or indeed, the opposing force. The determination is deliberately, a 
factual rather than a legal one. None of the instruments relating to the laws of armed 
conflict deal with computer network attacks explicitly, therefore the question must 
be asked whether the laws of armed conflict should apply to computer network 
attacks at all, and if so, under what circumstances a computer network attack would 
be sufficient to trigger the application of those laws. As with much of the application 
of the law to computer network attacks, the advancement of technology into a 
qualitatively different type of weaponry (rather than merely a difference in scale), 
requires a re-examination of the terminology. The question of the applicability of the 
laws of armed conflict to computer network attacks arises in three distinct 
circumstances: First, where computer network attacks are used with traditional 
weapons in an ongoing conventional armed conflict; secondly, where computer 
network attack are launched on their own; and finally, where the use of conventional 
weapons is insufficient in and of itself to qualify as an armed conflict, but it is 
accompanied by extensive computer network attacks. In some circumstances, a 
computer network attack may also represent an opening salvo in a wider conflict, 
and might therefore indicate the beginning of the application of the laws of armed 
conflict. The existence or not of an armed conflict is of particular relevance as the 
outbreak of an armed conflict between two States will lead to many of the rules of 
the ordinary law of peace being superceded, as between the parties to the conflict, by 
the rules of humanitarian law.1 For example the right to seize one another’s property, 
use force against each other and detain nationals will become materially different.
1 Christopher Greenwood, 'Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law' in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook 
o f  Humanitarian Law in Armed Conflict (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) 39-63,40.
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1. Armed Conflict
The Geneva Conventions apply in full to “all cases of declared war or of any other 
armed conflict which may arise between two or more of the High Contracting 
Parties, even if the state of war is not recognised by one of them” or in “all cases of 
partial or total occupation of the territory of a High Contracting Party, even if the 
said occupation meets with no armed resistance”.2 The Conventions also apply to 
and in respect of any non-contracting party, where that party accepts and applies the 
provisions of the Conventions itself. Additional Protocol I references Common 
Article 2 of the Conventions, and states that it also applies to “armed conflicts in 
which peoples are fighting against colonial domination and alien occupation and 
against racist regimes in the exercise of their right of self-determination”. In relation 
to conflicts not of an international character, that is, internal armed conflicts, 
Common Article 3 of the Conventions and Article 1 of Additional Protocol II, both 
refer to the term ‘armed conflict’ as the trigger for the application of humanitarian 
law principles.4
The term ‘armed conflict’ is not defined anywhere in the Conventions. This was a 
deliberate attempt by the drafters of the Conventions to avoid the political and legal 
wrangling that had occurred over the’legal definition of war, and the ensuing 
distinctions between a state of war, a police action, or any other form of hostile 
action.5 The determination is intended to be factual rather than legal. Pictet’s 
commentary to the Conventions takes a broad view stating that:6
“Any difference arising between two states and leading to the intervention of armed 
forces is an armed conflict within the meaning of Article 2, even if one of the parties 
denies the existence of a state of war. It makes no difference how long the conflict 
lasts, or how much slaughter takes place.”
2 Common Art. 2, Geneva Conventions 1949.
3 Art. 1, Additional Protocol I.
4 Additional Protocol II contains additional criteria for its application including control of territory by 
an armed group under a responsible command, capable of sustained and concerted military operations 
and capable of implementing the protocol. For a ftill discussion of the application of the laws of 
armed conflict to internal armed conflicts see Lindsay Moir, The Law o f  Internal Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press, New York, 2002).
5 ‘Article 2’ in Jean S. Pictet, The Geneva Conventions o f  12 August 1949: Commentary (International 
Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva, 1952), 32.
6 Ibid.
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Likewise the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) takes an expansive 
view of armed conflict, maintaining that in the case of cross-border operations, the 
first shot suffices to trigger an international armed conflict:
“By using the words ‘from the outset’ the authors of the Convention wished to show 
that it became applicable as soon as the first acts of violence were committed, even 
if the armed struggle did not continue. Nor is it necessary for there to have been 
many victims. Mere frontier incidents may make the Convention applicable, for they 
may be the beginning of a more widespread conflict.”
Given this apparent denial of a de minimis level of intervention, it would appear that 
computer network attacks could well come within the ambit of armed conflict. 
However this view is not universally held and the statement regarding the length and 
intensity of the conflict is not necessarily borne out by state practice. Christopher 
Greenwood notes that it is by no means clear that most States would regard an 
isolated incident or exchange of fire as an armed conflict, however serious the
o
consequences, bringing into operation the full panoply of the Geneva Conventions. 
While there are examples of relatively minor incidents where a State has claimed 
protection of the laws of armed conflict, there have been a number of border clashes 
and naval incidents, which have not been treated as armed conflicts.9 For example, 
during the Dogger Bank Incident of 1904 the Russian Navy’s North Sea fleet opened 
fire on British fishing trawlers believing them to be Japanese warships. The incident 
was closed by payment of compensation to the British government for the lives of 
the two men lost, the sinking of one trawler and injury and damage to other trawlers 
and crew.10 On 8 June 1967, Israeli fighter jets and torpedo boats attacked the USS 
Liberty, in the eastern Mediterranean, killing thirty-four crew members and 
wounding 171 more. The officially accepted explanation for the attack has been that 
it was a tragic mistake, and the U.S. accepted an apology and compensation for the
7 ICRC, ‘Article 6’, Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, 59.
8 Christopher Greenwood, The Law of War (International Humanitarian Law)' in M D Evans (ed) 
International Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003) 789-821.
9 Greenwood, 'Scope of Application of Humanitarian Law', 42.
10 Finding o f the International Commission o f  Inquiry Organized under Article 9 o f the Convention 
fo r the Pacific Settlement o f International Disputes, ofJuly 29, 1899 (the Dogger Bank Incident)
(1905) 2 AJIL 931-936, The International Commission of Inquiry between Great Britain and Russia 
arising out of the North Sea incident.
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\losses despite the controversy over the official findings.11 Similarly in 1987 when the 
USS Stark was struck by missiles launched from an Iraqi fighter jet under a 
misapprehension that it was an Iranian tanker, the United States was prepared to
10accept an apology and compensation for the 37 lives lost and damage to the frigate.
In contrast, when a U.S. Navy pilot was shot down and captured by Syrian forces 
over Lebanon in 1983, the United States maintained that this incident amounted to an 
armed conflict and the pilot was thus entitled to prisoner of war status.13 Reports 
from Syria also appeared to assume that this was the case.14 Similarly, when U.S. 
helicopters fired on the Iranian vessel the Iran Ajr during a mine laying operation 
and forced its crew to abandon ship, the rescued sailors and the bodies of their less 
fortunate compatriots were swiftly repatriated. Although the status of those particular 
sailors was never publicly discussed between the United States and Iran, the ICRC 
delivered a note to the United States stating that "such situations and their 
consequences fell within the scope of the Geneva Conventions".15 
A survey of these incidents, some of which led to extremely strained diplomatic 
relations, tends to suggest that States’ willingness to classify events as an armed 
conflict appears to be based on the perceived intentions of the other party, an 
assessment which is often largely influenced by realpolitik. However, where 
prisoners have been taken, a willingness to extend the protections of the Conventions 
to captured personnel appears to be a major driver behind the classification of such 
incidents as armed conflicts.
11 Several crew members and intelligence officials dispute the findings of the official inquiry stating 
that the attacks were deliberate. See generally, William D. Gerhard and Henry W. Millington, Attack 
on a Sigint Collector, the U.S.S. Liberty, National Security Agency (1981). For an article concluding 
the attack was deliberate see Walter L. Jacobsen, 'A Juridical Examination of the Israeli Attack on the 
USS Liberty' (1986) 36(Winter) Naval Law Review 69.
12 Jim Hoagland, 'U.S., Iraq to Confer on Air War', Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 25 May 
1987,1.
13 Although President Reagan later stated “I don't know how you have a prisoner of war when there is 
no declared war between nations. I don't think that makes you eligible for the Geneva Accords [sic]”, 
it appears that this was simply an error on the President’s part. 'President's News Conference on 
Foreign and Domestic Issues', New York Times 21 December 1983, A 22.
14 Thomas L Friedman, 'Widened Cabinet Sought in Beirut', Ibid. 8 December 1983,18; Thomas L 
Friedman, 'Syria Says Airman Seized in U.S. Raid Will Not Be Freed', New York Times 6 December 
1983, A 1.
15 ICRC, 'External Activities: September-October 1987' (1987) 27(261) IRRC 650. Note however that 
the ICRC did not make clear whether this determination was made by reference to the laws relating to 
neutral shipping or armed conflict.
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1.1. Intervention of the Armed Forces
Pictet’s commentary requires the intervention of the armed forces of a State as a 
precondition of armed conflict. This approach raises two problematic issues in 
respect of contemporary conflicts. First, in modem armed conflict, particularly in an 
age characterised by the civilianisation of the military and outsourcing of key 
defence functions, the armed forces of a State may not be the only actors engaged in 
its armed conflicts. The use of unmanned Predator drones by the United States 
Central Intelligence Agency in the ongoing war in Afghanistan is a case in point. For 
example, on 13 January 2006 the CIA ordered an air strike by a Predator drone that 
fired air-to-ground missiles at the Pakistani village of Damadola, close to the border 
with Afghanistan.16 The air strike was targeting a high level Al-Qaeda leader, but 
failed to eliminate him; eighteen other people were killed in the attack. The United
1 7States military denied any involvement in the strike. Although this attack took 
place in the context of an established and wider armed conflict, an attack such as this 
launched in peacetime would not fall within Pictet’s definition, and illustrates the 
changing nature of the participants involved in contemporary armed conflicts. 
However, while it may not always be the armed forces of a State who conduct such 
activities, it is clear that some nexus with governmental authority will be required to 
instigate an international armed conflict.
The second issue with Pictet’s requirement of the involvement of the armed forces is 
that military forces are often used against other States and groups for tasks other than
1 San armed conflict -  for example, aerial surveillance and reconnaissance. Michael 
Schmitt thus contends that a dispute resulting in the commitment of armed forces 
cannot be the sole criterion for establishing an armed conflict. He argues that the 
reference to the armed forces is more logically understood as a form of prescriptive 
shorthand for activity of a particular nature and intensity.19 That is, when a dispute
16 Dafiia Linzer and Griff Witte, 'U.S. Airstrike Targets A1 Qaeda's Zawahiri', Washington Post 
(Washington D.C.), 14 January 2006, A A09 <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
dyn/content/article/2006/01/13/AR2006011302260__pf.html> (last accessed 16 September 2008).
17 Ibid.
18 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Wired Warfare: Computer Network Attack and the Jus in Bello' in M N 
Schmitt and B T O'Donnell (eds), Computer Network Attack & International Law (U.S. Naval War 
College, Newport, R.1,2002) 187-218.
19 Ibid., 372.
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reaches the level that a State deems it necessary to involve the armed forces, it has
reached a sufficient level to be considered an armed conflict.
Internal armed conflicts are even more problematic. Involvement of the armed forces
of a State are not required for an internal armed conflict, however the identity of the
parties involved determine which legal regime will apply. Although nothing in
Common Article 3 defines internal armed conflicts in terms of the parties involved,
Additional Protocol II is more selective. Internal conflicts between the armed forces
of a State and dissident armed forces or organised armed groups may be covered by
Additional Protocol II, conflicts between other government agencies and such groups
do not qualify.20 Louise Doswald-Beck comments that any computer network attack
launched by a group, however well organised, is likely to be seen solely as criminal
behaviour to be dealt with by agencies other than the military, even though the
01potential for damage could be enormous. However, given the move to recognition 
of armed attacks by non-state actors the author considers that this position can no 
longer be supported.
The Appeals Chamber of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia in the Tadic case, considered the temporal and geographical scope of the 
term armed conflict, holding that:22
“an armed conflict exists wherever there is resort to armed force between states or 
protracted armed violence between government authorities and organised armed 
groups or between such groups with a state. International humanitarian law applies 
from the initiation of such armed conflicts and extends beyond the cessation of 
hostilities until a general conclusion of peace is reached; or, in the case of internal 
conflicts, a peaceful settlement is achieved. Until that moment, international 
humanitarian law continues to apply in the whole territory of the warring states or,
20 An explanatory note inserted into the Report of Committee I describes 'armed forces' as:
"All the armed forces.... According to the views expressed by a number of delegations, the expression 
would not include other government agencies the members of which may be armed; examples of such 
agencies are the police, customs and other similar organisations". According to Moir this leaves grey 
areas in the protocol. For a discussion of armed forces in internal conflict, see Moir, The Law o f  
Internal Armed Conflict, 38-40, 104-105.
21 Louise Doswald-Beck, 'Some Thoughts on Computer Network Attack and the International Law of 
Armed Conflict' in M N Schmitt and B T O'Donnell (eds), Computer Network Attack and 
International Law (Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2002) 163-186,165.
22 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (1995) Case No. IT-94-1-AR, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, para 70.
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in the case of internal conflicts, the whole territory under the control of a party, 
whether or not actual combat takes place”.
This definition does not address the nature of the parties involved in an international 
armed conflict, leaving open the possibility that institutions other than armed forces 
may be involved. Internal armed conflicts reflect the breadth of parties covered by 
Common Article 3 of the Conventions.
1.2. The Requirement of Armed Force
Although Pictet’s definition of armed conflict refers only to a ‘difference’ between 
States, the test in Tadic shows that armed force or armed violence is the requirement 
for armed conflict.23 The refinement of the test by the Tribunal also separates the 
level of violence required for international and internal armed conflict by requiring a 
level of protraction of the violence in conflicts not of an international nature. This is 
in keeping with the requirements set out in Common Article 3 and Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol II that the laws of armed conflict are not to apply to internal 
disturbances and tensions, such as riots, isolated and sporadic acts of violence and 
other acts of a similar nature. Both internal and international armed conflicts 
however, require the use of armed force. As with the term armed attack, armed force 
is not defined in international law (its definition undoubtedly being considered self- 
evident). However, as discussed in Chapter 2 supra, armed force is to be construed 
somewhat broadly, in particular the term includes indirect forms of support for the 
application of force. Thus where a computer network attack, directly or indirectly, 
results in injury or death, or destruction of physical property, it will constitute a use 
of armed force. Whether a computer network attack can amount to a use of armed 
force will be a factual determination, likely to be established over time by state 
practice, however a survey of the current thinking shows that it is likely that a certain 
level of physical damage will also be required.
23 It should be noted that there was no question in the Tadic case of whether there had been such force 
or violence used against the people of the former Yugoslavia, the case addressed the question o f the 
international or internal nature of the armed conflict that took place in the Balkans.
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2. Application to Computer Network Attacks
A number of authors have discussed the applicability of the laws of armed conflict to 
computer network attacks. Mark Shulman has no difficulty in finding that “[a]s with 
other armed conflict, defensive [information warfare] operations are subject to the 
restraints of LOAC and its principle of proportionality”, despite observing that 
“information warfare is neither ‘armed’ in the traditional sense, nor does it 
necessarily involve ‘conflict’.24 Other writers however are less sure of the 
application of the laws of armed conflict. Richard Aldrich claims that a physical 
manifestation such as an explosion is required.
‘“Armed conflict’, as presently understood, seems far less likely to be applied to the 
simple manipulation of bits inside a computer, although this may soon change since 
the nefarious manipulation of bits could, in some cases, already cause significantly 
more harm than could a bomb”.
Emily Haslam has analysed the approaches of Shulman and Aldrich and concludes 
that while it is welcome that the authors do not treat computer network attacks and 
other information operations homogenously, they fail to establish a test which either 
works within the framework of the laws of armed conflict, or sets out the appropriate 
components of information warfare whiqh should be taken into account (means and 
results respectively).26 Other authors have addressed the issue in different ways; for 
example, after a flawed analysis equating armed conflict to the definition of 
aggression and using the terms armed force and armed attack synonymously, 
Hanseman concludes that the laws of armed conflict will apply to computer network 
attacks where the “consequences of the attack are equivalent to the damage done by 
traditional weapons”.27 Scott, writing on disruption of telecommunications, argues
24 Mark R Shulman, Legal Constraints on Information Warfare, Center for Strategy & Technology, 
Air War Center, Occasional Paper No.7 (1999). Note that Shulman’s use of the term information 
warfare rather than computer network attack relates, in part, to his broader definition but also the date 
of the paper. As discussed in Chapter 1, earlier literature tends to use the term information warfare . 
rather than specifying computer network attacks. Shulman’s paper concentrates on information 
attacks that seek to alter "information without visibly changing the physical entity within which it 
arises."
25 Aldrich, 'International Legal Implications', 102.
26 Haslam, 'Information Warfare', 167.
27 Robert G Hanseman, 'The Realities and Legalities of Information Warfare' (1997) 42 AFL Rev 173, 
184.
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that the laws of armed conflict readily apply to computer network attacks: “In 
determining the constraints imposed on computer network attack by the law of war 
the focus of analysis must be the intent and likely results of an attack, not the novel 
method of attack”.28
As noted above, the question of the applicability of the laws of armed conflict to 
computer network attacks arises in three distinct circumstances:
(i) where computer network attacks are utilised as part of a ongoing conventional 
armed conflict;
(ii) where computer network attack are launched on their own; and
(iii) where the use of conventional weapons is insufficient in and of itself to qualify 
as an armed conflict, but it is accompanied by extensive computer network 
attacks.
2.1. Application during Conventional Armed Conflict
The question of whether the laws of armed conflict apply to computer network 
attacks launched during a conventional conflict can be dealt with fairly briefly.
The first possible argument is that the law should not be applied as the Conventions 
were drafted significantly before the technology to launch such attacks was
OQavailable. This argument can be dismissed on several grounds. First, the inclusion 
of the Martens Clause in the Geneva Conventions and the specific inclusion of 
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I indicate that the drafters of the Conventions 
anticipated the development and use of new weapons, means and methods of 
warfare.30 The fact that the drafters require States to determine the legality of new 
•methods of war by reference to the Protocol in and of itself indicates their 
acknowledgement of the applicability of the laws to newer technology. Secondly, the
28 Roger D. Scott, 'Legal Aspects of Information Warfare: Military Disruption of 
Telecommunications' (1998) 45 Naval Law Review 57, 59.
29 Schmitt, 'Wired Warfare'. Schmitt also raises a further possible argument that the LOAC do not 
apply to computer network attack because they are not specifically mentioned in the Conventions. 
This is swiftly dealt with -  an examination of the Martens Clause shows that new methods and 
innovations are clearly anticipated by the laws.
30 Art. 36 of Additional Protocol I states: “In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new 
weapon, means or method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this Protocol or by any 
other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting Party”.
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issue was addressed and dismissed by the International Court of Justice in relation to
<51 '1 'ynuclear weapons in the Nuclear Weapons case in 1996. The Court held:
Indeed, nuclear weapons were invented after most of the principles and rules of 
humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict had already come into existence; the 
Conferences of 1949 and 1974-1977 left these weapons aside, and there is a 
qualitative as well as quantitative difference between nuclear weapons and all 
conventional arms. However, it cannot be concluded from this that the established 
principles and rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict did not apply 
to nuclear weapons. Such a conclusion would be incompatible with the intrinsically 
humanitarian character of the legal principles in question which permeates die entire 
law of armed conflict and applies to all forms of warfare and to all kinds of 
weapons, those of the past, those of the present and those of the future.
Such a clear statement by the Court indicates that the Conventions and other general 
legal principles of the laws of armed conflict are applicable to computer network 
attacks, despite the fact that the technology is new, or the fact that such attacks are 
qualitatively different to weapons systems which have come before. This has led 
some commentators to state categorically that “there is no doubt that an armed 
conflict exists and the law of armed conflict applies, once traditional kinetic weapons 
are used in combination with new methods of computer network attack”.
However, it should be noted that computer network attacks may be distinguished 
from both conventional weapons and nuclear weapons in one significant respect that 
was not at issue in the Nuclear Weapons case and therefore not anticipated by the 
Court. The extent and type of damage inflicted by a computer network attack 
depends entirely on the objective and design of the attack itself. Conventional 
weapons and their nuclear counterparts have a single effect when employed against a
31 Nuclear Weapons Case; Schmitt, 'Wired Warfare', 189.
32 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 86. The Court also cited with approval, the written statement o f New 
Zealand: “International humanitarian law has evolved to meet contemporary circumstances, and is not 
limited in its application to weaponry o f an earlier time. The fundamental principles of this law 
endure: to mitigate and circumscribe the cruelty of war for humanitarian reasons. (New Zealand, 
Written Statement, 15, paras 63-64).
33 Knut Dflrmann, 'Applicability of the Additional Protocols to Computer Network Attacks' (Paper 
presented at the International Expert Conference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability 
of International Humanitarian Law, Stockholm, 17-19 November 2004) 139-154, 141. See Also, 
Doswald-Beck, 'Some Thoughts on Computer Network Attack and the International Law of Armed 
Conflict', 165.
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target -  vis physical destruction, injury and loss of life - and thus may be regulated as 
a category. The difficulty comes when dealing with a form of attack that may or may 
not cause physical destruction and may only indirectly cause loss of life or injury to 
individuals.
2.2. Computer Network Attack on its Own
The flexibility of the attack medium and the diversity of possible consequences of 
computer network attacks have raised a further argument against the application of 
the laws of armed conflict to such attacks. Although it is clear that one cannot apply 
a blanket rule against all computer network attacks, the question must be asked, can 
computer network attacks on their own be capable of being an armed conflict so as 
to trigger the application of the laws of armed conflict? The criteria established by 
the ICTY in Tadic, the ICRC commentary by Pictet and subsequent state practice 
indicate that a computer network attack will be considered the start of an armed 
conflict where the attacker is a state organ or armed group, that launches a computer 
network attack which is intended to cause, or which actually causes, physical 
damage to life and/or property. It is the perceived intention and consequences of the 
attack that must be addressed and this is where Pictet’s definition departs from state 
practice. Further, where the attack is launched by an armed group, the attack must be 
part of a protracted series of attacks (whether or not such attacks are computer 
network attacks) in order to establish that they are not isolated or sporadic acts of 
violence.
2.2.1. Armed Force
This author has argued that computer network attacks can constitute a use of force 
under Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter,34 but a separate question must be asked 
whether such attacks are to be considered ‘armed force’ in such a way to initiate the 
application of the laws of armed conflict. Given the broad scope of possible 
information operations, it is not clear where on the spectrum the line will be drawn 
regarding what amounts to an armed attack and what may be a use of armed force, or 
whether a further demarcation will occur between force generally and armed force.
34 See Chapter 2 supra.
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Following the discussion regarding armed attack above, it seems clear that any 
computer network attack launched by the armed forces, or some other organ of a 
State and causing large scale physical damage or personal injury equivalent to that 
caused by a conventional attack will be considered both an armed attack and the start 
of an armed conflict. However an attack designed to merely neutralise the air 
defence network of a country by switching it off, would not. Although if the 
attacking State’s air force were to take advantage of that window of opportunity to 
launch a conventional attack, that would then trigger the application of the laws of 
armed conflict, the start of which may then be backdated to the computer network 
attack. Admittedly this may only be a matter of minutes or hours. For example, had 
the 2007 raid by Israel against the alleged Syrian nuclear site escalated further, the 
laws of armed conflict would have applied from the start of the engagement with the 
single Syrian radar site at Tall al-Abuad near the Turkish border.
2.2.2. Humanitarian Principles
The motivation underlying the application of the laws of armed conflict is to limit 
the damage caused by hostilities and provide care for the casualties. As Louise 
Doswald-Beck points out, this would militate in favour of an expansive 
interpretation of when the laws of armed conflict should begin to apply. Greenburg 
et al, while not discussing the definition of armed conflict, addresses the issue of 
whether information warfare is war, and point out that international law draws “a 
strong distinction between traditional, kinetic force and the infliction of hardship or 
suffering on a government or population”. Computer network attacks which merely 
cause discomfort, inconvenience or even a certain level of suffering are not sufficient 
to equate to an armed conflict. Michael Schmitt has argued that the purposes of
35 See Chapter 3 supra.
36 The radar site was attacked with a combination of electronic attacks, computer network attacks and 
precision bombing. This would have been the case even without the precison bombing. See generally: 
Fulghum, Wall and Butler, 'Israel Shows Electronic Prowess'.
37 Doswald-Beck, 'Some Thoughts on Computer Network Attack and the International Law of Armed 
Conflict', 164; DOrmann, 'Additional Protocols'.
38 Doswald-Beck, 'Some Thoughts on Computer Network Attack and the International Law of Armed 
Conflict', 164.
39 Lawrence T Greenberg, Seymour E Goodman and Kevin J Soo Hoo, Information Warfare and 
International Law (CCRP, Washington D.C., 1998), 19
<http://www.dodccrp.org/files/Greenberg_Law.pdC> (last accessed 7 September 2008).
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humanitarian law are such that it must be reasoned that armed conflict occurs when a 
group takes measures that injure, kill, damage or destroy.40 He also considers that the 
term includes actions “intended to cause such results or which are the foreseeable 
consequences thereof.”41 He goes on to argue that in the case of computer network 
attacks:42
“.. .humanitarian law principles apply whenever computer network attacks can be 
ascribed to a State are more than merely sporadic and isolated incidents and are 
either intended to cause injury, death, damage or destruction (and analogous effects), 
or such consequences are foreseeable. This is so even though classic armed force is 
not being employed. By this standard, a computer network attack on a large airport’s 
air traffic control system by agents of another State would implicate humanitarian 
law. So too would an attack intended to destroy oil pipelines by surging oil through 
them after taking control of computers governing flow, causing the meltdown of a 
nuclear reactor by manipulation of its computerized nerve centre, or using 
computers to trigger a release of toxic chemicals from production and storage 
facilities. On the other hand, humanitarian law would not pertain to disrupting a 
university intranet, downloading financial records, shutting down Internet access 
temporarily or conducting cyber espionage, because, even if part of a regular 
campaign of similar acts, the foreseeable consequences would not include injury, 
death, damage or destruction.”
This analysis appears convincing in most respects. However Schmitt's extension of 
the term to incorporate the foreseeable consequences of an attack (which he uses to 
cover such actions as the shutting down of air traffic control systems), should be 
balanced particularly against the perceived intention of the attacking party. Where an 
attack is launched against a target which is not so obviously linked to the 
consequences, a blanket prohibition would a) beg the question of what is foreseeable 
to the attacker and b) preclude any assertions of mistaken identity such as those 
promulgated in the case of the Dogger Bank, USS Liberty and USS Stark incidents.
40 Schmitt, 'Wired Warfare', 373.
41 Ibid.
42 Ibid. (footnotes omitted).
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2.3. Computer Network Attacks in Support of Conventional Attacks
The third situation in which the applicability of the laws of armed conflict is raised 
occurs where a conventional attack is launched, which would not by itself qualify as 
an armed conflict, but which is supported by extensive computer network attacks. In 
that situation the accompanying computer network attacks would serve as an 
indicator of the intentions of the opposing party. For example, it would prove 
difficult for a State to claim a case of mistaken identity in the bombing of a ship, if it 
were later discovered that the radar system had been tampered with so that the ship's 
commander believed that the attacking aircraft were in fact allied military planes, 
and incoming missiles were not detected because the onboard defence system had 
been remotely turned off. There has been much speculation that this combined tactic 
will be used by armed groups to multiply the impact of any conventional attack. For 
example, the consequences of a small conventional attack in a metropolitan city 
would increase several-fold if at the same time the city experienced a power-cut, 
including power to traffic signals and hospitals, the emergency response telephone 
number was disconnected or jammed, and the water supply was cut off. It is likely 
that such a combination of attacks would also be considered sufficient to qualify as 
an armed conflict under the accumulation of events theory set out in Chapter 3 
supra.
3. Territory
Internal armed conflicts conducted through the means of computer network attack 
also raise an additional issue in respect of territory. Common Article 3 of the Geneva 
Conventions applies to armed conflicts not of an international character “occurring 
in the territory of one of the High Contracting Parties”. Likewise, Article 1 of 
Additional Protocol II also requires that the armed conflict in question must take 
place in the ‘territory of the high contracting party’. Despite some commentators’ 
arguments that conflicts involving computer network attacks take place in the 
somewhat ethereal plane of cyberspace, in general such discussion has been replaced 
by an understanding that it is the effects of these attacks on tangible objects and 
individuals which creates obligations and responsibilities under the laws of armed 
conflict. This is so even in the few discrete cases where communications equipment 
controlling assets in a particular State are located offshore, or even where the State’s
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entire online presence is hosted in a foreign State.43 Although not relating to 
computer network attack, the decision of the Appeals Chamber of the International 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia in Kunarac et al is instructive:44
There is no necessary correlation between the area where the actual fighting is 
taking place and the geographical reach of the laws of war. The laws of war apply in 
the whole territory of the warring states or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, 
the whole territory under the control of a party to the conflict, whether or not actual 
combat takes place there, and continue to apply until a general conclusion of peace 
or, in the case of internal armed conflicts, until a peaceful settlement is achieved. A 
violation of the laws or customs of war may therefore occur at a time when and in a 
place where no fighting is actually taking place. As indicated by the Trial Chamber, 
the requirement that the acts of the accused must be closely related to the armed 
conflict would not be negated if the crimes were temporally and geographically 
remote from the actual fighting. It would be sufficient, for instance, for the purpose 
of this requirement, that the alleged crimes were closely related to hostilities 
occurring in other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict.
Thus any State or armed group finding itself in an armed conflict involving the use 
of computer network attack, will be required to apply the laws of armed conflict to 
the whole of the territory of the State; or alternatively, in the case of the armed 
group, to any territory under its control. This latter requirement raises the question of 
in what manner an armed group can control territory.
Article 1 of Additional Protocol II requires armed groups to “exercise such control 
over a part of its territory as to enable them to carry out sustained and concerted 
military operations and to implement this Protocol.” The Diplomatic Conference 
considered several proposals to clarify the amount of territory which should be 
controlled,45 however they chose not to adopt any of these proposals and instead 
linked the control of territory to the ability first to launch sustained and concerted
43 See for example, Charles Arthur, 'The Day East Timor Was Deleted1, The Independent (London),
28 February 1999, Features 8; Chris Nuttall, 'Virtual Country 'Nuked' on Net', BBC News 26 January 
1999, <http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/sci/tech/263169.stm> (last accessed 4 April 2003).
44 Prosecutor v Dragoljub Kunarac et al (2002) (IT-96-23&23/1), International Criminal Tribunal for 
the Former Yugoslavia, para 57. (footnotes omitted).
45 Proposals considered by the committee included a requirement that it should be a ‘non-negligible 
part of the territory’ or a ‘substantial part of the territory’: See Claude Pilloud, et al., Commentary on 
the Additional Protocols o f 8 June 1977 (Martinus Nijhoff, Geneva, 1987), para 4465.
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military operations, and secondly to apply the Protocol. While the restrictiveness of 
this provision has been roundly criticised by scholars in the context of conventional 
internal conflicts,46 the use computer network attacks raises an interesting possibility. 
In the information age, territory is largely irrelevant. Armed groups can launch 
sustained and concerted computer network attacks against a State without ever 
capturing any significant territory. Of course, the desirability of undertaking such a 
strategy would be dependant on the purposes of the rebellion - although it should be 
noted that wars of national liberation (in which control of territory would be key) are 
covered by Additional Protocol I which does not contain any requirement for 
territorial control. In contrast to their approach to Common Article 3, the Diplomatic 
Conference decided that some cut-off point was required to show that conflicts must 
have reached a critical point before Additional Protocol II should apply.47 The 
criterion of ‘sustained and concerted’ military operations was arrived at in an effort 
to find criteria for the critical point, implying duration and intensity, but on a more 
objective assessment.48 This selection of criteria has opened the door for computer 
network attacks to meet the lower threshold of, and be covered by, Additional 
Protocol II where their more conventional counterparts remain under the auspices of 
Common Article 3.
The second criterion for application of the Additional Protocol II is that the armed 
group’s control of territory must be sufficient to enable it to apply the Protocol.49 
Waldemar Solf has argued in respect of the civil conflict in El Salvador:50
“I doubt that a movement that does not control a single town and whose political 
arm is situated in another country, with only loose links to the movement’s 
organised armed groups, has the capability of implementing the Protocol. I question 
whether it can implement the judicial standards of article 6, the standards established 
for the treatment of detained persons under article 5, and the standards established
46 Moir, The Law o f  Internal Armed Conflict, 105-106. The provision has been particularly criticised 
in respect o f those internal conflicts involving guerrilla warfare.
47 Ibid., 106.
48 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 4465; Moir, The Law o f  Internal Armed Conflict, 106.
49 For a criticism of this rather circular argument see Michael Bothe, et al., New Rules fo r  Victims o f  
Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 1982), 625; Moir, The Law o f  Internal Armed 
Conflict, 108.
50 Waldemar A Solf, 'Comment: Non-Intemational Armed Conflicts' (1981-1982) 31 Am U L Rev 
927, 932. These comments were made with respect to the 12 year civil conflict in El Salvador which 
ended in 1992.
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under articles 7-12 for the protection of wounded, sick, shipwrecked, and medical 
personnel units”.
While the same issue is raised in conflicts involving computer network attacks, if the 
conflict is waged only by these means, it may be that the necessity for the above 
standards set out by the Protocol and highlighted by Solf is negligible. Concerted 
computer network attacks which obey the principles of distinction and do not result 
in severe physical damage, may not result in wounded or detained persons. That will 
be highly dependent on the purpose of the conflict. Of course it may be argued in 
counterpoint that if there is no need for the protection of wounded etc, there is no 
need for the application of the Protocol in the first place.
4. Conclusion
As with the previous chapters, application of the laws of armed conflict to computer 
network attack requires us to revisit first principles in order to interpret humanitarian 
norms for the information age. It appears likely that the laws of armed conflict will 
apply to most computer network attacks launched by States (or in the case of internal 
armed conflicts, organized armed groups) where there is a physical manifestation 
resulting in damage to property and more importantly, injury or death to individuals. 
While it may not be necessary for the level of damage or injury caused to rise to the 
level of an armed attack as discussed in chapter three, any attack will need to be of 
significant seriousness to raise it above the de minimis level indicated by current 
state practice. The attacks must be more than isolated incidents and in the case of 
internal armed conflict, the online hostilities must be protracted and of a nature to 
raise them above the level of riots and other internal disturbances.
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Chapter 5 - Participants in Conflict: Combatant Status, 
Direct Participation and Computer Network Attack
The beginning of the twenty-first century has seen huge changes in the war-fighting 
capacities of the modem military. Regardless of one’s opinion about the existence of 
a revolution in military affairs, one thing is certain: the people involved, and the 
technologies available to them have changed significantly. Information operations, 
and in particular computer network attacks, have raised many challenging questions 
for the laws of armed conflict. This chapter focuses on the problems that computer 
network attack raises in regard to the participants in armed conflicts. Indeed, one of 
the most pressing problems facing the laws of armed conflict may not be how to deal 
with combatants or civilians who carry rifles on the frontlines, but rather in 
determining the status of personnel armed with CPUs and keyboards sitting at a desk 
a continent away.1 The reason for this is two-fold; first it is not obvious how the 
requirements for lawful combatancy will translate onto a medium where anonymity 
is the norm and distance and proximity are largely irrelevant. Secondly, the specialist 
nature of new technologies and the downsizing of military forces have resulted in 
increased civilianisation of State armed forces. Care must be taken in deciding what 
roles can be outsourced to civilian contractors, without jeopardising their legal 
protections under international conventions.
The law of armed conflict makes a fundamental distinction between combatants and 
civilians.2 The former have the right to participate in hostilities and may attack, kill 
and wound enemy combatants and destroy military objectives. Conversely, civilians 
are not allowed to directly participate in hostilities. Their status as civilians enables 
them to enjoy protection from the dangers arising from military operations and they 
are not allowed to be the object of an attack. Where civilians do take a direct part in 
hostilities, they lose their status as protected civilians for the period of their 
involvement and may be liable for punishment either through domestic or 
international criminal processes for their actions. This chapter will address both the
1 Kenneth Watkin, Combatants, Unprivileged Belligerents and Conflicts in the 21st Century, HPCR 
(2003).
2 See Nuclear Weapons Case, 251.
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question of what legal requirements must be met by combatants involved in 
computer network attacks in order to maintain combatant privileges, and what level 
of involvement in computer network attacks will constitute direct participation in 
hostilities by an actor. In particular the question of when civilian employees will be 
deemed to be directly participating in hostilities, thus losing their civilian privileges, 
must be addressed. This chapter also examines States’ obligations in relation to 
young would-be cyber-soldiers and whether the increasing numbers of embedded 
civilian contractors are at risk of falling foul of mercenary provisions.
1. Combatant Status
In international armed conflicts, combatants are further distinguished into two 
categories. First, those people who are members of the armed forces of a belligerent 
party (with the exception of medical and religious personnel), even if their specific 
tasks are not related to active hostilities; and second, any other person who takes an 
active part in hostilities.3 This second group are unlawful combatants.4 
Unlawful or unprivileged combatant status can be achieved in one of two ways. 
Either, the individual’s primary status is that of a combatant and they lose their 
privileged status through lack of compliance with the requirements of lawful 
combatancy; or they are civilians who directly participate in hostilities. Unlawful or 
unprivileged combatants may be targeted in the same manner as a combatant but 
they do not enjoy any of the privileges of lawful combatancy, nor those of civilian 
protection. The most important privileges of lawful combatancy are the legal shield 
that it provides for acts which would otherwise be illegal (for example murder), and 
the entitlement to prisoner of war status in the event of capture by the enemy.
The concept of combatant status is one which sits more securely in international 
armed conflicts, indeed some scholars would argue that it has no place in discussions 
involving internal armed conflicts. However, as discussed in Chapter 1, traditional 
interstate conflicts account for only a small minority of the world’s current
3 Yoram Dinstein, The Conduct o f Hostilities under the Law o f International Armed Conflict 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004), 27.
4 Such people are also known as unprivileged belligerents however for the purposes of this paper they 
will be referred to as unlawful combatants. See Richard R Baxter, 'So-Called 'Unprivileged 
Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs' (1951) 28 BYBIL 323.
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conflicts.5 The majority of conflicts are fought by non-state actors, whether they are 
insurgent groups fighting against the State,6 hybrid conflicts with both internal and 
international elements,7 multiple armed groups fighting each other on the territory of 
a State,8 or a transnational group fighting internal or State armed forces.9 The notion 
of a lawful combatant does not fit any of these groups. While Article 13(2) of 
Geneva Conventions I and II and Article 4 of Geneva Convention IV provide 
protection for volunteer groups and militia who are not incorporated into the armed 
forces, they are generally accepted to apply only to situations of occupied territory or 
wars of national liberation.10 The position under Article 43(2) of Additional Protocol 
I is much clearer -  only members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict (with 
the exception of medical and religious personnel) have the right to directly 
participate in hostilities. It should be noted however that the use of the term ‘armed 
forces’ in Additional Protocol I refers both to regular and irregular troops. It is clear 
that the States participating in the Geneva Diplomatic Conference which resulted in 
the Additional Protocols did not intend to go so far as to upgrade rebels to the status 
of ‘lawful combatants’, a move which in their view, would have entailed legitimising 
the rebels’ struggle.11 While States remain the primary focus of international 
relations and allegiance, they are unwilling to accept the principle that insurgent 
fighters are anything other than criminals. However as the global conflict paradigm 
shifts from a model where States maintain the monopoly on politically motivated 
violence, to a model where sub-state, trans-state and in some cases supra-state actors
5 Of the 118 conflicts recorded by the Uppsala Conflict Database between 1989-2006, only 5.8% were 
traditional interstate conflicts. However, a further 21.3% constituted internationalised internal 
conflicts which would include international elements. Lotta Harbom and Peter Wallensteen, 'Armed 
Conflict, 1989-2006' (2007) 44(5) Journal o f  Peace Research 623, 624.
6 See for example the conflicts between the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, Maoist rebels in Nepal, 
Chechen separatists fighting Russia.
7 The conflict in the territory of the former Yugoslavia is an example of this.
8 There are currently 5 separate armed groups on the territory of the Democratic Republic o f the 
Congo fighting against each other. Somalia is another example.
9 For example, A1 Qaeda against the Northern Alliance and the United States.
10 This thesis will not discuss the categorisation of the Chechen conflict as a war of national 
liberation.
11 Antonio Cassese, 'The Status of Rebels under the 1977 Geneva Protocol on Non-International 
Armed Conflicts' (1981) 30 International and Comparative Law Quarterly 416, fii2. In the last two 
weeks o f the final session of the conference, any provisions which could imply recognition of 
insurgent parties were deleted; Adam Roberts and Richard Guelff, Documents on the Laws o f  War 
(3rd ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999), 482.
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are encroaching on traditionally state controlled areas, this area may need to be 
revisited in the future.
1.1. Requirements of Combatant Status
Yoram Dinstein has usefully identified seven cumulative conditions for lawful
combatancy.12 The first four are cumulative conditions set out by the Hague
Regulations and Geneva Conventions for the applicability of prisoner of war and
lawful combatant status: (i) being under the command of a person responsible for his
or her subordinates; (ii) having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable at a distance;
(iii) carrying arms openly; and (iv) conducting operations in accordance with the
11laws and customs of war. An additional two may be implied from Article 4(A)(2) 
of Geneva Convention III, that of (v) organisation and (vi) belonging to a party to the 
conflict. Finally, a seventh condition may be inferred from case law, which denies 
prisoner of war status to any person owing a duty of allegiance to a detaining 
power.14 Members of the armed forces of a party, militia and volunteer forces must 
comply with these conditions to be accorded the status of a prisoner of war or lawful 
combatant.15 Several of these conditions raise particular issues with respect to 
computer network attack; others simply require reinterpretation for the digital age.
Responsible Command
The first condition, that of being commanded by a person responsible for his/her 
subordinates, merely excludes individuals, or groups of individuals, from 
independently waging war on the enemy. Warnings against this kind of behaviour 
have been seen in the press by U.S. officials attempting to dissuade U.S. based 
hackers from ‘joining-in’ the conflicts against Afghanistan and Iraq.16 However in
12 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 33-37.
13 Art. 13(2) Geneva Conventions I & II and Art. 4(2) Geneva Convention IV.
14 Public Prosecutor v Koi et al (1968) AC 829, Privy Council, (per Lord Hodson). The Privy Council 
considered that the principle was one of customary international law; cf. Rogers who argues that this 
decision has probably not survived the introduction of Additional Protocol I, A. P. V. Rogers, Law on 
the Battlefield (2nd ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2004), 32.
15 Pictet, Commentary, 48. See also Osman Bin Haji MohamedAli and Another v the Public 
Prosecutor (1969) 1 AC 430, Privy Council, 449.
16 David F. Gallagher, Hackers; Government Tells Vigilantes Their 'Help' Isn't Necessary', New York 
Times 20 February 2003, G1 5.
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2008 the action by Russia against Georgia over South Ossetia, was accompanied by 
distributed denial of service attacks launched by individuals, and facilitated by non­
state groups.17 Such actions are clearly not permitted, and no individual engaged in 
such attacks would be entitled to claim combatant immunity for their part.
Distinction
The second and third conditions, that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognisable 
at a distance and that of carrying arms openly, may be dealt with together as they 
cause similar problems for computer network attack. The problem stems primarily 
from the anonymity that is characteristic of the Internet, namely that it is impossible 
to tell who is sitting at any particular computer. The intention of the two 
requirements is to eliminate confusion in the distinction between civilians and
151combatants, and to prevent deception. However the rules were drafted in an era 
when warfare involved a certain amount of physical proximity between opposing 
forces. For the most part, combatants could see one another and hence distinguish 
between combatant and non-combatant, friend and foe. In the instance of a computer 
network attack, where the adversaries are plainly not in sight of each another (and 
may be half a world away), the usefulness of these conditions has diminished. The 
principle of distinction on which they are based however, remains fundamental. 
Although problematical, the issue is not without precedent. Vehicles, engines of war, 
aircraft, tanks and boats etc are all required to be marked with the distinctive sign of 
the belligerent party whenever partisans are on board.19 Given the impossibility of 
determining the user of a particular computer at any given moment, the requirement 
to display a distinctive sign may be applied to the computer from which the attack is 
launched. One method of achieving such markings would be to require any computer 
network attack to emanate from a designated military IP address. A form of
17 See for example Morozov, 'An Army of Ones and Zeroes'.
18 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 37.
19 This is in line with the long established regulations in international law regarding the flag in the 
case o f war at sea. Pictet, Commentary, 60.
20 Every device (computer, server etc) that communicates over the Internet is assigned a four number 
numerical address (e.g. 168.212.226.204) that uniquely identifies the device and distinguishes it from 
other computers on the Internet. Each address is registered with one of three registry bodies to avoid 
duplicates. Creating a class of military addresses, or another form of military network designator 
would be a relatively simple matter.
129
electronic marking is already in use for medical transports appearing on radar or IFF
1
technology, albeit with the opposite intention of marking a protected object. Such 
an approach would also address the issue of the obligation of an individual to wear 
uniform while carrying out such an attack. Members of armed forces not wearing
uniform aboard properly marked warships or military aircraft and taking part in
00hostilities are and remain combatants regardless of this circumstance.
Attractive as this suggestion may initially seem, it is not without problems of its
own. In the age of computer network attack where range and visibility are no longer
requirements for targeting, requiring a computer to be marked as a military computer
is tantamount to painting a bulls-eye on any system to which it is connected. At any
one time the Internet is being searched or ‘crawled’ by millions of software bots
00intent on finding connected computers. A bot searching for military designated IP 
addresses would be able to find them in a matter of minutes.24 Once found, there are 
no lines to retreat behind and no way to move the computer out of range other than 
to disconnect the computer, a solution which is likely to disrupt the normal running 
and/or usefulness of the system. Any computer remaining connected to the Internet 
in anyway would be solely reliant on its electronic defences to prevent intrusion. In 
addition, it is not only potential enemy forces that will attempt to access military 
computers. For example, the U.S. Department of Defense is an attractive target for 
regular hackers, and the number of attacks on its systems has grown steadily. For 
example, in 1992 U.S. Department of Defense and military computers came under 
attack from intruders approximately 53 times. By 1997 the annual number of 
attacks had risen to 780, that number had risen again to almost 40,000 times in 2002,
21 Additional Protocol 1, Annex 1, Art. 8. IFF stands for Identification Friend or Foe, a secondary 
radar system that transmits an identification code when the transponder is triggered by detection of 
the target by the primary radar.
22 Knut Ipsen, 'Combatants & Non-Combatants' in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook o f Humanitarian Law 
in Armed Conflicts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999) 65-104,101.
23 Bots (also called spiders) are used legitimately to create search engines, mailing lists, indexes etc 
and less legitimately to trawl for undefended computers that might provide access to systems or 
recruitment possibilities as a zombie or slave.
24 In fact a list of military IP addresses has been circulating the Internet for several years, however the 
IP ranges specified are for fixed installations which may contain multiple dynamic IP addresses 
within the range. See for example, 'U.S. Gov IP Addresses You Should Not Scan' (2007) Hellhound 
Hackers 21 June 2007 <http://www.hellboundhackers.org/articles/721-US-GOV-IP-ADDRESSES- 
YOU-SHOULD-NOT-SCAN.html> (last accessed 13 September 2008).
25 Schmitt, Normative Framework', 885 n25.
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despite a brief dip in attacks following the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks when
If*many U.S. military networks were disconnected from the Internet. U.S. 
governmental and military systems remain high cache targets for independent 
hackers, not to mention those hackers deliberately attempting to access classified 
military information.
Additionally, most attacks do not proceed directly from the originating computer to 
the target. Attacks are likely to be routed through several intermediary servers (each 
with its own IP address) in various locales before the attack reaches the target 
computer. Tracing an attack back to its origin takes time and at the present state of 
technology, it is not always possible to ensure that the apparent source of the attack 
is in fact the end of the trail. While the legitimacy of this tactic is perhaps more 
pertinent to discussions of perfidy and camouflage, it illustrates a problem with the 
solution proposed.
On the other hand, it may be argued that in the high-tech battlespace there is no 
practical need for such distinguishes. During a computer network attack against 
military assets, the originator is either a lawful combatant or a civilian directly 
participating in hostilities; in either case, he or she may be legitimately targeted. 
While this holds true for targeting judgements made in the heat of battle, a more 
sophisticated determination of an individual’s status is required in the event that the 
originator is captured to ensure protection of the rights of prisoners of war. 
Obviously this situation is far more likely to apply to the combatant who is not 
sitting a continent away but is physically present in the battlespace. What then of the 
requirement to distinguish the individual combatant from the civilian population? 
Although the technological revolution in military affairs means that warfare is 
moving away from a situation where there is a clear set of enemy lines, it is not 
always the case. A common sense approach to the problem should suffice. Where a 
combatant engages in a computer network attack in circumstances where they are in 
physical proximity to opposing forces such that there is a risk that they may be 
mistaken for a civilian, the requirement to wear a uniform or other distinctive mark 
would remain. Where there is no danger of deception or of the combatant being
26 James F Dunnigan, The Next War Zone: Confronting the Global Threat o f  Cyber Terrorism 
(Citadel Press Books, New York, 2003), 85. Note that Dunnigan's figure for attacks in 1999 was 
22,144 attacks. Latest figures from the Pentagon show the number of attempted intrusions from all 
sources in 2005 totalled 79,000.
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mistaken for a civilian, the need for an individual to wear a distinguishing emblem is 
irrelevant.27
The problems involved in applying the requirement to wear distinguishing marks and 
carry arms openly have arisen in other cases of non-traditional conflict, namely the 
situation of guerrilla fighters in occupied territory. The requirement that combatants 
wear a fixed distinctive emblem visible from a distance has been relaxed somewhat 
as a result of Article 44(3) of Additional Protocol I, which recognises that there are 
some situations in which the nature of hostilities make it impossible (or suicidal) for 
a combatant to distinguish him or herself at all times. In those cases the 
requirement is restricted to the engagement and such times as the individual is 
visible to the adversary in the preceding military deployment. The controversial 
provision is aimed primarily at guerrilla fighters, whose use of covert tactics are 
designed to address inequality between the military and logistical means of the 
parties.29 However, an argument may be made that computer network attacks are an 
example of a type of warfare, the nature of which is anticipated by this provision. 
CNA is by its very nature a covert method of warfare and many authors have cited 
its possible use as a force multiplier for militarily weaker opponents. If this is the 
case, it raises the possibility that preparatory moves for a CNA may be attempted 
from non-military computers (for example electronic probing and reconnaissance, 
sending a virus with a back-door payload to enable access to vulnerable systems or
27 Mark R Shulman, 'Discrimination in the Laws of Information Warfare' (1999) 37 Col J  Trans L 
939, 956.
28 The article provides “in order to promote the protection of the civilian population from the effects 
of hostilities, combatants are obliged to distinguish themselves from the civilian population while they 
are engaged in an attack or in a military operation preparatory to an attack. Recognising, however, 
that there are situations in armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an armed 
combatant cannot so distinguish himself, he shall retain his status as a combatant, provided that, in 
such situations, he carries his arms openly: (a) during each engagement, and (b) during such time as 
he is visible to the adversary while he is engaged in a military deployment preceding the launching of 
an attack in which he is to participate....”
29 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, 527. Some States have argued that this provision is mainly restricted to 
resistance movements in occupied territories and indeed some countries (e.g. the United Kingdom) 
have stated in their reservations to the convention that their acceptance of this clause is limited to such 
territories and wars of self-determination.
30 See for example Schmitt, 'Normative Framework', 897; Michael J Robbat, 'Resolving the Legal 
Issues Concerning the Use of Information Warfare in the International Forum: The Reach of the 
Existing Legal Framework, and the Creation of a New Paradigm' (2000) 6 BUJSci & Tech L 10.
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•  1recruiting zombie computers to a botnet for a distributed denial of service attack), 
but that once the attack proper starts, it would need to emanate from a designated 
‘combatant’ computer or system.32
Compliance, Organisation & Allegiance
The remaining requirements for lawful combatancy do not change markedly with the 
advent of computer network technology. The obligation to conduct hostilities in 
accordance with the laws of armed conflict will be the same, regardless of the 
technology employed by the combatant. The level and type of organisation required 
to satisfy the fifth requirement is affected by the changing structures of parties to 
conflicts generally, but the nature of their weaponry does not raise any particular 
issues.33 Certain computer network attack techniques, for example distributed denial 
of service attacks, allow for a more dispersed structure of the armed group, allowing 
group memebers who are geographically dispersed to play a more active role in co­
ordinated actions. However this is a factual issue rather than a legal one. If the group 
does not have the requisite organisation (whether in network or hierarchical form), 
maintain discipline and supervision, its members cannot be lawful combatants. 
Likewise, the sixth condition, namely that a combatant must belong to a party to the 
conflict, will deny protection to vigilante groups of hackers from ‘joining in’ the 
confrontation in much the same way that protection is denied to independent 
guerrilla groups fighting for a cause without a relationship to a belligerent party.34 
The seventh requirement that the person does not owe a duty of allegiance to the 
capturing power will apply equally in the case of electronic attackers as it does to 
traditional combatants.
31 Note that New Zealand has specifically included a declaration interpreting the term ‘visible’ to 
include visible any form of surveillance, electronic or otherwise. This would appear to be broad 
enough to encompass sweeps of all activities against military IP addresses, a situation which may 
require all preparatory manoeuvres against NZ to emanate from a designated computer.
32 This may raise further issues about whether a distributed denial of service (DDoS) attack could ever 
be legal as it may amount to hiding in the demography, one military computer amongst thousands of 
civilian zombies. However such an attack would tend to be considered a nuisance attack rather than 
one o f the main threats that could cause damage.
33 See generally, John Arquilla, David F. Ronfeldt and United States. Dept, of Defense. Office of the 
Secretary of Defense., Networks and Netwars: The Future o f  Terror, Crime, and Militancy (RAND, 
Santa Monica, 2001) <http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1382/>, for a description of the 
evolving nature of parties from military style hierarchies to networks.
34 Public Prosecutor v Koi et al.
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1.2. Saboteurs and Spies
1  r
The laws of armed conflict do not prohibit sabotage or espionage, however capture 
of a combatant while engaged in either act, will result in loss of privileged status and 
the perpetrator will not be entitled to treatment as a prisoner of war. Article 24 of the 
Hague Regulations 1907 states that “Ruses of war and the employment of measures 
necessary for obtaining information about the enemy are considered permissible”. 
Likewise, Additional Protocol I allows ruses of war and provides that any member of 
the armed forces taken by the adverse party while engaged in espionage is not 
entitled to prisoner of war status.37 Traditionally, both sabotage and espionage 
require the combatant to be operating behind enemy lines, that is, in territory 
controlled or occupied by an adverse party. However, advanced technology means 
that sensitive information can be retrieved from, and damage can be caused in, the 
territory of the adverse party without ever setting foot in it. No-one would deny that 
war-time electronic eavesdropping or aerial surveillance are accepted methods of 
gathering information provided that the operative remains outside the territory of the 
adverse State (or wears distinctive emblems while engaged in such activities). 
However the issue that is raised by computer network attack is its proactive and 
clandestine nature of the intrusion and an actor's ability to manipulate data and 
information inside the territory, while remaining physically outside.
1.2.1. Sabotage
It is possible to argue that many acts of computer network attack will amount to acts 
of sabotage where a State engages in acts of disrupting or disabling damage to 
opposition resources in a clandestine manner, in other than occupied territory. This is 
precisely the type of attack for which computer network attacks are likely to be used. 
While sabotage is not in and of itself internationally culpable (unless committed by a 
person resident in occupied territory, who is not a member of the armed forces), it
35 So long as acts of sabotage are directed at a legitimate military target.
36 Art. 24, Hague Convention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land 1907.
37 Arts. 37(2) and 46 respectively.
38 Some questions arise when the espionage takes place in the exclusive economic zone or territorial 
waters o f the target country; see the 1968 case of the USS Pueblo in North Korean waters, or the more 
recent 2001 case of the US EP-3 surveillance plane which crashed after colliding with a Chinese F8 
fighter jet. It should be noted that both were peacetime incidents.
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will result in the loss of combatant privileges and prisoner of war status on capture. 
The cases of Ex Parte Quirin in which eight German saboteurs were convicted of
' IQ
‘unlawful combatancy’ for unsuccessful sabotage missions in the United States, 
and Ali which involved the sabotage of a civilian building in Singapore.40 
In Ex Parte Quirin, eight Germans landed secretly on the shores of the United States 
in German uniform with explosives for the purposes of sabotage. While they landed 
in German uniforms, on landing they changed into civilian clothing and proceeded to 
travel to their destinations. They were captured. The Supreme Court of the United 
States held:41
“The spy who secretly and without uniform passes the military lines of a belligerent 
in time of war, seeking to gather military information and communicate it to the 
enemy, or an enemy combatant who without uniform comes secretly through the 
lines for the purpose of waging war by destruction of life or property, are familiar 
examples of belligerents who are generally deemed not to be entitled to the status of 
prisoners of war, but to be offenders against the law of war subject to trial and 
punishment by military tribunals.”
The Court went on to hold:42
“The law of war cannot rightly treat those agents of enemy armies who enter our 
territory, armed with explosives intended for the destruction of war industries and 
supplies, as any the less belligerent enemies than are agent similarly entering for the 
purpose of destroying fortified places or our Armed Forces. By passing our 
boundaries for such purposes without uniform or other emblem signifying their 
belligerent status, or by discarding that means of identification after entry, such 
enemies become unlawful belligerents subject to trial and punishment.”
In a similar case, Ali v Public Prosecutor, two members of the Indonesian army 
entered a bank in Singapore in civilian clothing and deposited a bag containing 
nitroglycerine in the stairwell. The bag exploded killing three civilians. Three days 
later the perpetrators were rescued from the sea and arrested, still wearing civilian
39 Ex Parte Quirin et al (1942) 317 US 1, Supreme Court of the United States.
40 Osman Bin Haji Mohamed Ali and Another v the Public Prosecutor.
41 Ex Parte Quirin, 31.
42 Ibid., 37.
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clothes and carrying no identity documents. The Privy Council confirmed the 
Federal Court of Malaysia’s decision that:
members of enemy armed forces who are combatants and who come here with 
the assumption of the semblance of peaceful pursuits divesting themselves of the 
character or appearance of soldiers and are captured, such persons are not entitled to 
the privileges of prisoners of war.”
In both these cases, the act of sabotage, and the basis of their culpability as unlawful 
combatants, was committed by entering onto the territory of the victim State in 
civilian dress and committing (or attempting to commit) acts of destruction. The 
difficulty that technology now brings is that such acts of sabotage are now capable of 
being committed without the perpetrator setting foot in the territory of the victim 
State. It is now possible to commit acts of sabotage by entering into an adversary’s 
computer systems in a clandestine manner (i.e. through a backdoor) and causing 
significant damage to State interests. Like most issues involving computer network 
attack, the legal status will depend on the type of attack being envisaged.
The simplest instances of sabotage by computer network attack are those utilised on 
a daily basis by civilian virus writers around the world. An attacker sends an email to 
the recipient which incorporates a virus or other malicious code; the code activates 
upon opening the email or email attachment and damages information resident on the 
recipient’s computer networks.43 As long as the email does not purport to be from a 
person or organisation with protected status or claim to offer terms of surrender or 
some other perfidious simulation, the combatant remains entitled to POW status in 
the event of capture. This is the electronic equivalent of sending dangerous items 
though the mail i.e. letter or parcel bombs. The computer system is merely being 
used as a delivery device.
A direct intrusion into a system or network however may be more akin to sneaking 
across borders to directly cause damage. Given that the physical act of crossing a 
border or passing into enemy occupied territory is no longer necessary to cause 
covert damage, a question may be raised as to whether the actor being physically
43 Damage estimates from computer network attacks such as viruses are notoriously difficult to 
quantify as there are no agreed standard measures. However, it is estimated that viruses cost 
businesses billions of dollars every year.
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present in the territory is a fundamental element of sabotage. Yoram Dinstein has 
argued in relation to espionage that the combatant must be physically located in an 
area controlled by the enemy for the offence to crystallize.44 An alternative reading 
would require only that the effects of the act take place in the territory, in much the 
same way that traditional 'shot across the border1 cases and more recent domestic 
cases of computer intrusion are prosecuted in the State where the damage occurs.45 
This is the fundamental territorial principle set out in the Lotus Case.46 This 
approach argues that it is the act of deception for the purposes of destruction which 
negates combatant status. This would also fit with the reasoning set out in the 
Hostages Trial where "guerrillas were actually said, in legal intendment, to resemble 
spies in that the enemy punished such activities not because of their illegality in an 
international sense but because of the danger they presented to him" 47 The fact that 
acts of covert damage can now be performed from outside the territory controlled by 
the enemy does not eliminate the danger and in fact, makes it more difficult to 
detect. Under this analysis, a covert intrusion into a system resident in the territory of 
a victim State, with the intention of causing damage, while disguised as something 
other than a combatant, is likely to be considered sabotage with the resultant loss of 
combatant status for any operative thus caught. An intrusion attempt directly from a 
military computer would remain legitimate, as there is no deception involved.
1.2.2. Espionage
In the case of electronic espionage, multiple peacetime instances of which have been 
made publicly available,48 it is doubtful that this will raise any new difficulties.
44 See section 5.2.2 infra’, Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 209.
45 See generally Antonio Cassese, International Criminal Law (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 
2003), 278., citing Rivard v United States (1967) 375 F 2d 882, U.S Ct. App., 5th Cir.: “[a]ll the 
nations of the world recognize the principle that a man who outside of a country wilfully puts in 
motion a force to take effect in it is answerable at the place where evil is done”.
46 The Lotus (1927) Series A No. 10, Permanent Court of International Justice.
47 Baxter, 'So-Called 'Unprivileged Belligerency': Spies, Guerrillas, and Saboteurs', 336. Citing United 
States v List et al (1949) Trials of War Criminals, XI (1950), 1245; War Crimes Reports, VIII (1949) 
56.
48 One example, code-named ‘Titan Rain’, consists of a series of coordinated attacks launched against 
U.S. computer systems since 2003. The attacks are highly sophisticated intrusions against unclassified 
networks, in which the attackers have gained access, copied as many files as possible from the 
computer, transmitted them via way stations to China and made a near clean exit. Systems 
compromised include NASA, the World Bank, military sites such as Redstone Arsenal military base, 
and defence contractors such as Lockheed Martin. Unusually for cyber intrusions, the origin o f the
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Espionage in time of war is not a violation of the laws of armed conflict, as 
evidenced by Article 24 of the Hague Regulations, or indeed of any other 
international law. Capture results in the loss of combatant status and the right to 
prisoner of war treatment and will be prosecuted under the national laws of the State. 
Under the Hague Regulations, a key factor in the offence of espionage is the attempt 
to gain information in the zone of operations of a belligerent. Additional Protocol I 
extends the zone of operations to all territory controlled by the enemy.49 Yoram 
Dinstein has stated that this means that the combatant must be physically located in 
an area controlled by the enemy. “A person stationed on his own State’s side of the 
front line -  say, clandestinely monitoring or deciphering enemy radio signals -  is not 
a spy”.50 While this latter statement is undoubtedly correct, it does not follow that 
combatant must necessarily be physically located in enemy controlled territory. A 
distinction can be made between the passive collection of radio signals from outside 
a specified zone of operations, and the active intrusion into a system either controlled 
by an adverse party, or resident on enemy territory, for the purposes of information 
collection. Passive collection of information (even when assisted by the strategic 
placement of a listening post), does not require an act which would allow the 
opposing State to assert any grievance or jurisdiction over that act. A similar 
computer-based equivalent would be use of a listening post system such as Echelon 
to intercept emails, telephone calls and other data traffic off satellite 
communications, or taking advantage of an unsecured wireless network to intercept 
traffic travelling across that network.51 However, using the analysis set out in the 
section above with relation to sabotage, it can be argued that it is the act of collection 
of the information which must occur in the territory controlled by the enemy. Active
attacks was quickly and clearly traced to three routers operating in Guangdong province China, 
however it is unclear whether the attacks are emanating from military, corporate or individual 
operators. The Chinese government denies any involvement. Bradley Graham, 'Hackers Attack Via 
Chinese Web Sites', Washington Post (Washington D.C.), 25 August 2005, A 1; Thornburgh, et al., 
'The Invasion of the Chinese Cyberspies (and the Man Who Tried to Stop Them)'.
49 The Commentary to Additional Protocol I states that the additional protocol did not intend to 
change the substance o f the traditional rules o f espionage adopted in The Hague, but merely sought to 
supplement and elaborate them. This conclusion was confirmed by the wording of Art. 39(3) 
(Emblems of nationality), which refers to the "existing generally recognized rules of international law 
applicable to espionage".
50 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 209.
51 Echelon is the signals intelligence collection system operated between the U.S., U.K., Australia, 
Canada and New Zealand.
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penetration into a network controlled by the enemy in order to collect information 
(by breaching firewalls and other electronic defences), would be enough to situate 
the collection of information from that system in the territory of the adverse party.
In the same manner that sabotage is distinguished from ordinary military operations 
in the section above, it is the clandestine character of the activity and the spy’s 
intention to deceive, that distinguishes espionage from the reconnaissance, scouting 
or surveillance performed by military forces and by individual members of the armed 
forces.52 It is this fact that prevents the operators of unmanned aerial vehicles 
(UAVs), which have been operating in war zones since the 1950s, from being 
classed as spies. An intrusion attempt launched directly from a military computer 
would remain legitimate, as there is no deception involved.
There is one additional factor which must be taken into account with computer based 
forms of espionage. Spies are excused for any liability for their actions under
m # f
national law once they rejoin the army to which they belong. If the spy in question 
never leaves his or her lines it seems unlikely that they will ever be at risk of capture 
before regaining their combatant privileges. However a combatant stationed inside 
the territory of the opposing forces, or in any other territory, would run the same 
risks as any other spy.
2. Direct Participation by Civilians
Civilians are entitled to protection from the dangers arising from military operations 
and may not be targeted until, and for such time as they take an active or direct part 
in hostilities.54 Where civilians do take a direct part in the hostilities, they lose their 
protected status for the period of their involvement and may be liable for punishment 
either through domestic or international criminal processes for their actions.
However the question of what actions will amount to direct participation in 
hostilities is one which continues to raise difficult issues for the laws of armed
52 Erik Castr6n, The Present Law o f  War and Neutrality (Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian Toimituksia, 
Helsinki, 1954), 152. cited in Dinstein, Conduct o f Hostilities, 111.
53 Art. 31 Hague Regulations; Art. 46(4) Additional Protocol I.
54 Common Art. 3 Geneva Conventions; Art. 51(3) Additional Protocol I. Common Article 3 of the 
Geneva Conventions employs the term ‘active’ rather than ‘direct’ as used in the Additional 
Protocols. The distinction between active and direct participation was discussed by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda in the Akayesu case which held that the terms are so similar that they 
should be treated as synonymous: Prosecutor v Jean-Paul Akayesu (1998) Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, 
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, para 629.
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conflict. Civilians have played a vital supporting role in warfare throughout history, 
and modem warfare is no exception. Civilians are widely employed by the armed 
forces, both as contractors and as full-time employees, or they may accompany the 
armed forces for a variety of other reasons. The use of contractors in particular, has 
increased exponentially in recent years as the combined effects of the technological 
revolution and ‘privatisation through outsourcing’ have been used to ensure 
continuing military might, while reducing costs.55 For example, in 2006 over 38,000 
contractors were serving with coalition forces in Iraq in functions from cleaners and 
cooks, with an additional 30,000 providing security for both the military and other 
contractors and guarding convoys and military installations.56
The use of civilians has arisen particularly with regard to technologically advanced 
methods of warfare. Civilians maintain complex weapons systems such as the F-l 17 
Nighthawk fighter, B-2 Spirit bomber, Ml Abrams tank, and TOW missile system,
cn
and have both maintained and operated the Global Hawk and Predator UAVs. This 
high level of outsourcing takes place for a number of reasons. First, it is far more 
cost effective to hire civilian contractors to maintain and operate the systems which 
run the military than to train military personnel to do so. Despite the (generally) 
higher salaries of contractors, they do not require the training and infrastructure costs 
of military personnel. Second, the systems being used are seldom standard inventory; 
for the most part, they are too specialised and often still in the throes of research and
CO
development. It is clear that military personnel are being trained in computer 
network attack capabilities,59 however it is also apparent that civilian contractors are
55 Guillory, 'Civilianising the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubicon?' 111.
56 As at 1 May 2006, the number of civilian logistics personnel was reportedly 38,305, Brookings 
Institution, Iraq Index, Brookings Institute (2006) 15 <http://www.brookings.edu/iraqindex> (last 
accessed 12 September 2008). It is unclear whether this data relates only to the US Central Command 
Area of Responsibility. Figures on the numbers of security contractors are harder to come by but a 
recent figure in a Frontline report put this figure at an additional 35,000 both Iraqi and non-Iraqi 
contractors, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/faqs/.
57 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation by Private Contractors or Civilian 
Employees' (2004) 5(2) C hiJIn t'lL  511, 512.
58 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Direct Participation in Hostilities and 21st Century Armed Conflict' in H 
Fischer, et al. (eds), Crisis Management and Humanitarian Protection (Berliner WissenschaftsVerlag, 
Berlin, 2004) 505-529, 523.
59 See for example, C. Todd Lopez, 'Military Students Get Lesson in Cyberwarfare', Air Force Print 
News 3 May 2006,
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used by the military to run their information systems. As these information systems 
become both targets and weapons, such contractors find themselves involved in 
hostilities on an unprecedented scale. It is therefore essential to carefully delineate 
which tasks are permissible non-combatant support and which will constitute 
unlawfully participating in hostilities.
2.1. Requirements of Direct Participation
Although there remains significant debate over the definition and requirements of 
‘active’ or ‘direct’ participation,60 the commentary to Article 43 of Additional 
Protocol I indicates that the phrase includes “acts which are intended by their nature 
or their purpose to hit specifically the personnel and the materiel of the armed forces 
of the adverse party”.61 The commentary goes on to state that “direct participation in 
hostilities implies a direct causal relationship between the activity engaged in and the 
harm done to the enemy at the time and place where the activity takes place”. A 
similar assessment is seen in the commentary to Additional Protocol II relating to 
Article 13(3) of the Protocol; it requires a ‘significant causal relationship’ between 
act and immediate consequence. As a result, any determination of status will need 
to be done on a case-by-case basis, an approach confirmed by the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in Tadic.64
“It is unnecessary to define exactly the line dividing those taking an active part in 
hostilities and those who are not so involved. It is sufficient to examine the relevant 
facts of each victim and to ascertain whether, in each individual’s circumstances, 
that person was actively involved in hostilities at the relevant time”.
<http://searchsecurity.techtarget.eom/originalContent/0,289142,sidl4_j*cil 186049, OO.html> (last 
accessed 11 May 2006).
60 See for example the ICRC, Direct Participation in Hostilities under International Humanitarian 
Law, ICRC (2003) <http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/participation-hostilities-ihl-
311205> (last accessed 18 August 2008); ICRC, Second Expert Meeting - Direct Participation in 
Hostilities under International Humanitarian Law, ICRC (2004)
<http://www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsf/html/participation-hostilities-ihl-311205> (last accessed 
18 August 2008).
61 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 1679.
62 Ibid.
63 Ibid., para 4787.
64 Prosecutor v Dusko Tadic (1997) 36 ILM 908, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia, para 616.
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Hays Parks has defined civilian participation in warfare as a spectrum between total 
non-participation on one end (what has sometimes been termed the ‘pure’ civilian) 
through war effort, military effort and finally direct participation in military 
operations.65 Such categories were based on the 1979 ICRC Conference of 
Government Experts which resulted in the Additional Protocols. It is widely 
recognised that acts that help the general war effort do not constitute direct 
participation,66 however where the line is to be drawn is a subject of intense debate 
between commentators which has still not been settled.67 A.P.V. Rogers has argued 
for a narrow construction of a ‘direct part in hostilities’, stating that actions such as 
arms production, military engineering work or military transport (including the oft- 
cited example of the ammunition truck driver) would not be deemed direct 
participation.68 He argues that to hold otherwise places civilian protection severely at 
risk. However the same argument has been used by both Hays Parks and Michael 
Schmitt to advocate a wider construction. Parks has stated that civilians working 
toward the military effort are far more combatant than civilian, and has argued for an 
expansive approach, which would include intelligence gathering and logistical 
.support for combatant forces as direct participation.69 Using the traditional example 
of the status of the civilian driver of an ammunition supply truck, Parks thus finds 
that the truck driver should be a lawful target of attack.70 Rogers has dismissed this 
view as creating a class of quasi-combatants based on job description, a situation that
71has been expressly rejected by the Commentary to the Protocol.
In an attempt to find a more general rule, Michael Schmitt has argued that the best 
approach is to assess the criticality of the act to the direct application of violence
77against the enemy. Although direct cause and effect is unnecessary, there must be
65 See generally, W. Hays Parks’ categories o f civilian participation as considered by the 1979 ICRC 
Conference of Government Experts: W. Hays Parks, 'Air War and the Law of War' (1990) 32 AFL 
Rev 1, 132.
66 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 1679.
67 The ICRC and The TM Asser Institute have engaged in a series of expert meetings to debate the 
question. ICRC, Direct Participation 2003; ICRC, Direct Participation 2004.
68 Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 9.
69 See Parks, 'Air War and the Law of War', 132.
70 Ibid., 132.
71 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 1679; Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 9.
72 Schmitt, 'Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation', 534; Schmitt, 'Direct Participation', 505.
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sufficient causal proximity to a foreseeable consequence of harm or other
71
disadvantage to the enemy.
“[T]he civilian must have engaged in an action that he or she knew would harm (or 
otherwise disadvantage) the enemy in a relatively direct and immediate way. The 
participation must have been part of the process by which a particular use of force 
was rendered possible, either through preparation or execution. It is not necessary 
that the individual foresaw the eventual result of the operation, but only that he or 
she knew their participation was indispensable to a discrete hostile act or series of 
related acts.”
He further argues that any grey areas should be interpreted towards in favour of 
finding direct participation to protect the law and provide an incentive for civilians to 
remain as distant from conflict as possible. Thus under Schmitt’s analysis, the 
civilian driver of an ammunition supply truck is not taking a direct part in hostilities 
when driving from the factory to the ammunitions depot, but would be when driving 
from the depot to the front.74 Both Parks and Schmitt maintain that to grant 
immunity to civilians who are intimately involved in the conflict is to risk 
engendering disrespect for the law by combatants who are put at risk by their
7*
actions. In others words, the actions of the relatively small number of civilians 
supporting the military should not endanger the lives of civilians who have no part in 
the conflict.
Some scholars have argued that direct participation includes not only activities 
involving the delivery of violence, but also acts aimed at protecting personnel,
7 *
infrastructure or material. These problems have arisen in Iraq in relation to private
77
security contractors engaged to defend military installations. U.S. military doctrine
73 Schmitt, 'Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation', 533.
74 Schmitt, 'Direct Participation', 504.
75 Parks, 'Air War and the Law of War', 132; Schmitt, 'Direct Participation', 505.
76 U.S. Air Force, Pam. 110-34, Judge Advocate General: Commander’s Handbook on the Law of 
Armed Conflict (1980, §2-8) commenting that the rescue of downed airmen would constitute taking 
direct part in hostilities, cited in Jean-Fran?ois Qu6guiner, Direct Participation in Hostilities under 
International Humanitarian Law, Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict Research at Harvard 
University (2003) <http://www.ihlresearch.org/ihl/pdfs/briefmg3297.pdf> (last accessed 13 
September 2008). See also, U.K. Ministry of Defence, The Manual o f  the Law o f  Armed Conflict 
(Oxford University Press, Oxford; New York, 2004), §12.69.
77 See PBS Frontline, Interview with Stephen Schooner - Private Warriors
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/schooner.html> (last accessed
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(and international law) states that contractors are allowed to carry arms for the 
purposes of defence only,78 however Peter Singer has noted that despite this, 
contractors are in fact being used for roles which clash with that doctrine, and that 
the very function for which they are being hired mandates their use in combat 
roles.79 For example, if States are hiring a private military company to guard a key 
installation in a combat zone, or to escort a convoy through insurgent territory which 
is renowned for attacks on convoys, it is then disingenuous to argue that the 
contractors are armed solely for self-defence.80 Michael Schmitt has stated that a 
civilian government employee or private contractor defending military personnel or
•  •  •  ft 1 _military objectives from enemy attacks directly participates in hostilities. These 
arguments accord with Article 49 of Additional Protocol I, which states that the term 
‘attacks’ incorporates acts of violence against the adversary, whether in offence or 
defence. This definition would appear to extend to those technicians who engaged in 
active defence of military computer networks such that harm is caused to the 
attacking adversary or their equipment.
One further point deserves brief comment. Traditionally geographic proximity to the 
battle lines has also been used as a rough guide to ascertaining the status of the 
civilian concerned, however this measure is no longer decisive in twenty-first 
century combat. Not only have traditional battle lines been replaced by amorphous 
battlespaces, but physical proximity to that space is no longer required. Even before 
computer networks are considered, missiles and other weapons may now be loaded 
onto aircraft or otherwise launched from continents away and strike any point on the 
globe.
13 September 2008). Also, for example the use of the private military firm Blackwater to defend the 
Coalition Government Headquaters in Najaf, Iraq which subsequently came under attack. Dana Priest, 
’Private Guards Repel Attack on US Headquarters', Washington Post 6 April 2004, A01 
<http://www. washingtonpost. com/ac2/wp-dyn/A53059-2004Apr5 ?language=printer> (last accessed 
13 May 2006). See section 2.4 infra.
78 Rumsfield letter cited in Schmitt, 'Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation', nl 1. 
http://www.house.gov/skelton/5-4-04_Rumsfeld_letter_on_contractors.pdf
79 PBS Frontline, Interview with Peter Singer - Private Warriors
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/singer.html> (last accessed 13 
September 2008).
80 Ibid.
81 Schmitt, 'Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation', 538.
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2.2. Offensive Computer Network Attack
Despite the need to examine the context of particular actions, it is clear that any 
civilian engaged in a proactive, offensive computer network attack against an 
adversary's networks or personnel would be taking a direct part in hostilities in much 
the same way that a civilian taking up conventional arms would be. This is the case 
regardless of whether the attack was designed to cause damage in and of itself, or 
whether it was designed to support a conventional attack, for example, disabling an 
enemy’s air defence network prior to the launch of conventional air strikes. The fact 
that damage is caused by reason of computer manipulation rather than conventional 
arms is irrelevant.
2.3. Computer Network Attack System Support
The issue becomes more complex when applied to civilians engaged in activities less 
immediately linked to hostilities. While IT support is a concept that seems ripe for 
civilian outsourcing, maintenance of systems and networks which are used to launch 
computer network attacks may be viewed as maintenance of a weapons system, 
placing the technicians who maintain these networks at risk of direct participation in 
hostilities. Knut Ipsen has argued that direct participation includes ‘use of a weapons 
system in an indispensable function’, although he gives no guidance as to which
O')
functions should be considered indispensable. Two questions come out of this 
statement; first, whether a system used for launching computer network attacks is a 
weapons system and second, whether maintenance and support of that network 
constitutes an indispensable function such that it would amount to direct 
participation in hostilities.
The U.S. Department of Defense dictionary of military terms defines a weapons 
system as “[a] combination of one or more weapons with all related equipment, 
materials, services, personnel, and means of delivery and deployment (if applicable)
O'!
required for self-sufficiency.” Depending on the type of computer network attack 
envisaged, the weapons involved may be malicious coding (in the case of Trojans,
82 Ipsen, 'Combatants & Non-Combatants', 67.
83 U.S. Department of Defense, Dictionary o f  Military and Associated Terms (as Amended through 20 
March 2006) (Washington D.C., 2001) <http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/jel/new_pubs/jpl_02.pdf> (last 
accessed 13 September 2008).
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viruses and other kinds of backdoor attacks) or the network itself in the case of 
intrusion and sabotage. In either case it is quite clear from this definition that 
networks used to launch computer network attacks would fall within this definition,
R4.either as the weapon itself or as the means of delivery and deployment.
Maintenance of a weapons system would seem to be an act which has a direct causal
Of
relationship with the harm done to the enemy, and yet the maintenance of more and 
more military systems is being outsourced as part of the drive for cheaper, smaller, 
more streamlined armed forces. The U.S. Air Force Congress now requires that 
maintenance and repair for all new critical weapons systems be under contractor 
support for at least four years and for life for non-critical systems. This so-called 
‘factory to foxhole’ support includes weapons systems such as the Patriot missile
0*7
system, JSTARS, data processing systems and the Fox nuclear chemical biological
n o
reconnaissance system, combat aircraft and the Abrams Ml Al tank. Further, 
civilian contractors staff the entire information operations cell supporting the U.S. 
Southern Command, which is responsible for defence operations in 32 countries in
OQ
Central and South America and the Caribbean. Despite this evidence of state 
practice to the contrary, maintenance of these systems, particularly maintenance that 
takes place once a system has come under attack and are aimed against a direct 
intrusion, would amount to direct participation in hostilities. How then to reconcile 
state practice with the inescapable conclusion that maintenance is an indispensable
84 For a contrasting view see Gregory F. Intoccia and Joe Wesley Moore, 'Communications 
Technology, Warfare, and the Law: Is the Network a Weapons System?' (2006) 28 Hous JInt'l L 467, 
479. While arguing that the network should not be considered a weapons system, Intoccia & Moore 
base their opinion on an overly broad definition of the network which encompasses practically the 
entire range of communications equipment available both at national and international level.
85 Note that this is not a universal view. Although disagreeing with the merits of it, Parks does not 
consider that the maintenance of the Swiss Air Force by civilian engineers would constitute direct 
participation under the terms of Additional Protocol I: Parks, 'Air War and the Law of War', n397.; 
but c f  Schmitt, 'Direct Participation', 508.
86 “Outsourcing and Privatization” 1988 Air Force Congressional Issue Papers Extract cited in Steven 
J. Zamparelli, 'What Have We Signed up For?: Competitive Sourcing and Privatization - Contractors 
on the Battlefield' (1999) XXIII(3) AFJLog  9.
87 JSTARS (Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System) offer an airborne, standoff range, 
surveillance, and target acquisition radar and a command and control centre to those managing a 
conflict. It possesses secure data links with air operations centre, army mobile ground stations and 
other military command, control & intelligence assets: Schmitt, 'Direct Participation', 512.
88 Zamparelli, 'What Have We Signed up For?' 13; Schmitt, 'Humanitarian Law and Direct 
Participation', 518.
89 Dan Verton, Navy Opens Some It Ops to Vendors' (2000) Federal Computer Week 
<www.fcw.eom/fcw/articles/2000/0821/pol-navy-08-21-00.asp> (last accessed 15 April 2004).
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function in the delivery of violence. Schmitt argues that immediate maintenance and 
support, that is, support not of a routine nature, may be seen as direct participation -  
parallels may be drawn with civilian aircraft engineers in charge of maintaining, 
loading and launching aircraft hundreds of miles away from a conflict zone.90 
Whereas other routine maintenance falls into a different category and should not be 
so considered.
2.4. Generic IT Support
Another question arises in the case of the civilian technician employed to maintain 
military networks, not directly involved in offensive information operations, but 
which may subsequently come under attack by computer network attacks. In highly 
technologically advanced militaries, particularly those who rely heavily on their 
networking capabilities for an advantage, disruption of the networks which link the 
various components of the military together will create a significant advantage for an 
opposing force. Thus for example, any U.S. military network, including those which 
utilise civilian assets either wholly or in part, becomes a useful and legitimate target 
(subject always to the principle of proportionality). In 2000 the U.S. Navy opened up 
all defensive information operations, including information assurance and other 
defensive security operations, as “non-inherently governmental” job functions and 
thus open to outsourcing.91 It seems clear that routine systems maintenance, security 
updates and other generic IT functions which are not related to hostilities (CNA or 
otherwise) would not be considered direct participation. Merely, setting up security 
protocols on a network would be akin to civilians helping with the war effort to lay 
down barbed wire on the beaches in advance of a suspected landing. However as 
seen above, guarding a military objective against enemy action and defence of a 
military installation does comprise direct participation in hostilities. At what point 
does the technician, cease to become a protected civilian merely supporting and 
maintaining a network (including network security measures), and become an active 
participant defending a military objective? A conservative view would dictate that at 
the very moment the system comes under computer network attack, civilians must 
step away from their posts. However, in contrast to defence of a ’real world' military
90 Schmitt, 'Direct Participation', 512.
91 Verton, TSfavy Opens Some It Ops to Vendors'.
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objective, defence of a system or network may not require the use of force by the 
defenders. For instance, when private contractors came under fire defending the 
Coalition Headquarters in Najaf, Iraq in 2004, a three and a half hour firefight 
ensued that used thousands of rounds of ammunition and hundreds of grenades, and 
resulted in the wounding of three coalition personnel and an unspecified number of 
Iraqi casualties.92 In contrast, defence of a computer network seldom results in
Q -l
casualties and solely defensive measures may not even comprise a use of force. 
Although the application of force is not a criterion for direct participation, it may be 
that this disjuncture from damage removes network defence sufficiently from the 
chain of causation to disqualify it from direct participation. Although in this respect 
it is useful to note Michael Schmitt's comment that civilians performing defensive 
functions frees up soldiers for other combat missions, thereby further contributing to 
hostile action.94 As with each of these scenarios, the specific circumstances of the 
civilian's actions will need to be assessed.
Computer network operations pose an additional issue in relation to the difficulty in 
attributing attacks to a specific actor.95 Civilians are entitled to defend property from 
criminals and looters without such actions constituting direct participation in 
hostilities; thus civilian technicians are entitled to defend military networks from 
regular hackers. Not only are military networks a prime target for enemy forces, they 
come under increasing attack from civilians during time of war as well.96 Given the 
anonymous nature of the Internet and the current lag in tracing the source of attacks, 
civilian technicians are unlikely to be able to determine whether or not they are 
directly participating in hostilities. They will be unable to ascertain immediately who 
is perpetrating the attack, and in many cases even where it is determined that a
92 Priest, 'Private Guards Repel Attack on US Headquarters'. Coalition wounded comprised two 
contractors and one marine.
93 See Chapter 2 supra.
94 Schmitt, 'Humanitarian Law and Direct Participation', 538.
95 See Chapter 3 supra.
96 The 2008 computer network attacks launched against Georgian government and other websites are 
a prime example of this. Computer network attacks have also accompanied the Arab-Israeli conflict 
and Zapatista uprisings in Mexico among other incidents. Interestingly, despite predictions of this 
behaviour in Iraq, the number of intrusions remained stable, although a large number of website 
defacements did occur: Peter Rojas, 'The Paranoia That Paid Off, The Guardian (London), 24 April 
2003,27.
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civilian is behind the attack, it will not be possible to determine if there is a sufficient
07nexus between the attack and any ongoing hostilities.
2.5. Mercenaries
The increased numbers of civilian employees and contractors working for the 
military also raises issues regarding their possible classification as mercenaries. As 
set out in the section above, civilians accompanying the forces without being part of 
it are granted prisoner of war status under Article 4(4) Geneva Convention III, 
however those directly participating in hostilities, for example where contractors are 
engaged to conduct proactive offensive computer network attacks, run the risk of 
being categorised as mercenaries. It is clear that both individual hackers and private 
military companies (PMCs) specialising in computer network operations have 
attempted to, or are in fact, acting with States to provide computer network attack
Q O
possibilities. Although the use of mercenaries in warfare is an ancient practice, in 
post-colonial times mercenaries have fallen from favour and have become personae 
non grata in international relations.
Under the Geneva Conventions, mercenaries (along with "other militias") qualify as 
lawful combatants as long as they meet the conditions set out in Article 13(2)." 
However that position had changed by the implementation of the Additional 
Protocols. Adopted in the wake of nearly two decades of post-colonial struggles for 
self-determination in Africa, Additional Protocol I provides that mercenaries do not 
have the right to be combatants and deprives them of their right to be treated as
97 Obviously in cases where attacks are accompanied by website defacement, such as have occurred in 
the above cases, the link with ongoing hostilities will be easier to ascertain. See for example,Izhar 
Lev, 'E-Intifada: Political Disputes Cast Shadows in Cyberspace' (2000) 12(12) Janes Intelligence 
Review 16; Steve Mertl, 'Cyberspace Experts Await Full-Scale Attack', Globe & Mail (Canada), 27 
December 2002, A ll ;  Reuters, 'Cyber-War Rages over Iraq', ZDNetNews 31 March 2003, 
<Http://www.zdnet.com/newstech/security/stoty/0,2000024985,20273268,00.htm> (last accessed 31 
March 2003).
98 See for example PBS Frontline ‘Interview with Hacker’ Cyberwar! (PBS Airdate 24 April 2003) 
Available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/interviews/hacker.html (last 
accessed 29 May 2004); Ruth Alvey, 'Russian Hackers for Hire: The Rise of the E-Mercenary' (2001) 
13(7) Jane's Intelligence Review 52.
99 The conditions are set out in section 1 above, i.e. responsible command, having a fixed distinctive 
sign, carrying arms openly and conduct in accordance wit the laws and customs of war. See Dino 
Kritsiotis, 'Mercenaries and the Privatisation of Warfare' (1998) 22 Fletcher Forum o f  World Affairs 
11,16.
149
prisoners of war if captured.100 Significantly, given the historical context of the 
outlawing of mercenarism, Additional Protocol II relating to non-international armed 
conflicts does not contain any provisions relating to mercenaries.101
109The definition of a mercenary is set out in Article 47(2) of Additional Protocol I:
A mercenary is any person who:
(a) is specially recruited locally or abroad in order to fight in an armed conflict;
(b) does, in fact, take a direct part in the hostilities;
(c) is motivated to take part in the hostilities essentially by the desire for private gain 
and, in fact, is promised, by or on behalf of a Party to the conflict, material 
compensation substantially in excess pf that promised or paid to combatants of 
similar ranks and functions in the armed forces of that Party;
(d) is neither a national of a Party to the conflict nor a resident of territory controlled 
by a Party to the conflict;
(e) is not a member of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict; and
(f) has not been sent by a State which is not a Party to the conflict on official duty as 
a member of its armed forces.
The conditions of the article are cumulative and it is widely considered that taken
i mtogether the conditions are unworkable against contemporary ‘soldiers for hire’. It 
is particularly difficult to apply the definition to modern-day private military 
companies for a number of reasons. First, the definition of mercenaries applies only
100 Art. 47(1), Additional Protocol I. Mercenaries are also banned under the 1977 OAU Convention 
for the Elimination of Mercenaries in Africa and the 1989 International Convention against the 
Recruitment, Use Financing and Training of Mercenaries.
101 For an in-depth analysis of the history and evolution of the prohibition against mercenaries see 
Leslie C. Green, 'The Status of Mercenaries in International Law' in L C Green (ed) Essays on the 
Modern Law o f War (Transnational Publishers, Dobbs Ferry, NY, 2000), 529; Todd S Milliard, 
'Overcoming Post-Colonial Myopia: A Call to Recognise and Regulate Private Military Companies' 
(2003) 176 Mil L Rev 1.
102 The same definition can be found in the International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, 
Financing and Training o f Mercenaries UN GAOR 44th Sess., Supp No.43, UN Doc. A/RES/44/34 
(1989).
103 See for example Milliard, 'Post-Colonial Myopia', 42; Peter W. Singer, 'War, Profits, and the 
Vacuum of Law: Privatized Military Firms and International Law' (2004) 42 Col J  Trans L 521, 524.
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to natural persons, so the PMC itself cannot be held accountable. Secondly, because 
of their corporate structure, individuals are hired and paid as contractors by the 
company, not by a party to the conflict, which enables them to hide behind its 
corporate veil. In addition, both contractors and PMC's are often hired for multiple 
purposes, not for a specific conflict. In some cases nationality may be extended to 
contractors for the express purpose of avoiding the provisions.104 Finally, individual 
contractors may be incorporated into the armed forces of the State or given special 
status such as detectives, regardless of their nationality.105 All of these difficulties 
can be addressed as conditions of the contract of hire, to the extent that that one 
commentator has been caused to remark that “any mercenary who cannot exclude 
himself from this definition deserves to be shot -  and his lawyer with him!”.106 
However, in modem conflicts the increasing use of private contractors and the 
disjuncture between States’ policy on the use of contractors in particular roles and 
their actual use, means that despite the ability to manage the risk of mercenary status
1 ( Y 7through contractual terms, some contractors may find themselves exposed. As 
seen above, in an age of high-tech militaries, where the cost of training soldiers to 
operate increasingly complex and specialised systems in prohibitive, contractors are 
being used to deliver, support and in some cases even operate systems. This clearly 
brings them within the direct participation requirement and the recruitment 
specifically for the purposes of armed conflict. Individual contractors who are 
foreign civilians, and are recruited for their specific computer network attack 
capabilities in respect of a particular conflict are at risk of falling into this category. 
Private contractors are routinely paid salaries in excess of that paid to their military 
counterparts, a fact that has caused resentment amongst serving military personnel, 
and despite the concern over determining the motivation of an individual, many
104 Samia Kazi Aoul, et al., Towards a Spiral o f  Violence?, (2000)
<http://www.miningwatch.ca/updir/Memorandum-final-en.pdf!> (last accessed 18 August 2008).
105 For example, a 1997 contract between Sandline International (a PMC) and the government of 
Papua New Guinea, for provision of military assistance to deal with a secessionist rebel movement on 
Bougainville Island, provides that Sandline personnel are to be enrolled as "special constables". 
http://coombs.anu.edu.au/SpecialProj/PNG/htmls/Sandline.html (last accessed 1 May 2006).
106 P. W. Singer, Corporate Warriors: The Rise o f  the Privatized Military Industry (Cornell 
University Press, Ithaca, 2003).
107 See PBS Frontline ‘Interview with Peter Singer’ Private Warriors (PBS interview conducted on 22 
March 2005) Available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/warriors/interviews/singer.html. (last accessed 13 
September 2008).
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contractors operating in Iraq are open about the fact that they are there for financial
It should be noted that Additional Protocol I merely removes combatant privilege 
and rights to prisoner of war status from a mercenary (thus rendering them an 
unlawful combatant); it does not criminalize the status of mercenaries, nor does it 
make criminal the recruiting, training or financing of mercenaries.109 Such acts are 
made criminal by both the OAU Mercenary Convention and the U.N. Mercenary 
Convention, and any contractors found to be in breach of those provisions and their 
hiring states may be punished.110 However as Dinstein points out, the U.N. 
Convention has not been widely ratified.111
3. Child Soldiers
It should also be noted that the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child specifically bars persons under the age of eighteen from taking a direct part 
in hostilities.112 Under both Additional Protocols, the age is fifteen.113 The obligation 
on States under both Protocols is to ‘take all feasible measures’ to ensure that 
children under the specified age do not take a direct part in hostilities.114 The 
Appeals Chamber of the Special Court for Sierra Leone held that the prohibition 
against child recruitment had crystalised as customary international law entailing
108 In 2005 in Iraq, guards working for private military firms could typically make US$400-600 per 
day, approximately twice the salary of a U.S. soldier. Guards employed by Blackwater (an American 
PMC, charged with guarding U.S. Ambassador Paul Bremer, the former head of the Coalition 
Provisional Authority) are paid up to US$1000 a day: Frontline Private Warriors, 2005. (PBS: USA, 
21 June 2005).
109 Milliard, 'Post-Colonial Myopia', 41.
110 Ibid., 19.; OAU Convention fo r  the Elimination o f Mercenaries in Africa, OAU Doc. 
CM/433/Rev.L Annex 1; International Convention against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and 
Training o f  Mercenaries, UN Doc.
111 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 52.
112 Arts. 1-4, Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of 
children in armed conflict UN Doc. A/RES/54/263 (25 May 2000) entered into force on 12 February 
2002.
113 Art. 77(2), Additional Protocol I; Art. 4(3) Additional Protocol II, note however that Additional 
Protocol II does not make a distinction between direct and indirect participation.
114 Ibid. A compromise was reached was reached in the drafting of the Optional Protocol to allow 
more flexibility for those States allowing the recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen into the 
armed forces. See U.N. Economic and Social Council, Report o f  the Working Group on a Draft 
Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights o f  the Child on Involvement o f  Children in Armed 
Conflicts in Its Sixth Session, UN Doc. E/CN.4/2000/74 (2000) para 57-59.
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individual criminal responsibility by 1996.115 The Commentary to Additional 
Protocol I states that the parties resolved to use the word ‘feasible’ as it was used 
elsewhere in the Protocols and thus it should be understood as meaning ‘capable of 
being done, accomplished or carried out, possible or practicable’.116 While it is 
certain that this will prohibit armed forces from actively recruiting minors, there is 
scope for young volunteers to be utilised. Given the ease with which young hackers 
(many of which are aged between 12 and 16) can now launch attacks, either through 
their own skill or by utilising another’s coding, consideration must be given to what 
measures States may be required to put in place to ensure that minors do not 
participate by launching their own attacks on enemy forces. As Happold has pointed 
out, whether something is practicable is a question referring to whether in the 
particular circumstances of the moment, the efforts required to do it are not 
disproportionate to the results obtained on having done so.117 It seems likely that any 
effort to track down and prevent underage hackers would be vastly disproportionate 
to the result, particularly in circumstances where they are operating outside the 
battlespace. Armed groups distinct from the national armed forces are not permitted 
to use, recruit or accept volunteers under the age of eighteen under any
1 i o
circumstances. Certainly statements such as the general admonition issued by the 
U.S. in respect of patriotic hackers ‘joining-in’ the conflict in Iraq would be an easy 
practical measure for States to implement.119
115 Prosecutor v Norman (Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on Lack o f  Jurisdiction (Child 
Recruitment)) (2004) SCSL-04-14-AR72(E)-131, Special Court for Sierra Leone, para 53. (with 
Judge Robertson dissenting).
116 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, 692,900. Note that the commentary on the Optional Protocol argues 
that a comparison of the French texts implies that the term feasible in the optional protocol should be 
interpreted more widely than in the Additional Protocols, however admits that its exact interpretation 
is uncertain and in any event will be controversial given the context of any particular case.Tiny 
Vandewiele, Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights o f  the Child, 46 Optional 
Protocol: The Involvement o f  Children in Armed Conflicts (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden; 
Boston, 2005), 27.
117 Matthew Happold, 'Child Soldiers in International Law: The Legal Regulation of Children's 
Participation in Hostilities' (2000) 47 NIL Rev 27, 34.
118 Art. 4, Optional Protocol on the Rights of the Child. States must also take legal measures to 
prohibit and criminalise such practices.
119 Gallagher, 'Hackers; Government Tells Vigilantes Their 'Help' Isn't Necessary'.
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4. Conclusion
The combination of increased civilianisation and high-tech methods of warfare have 
raised some interesting challenges for the laws of armed conflict and in particular the 
determination of combatant status. The decreased relevance of time and proximity to 
the battlespace, and the nature of the online environment have created problems for 
the relevance and interpretation of the law requiring distinction between civilian and 
combatant. While technical solutions are available, they are not without problems of 
their own. Other requirements of lawful combatancy merely require reinterpretation 
for the digital age.
One of the main classes of unlawful combatants, civilians engaged directly in 
hostilities, has also increased in numbers with the changes in the armed forces.
While it seems clear that those engaged in proactive offensive computer network 
attacks will be considered to be taking a direct part in hostilities, the situation is more 
confused for those taking a less immediate role. Regardless of the difficulties and the 
need for case-by-case analysis, it is clear that a view must be reached in broad terms 
as to the line between legitimate support and direct participation so that civilians are 
not unknowingly conceding their right to protection.
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Chapter 6 -  Targeting & Precautions in Attack
Computer network operations allow for both the precise targeting of particular 
systems vital to an adversary’s war effort and the ability to cause wide-spread 
disruption to everyday life. Like any other military operation, when computer 
network attacks are employed in an armed conflict, targets selected for attack must 
conform to the principles of distinction, proportionality and necessity; however 
computer network attacks also raise a number of specific issues with regard to 
targeting and precautions in attack. In addition to the pressures currently being 
exerted on the principle of distinction by modem conflict (of which technological 
advance is a major factor), the question is raised as to when a computer network 
attack becomes an attack for the purposes of international humanitarian law. Most, 
although not all, targeting restrictions are based on attacks, and as Michael Schmitt 
has pointed out, not all computer network attacks will rise to this level. Further, the 
very nature of the network design means that knock-on effects of attacks can be far 
reaching. This raises the required level of understanding of the connectivity of the 
attacked network far above what might be required for a conventional attack in order 
to exercise the appropriate precautions in attack.
Computer network attacks also increase the opportunities for attacks by allowing the 
targeting of objectives which would otherwise be prohibited by the principle of 
proportionality. By minimising collateral damage and incidental injury, targets 
which would have been off-limits for neutralisation by traditional kinetic means are 
made permissible by the simple expedient of turning them off.
1. The Principle of Distinction
Article 48 of Additional Protocol I codifies the basic rule that parties must 
distinguish between civilian objects and military objectives:
In order to ensure respect for and protection o f  the civilian population and civilian 
objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all tim es distinguish between the civilian 
population and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and 
accordingly shall direct their Operations only against military objectives.
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This is a modem restatement of the principle of distinction which has been held by 
the International Court of Justice to constitute one of the “cardinal principles” of the 
laws of armed conflict and one of the “intransgressible principles of international 
customary law”.1 It is further enshrined in the Statute of the International Criminal 
Court which dictates that “intentionally directing attacks against civilian objects, that 
is, objects which are not military objectives” constitutes a war crime in international 
armed conflicts.2 Although neither Common Article 3 nor Additional Protocol II 
contain any requirements for precautions in attacks,3 the Appeals Tribunal in the 
Tadic case extended the application of the principle to conflicts not of an 
international nature. Citing with approval General Assembly resolutions, the Court 
recognised the principle of distinction as a principle of customary international law 
applicable “in conflicts of any kind”.4 The Hague Regulations of 1899 and 1907 also 
lay down certain protections for civilian property and undefended places;5 specific 
protections are also provided for cultural property which are discussed in Chapter 8 
infra.6 However it should be noted that the Hague Regulations clearly imply that 
there is no conventional legal prohibition on the bombardment of civilians in 
defended places.7 The emphasis on differentiating between defended and undefended 
targets in the Hague Regulations was made obsolete by developing methods of 
warfare and was replaced by the development of a definition of ‘military objective’, 
consideration of the concept of indiscriminate attacks and the introduction of 
proportionality in the 1923 Hague Rules of Air Warfare.8
1 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 79.
2 Art. 8(2)(b)(ii), Statute of the International Criminal C ourt.
3 Art. 13(1), Additional Protocol II contains a general principle that “the civilian population and 
individual civilians shall enjoy general protection against the dangers arising from military oprations”. 
The commentary notes that this codifies a principle of customary international law, and notes that the 
implementation o f such a protection requires that precautions are taken in both attack and defence: 
Pilloud, et al., Commentary, 1448, para 4772.
4 Tadic (Interlocutory Appeal), 112, 127.
5 Art. 23(g) forbids the destruction and seizure of enemy property unless that action is imperatively 
demanded by the necessities of war. Art. 25 provides the attack or bombardment, by whatever means, 
of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended is prohibited.
6 Art. 27, Hague Regulations.
7 Richard R Baxter, 'The Duties of Combatants and the Conduct of Hostilities (the Law of the Hague)' 
in UNESCO (ed) International Dimensions o f  Humanitarian Law (Martinus Nijhoff, Dordrecht, 
1988)93-134, 115.
8 Judith G. Gardam, 'Proportionality and Force in International Law' (1993) 87(3) AJIL 391, 400.
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The increased targeting opportunities offered by computer network attack 
capabilities come at a time when changes in the types of armed conflicts and the 
emerging dominant theory of warfare, namely effects-based operations, are causing 
an underlying tension in the laws of armed conflict regarding the continued pre­
eminence of the principle of distinction in modem warfare. Two schools of thought 
advocate the expansion of permissible targets to include previously prohibited 
civilian objects, but for fundamentally different reasons. The first approach is 
partially expounded in the United States expanded definition of ‘military objective’ 
which includes war-sustaining objects, which is discussed in section 2.2 infra, and 
finds its most extreme expression in the work of Charles Dunlap.9 Dunlap argues:10
We need a new paradigm when using force against societies with malevolent 
propensities. We must hold at risk the very way of life that sustains their 
depredations, and we must threaten to destroy their world as they know it if they 
persist. This means the air weapon should be unleashed against entire new 
categories of property that current conceptions of LOAC put off-limits.
There is not sufficient room in this thesis for a full discussion of the arguments of 
Dunlap’s paper, and this has been addressed extensively in other places.11 There are 
also those who attack the principle of distinction from the opposite side, arguing that 
the principle relies on an outdated world view in which large-scale interstate wars 
were the norm.12 One such author, Gabriel Swiney argues that strict adherence to the 
principle in an age of non-intemational armed conflicts violates the equal protection 
of laws, precluding the rule of law and endangering the lives of those whom it was 
designed to protect.13 He argues that asymmetry handicaps insurgent parties in the 
conduct of non-intemational armed conflicts, thus forcing insurgent parties to reject
9 Charles J Dunlap, The End of Innocence: Rethinking Non-Combatancy in the Post-Kosovo Era' 
(2000) Summer Strategic Review 9.
10 Ibid., 14.
11 See for example contributions by Schmitt, Oeter, Parks in Wolff Heintschel von Heinegg and 
Volker Epping, International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges: Symposium in Honour o f  
Knutlpsen (Springer, Berlin; New York, 2007).; Michael N. Schmitt, The Principle of 
Discrimination in 21st Century Warfare' (1999) 2 Yale Hum Rts & Dev L J 143.
12 Gabriel Swiney, 'Saving Lives: The Principle of Distinction and the Realities of Modem War' 
(2005) 39 International Lawyer 733.
13 Ibid., 733.
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the laws of armed conflict because to do otherwise would mean defeat. Major 
powers bend the principle to suit their needs by utilizing the civilian sector as 
contractors and using civilian settlers to effect their occupations (Swiney cites as 
examples, Israel and Sri Lanka).14 Both the approaches advocated by Dunlap and 
Swiney seek to undermine the principle of distinction albejt for different reasons.
The principle of distinction has been under threat before. As Stephen Oeter points 
out, the principle of distinction has always belonged to the basic set of rules which in 
practice were put into doubt by belligerents who were not willing to restrict their use 
of violence as soon as such restrictions were perceived as being harmful to their 
strategies.15 However the current threat stems from the multiple layers of movement 
currently happening in relation to armed conflict; many of these are both a product 
of, and instrumental in, the advance of military technology. One effect which is not, 
however, is at the politico-societal level where a move from conflicts occurring over 
resources and territory to conflicts for the purpose of shaping decision-making 
processes is taking place.16 This shift in the underlying purposes of conflict is also 
seen in the changing goals of warfare in the modem era toward influencing political 
changes rather than outright military victory. An example of such a ‘compellance’ or 
‘coercive’ campaign was seen in the NATO intervention over Kosovo, where force 
was applied in order to coerce Milosevic to abandon a policy of ethnic cleansing in 
the area.17 At the strategic level, there is a movement in the dominant theory of 
warfare in the West from attrition warfare towards effects-based operations which 
are designed for coercive campaigns. Effects-based operations represent the
1 Doperationalisation of network-centric warfare. In attrition warfare the purpose is to
14 Ibid., 750.
15 Stefan Oeter, 'Comment: Is the Principle of Distinction Outdated?' in W H v Heinegg and V Epping 
(eds), International Humanitarian Law Facing New Challenges (Springer, Berlin; New York, 2007) 
53-65, 55.
16 Gray, Another Bloody Century; Smith, Utility o f  Force, 270.; Chapter 1 supra. Although this may 
not represent a permanent trend as predictions are that conflicts based on resources, particularly water, 
are expected to increase with environmental changes brought about by global warming. See generally, 
Klare, Resource Wars: The New Landscape o f Global Conflict.
17 Schmitt, 'Asymmetrical Warfare', 36-38. Attacks on industrial facilities in Bor and Smederevo were 
designed to put pressure on cronies o f President Milosevic to influence him to withdraw his troops. 
Arkin and Windrem, 'The Other Kosovo War'; Marc J. Romanych and Kenneth Krumm, 'Tactical 
Information Operations in Kosovo' (2004) September-October 2004 Military Review 56.
18 See generally, Smith, Effects Based Operations, 1.
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significantly weaken the military forces of the opposing side in order to destroy their 
physical capacity to wage war. In effects-based operations, the purpose is to coerce 
the other side using a combination of force and other non-forceful methods such as 
diplomacy to effect change at the political level.19 This tempts military commanders 
to attack any target which will achieve the aims of the operation, and hence end the 
war, in the most effective manner possible; many times these will be civilian 
targets.20 At the technological level, advancement of weapons technology allows 
technologically advanced militaries to strike almost any target they choose in the 
battlespace. On top of this uneasily shifting structure sits computer network attack. 
Computer network attacks not only increase the number of targets that it is possible 
to attack by reducing the collateral damage and hence the proportionality equation in 
target selection, they also allow the possibility of operations which cause no physical 
damage but nonetheless destroy or merely neutralize the object or system in 
question. This is an attractive option for States, particularly in conflicts which will 
necessitate the reconstruction of the battlespace at the conclusion of hostilities; it is 
inefficient to bomb a power generating station, if you can simply turn it off.
2. Legitimate Military Objectives
The principle of the military objective has become part of the customary
1international law for armed conflict, at sea as well as on land or in the air. In 1977 
the principle was codified and a definition of the term ‘military objectives’ was 
included in Article 52(2) of Additional Protocol I:22
Attacks shall be limited strictly to military objectives. In so far as objects are 
concerned, military objectives are limited to those objects which by their nature,
19 Effects-based operations are not new. Their roots can be traced back for centuries and are what 
good generals and statesmen have always attempted to do. When combined with network-centric 
thinking and technologies, however, such an operational approach offers a way o f applying the power 
of the network to the human dimension of war and to military operations in peace and crisis, as well 
as combat. Ibid., xxiii.
20 Schmitt, High and Low-Tech Warfare, 8.
21 Horace B. Robertson, 'The Principle of the Military Objective' (1997-1998) 8 US AF Acad J  Legal 
Stud 35,46.; See also Yoram Dinstein, 'Legitimate Military Objectives under the Current Jus in Bello' 
in A E Wall (ed) Legal and Ethical Lessons o f NATO's Kosovo Campaign (Naval War College, 
Newport, Rhode Island, 2002) 139-173, 140.
22 The definition of military objectives also appears in several subsequent instruments: Additional 
Protocols II & III, Annexed to the 1980 Conventional Weapons Convention, and the second protocol 
to the Cultural Property Convention. See Dinstein “Legitimate Military Objectives”, 141.
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location, purpose or use make an effective contribution to military action and whose 
total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the circumstances ruling at 
the time, offers a definite military advantage.
The definition contains several elements which raise interesting questions in relation 
to computer network attacks. The first is easily dealt with, the definition relates to 
objects (or in the French text ‘Mens’), which the ICRC commentary notes refers to 
something visible and tangible.23 It could be argued that only material tangible things 
can be targets,24 and thus the intangible nature of many computer network attack 
targets exclude them from that definition. However, it is clear from the text of the 
commentary that this definitional point is being made to distinguish the term object 
as a ‘thing’ from its use in the sense of ‘aim or purpose of an operation’, rather than 
to exclude an intangible object from the definition. Thus any computer program, 
database, system, or virtual network would still be a legitimate target if it meets the 
above definition, regardless of whether it has a tangible component or exists purely 
as lines of code.
2.1. Nature, Location, Purpose & Use
The criteria imposed by Article 52(2) is that the prospective target must by its nature, 
location, purpose, or use make an effective contribution to military action. Objects 
which by their nature make a contribution to military action comprise all objects 
directly used by the armed forces: weapons, equipment, transports, fortifications, 
depots, buildings occupied by the armed forces, staff headquarters, communications 
centres etc.26 To meet this yardstick they must have something in their intrinsic
23 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2008-2010.
24 Marco Sassbli, 'Targeting: The Scope and Utility of the Concept of "Military Objectives" for the 
Protection of Civilians in Contemporary Armed Conflicts' in D Wippman and M Evangelista (eds), 
New Wars, New Laws?: Applying the Laws o f  War in 21st Century Conflicts (Transnational 
Publishers, Ardsley, N.Y., 2005) 181-210,185.
25 The formulation was influenced by that proposed in Art. 2 of the Edinburgh resolution of the 
Institute of International Law, which defined military objectives as facilities which by their “very 
nature or purpose or use, make an effective contribution to military action, or exhibit a generally 
recognised military significance, such that their total or partial destruction in the actual circumstances 
gives a substantial, specific and immediate military advantage to those who are in a position to 
destroy them”. Bothe, et al., New Rules, 321.
26 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2020.
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97character, an inherent attribute which contributes to military action. In terms of 
targets for computer network attack this would include all weapons systems, sensor 
arrays, battlefield devices, military networks and databases, digital communications 
systems and any other military specification digital device or system.
Location is the second criterion set out by the article. As noted by the ICRC 
commentary, there are objects which by their nature have no military function but 
which by virtue of their location make an effective contribution to military action. 
Examples relating to computer network attack are not easily come by given the 
inherent nature of networks. The existence of multiple pathways to the same 
destination provides a network with its efficiency and robustness, and in the case of 
the Internet, the physical location of nodes in the network is not of primary 
importance. However there may be circumstances where location plays a role in 
computer network attacks where it may be important to deny a network or other 
object to the enemy. For example, a civilian wireless network may exist in a 
particular area that would enable the adversary’s military located in the area to 
piggy-back military communications off the signal in the event of the military 
network being disabled or to usurp the use of the network entirely.29 The primary 
connection nodes of a State’s internal telecommunications network to the Internet 
backbone would make attractive targets, depending on the level of connectivity of 
the particular State.30
27 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 88.
28 Note that this would not include medical devices, databases or networks which are subject to 
measures of special protection. See Chapter 7 infra.
29 For example, some areas have entire cities connected with wireless networks i.e. Toronto. These are 
not restricted to developed areas, wireless communications technology is fast becoming one of the 
steps in developing communications infrastructure in parts of Africa. See for example Mark Cieslak 
“Bridging an African Digital Divide” BBC Click Online, 7 September 2007 Available at 
http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/programmes/click_online/6983397.stm (last accessed 10 September 2007).
Art. 53 of the Hague Regulations allows an army of occupation to take possession of “Railway plant, 
land telegraphs, telephones, steamers and other ships, apart from cases governed by maritime law, as 
well as depots of arms and, generally, all kinds of munitions of war, even though belonging to 
companies or to private persons, are likewise material which may serve for military operations, but 
they must be restored at the conclusion of peace, and indemnities paid for them.” This allows an 
occupying force to take control of all lines of communication including all networks.
30 For example, New Zealand connects to the Internet backbone through primary nodes which provide 
connections through three undersea cables, the Pacrim, Tasman 2 and Southern Cross fibre-optic 
cables. Disabling these nodes would effectively cut New Zealand off from all but satellite 
communications. Many countries have similar limited connections to the backbone. For example, the 
Eastern African Submarine Cable System provides fibre-optic cable links for South Africa, Sudan, 
Mozambique, Madagascar, Tanzania, Kenya and Djibouti. Each of the nodes connecting to the
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The criteria of purpose and use are linked -  purpose is concerned with the intended 
future use of an object, while use is concerned with its present function.31 Dinstein 
notes that military purpose should be deduced from an established intention of a 
belligerent as regards future use. He warns it must be predicated on intentions 
known to guide the adversary, not on those figured out hypothetically in contingency 
plans based on a ‘worst-case scenario’. Actual use of an object which makes an 
effective contribution to military action will likewise render the object a military 
objective and thus liable to attack. In the event that there is any doubt over whether 
an object which is normally a civilian object is being used to make an effective 
contribution to military action, Article 52(3) provides a presumption that it is not 
being so used. Should a computer network attack be launched from a civilian 
computer system or network, that network would become a legitimate military 
objective and may be attacked (presuming that its destruction, capture or 
neutralisation also provides a definite military advantage to the attacking State).34 
This is significant for countries such as the United States where a large percentage of 
all military communications are transmitted over civilian networks, making them a 
potential target for computer network attacks.
2.2. Effective Contribution to Military Action
The second part of the definition requires that the object must make an effective 
contribution to military action. While all parties accept this provision as a statement 
of customary international law, there is some variation in the interpretation of the 
scope of the contribution to military action required. Bothe et al point out in their
national networks would present an attractive target. IRIN News Report “Africa: Getting Connected 
at Last” 24 January 2006.
31 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2022.
32 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 89-90.
33 Ibid. Dinstein cites the example of the Abbey of Monte Cassino as a warning against reliance on 
supposition backed by flimsy intelligence.
34 In much the same way, civilian taxis commandeered by the military governor of Paris to transport 
reservists to the front in 1914 became military objectives.
35 In 1995 more than 95% of all U.S. military communications were sent across civilian networks. A 
more recent figure has not been made publically available. Aldrich, 'International Legal Implications', 
105.citing Science Applications International Corporation, “Information Warfare: Legal, Regulatory, 
Policy and Organizational Considerations for Assurance,” research report for the chief, Information 
Warfare Division (J6K), Command, Control, Communications and Computer Systems Directorate, 
Joint Staff, The Pentagon, Washington, D.C., 4 July 1995.
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commentary to the Protocol, that the requirement of effective contribution relates to 
military action in general, and there need be no ‘direct connection’ with specific 
combat operations such as that required of civilians who lose their immunity for 
directly participating in hostilities.36 Despite being a broader requirement than 
‘direct participation’, there remains disagreement over the level of connection to 
military action required.
The United States substitutes the words “war-fighting or war-sustaining capability” 
for the term ‘military action’ as used in the Protocol. Using the targeting of 
Confederacy cotton production in the American Civil War as an example, it argues 
that “[e]conomic targets of the enemy that indirectly but effectively support and
no
sustain the enemy’s war-fighting capability may also be attacked”. The report on 
U.S. practice provided for the ICRC work on customary international law explains 
that while the U.S. accepts the customary nature of Article 52(2), the alternative 
formulation reflects its position that this definition is a wide one which includes 
areas of land, objects screening other military objectives and war-supporting 
economic facilities. Other authors disagree with this position; for example Dinstein 
argues that the reference to ‘war-sustaining capability’ goes too far, opening a 
slippery slope in which just about every civilian activity could be construed as 
indirectly sustaining the war effort.40 The present author agrees, taken to its logical 
conclusion the U.S. position means that any goods or services which support the 
economy of the country (and thus the ability of the government to wage war) would 
become legitimate targets. As Stefan Oeter has pointed out, the U.S. targeting of 
war-sustaining capabilities moves the target of military operations away from the 
military effort of the enemy and onto the political command and control system and
36 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 324.
37 The latest military manual to be released in the United States is the U.S. Commander’s Handbook 
on the Law o f  Naval Warfare NWP 1-14M it is useful as the most current expression of U.S. policy in 
this area. The reference to war-sustaining capability is set out in paragraph 8.2.
38 Michael N. Schmitt, 'Fault Lines in the Law of Attack' in S Breau and A Jachec-Neale (eds),
Testing the Boundaries o f  International Humanitarian Law (British Institute of International and 
Comparative Law, London, 2006) 277-307.
39 Jean-Marie Henckaerts and Louise Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law 
(Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005), 31.
40 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 87. For an extreme application of the U.S. position and an example 
of Dinstein’s concerns regarding a slippery slope see Dunlap, 'The End of Innocence: Rethinking 
Non-Combatancy in the Post-Kosovo Era'. Dunlap suggests that any object, civilian or military, not 
indispensable to the civilian population should be fair game.
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its resource base; this approach gives up the requirement of a close nexus between 
the target and ongoing military operations.41
This disparity in interpretation will have particular relevance in respect of computer 
network attacks against highly developed information societies where the propensity 
for damage is higher. Consider for example the damage which could be inflicted on a 
State which is dependant on the export of a natural resource such as oil or minerals. 
Destruction of the immediate processing plants of the State can be justified as 
making an effective contribution to the military effort, however destruction of the 
resource itself would effect the long-term economic welfare of the State and be too 
far removed from military action to justify the attacks 42 Contrast that with the 
economic meltdown which would be achieved in attacks aimed at the commercial 
heart of an information-based economy such as Taiwan. Taiwan is one of the most 
information technology dependant economies in the world; one of their greatest fears 
is that China will unleash a wave of computer network attacks which will completely 
shut down political and economic institutions in a matter of days.43 Under the U.S. 
interpretation such attacks would be permissible as the economy and therefore war- 
sustaining capability of the target state would be affected. There is also a question 
about what would constitute an attack which is dealt with in section 4.1 infra. 
However a balance must be struck between legitimate economic measures in 
wartime, for example a sanctions regime or measures which destabilise or devalue a 
State’s currency or credit,44 and military operations targeting legitimate military 
objectives. This is particularly so in the case of coercive campaigns where measures 
are designed to effect a change in the decision-making behaviour of the adversary. A 
similar effect, albeit on a smaller scale, was seen in the cyber attacks against Estonia
41 Oeter, 'Comment: Is the Principle of Distinction Outdated?' 56.
42 Schmitt, 'Fault Lines', 281.
43 'Taiwan Plays Cyber War Games', BBC News 7 August 2000,
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/asia-pacific/870386.stm> (last accessed 15 September 2007). See 
also David Lague, 'Chinese See Military Dependence on Computers as Weakness', International 
Herald Tribune (Paris), 29 August 2007, Asia Pacific
<http://www.iht.com/articles/2007/08/29/news/cyber.php> (last accessed 15 September 2007). 
Although some analysts argue that Taiwan’s advanced computing and information technology 
industry would allow the islands military to resist cyber attack more readily than China’s mounting 
conventional firepower.
44 For example the United States refusal to back the pound sterling during the Suez Crisis in 1956 led 
to a monetary crisis for the British economy* forcing it to call off its campaign.
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in April and May 2007.45 The prolonged distributed denial of service attacks, which 
lasted over a month, came close to shutting down the country’s digital infrastructure, 
clogging the websites of several government agencies, several newspapers and 
forcing the country’s main bank to cease operations. Estonia is one of the most wired 
societies in Europe, using the Internet for everything from voting, filing taxes and 
paying for parking.46 Under U.S. targeting analysis such measures would be legally 
justified if they were to take place during the course of an armed conflict.
2.3. Definite Military Advantage
The definition of military objective in Article 52 also requires that the destruction, 
capture or neutralisation of the object in question must provide a “definite military 
advantage”. Although there was much discussion in the working group that drafted 
the provision regarding the appropriate adjective to be applied to the term ‘military 
advantage’, on reporting back to the conference the Rapporteur commented that he 
was unable to draw any significance from the particular choice of ‘definite’; Bothe et 
al conclude that the adjective is a word of limitation denoting in this context a 
concrete and perceptible military advantage rather than a hypothetical and 
speculative one.47
The advantage gained must also be military in nature and not, for example, purely 
political.48 Thus as Dinstein notes, forcing a change in the negotiating attitudes of the 
adverse Party cannot be deemed a proper military advantage. That is not to say that 
once a potential target has met the criteria as a military objective, the choice between 
two competing objectives cannot be motivated by which one would produce a 
favourable political result. The targeting choices made by NATO forces in the 
Kosovo campaign as the conflict progressed provide a good illustration of politically 
directed target selection process aimed to force Milosevic to capitulate to NATO
45 See Chapter 1 supra and Appendix 1 for further details.
46 Mark Landler and John Markoff, 'Digital Fears Emerge after Data Seige in Estonia', New York 
Times 29 May 2007, <www.nytimes.com/2007/05/29/technology/29estonia.html> (last accessed 20 
August 2007); Traynor, 'Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia'.
47 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 326.
48 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 86.
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demands.49 Dinstein also notes that the scope of the advantage should be wider than 
purely tactical.50 Australia, Canada and New Zealand have stated that the term 
‘military advantage’ includes the security of the attacking forces.51 In an age of 
coalition warfare, it should also be noted that the military advantage gained may also 
constitute a benefit for an allied force or the alliance as a whole.
A further question that arises is whether the military advantage gained must result 
from a single attack. In an age of network centric warfare the individual targeting of 
small parts of an integrated system will accrue to contribute to a military advantage 
that would not necessarily be apparent from neutralising a single part of the system. 
For example, in order to incapacitate a communications network it may be necessary 
to neutralise all nodes in the network to achieve the anticipated military advantage. 
Each node must be attacked separately, but without the neutralisation of all parts, the 
advantage will not be gained. The attack on the Radio-Television Serbia (RTS) 
television centre in Belgrade as part of an attack on the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (FRY) communications network during the Kosovo conflict was an 
example of this approach.53 According to NATO reports the FRY command and 
control network was a complex web and could not be disabled in one strike. In actual
49 Although all targets selected were military objectives (under the U.S. definition), the later part of 
the bombing campaign focused on industrial targets belonging to Milosevic’s cronies. See generally 
Judith Millers Comments in Andru E. Wall, Legal and Ethical Lessons o f  NATO's Kosovo Campaign 
(Naval War College, Newport, R.I., 2002), 110. Stephen T. Hosmer, The Conflict over Kosovo: Why 
Milosevic Decided to Settle When He Did (RAND, Santa Monica, 2001)
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1351/> (last accessed 1 September 2007); Benjamin S. 
Lambeth, U.S. Air Force and Project Air Force, NATO's Air War fo r Kosovo: A Strategic and 
Operational Assessment (RAND, Santa Monica, 2001), 13
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR1365/> (last accessed 15 September 2008).
50 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 86.
51 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 50.
52 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 86. Citing H Meyrowitz “Le Bombardement Strat6gique d’aprfcs le 
Protocole Additionnel I aux Conventions de Gen6ve” (1981) 41 ZaORV 1,41.
53 The bombing of the TV studio was part of a planned attack aimed at disrupting and degrading the 
C3 network. In co-ordinated attacks, on the same night, radio relay buildings and towers were hit 
along with electrical power transformer stations.... The FRY command and control network was 
alleged by NATO to comprise a complex web and that could thus not be disabled in one strike. As 
noted by General Wesley Clark, NATO "knew when we struck that there would be alternate means of 
getting the Serb Television. There’s no single switch to turn off everything but we thought it was a 
good move to strike it and the political leadership agreed with us" ICTY, Final Report to the 
Prosecutor o f  the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing Campaign against the 
Federal Republic o f  Yugoslavia, ICTY (2000) paras 72 & 78 
<www.un.org/icty/pressreal/nato061300.htm> (last accessed 16 September 2007).
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fact, RTS was broadcasting again in just over three hours.54 The investigating 
committee found that:55
With regard to these goals, the strategic target of these attacks was the Yugoslav 
command and control network. The attack on the RTS building must therefore be 
seen as forming part of an integrated attack against numerous objects, including 
transmission towers and control buildings of the Yugoslav radio relay network 
which were "essential to Milosevic’s ability to direct and control the repressive 
activities of his army and special police forces in Kosovo" (NATO press release, 1 
May 1999) and which comprised "a key element in the Yugoslav air-defence 
network" (ibid, 1 May1999).
Oeter points out that although Additional Protocol I relies on a specific concept of 
‘attack’ as an “isolated ground operation by a specific unit”, such an approach 
ignores the problems resulting from modem strategies of warfare which are based on 
an integrated series of separate actions forming one ultimate compound operation.56 
Rogers addresses this point, noting that although a particular offensive may combine 
infantry, tanks, artillery, helicopters and other close support aircraft in coordinated 
actions, each would amount to an attack, as would the whole.57 Several States have 
made statements on ratification of the Protocol stating that the military advantage 
anticipated from an attack is intended to refer to the attack as a whole and not from
CQ
isolated or particular parts of the attack. The ICRC commentary to the Article 
suggests that such a statement is redundant: “it goes without saying that an attack 
carried out in a concerted manner in numerous places can only be judged in its 
entirety” the commentary goes on to say “this does not mean that during such an 
attack actions may be undertaken which would lead to severe losses among the 
civilian population or to extensive destruction of civilian objects”.59
54 Raising the issue of the importance of the military advantage gained by the attack vis-a-vis the 
civilian casualties. Ibid., para 78.
55 Ibid.
56 Stefan Oeter, 'Methods and Means of Combat' in D Fleck (ed) The Handbook o f Humanitarian Law 
in Armed Conflicts (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995) 105-207, 162, §444.
57 Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 29.
58 See statements made by Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, New 
Zealand, Nigeria, Spain and the United Kingdom.
59 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2218. cited in Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 29.
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As the ICRC Customary International Humanitarian Law study indicates, numerous 
States have pointed out that those responsible for planning, deciding upon or 
executing attacks necessarily have to base their decisions on the assessment of the 
information from all sources which is available to them at the time.60 How much 
information is necessary for a computer network attack and how sophisticated the 
network intelligence should be, is addressed infra under precautions in attack.
3. Dual Use Technology
The term dual use target is not a term of international humanitarian law. It is a term 
which has become popular in various quarters to refer to an object that has 
concurrent civilian and military uses. In terms of international humanitarian law 
however, once an object is used in such a way that it meets the definition of a 
military objective, it loses its civilian status and becomes liable to attack. The 
discussion of any civilian aspect or purpose of that piece of technology should 
therefore be considered under the proportionality equation rather than confusing the 
distinction question.
One of the often cited examples of the attack of a so-called dual use target is the 
coalition bombing of the Iraqi electrical grid in the 1991 Gulf War. Yoram Dinstein 
effectively reviews the outcome of that campaign as follows:61
Since the electrical grid in Iraq was totally integrated, attacks against it -  and its 
installations -  resulted not only in a tremendous military advantage (shutting down 
radar stations, military computers, etc.), but also extensive damage to civilians: 
hospitals stopped operating, water pumping facilities came to a standstill, etc. From 
a legal point of view, a “dual use” of Iraq’s electrical grid did not alter its singular 
and unequivocal status as a military objective. There was, as usual with military 
objectives, the question of proportionality where collateral damage to civilians is 
concerned. But the extensive damage to civilians was not excessive in relation to the 
military advantage anticipated.
60 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 50.
61 Comment by Yoram Dinstein in 'Discussion' in A E Wall (ed) Legal and Ethical Lessons o f  NATO's 
Kosovo Campaign (Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, 2002) 211-222, 219.
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In terms of computer network attack however, most computer technology, hardware 
and software, has become dual-use. Some systems initially designed for military use 
have become so integrated into civilian society that any interference or disruption 
caused by computer network attacks would have serious effects on civilians. The 
Global Positioning System (GPS), for example, is a U.S. military system which has 
become integrated into many civilian applications from aircraft traffic control to cell 
phones and laptops and even the Internet itself.62 Disruption of the service through 
jamming or blocking,63 or spoofing the signal via computer network attack would 
cause massive disruption and potentially endanger civilian lives.64 Other countries 
operate (or are in the process of developing) similar systems which would exhibit 
similar vulnerabilities.65
In the modem era of effects-based operations dual use targets become particularly 
attractive targets precisely because of their ties to both military and political 
objectives.66 The attacker not only benefits from the destmction or neutralisation of 
the target’s military value, but also from cumulative effects on the civilian 
population.67
4. Civilian Objects
In addition to Article 48 of Additional Protocol I outlined above which provides the 
basic mle, Article 52(1) provides that “civilian objects shall not be the object of
62 GPS uses two levels of signal, the military signal (Y-code) is more accurate and encrypted, the less 
secure civilian code (or P-code) is not and thus makes it more susceptible. The precision timing 
provided by the GPS system is needed to the accurate routing of information packets through 
computer networks.
63 Both are methods of electronic attack which will not be covered by this thesis.
64 Spoofing the GPS signal involves feeding a GPS receiver a fake signal so that it computes the 
wrong time or location of the receiver. Spoofing can occur either through electronic means (such as 
broadcasting a fake GPS signal with a higher signal strength than the true signal via a GPS satellite 
simulator) or through the network to GPS receivers. Note that the military has specific anti-spoofing 
measures in place which encrypt the general civilian P-code signal into a more secure Y-code which 
only military receivers can use. All military GPS acquisitions post 2006 are required to have the 
Selective Availability Anti-Spoofing Module (SAASM) attached. See generally, Scott Pace, et al., 
The Global Positioning System: Assessing National Policies (RAND, Santa Monica, 1995) 
<http://www.rand.org/publications/MR/MR614/> (last accessed 13 September 2008); Symmetricon, 
Why Convert to a SAASM Based Global Positioning System (GPS)?, (2006) 
<http://www.symmttm.com/pdfigps/SAASM_2006_wp.pdf> (last accessed 25 September 2007).
65 For example, the Russian GLOSNASS system, Chinese Beidou system or the European Galileo 
system.
66 Schmitt, 'Targeting', 65.
67 Ibid.
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attack or of reprisals”. The International Court of Justice stated in its Nuclear 
Weapons Advisory Opinion that “States must never make civilians the object of 
attack”.68 The Rome Statute makes it a war crime to intentionally direct attacks 
against the civilian population as such, individual civilians or civilian objects.69 
Civilians are non-combatants, and are neither members of the armed forces nor do 
they directly participate in conflict.70 The civilian population is defined in Article 
50(2) of Additional Protocol I as comprised of “all persons who are civilians”; the 
presence of persons who are not civilians in the population does not deprive the 
population of its civilian character.71 Civilian objects are defined as all objects which 
are not military objectives.72 Where there is doubt over the civilian character of a 
person or an object, the doubt is resolved in favour of finding civilian status. The 
problem of civilians directly participating in conflict, a particular problem in relation 
to modem warfare and computer network attacks in particular is dealt with in 
Chapter 5 supra.
As a general proposition, it is prohibited to direct computer network attacks against 
civilian objects in the same manner that a conventional attack would be prohibited. 
Thus attacks against oil pipelines, civilian air traffic control or rail networks, 
emergency response networks, financial institutions and other civilian objects are 
prohibited. During the NATO action over Kosovo, there were legal concerns 
expressed inside the U.S. administration regarding proposals to conduct information 
operations such as inserting viruses into Serbian computer systems or hacking bank 
accounts thought to contain funds plundered from Serbian businesses by Milosevic’s 
cronies.74 However, the nature of computer network attacks raises some interesting 
dilemmas for modem armed forces. In addition to the issues raised by the ‘war-
68 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 78.
69 Art. 8(2)(b)(i)-(ii) Additional Protocol I.
70 Art. 50(1) Additional Protocol I provides “A civilian is any person who does not belong to one of 
the categories of persons referred to in Article 4 A (1), (2), (3) and (6) of the Third Convention and in 
Article 43 of this Protocol. In case of doubt whether a person is a civilian, that person shall be 
considered to be a civilian”.
71 Arts. 50(2) & (3) Additional Protocol I.
72 Art. 52(1) Additional Protocol I.
73 Arts. 50(1) & 52(3) Additional Protocol I.
74 Ark in and Windrem, 'The Other Kosovo War'.
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sustaining’ phraseology of the United States’ interpretation which are discussed 
above, computer network attacks raise some issues for the law of targeting. First, 
computer network attacks do not necessarily result in physical damage, death or 
injury, thus opening a range of possible targets for attack which might otherwise be 
unreachable due to excessive collateral damage. A second and related point is that 
computer network attacks can be designed to result in a range of outcomes, allowing 
the attacker to merely disable or neutralise a particular target without causing 
permanent damage or destruction. Such computer network operations may not even 
rise to the level of an ‘attack’ at all.
4.1. Attacks and Operations
The ability of a computer network attack to neutralise or destroy target systems 
without causing physical damage raises an interesting question with regard to the 
legitimate targets of such attacks. Although the basic rule laid down in Article 48 of 
Additional Protocol I is general in nature, the majority of the provisions relating to 
targeting of civilians and civilian objects are phrased in terms of the prohibition of 
‘attacks’. Attacks are defined in Article 49 of Additional Protocol I as “acts of 
violence against the adversary, whether in offence or defence”. Bothe et al’s 
commentary to Article 49 states that the term ‘acts of violence’ denotes physical 
force and thus the concept of attacks does not include dissemination of propaganda, 
embargoes or other non-physical means of psychological, political or economic 
warfare. However it should be noted that any act of violence fills this requirement: 
not only massive air attacks or artillery barrages but also small scale attacks such as
no
a sniper firing a single round. This has led to a disagreement between 
commentators, particularly in the area of computer network attacks, regarding the 
legality of directing non-violent computer network attacks against civilian objects. 
The problem is particularly relevant in respect of modem armed conflicts, not only
75 Art. 48 provides: “In order to ensure respect for and protection o f the civilian population and 
civilian objects, the Parties to the conflict shall at all times distinguish between the civilian population 
and combatants and between civilian objects and military objectives and accordingly shall direct their 
operations only against military objectives.”
76 Note that this only applies to objects on land.
77 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 289.
78 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 141.
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because of the technology now available to modem militaries but also because of the 
transformation in the character of warfare towards effects-based operations and the 
increased importance in the use of force to influence decision-making patterns rather 
than for territorial gain or control of resources.79
It is common ground that computer network attacks which result in physical damage 
to civilian property, injury or death to civilians constitute attacks under international 
humanitarian law and are thus prohibited.80 However, the status of computer network 
attacks that do not result in such deleterious effects remains the subject of debate.
01
Knut Ddrmann argues that physical damage is not a requirement of an attack. He 
points out that the definition of a military objective refers to neutralization of an 
object as the possible outcome of an attack. He thus concludes that the mere 
disabling of an object, such as shutting down an electricity grid, without destroying it 
should also qualify as an attack.82 Dormann’s argument relies on the location of the 
definition of ‘military objective’ in the section dealing with attacks against civilian 
objects. However the argument fails to acknowledge that the use of the term 
‘military objective’ in Additional Protocol I is not restricted to articles and
O'!
paragraphs detailing the permissible objects of attacks. Further, the term 
‘neutralization’ was added to the definition by the drafting committee without much 
explanation. However it is clear that an object may also be neutralised by a 
conventional attack, that is, one which causes death, injury or destruction, therefore
79 See Chapter 1 supra, also see generally, Gray, Another Bloody Century; Smith, Utility o f Force. 
This is by no means to suggest that the use o f force against civilians or civilian objects to influence 
their governments is a creation of the modem military. WWII bombing campaigns are a prime 
example o f operations specifically targeting civilian morale.
80 See the discussion in Chapter 3 supra regarding armed attacks.
81 Ddrmann, 'Additional Protocols', 142-143.
82 Ibid. Ddrmann uses Bothe et al’s commentary which provides (in full): “The term “neutralization”, 
insofar as it deals with bombardment, refers to an attack for the purpose of denying the use of an 
object to the enemy without necessarily destroying it. For example, a specific area of land... might be 
neutralised by laying landmines on it, thus denying its use to the enemy. Enemy artillery or surface- 
to-air missiles may be neutralized for a sufficient time to prevent their interference with a planned 
operation by firing antipersonnel munition at such targets in an attempt to force gun crews to take 
shelter. Such an attack would not be likely to destroy their intended target, but it would neutralize the 
target for the limited time required by the attacker.” Bothe, et al., New Rules, 325.
83 Art. 48 refers to military operations directed against military objectives; Arts. 51(7) also refers to 
military objectives in the context of military operations.
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the inclusion of the term cannot shed any light on whether or not an operation which 
does not cause such effects meets that definition.
Bothe et al’s commentary’s conclusion that the concept of attacks does not include 
dissemination of propaganda, embargoes or other non-physical means of 
psychological, political or economic warfare, is supported by state practice.
Michael Schmitt expands on this argument, noting the different wording between 
Article 48 which relates to ‘military operations’ and Article 52(2) and surrounding 
which are all framed in terms of ‘attacks’.85 Schmitt argues that the disparity in the 
terminology means that CNA operations which are not designed to, nor would 
foreseeably cause, injury, death, damage, or destruction, may be directed against 
non-military objectives.86 Should this be the case, it opens up a range of targets for 
the military which may not be attacked but may be targeted in other ways; computer 
network attack technology could open up large swathes of permissible targets which 
may better serve the coercive element of effects based operations. However, the 
assertion that the distinction allows States to deliberately target, but not ‘attack’, 
civilian objects in ways not designed to cause injury, death etc must be examined 
further.
The present author agrees that there is a distinction between military operations and 
attacks, however it does not follow that non-violent computer network attacks may 
be therefore conducted against civilian objects. Article 48, setting out the basic rule, 
prohibits ‘operations’ rather than attacks, and while it is agreed that the term 
operations should refer to military operations (as opposed to any other activity 
supporting the war effort), the term is in no way synonymous with attacks. The 
ICRC Commentary to Article 48 sets out that the word operations should be 
understood in the context of the whole of the section; it goes on to set out the 
dictionary definition of military operation which “refers to all movements and acts
84 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 289. See for example the U.S. intervention in Suez as an example of 
economic warfare; examples of propaganda from WWII onwards; sanctions etc as acts of political 
warfare.
85 Schmitt, 'Wired Warfare', 194.
86 Ibid.
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related to hostilities that are undertaken by the armed forces”.87 This interpretation is
oo
echoed by the commentary provided by Bothe et al who note:
“As used in Protocol I, this term deals generally w ith those aspects o f  military 
operations that are likely to cause civilian casualties or damage to civilian objects. 
Generally, the provisions o f  this section regulating attacks and other violent phases 
o f  military operations do not necessarily affect m ovem ent or manoeuvres by which a 
military unit secures or exercises dominion and control over key terrain features, 
lines o f communication and avenues o f  approach. ...T he discussion in the preceding 
paragraph o f  the operation to take a non-defended place which is open to occupation 
without resistance is equally relevant to  the term  “m ilitary operation” . Nevertheless, 
such operations when carried out in areas containing a dense concentration o f  
civilians present the adverse Party w ith a m ilitary target and invoke the obligation o f  
Art. 58 to take feasible and appropriate precautions”
The reference to the discussion in the preceding paragraph refers to a discussion on 
the permissibility of entering and occupying a non-defended locality and exercising 
‘dominion and control’ over such an area without contravening the prohibition on 
‘attacks by any means whatsoever’. Thus the commentary states the need to take 
precautions in attack when conducting military operations in dense concentrations of 
civilians. Schmitt argues that the general acceptance by the international community 
of psychological operations as an element of warfare, operations which he describes 
categorically as ‘military operations’, suggests that the term is shorthand for attacks 
in which physical violence is the consequence. The commentaries would appear to 
suggest otherwise. The fact that acts associated with the application of violence, such 
as movement and manoeuvre, do not necessarily result in violent consequences of 
their own does not exempt them from the requirement to take precautions in attack 
when they take place in dense concentrations of civilians, a requirement of a military 
operation, not just an attack. Article 57(1) sets out the general rule relating to 
military operations and continues in Article 57(2) which relates specifically to 
attacks. The commentary to Article 57 states “The term ‘military operations’ should 
be understood to mean any movements, manoeuvres and other activities whatsoever
87 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 1875. This is also reiterated in the commentary to Article 51 
(Protection of the Civilian Population).
88 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 286.
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carried out by the armed forces with a view to combat”.89 Therefore, wherever an act 
takes place in conjunction with the application of force it must be restricted to 
military objectives. Such an approach is also consistent with the position adopted by 
several State Parties to the Protocol which made reservations or declarations 
interpreting the military advantage to be gained from an attack as a whole not merely 
a part.90 Thus to be a prohibited military operation the computer network attack must 
be associated with the use of physical force, but it does not have to result in violent 
consequences itself. The proximity calculation is similar to that used to determine 
direct participation in hostilities for civilians but is not as strict.91 As with all 
computer network operations, the legality of the particular attack will depend on 
what it is designed to do. However this does raise the question of whether, if a 
civilian object is targeted by computer network attack in order to achieve a physical 
force strike, it was making a sufficient contribution to military action to become a 
military objective in its own right.
This difference between attacks and operations leaves a lacuna in the law and may 
place the military in the unenviable situation of having a course of action available to 
it before an armed conflict is embarked upon, only to have that same course of action 
denied during the course of conflict. Although Schmitt’s analysis, that the meaning 
of the general provision is to be taken from the specific provisions relating to attack 
which follow it, is appealing in order to avoid this problem, at present it is not 
correct in law and is not without difficulty of its own. Once the ability to target 
civilian objects is permitted, it crosses the fundamental philosophical line enshrined 
in the 1868 Declaration of St Petersburg which states “the only legitimate object 
which States should endeavour to accomplish during war is to weaken the military 
forces of the enemy”. While the argument has been made that the character of war 
has changed in the twenty-first century such that this bright-line distinction between
89 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2191.
90 Several States have indicated that in their target selection they will consider the military advantage 
to be anticipated from an attack as a whole and not from parts thereof. See for example, the statements 
of Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, New Zealand, Spain and the United States. Certain 
military manuals also consider that the anticipated military advantage can include increased security 
for the attacking forces or friendly forces. Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International 
Humanitarian Law, 31.
91 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 324.
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civilian and military is no longer appropriate, until a legitimate forum decides that 
it is appropriate, then it is the present author’s opinion that targeting civilian objects 
as part of a military operation remains prohibited by Article 57. This is also in 
conformity with the approach of the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY in Kupreskic 
which held that the Martens Clause should be used to interpret Articles 57 & 58 to
Q*J
protect civilians and limit attacks. It is possible that the issue will be circumvented 
by the use of civilian contractors (or government operatives) engaging in those parts 
of the overall strategy which require that undertaking anyway.
4.2. Indiscriminate Attacks
While in general, computer network attacks allow for great precision in their 
application, some forms of malicious code are designed to spread from computer to 
computer without discrimination. The prohibition against indiscriminate attacks is a 
rule of customary international law and is expressed in Article 51(4) of Additional 
Protocol I:
Indiscriminate attacks are prohibited. Indiscrim inate attacks are:
(a) those which are not directed at a specific m ilitary objective;
(b) those which employ a method or means o f  com bat which cannot be directed at a 
specific military objective; or
(c) those which employ a method or means o f  com bat the effects o f  which cannot be 
limited as required by this Protocol; and consequently, in each such case, are o f  a 
nature to strike military objectives and civilians or civilian objects without 
distinction.
As Dinstein points out, indiscriminate attacks differ from direct attacks against 
civilians in that ‘the attacker is not actually trying to harm the civilian population’, 
the injury to the civilians is merely a matter of ‘no concern to the attacker’.94 
Viruses and worms are two methods of computer network attack which would fall 
into this category as their effects are not usually limited.95 Both forms of malicious
92 See section 1 supra.
93 Prosecutor v Kupreskic (2000) Case No: IT-95-16-T, International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia.
94 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 117.
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code can be designed to carry a payload which may cause a variety of effects from 
mere annoyance, to compromising the system by leaving a backdoor for an attacker 
(in order to access or control the computer), or deleting or rewriting code on the 
infected system to varying effect.96 Where the payload is designed to cause effects of 
such a magnitude to constitute an attack, both viruses and worms would fall foul of 
paragraph (b) of Article 51(4) above as they are methods of distribution which do not
07
discriminate between civilian and military computers.
Article 57(5) then sets out two examples of indiscriminate attacks; target area
QO
bombing and disproportionate attacks causing excessive collateral damage. It is 
difficult to envisage a computer network attack equivalent of target area bombing as 
each attack must be conducted against a specific system or node in that system. No 
matter how ‘high-level’ the target system or node is in the victim network, and 
whatever the subsequent effects of its destruction or neutralisation, each node must 
be assessed on its own merits to qualify, or not, as a military objective. For example, 
the DNS root servers which run the Internet have come under attack twice in recent 
years.99 The denial of service attacks used in those incidents merely shut down the
95 Viruses are programs or bits of malicious code which are attached to a program or file and spread 
from computer to computer as they are passed between users. Generally they cannot infect computers 
without being opened or run by the user. Worms, although similar in design, are self-replicating and 
take advantage of mail or other information transport systems on the system to travel unaided. For 
example the worm may replicate and send itself to everyone on the users email contacts list, this is 
how several of the more high profile email worms of the past few years (Slammer/Sapphire, Mydoom 
& Nimda) have propagated.
96 Obviously rewriting the code which controls value pressure on an oil pipeline system will have far 
more serious effects than the ‘nuisance’ viruses which generally circulate.
97 From a technical standpoint it is possible to create a virus with a specific dialling protocol which 
will only dial specific IP address ranges. The IP address ranges of U.S. and other military and 
intelligence agencies are freely available on the Internet. However most virus writers are trying to get 
the maxim coverage possible, therefore the Slammer worm utilized a random dialling algorithm.
98 Art. 57(5) provides: Among others, the following types of attacks are to be considered as 
indiscriminate:
(a) an attack by bombardment by any methods or means which treats as a single military objective a 
number of clearly separated and distinct military objectives located in a city, town, village or other 
area containing a similar concentration of civilians or civilian objects; and
(b) an attack which may be expected to cause incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, 
damage to civilian objects, or a combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the 
concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.
99 In both 2002 & 2007 attacks were launched against the DNS root servers. In 2002 all 13 root 
servers were attacked, however in 2007 the attacks were limited to three of the servers including the 
server operated by the U.S. Department of Defense. Ryan Naraine, Massive DDoS Attack Hit DNS 
Root Servers <www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/1486981> (last accessed 6 September 
2007); Roger A. Grimes, 'Security Adviser: DNS Attack Puts Web Security in Perspective' (2007) 
29(8) InfoWorld 19 February 2007
<http://www.infoworld.com/article/07/02/16/080Psecadvise_l.html> (last accessed 1 October 2007).
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servers (or slowed them) however in both incidents the individual servers targeted 
are either military objectives (for example the case of root server G, maintained by 
the U.S. Department of Defense) or civilian objects. Where the particular node (in 
this case a server) is the reference for both military and civilian sources, it is a so- 
called dual use target; the question of the effects of the attack will consequently 
become more important.100
One of the problems brought on by the interconnectedness of the Internet is that the 
knock-on effects of computer network attacks may have even further reaching 
consequences than they do with conventional kinetic attacks. For example, it has 
been reported that U.S. officials may have rejected launching a planned cyber attack 
against Iraqi financial computers because Iraq’s banking network is connected to a 
financial communications network also located in Europe.101 Similarly, the Iraqi oil 
pipeline communications network is reportedly cross-linked with the fibre-optic
1 (V)Tiger Song air defence network. Such close linkages reportedly frustrated attempts 
by U.S. Forces to design a computer network attack that could be limited to military
i mobjectives solely in Iraq. Although exacerbated by computer network technology, 
this problem is certainly not unique to computer network attacks. As noted above, 
both the 1991 Gulf War and the NATO campaign over Kosovo faced similar 
problems when the attacks on the power supply networks resulted in water pumping 
stations being closed.104
5. Precautions in Attack
Article 57 of Additional Protocol I requires attackers to take precautionary measures 
in carrying out military operations and attacks. The ICTY has recognised the 
customary nature of these precautions in both the Kupreskic and Tadic cases.105 The
100 See section 3 supra.
101 Clay Wilson, Information Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and 
Related Policy Issues, Congressional Research Service, RL31787 (2007) 5.
102 Charles R Smith, U.S. Information Warriors Wrestle with New Weapons' (2003) NewsMaxcom 13 
March 2003 <http://www.newsmax.eom/archives/articles/2003/3/12/134712.shtml> (last accessed 4 
October 2007).
103 Ibid.
104 In the case of the attacks on Iraqi power networks knock-on effects affected hospitals, refrigeration 
as well as water supplies. NATO Denies Targeting Water Supplies', BBC News 24 May 1999, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/world/europe/351780.stm> (last accessed 5 October 2007).
105 Tadic (Interlocutory Appeal), para 111-112; Kupreskic, para 524.
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Appeals Tribunal in Tadic cited with approval the UN General Assembly Resolution 
2675 that “all necessary precautions should be taken to avoid injury loss or damage 
to civilian populations” stating that the resolution represented customary 
international law “in armed conflicts of any kind”.106 The judgement confirms that 
the rule extends to non-international armed conflicts despite a lack of provisions in 
Common Article 3 or Additional Protocol II.
In the conduct of military operations, constant care must be taken to spare the
107 •civilian population, civilians and civilian objects. As discussed in section 4.1 
supra, military operations are a broader concept than attacks and the general rule 
thus applies more widely than the specific rules which follow relating to that part of 
the operation which constitutes an attack. Boivin usefully summarises the measures 
to be taken by those who plan or decide on attacks as follows:108
(i) do everything feasible to verify that the objectives to be attacked are military 
objectives;109
(ii) take all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of warfare;110
(iii) do everything feasible to assess whether the attack may be expected to cause 
excessive collateral damage;111
(iv) do everything feasible to cancel or suspend an attack if it becomes apparent that 
the proportionality rule will be breached, or that the target is not a military objective 
or that it is subject to special protection;112
(v) give effective advance warning prior to an attack that is likely to affect the
11^civilian population, unless the circumstances do not permit; and
(vi) where a choice between several military objectives is possible, choose the one 
that will cause the least danger to civilian lives and civilian objects.114
106 Tadic (Interlocutory Appeal), para 111-112. citing GA Res 2675 (XXV) Basic Principles for the 
Protection of Civilian Populations in Armed Conflicts UN GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp No. 28, 76, UN 
Doc. A/8028 (1971) of 1 December 1970.
107 Art. 57(1), Additional Protocol I.
108 Alexandra Boivin, The Legal Regime Applicable to Targeting Military Objectives in the Context o f  
Contemporary Warfare, University Centre for International Humanitarian Law, 2 (2006) 36 
<http://www.cudih.org/recherche/objectif_militaire_recherche.pdf> (last accessed 10 October 2007).
109 Art. 57(2)(a)(i), Additional Protocol I.
110 Art. 57(2)(a)(ii), Additional Protocol I.
111 Art. 57(2)(a)(iii), Additional Protocol I.
112 Art. 57(2)(b), Additional Protocol I.
113 Art. 57(2)(c), Additional Protocol I.
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Computer network attacks raise several issues with regard to the requirement to take 
precautions in attack. However two general matters should be dealt with before 
addressing these specific concerns. First, it should be noted that as with obligations 
regarding targeting set out in Article 49 and following, the majority of provisions 
relating to the precautions in attack refer to ‘attacks’. That is, other than the general 
rule expressed in Article 57(1) requiring that constant care be taken to spare the 
civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects in the course of military 
operations, the specific obligations will only apply to those computer network 
attacks which result in physical damage, injury or death.115 
Secondly, the first four precautionary measures all refer to ‘feasibility’, a measure 
which has been interpreted by many States, and defined in the Commentary, as 
“those precautions that are practicable or practically possible, taking into account all 
the circumstances ruling at the time, including humanitarian and military 
considerations”.116
5.1. Verification of military objectives
The law requires that commanders do everything feasible to verify that the target is 
not protected from attack and that it is a military objective.117 As most targeted 
computer network attacks (as opposed to mass disruption attacks like worms and 
viruses) require fairly extensive system surveillance and scanning to determine an 
entry point to the system, this obligation should not prove difficult for preselected 
targets. However so-called ‘targets of opportunity’ may prove more difficult.
Attacks refer to acts of violence both in offence and in defence. Where a commander 
wishes to respond to an adversary’s computer network attack they must verify first, 
the source of the attack, and secondly, that it is a military objective. As discussed in 
Chapter 3, the problem of accurate attribution of computer network attacks is made 
difficult by the tendency of attackers to spoof the origin of the attack, that is, to 
deliberately mislead the adversary as to the source of the attack. Note that the
114 Art. 57(3) Additional Protocol I.
115 For a discussion of the difference between attacks and operations and what this may mean for 
computer network attacks, see section 4.1, supra.
116 UK Declaration of Understanding. This wording has been adopted by Protocols II, III and 
amended Protocol II to the Conventional Weapons Treaty.
117 Art. 57(2)(a)(i), Additional Protocol I.
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deception must not extend to a violation of Article 51(7) by the dissemination of 
false intelligence reports intended to induce the enemy to attack civilians and civilian
•  1 10objects in the mistaken belief that they are military objects.
The extent of knowledge to be expected from the commander in assessing possible
targets may prove problematical, and echoes the concerns held by many parties to
Additional Protocol I regarding the level at which commanders’ decisions were to be
taken. Michael Schmitt raises this issue, querying to what extent computer expertise
must be available during the targeting process to assess possible collateral damage
and incidental injury.119 However, military commanders are not expected to have
personal knowledge of every target they attack and rely on intelligence reports for
much of their information in regard to conventional attacks. Military commanders
have to make their decisions on the basis of the information from all sources which
is available to them at the time.120 Many military manuals stress that the commander
must obtain the best possible intelligence, including information on concentrations of
civilian persons, important civilian objects, specifically protected objects, the natural
1 1environment and the civilian environment of military objectives. In its Final 
Report to the Prosecutor, the Committee Established to Review the NATO Bombing 
Campaign Against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia described the obligation 
thus:122
A m ilitary com m ander m ust set up an effective intelligence gathering system to 
collect and evaluate information concerning potential targets. The com m ander must 
also direct his forces to use available technical m eans to properly identify targets 
during operations. Both the commander and the aircrew actually engaged in 
operations must have some range o f  discretion to determine which available 
resources shall be used and how they shall be used.
118 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 363. Giving the example of WWII British intelligence sending out false 
intelligence reports which induces the Luftwaffe to bomb civilian areas believing they were bombing 
strategic military objectives.
119 Michael N. Schmitt, 'CNA and the Jus in Bello: An Introduction' (Paper presented at the 
International Expert Conference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability of International 
Humanitarian Law, Stockholm, 17-19 November 2004) 101-125, 117.
120 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 50, 54. Citing the 
military manuals o f Algeria, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Equador, Egypt, Germany, Ireland, 
Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, the United Kingdom & the United States.
121 Ibid., 55.
122 ICTY, Final Report to the Prosecutor, para 29.
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It follows that the same level of reliance on information must occur in respect of 
computer network attacks. In practical terms, it is also unlikely that any computer 
network attacks will be organised from a field position located in a combat zone, but 
would be the task of dedicated teams of computer technicians elsewhere in the 
battlespace where the requisite expertise is available.
5.2. Choice of Weapons
Ironically, the requirement for an attacker to take all feasible precautions in the 
choice of means and methods of warfare may require States who have the ability to 
launch computer network attacks to use that ability in preference to more traditional 
means. A similar argument has been advanced in relation to the use of precision-
19^guided missiles, particularly with respect to warfare in urban environments.
Article 57(2)(a)(ii) of Additonal Protocol I requires those deciding on attacks to take 
all feasible precautions in the choice of means and methods of attack with a view to 
avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, incidental loss of civilian life, injury to 
civilians and damage to civilian objects. The ICRC study has concluded that state 
practice establishes this as a norm of customary international law applicable in both 
international and non-international armed conflicts.124 As Kalshoven points out, the 
primary obligation in the provision is to ‘avoid’ damage to the civilian population; 
the goal of ‘minimizing’ such damage will come into play only when total avoidance 
is not feasible.125 These factors tend to promote the use of computer network attack 
methods which do not have an inherent risk to civilian objects and do not necessarily 
cause destruction. As Schmitt notes:
W hereas in the past physical destruction may have been necessary to neutralize a 
target’s contribution to the enem y’s efforts, now  it may be possible to simply “turn it 
o f f ’. For instance, rather than bombing an airfield, air traffic control can be
123 See generally, Stuart Walters Belt, 'Missiles over Kosovo: Emergence, Lex Lata, of a Customary 
Norm Requiring the Use of Precision Munitions in Urban Areas' (2000) 47 Naval Law Review 115,or 
an alternative view see also, D. L. Infeld “Precision guided Munitions” cited in Dinstein, Conduct o f  
Hostilities, 126.
124 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 57.
125 Frits Kalshoven and Liesbeth Zegveld, Constraints on the Waging o f  War (ICRC, Geneva, 2001), 
108.
126 Schmitt, 'Wired Warfare', 394.
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interrupted. The same is true o f  power production and distribution systems, 
communications, industrial plants, and so forth.
One of the difficulties of certain computer network attack techniques is the fact that 
once they have been used once, they may be guarded against and may not work 
again.127 Does this impact on a coinmander’s obligation to field such weapons? The 
limited availability of weapons has been discussed with respect to the use of 
precision-guided munitions. Thus, Dinstein argues that the legal position is quite 
simple: the law of armed conflict instructs the planners to take whatever steps are 
necessary, in order to avoid or minimize collateral damage to civilians.... The 
availability of precision-guided munitions by no means forecloses alternative
n o
precautions in attack.
Can such weapons be held in reserve in case they are needed further down the line?
With regard to the Gulf conflict of 1990-91, Christopher Greenwood has noted that
the United States did not invariably use precision-guided munitions whenever an
attack involved a risk of collateral damage, on the grounds that supplies of these
weapons were limited and they might have to be conserved for attacks on other
objectives later in the campaign. Greenwood states that this approach involves a
broad (though not untenable) interpretation of the duty to take ‘feasible’
precautions.129 Certainly, the position is stronger where the weapons are held in
reserve for an attack which is definitely planned down the line. The U.S.
Department of Defense Final Report to Congress on the conduct of the Gulf War
1990-1991 makes it clear that the United States did not regard itself as bound always
to select the method or means of attack which would cause the least danger to
civilians, but was entitled to take account of the risk to coalition aircrews and the
110likelihood of successfully destroying the target. The report states:
127 In the same way that security flaws in software may be patched for domestic applications, ports 
may closed, patches installed and anti-virus software updated.
128 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 126-127.
129 Christopher Greenwood, 'Customary International Law and the First Geneva Protocol of 1977 in 
the Gulf Conflict' in P J Rowe (ed) The Gulf War 1990-1991 in International and English Law 
(Routledge, London, 1993) 63-88, 85-86.
130 U.S. Department of Defence, Conduct o f  the Persian Gulf War: Final Report to Congress, U.S. 
Department of Defence, (1992) 697-698.
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To the degree possible and consistent w ith allowable risk to aircraft and aircrews, 
aircraft and munitions were selected so that attacks on targets within populated areas 
would provide the greatest possible accuracy and the least risk to civilian objects 
and the civilian population. W here required, attacking aircraft were accompanied by 
support mission aircraft to minimize attacking aircraft aircrew distraction from their 
assigned mission.
Greenwood argues that this approach is consistent with the interpretation placed on 
the word ‘feasibility’ in Article 57 by several States on signature or ratification of the 
Protocol and that it is inconceivable that any State would fail to take such factors 
into account.131 Certainly the United Kingdom, which interprets the term ‘feasible’ 
to mean ‘all measures practicable under the circumstances ruling at the time’, lists 
the risks to a commander’s own troops under the various options open to him as a 
factor to be considered when choosing what means and methods of warfare to 
employ.132
It must also be noted that the choice of weapons available to the war-fighter will 
vary depending on the level of the decision making. A military commander will have 
a greater ability to choose between various methods of attack than a unit commander 
located in the battlespace or an individual combatant. As Kalshoven has pointed out, 
a combatant simply cannot be equipped with a wide array of weapons for all kinds of 
situations, as the golf player is with his bag of clubs.133 Interestingly, the advent of 
networked militaries and the concept of network-centric warfare actually allows a 
unit on the ground access to more technologies than has been previously available. 
Real-time communications allow the soldier on the ground to call in air strikes,
131 Greenwood, 'Customary International Law in the Gulf, 85, 375, nl 17.
132 U.K. Ministry of Defence, UK Manual, 83-84,. The factors are as follows: (1) the importance of 
the target and the urgency of the situation; (2) intelligence about the proposed target -  what it is 
being, or will be used for and when; (3) the characteristics o f the target itself, for example, whether it 
houses dangerous forces; (4) what weapons are available, their range, accuracy and radius of effect; 
(5) conditions effecting the accuracy of the targeting, such as terrain, weather, and time of day; (6) 
factors affecting incidental loss or damage, such as the proximity if  civilians or civilian objects in the 
vicinity o f the target or other protected objects or zones and whether they are inhabited, or the 
possible release of hazardous substances as a result of the attack; (7) the risks to his own troops under 
the various options open to him.
133 Frits Kalshoven, 'The Soldier and His Golf Clubs' in C Swinarski (ed) Studies and Essays on 
International Humanitarian Law and Red Cross Principles in Honour o f  Jean Pictet (Martinus 
Nijhoff, The Hague; Boston, 1984) 369-385, 385.
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‘paint’ targets with laser sights for laser guided missiles or plant GPS locator 
beacons, all increasing the options available to them rather than being limited to the 
contents of their backpack. These increased options will require commanders in the 
field to assess the appropriate options for attack.
Even more than the military commanders, the authorities who decide on the 
armament of the armed forces have the option to select suitable weapons. Although 
Kalshoven has noted that considerations of military efficiency will tend to 
preponderate in the deliberations of those authorities, he considers that “at the same 
time they will fail in their duty if they lose sight of the humanitarian requirement of 
minimisation of human suffering”.134 However, humanitarian law does not contain 
any obligation to acquire military capabilities that provide civilians greater 
protection; instead, it limits itself to imposing a duty to use capabilities once in the
135inventory.
5.3. Proportionality
The principle of proportionality is part of customary law of armed conflict, however 
its codification and exact scope has not been without debate.136 Article 57(2)(iii) of 
Additonal Protocol I codifies the principle of proportionality which requires those 
planning an attack to:
“refrain from deciding to launch any attack which may be expected to cause 
incidental loss o f  civilian life, injury to civilians, damage to  civilian objects, or a 
combination thereof, which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct 
m ilitary advantage anticipated”
The wording is repeated in Article 51 (5)(b) which considers such attacks to be 
indiscriminate; indiscriminate acts in violation of the rule of proportionality 
constitute ‘grave breaches’ under Article 85 of Additional Protocol I.
Ruth Wedgwood has addressed the proportionality equation for computer network 
attacks and suggested that greater damage to civilian objects may be tolerated in
134 Ibid.
135 Schmitt, High and Low-Tech Warfare, 11.
136 Nuclear Weapons Case., per Higgins J in her dissenting opinion (dissenting on other grounds); 
Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 46.
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•  1 17  _ » •order to eliminate a security threat, so long as that damage is reversible. This view 
seems to be based on the idea that an attack may not cause destruction but mere 
incapacity. Although this view corresponds with Knut Dormann’s approach outlined 
in section 4.1 supra, i t  does not accord with the requirement of the Protocol’s 
definition of attacks as ‘acts of violence’. Taken to its logical conclusion, 
Wedgewood’s argument would seem to infer that any damage is permissible as long 
as the damage can be reconstructed at the conclusion of the conflict.
Michael Schmitt has also queried the extent to which specialised computer expertise 
must be available during the targeting process to assess possible collateral damage 
and incidental injury.139 As he points out, in traditional kinetic attacks, properly 
trained mainstream military officers can usually conduct reliable estimates. However 
in computer network attacks highly specialised expertise would be required.140 This 
argument is essentially the same argument that occurs in terms of verification of 
military objectives, and can be addressed in the same manner.
Two major problems for modem proportionality judgements, especially with respect 
to computer network attacks, are the extent to which the knock-on effects of attacks 
must be incorporated into the calculation and the effects of increasingly dual use 
technological systems on that calculation.
Knock-on effects
As Christopher Greenwood has noted, the Gulf Conflict of 1990-91 has highlighted 
the fact that knock-on effects of attacks cause more harm to civilians than the direct 
effect of the attack itself.141 Application of the proportionality test today, at least at 
the strategic level, requires that less immediate damage of this kind must also be
137 Ruth G. Wedgwood, 'Proportionality, Cyberwar, and the Law of War' in M N Schmitt and B T 
O'Donnell (eds), Computer Network Attack and International Law (Naval War College, Newport, RI, 
2002)219-232,228.
138 DOrmann, 'Additional Protocols', 142-143.
139 Michael N. Schmitt, 'CNA and the Jus in Bello: An Introduction'Ibid., 101-125,117.
140 Ibid.
141 Christopher Greenwood, 'The Law of Weaponry at the Start of the New Millennium' in M N 
Schmitt and L C Green (eds), The Law o f  Armed Conflict: Into the Next Millennium (Naval War 
College, Newport, Rhode Island, 1998) 185-231,202.
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taken into account, although the difficulty of doing so is apparent.142 While this 
problem is not unique to computer network attacks, both the 1991 Gulf Conflict and 
the NATO action in Yugoslavia illustrated the knock-on effects of targeting the 
electricity networks,143 the problem is exacerbated by the nature of computer systems 
and linkages between military and civilian systems. Certainly the attacker will be 
required to have conducted some sort of mapping of the target network or system to 
ascertain what ancillary networks or systems are connected to the target. It is unclear 
how many levels of these cascading effects will need to be taken into account by the 
planners of the attacks and those executing them. Michael Schmitt argues that those 
effects that are reasonably foreseeable, no matter what ‘tier’ of effect they may be 
must be factored into the proportionality calculation.144 This fits with the language of 
the article which refers to the expected consequences. Ironically, the move towards 
militaries buying off-the-shelf technology and systems may aid attackers in correctly 
predicting the effects of certain attacks.
Dual Use Systems
To what extent does that fact that a State has deliberately integrated civilian and 
military systems together impact the proportionality calculation? For example, the 
Iraqi Tiger Song air defence network was cross-wired with the Iraqi oil pipeline 
communications network,145 additionally a large majority of U.S. military 
communications travel across civilian networks. While such actions undoubtedly 
expose the networks to attack as military objectives, can the argument be made, as 
with the case of voluntary human shields,146 that if the defenders have integrated 
their military and civilian systems such that the military system may not be attacked 
without impacting the civilian, that the civilian impact should be excluded from the
142 Ibid.
143 In the Gulf Conflict of 1990-1991, Allied forces disabled the Iraqi power distribution networks 
using a variety of tactics including carbon-fibre filament munitions. The unintended (and apparently 
unexpected) side effects of these attacks were to deny electricity to the sewerage and water treatment 
facilities supplying the civilian population: William M Arkin, 'Cyber Warfare and the Environment' 
(2001) 25 Vermont Law Review 779, 781.citing Daniel T Kuehl, 'Airpower vs Electricity' (1995) 18 
Journal o f  Strategic Studies 28. Similarly, when NATO forces attacked Yugoslavia’s electrical supply 
network, water pumping stations were affected: NATO Denies Targeting Water Supplies'.
144 Schmitt, High and Low-Tech Warfare, 10; Schmitt, 'Fault Lines', 296.
145 Smith, 'U.S. Information Warriors Wrestle with New Weapons'.
146 Schmitt, 'Fault Lines', 298.
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proportionality calculation. The answer must be negative, as the protection only 
exists for civilians not civilian objects. In addition, for the most part civilians would 
be unaware that the systems were so intertwined; thus the parallel would be drawn 
with involuntary human shields which must definitely be taken into account when 
conducting the targeting analysis. Further as Schmitt points out, there are instances 
where protected objects lose their protected status due to the adversary’s misconduct. 
A hospital housing combatants (who are not otherwise hors du combat) may be 
attacked once a warning to desist has been ignored.147 Rogers argues that a tribunal 
that is considering the criminal liability of an attacker in respect of death or injury to 
civilians, would be entitled to consider the extent to which the defenders had flouted 
their obligations to separate military objects from civilian objects.148
5.4. Choice of Targets
Article 57(3) of Additional Protocol I provides that where there is a choice of several 
military objectives for obtaining a similar military objective, the objective chosen 
should be the one which causes the least danger to civilian lives and to civilian 
objects. Christopher Greenwood notes that although this Article may have gone 
beyond the customary law as it stood at 1977, it certainly represented customary 
international law by the 1990-1991 Gulf Conflict.149 The obligation is particularly 
relevant for computer network attacks as the form of attack opens multiple options to 
achieve the same effect. For example, a system may be neutralised by disabling an 
essential component of the system so that it is unable to function, attacking the 
system as a whole, attacking the network on which that system resides, or by 
shutting off the electrical supply to the target system. All would achieve the same 
result, i.e. denying the target system to the adversary. This is, to a certain extent, a 
natural extension of the obligation to choose means and methods of attack which 
minimise harm to civilians, however as computer network attacks increase the ability 
to break target networks into their component systems, the targeting analysis will 
likewise become more refined. Thus the obligation to choose ‘the lesser of two
147 Ibid., 300.
148 Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 129. Rogers considers this proportionality approach would redress 
the balance which might otherwise be tilted in favour of the unscrupulous.
149 Greenwood, 'Customary International Law in the Gulf, 83.
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evils’; the example given in the ICRC Commentary is the bombing on railways lines 
rather than stations which are primarily located in urban areas.150 Of course the 
obligation, as with the other precautions in attack, is to take feasible measures, 
therefore the question will be dependent on the ability to access the networks, the 
ability to determine the effects of neutralising a particular component, the desired 
effect of the attack and whether the systems can be cracked in time for the purposes 
of the operation. Although the specifics of this provision will only apply to those 
computer network attacks which amount to attacks as discussed supra, the general 
obligation under Article 57(1) would oblige attackers to take these factors into 
consideration in part of any military operation.
Failure to sufficiently refine the target, particularly in relation to dual use targets, 
also raises possible parallels with target area bombardment which is prohibited by 
Article 51(5)(a):lsl
An attack by bombardment by any method or m eans which treats as a single military 
objective a num ber o f  clearly separated and distinct m ilitary objectives located in a 
city, town, village or other area containing a sim ilar concentration o f  civilians or 
civilian objects.
If a system or network is disrupted too far ‘up-stream’ from the ultimate objective, it 
will affect the not only the objective, but all other systems (including any civilian 
systems) on the network. However the analogy is flawed, as any system attacked will 
qualify as a military objective or not on its own merits (with the knock-on effects 
included in the proportionality equation), rather than treating a number of objectives 
as a single objective.
6. Precautions Against the Effects of Attacks
The main prohibition addressed to defenders in respect of the civilian population or 
individual civilians is expressed in Article 51(7) of Additional Protocol I which
150 Bothe, et al., New Rules, para 2227-2228.
151 Art. 51(5)(a), Additional Protocol I provides: The presence or movements of the civilian 
population or individual civilians shall not be used to render certain points or areas immune from 
military operations, in particular in attempts to shield military objectives from attacks or to shield, 
favour or impede military operations. The Parties to the conflict shall not direct the movement of the 
civilian population or individual civilians in order to attempt to shield military objectives from attacks 
or to shield military operations.
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1 ^9prevents the use of civilians as human shields for military objectives. However 
this does not raise many issues for computer network attacks, other than to comment 
that counter attacks against computer network attacks may not necessarily be 
returned in kind, and the use of civilian contractors to defend against intrusions into 
military networks does not prevent them from being targeted or attacked by other 
means. Of more interest is Article 58 which provides that:
The Parties to the conflict shall, to the m aximum extent feasible:
(a) w ithout prejudice to Article 49 o f  the Fourth Convention, endeavour to remove 
the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their control 
from the vicinity o f  military objectives;
(b) avoid locating m ilitary objectives w ithin or near densely populated areas;
(c) take the other necessary precautions to protect the civilian population, individual 
civilians and civilian objects under their control against the dangers resulting from 
military operations.
These rules represent customary international law,153 however as Christopher 
Greenwood points out in most conflicts little more than lip service appears to have 
been paid to this rule.154 However the wording of the provision clearly indicates that 
these obligations are weaker than those of the attacker.155 Unlike the obligations of 
the attacker, failure to comply with the provision does not constitute a grave breach 
of the Protocol; defenders obligations only have to be taken “to the maximum extent 
possible”, and the defender has only to “endeavour to remove” the civilian 
population and “avoid” locating military objectives nearby.
What does this mean for computer network attacks? Paragraph (a) requires that 
parties endeavour to remove civilian objects from the vicinity of military objectives,
152 Sassdli, 'Targeting', 206.
153 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 67-76. The Trial 
Chamber in Kupreskic considered that both Art. 57 API (pertaining to precautions in attack) and Art. 
58 are now part of customary international law, not only because they specify and flesh out general 
pre-existing norms, but also because they do not appear to be contested by any State, including those 
which have not ratified the Protocol. Kupreskic, para 524.
154 Greenwood, 'Customary International Law in the Gulf, 374, nl22.
155 Sassbli, 'Targeting', 207.
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to the maximum extent feasible.156 This would require parties (where practicable) to 
extricate military systems and networks from civilian ones and to avoid using 
civilian networks for military communications. However, as has been pointed out 
throughout this thesis, the increasing civilianisation of the military and widespread 
networking of modem militaries has led to the opposite happening. The integration 
of civilian and military technology such as civilian use of the GPS system, and 
military use of civilian communications satellites and networks. The lack of 
partitioning between Iraqi military and civilian systems caused difficulties for the 
U.S. in achieving some of their computer network attacks aims in the 2003 Iraq 
conflict.157
Paragraph (c) also imposes a general obligation to take other necessary precautions 
to protect the civilian population, individual civilians and civilian objects under their 
control from dangers resulting from military operations. It is unclear how far this 
obligation will go in an age of computer network attack. Practice reports submitted 
to the ICRC customary international humanitarian law study have indicated 
construction of shelters, digging of trenches, direction of traffic, guarding of civilian 
property and the mobilisation of civil defence organisations are measures which 
States have taken. Such measures in relation to digital property may include ensuring 
that all publicly administered digital property is properly backed up and all systems 
have built in redundancy, so that any loss of systems or information can be restored. 
Similar digital disaster planning programs were put in place on a wide scale in 
preparation for the year 2000 change-over following predictions of catastrophic 
electronic failures.
156 As with other Articles in the Protocol which incorporate the word ‘feasible’, a number of 
delegations have indicated that the word feasible means that which is practicable or practically 
possible, taking into account all the circumstances at the time, including those relevant to the success 
of military operations. Bothe, et al., New Rules, 373.
157 Smith, 'U.S. Information Warriors Wrestle with New Weapons'.
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Chapter 7 -  Measures of Special Protection
Special protection is granted to certain personnel and objects under the laws of 
armed conflict. Although even the most advanced information society is yet to 
deploy technology which would enable direct attacks against personnel using 
computer network attacks, other objects have become sufficiently incorporated into 
computer networks to make them vulnerable to a computer network attack. The 
environment, installations containing dangerous forces (namely dams, dykes and 
nuclear power plants), hospitals and other medical units are all granted particular 
protection from attack over and above the general protection granted to civilian 
infrastructure. As much of the developed world’s critical infrastructure is now 
controlled using computer networks, this protection will extend to prohibit computer 
network attacks against such objects. Dams, power stations, chemical plants, water 
and sewage, gas and oil pipelines are all controlled by networked systems such as 
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems, thus making them 
vulnerable to computer network attacks.1 In addition, information societies now rely 
on digital information for fast and reliable access to up-to-date information; this 
trend is also seen in the medical sector where medical records and other information 
are stored and transmitted over computer networks, thus also leaving them 
susceptible to computer network attack. While there is no question that these 
installations and data remain protected by their status regardless of the means or 
method of warfare adopted against them, some issues require review in light of the 
new technology.
1. The Environment
Harm caused to the environment during periods of armed conflict, both directly and 
as a by-product of war, has been an unfortunate inevitability of conflict throughout 
the ages; post-modern warfare is no exception. For example, the 2006 armed conflict 
between Hezbollah and Israel resulted in severe damage to the Lebanon coastline
1 SCADA systems (Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition) are organisational systems which 
control other networks and automated processes.
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after a power station was damaged by Israeli missile fire;2 likewise the oil fires 
resulting from the 1991 Gulf War caused substantial damage to the ecology in 
Kuwait & Iraq.3 In the latter incident, the deliberate damage caused to the 
environment by Iraqi troops shocked the world and prompted a flurry of legal 
commentary on the degree of protection provided by the law pertaining to 
environmental warfare.4
At the time of writing no reports of incidents of wartime environmental damage 
using computer network attack exist in the public domain. However, in April 2000 a 
domestic case emerged in Queensland, Australia, solving a mystery that had 
perturbed authorities for months, and showing the potential of this new type of attack 
for environmental damage.5 Vitek Boden was arrested after being caught using a 
stolen computer and radio transmitter to gain access to a water sewerage treatment 
system. Over the previous two month period Boden had accessed the system 46 
times, gaining complete control of treatment of the region’s sewerage and drinking 
water facilities and dumping 250 million tonnes of putrid sludge into the area’s 
rivers and parks, killing wildlife and plants. Although Boden was acting for personal 
reasons in his attacks,6 the case illustrates the potential for intrusion and 
establishment of control over infrastructure utilising SCADA systems, a tactic which 
could easily be adopted for military purposes. Could a repeat of the 1991 Gulf War 
oil disaster occur as a result of computer network attacks? Based on current 
technology, the answer is undoubtedly yes. For example, approximately thirty 
percent of the United Kingdom’s oil output runs over one pipeline system in the 
North Sea, pumping a volume of 2.5 million gallons of oil a day. The Forties
2 Mark Kinver, "Damage Is Done' to Lebanon Coast', BBC News 8 August 2006, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/sci/tech/5255966.stm> (last accessed 9 January 2007).
3 Oil well fires were greater in number than all well fires in previous history put together. Oil slicks 
were more than two to three times the size of the word’s previously largest oil spill, the Exxon 
Valdez. Gushing Oil wells, pipes, and storage tanks left rivers and lakes o f spilled oil, more than 
ninety million barrels covering over fifty percent of Kuwait’s land area. This huge amount of exposed 
oil released toxic substances, heavy metals, and unequalled emissions of hydrocarbons. Arkin, 'Cyber 
Warfare and the Environment'.
4 Eric Talbot Jensen, 'The International Law of Environmental Warfare: Active and Passive Damage 
During Armed Conflict' (2005) 38 Vand J  Transnat'lL 145.
5 R v Boden (2002) QCA 164, Court of Appeal of the Supreme Court of Queensland (Australia).
6 Evidence at his trial suggested that Boden was motivated either by a desire for vengeance or that he 
hoped to be re-employed by the company running the system in a consulting capacity to solve the 
problem he had caused: Ibid; Gellman, 'Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared'.
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pipeline is controlled by a SCADA system similar to those that control the 
Queensland water and sewerage treatment plant infiltrated by Boden. By resetting 
the valves on the North Sea Forties oil pipeline it may be possible to cause a 
hammering effect in the lines;7 the resulting rupture of the pipeline would cause 
untold damage to the ecology of the area (including an area of special scientific 
interest), and cripple the U.K. oil supply for weeks.
As with all of the issues outlined in this thesis, the general principles of the laws of 
armed conflict will continue to apply to computer network attacks despite the 
application of new technology to cause harm. In addition, those general principles 
also serve to protect the environment indirectly, even where direct protection is not 
provided by specific prohibitions relating to the environment.8 Specific protection of 
the environment in armed conflict has been rising in prominence since the Vietnam 
War and it has come to the forefront of legal attention since the 1991 Gulf War.
1.1. Additional Protocol I
Additional Protocol I contains two articles containing measures of direct protection 
for the environment during international armed conflict, namely Articles 35(3) and 
55. There is no equivalent provision in Additional Protocol II relating to non- 
intemational armed conflicts.9 Both Articles contain broad prohibitions against any 
means or method of warfare which is intended or may be expected to cause damage 
to the environment;10 thus computer network attacks which meet the requisite criteria 
for damage are also prohibited. Both Article 35(3) and Article 55(1) are restricted in 
terms of the intended or foreseeable consequences of the attack; the effect on the
7 See also the account of the ‘farewell dossier’ incident in Appendix 1, although an explosion would 
be unlikely in a predominantly seabed system.
8 For example, the general protection granted to civilian objects, protection of objects indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population and simple application of the principles of proportionality and 
necessity will provide protection for many parts of the environment.
9 A proposal was made at the diplomatic conference to introduce into Additional Protocol II a 
provision analogous to Art. 35(3) and Art. 55 of Additional Protocol I but the idea was ultimately 
rejected. Antoine Bouvier, 'Protection of the Natural Environment in Time of Armed Conflict' (1991) 
285 IRRC 567 <www.icrc.org/web/eng/siteengO.nsFhtml/57JMAU> (last accessed 10 January 2007).
10 Art. 33 states “It is prohibited to employ methods or means of warfare which are intended, or may 
be expected, to cause widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment”.
Art. 55: Care shall be taken in warfare to protect the natural environment against widespread, long­
term and severe damage. This protection includes a prohibition of the use of methods or means of 
warfare which are intended or may be expected to cause such damage to the natural environment and 
thereby to prejudice the health or survival of the population.
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environment must be “widespread, long-term and severe”,11 and in the case of 
Article 55(1), the subsequent effect of the environmental damage must also be 
prejudicial to the health or survival of the population. Article 55(1) also contains a 
general obligation of care to protect the natural environment against “widespread, 
long-term and severe” damage.
Article 55(2) of the Additional Protocol I also contains a blanket prohibition against
any attacks against the natural environment by way of reprisals; this constitutes an
•  1absolute standard of zero harm to the environment in the case of reprisals.
1.2. ENMOD Convention
Like Additional Protocol I, the 1977 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or 
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques (ENMOD) does 
not limit itself to specific means and methods of warfare.14 Article 1 of the ENMOD 
Convention prohibits States Party from military or any other hostile use of 
environmental modification techniques which result in “widespread, long-lasting or 
severe” effects as a means of affecting any other State party to the Convention.15
11 Note that under Additional Protocol I, a means or method of warfare must cause damage which 
cumulatively fulfils all three conditions to be rendered unlawful. For an examination o f the meaning 
of the terms “widespread, long-term and severe” under the Protocol, see Karen Hulme, War Torn 
Environment: Interpreting the Legal Threshold (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Leiden, 2004), 91-100.
12 The word "health" was included to indicate that the provision was also concerned with acts which 
could seriously prejudice health, such as congenital defects, degenerations or deformities. Pilloud, et 
al., Commentary, 663-664.
13 Hulme, War Torn Environment, 73.
14 18 May 1977, Convention on the Prohibition o f  Military or Any Other Hostile Use o f  
Environmental Modification Techniques.
15 The terms “widespread, long-lasting or severe” are used deliberately to mirror the terminology in 
Additional Protocol I which was negotiated in the same time-frame. Note however the use of ‘or’ 
rather than ‘and’ which gives the ENMOD Convention a broader application. Although the 
terminology is practically identical, the terms are not used synonymously. While not defined in the 
Convention, the terms have been given definition by a set of “Understandings” which were drafted at 
the same time by the Committee and are attached to the Convention (although not officially 
incorporated into it). ‘Widespread’: encompassing an area on the scale o f several hundred square 
kilometres; ‘long-lasting’: lasting for a period of months, or approximately a season; severe: involving 
serious or significant disruption or harm to human life, natural and economic resources or other 
assets.
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Environmental modification techniques are defined broadly as:16
“A ny technique for changing -  through the deliberate m anipulation o f  natural 
processes -  the dynamics, composition or structure o f  the Earth, including its biota, 
lithosphere, hydrosphere and atmosphere, or o f  outer space” .
Possible methods mooted for manipulating the environment are: triggering 
earthquakes, generating tsunamis, triggering landslides, fluidising thixotropic soils, 
activating volcanoes, breaching water containments, melting polar ice, disrupting 
permafrost soils, seeding clouds to create rain & flooding, creating holes in the
17ozone layer and creating drought conditions. Other than breaching water 
containment facilities, a topic which is dealt with further in the following section on 
installations containing dangerous forces, it is difficult to see how a computer 
network attack could directly manipulate the environment. However, where a 
computer network attack is capable of performing such a function, the provisions of 
the ENMOD Convention are broad enough to prohibit it.
With the current state of technology, the most likely scenario involves hostile 
manipulation of existing peacetime environmental modification techniques which
1 Rhave been put in place to combat increasing environmental problems. Such 
solutions are likely to be controlled by SCADA systems or other networked 
computer systems and may therefore be susceptible to appropriation and 
manipulation for hostile purposes. The Thames Barrier, a 523 metre gated barrier 
across the River Thames in London, is an example of an environmental modification 
technique used for peaceful purposes. The Barrier was created to protect London and 
the Thames Estuary from flooding caused by rising tide levels and surge tides.19 The 
massive hydraulic gates of the Barrier are ultimately controlled via a computer 
system and are therefore theoretically vulnerable to manipulation by computer
16 Art. 2, ENMOD Convention.
17 Em6 M^szdros, Techniques for Manipulating the Atmosphere1 in A H Westing (ed) Environmental 
Warfare: A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal (Taylor & Francis, London, 1984), 13; Hallan C 
Noltimier, 'Techniques for Manipulating the Geosphere' in A H Westing (ed) Environmental Warfare: 
A Technical, Legal and Policy Appraisal (Taylor & Francis, London, 1984)25-31.
18 Peaceful use of environmental modification techniques are specifically excluded from the ambit of 
the ENMOD Convention under Art. 3(1).
19 See generally The Environment Agency, The Thames Barrier: Flood Defence for London 
<http://www.environment-agency.gov.uk/regions/thames/323150/335688/341764/> (last accessed 29 
November 2006).
196
network attack. For example, preventing the system from closing the gates during a 
tidal surge would allow the natural flow of flood waters to cause damage to a 
substantial part of London. It would also be possible to use the Barrier itself to 
amplify the deleterious effects of such tides on London. By closing the gates during 
a surge tide and then opening them at the height of the tide, a wall of water would
n/\
flood central London causing immense loss of life and property damage. Such 
damage would certainly meet the ‘severe’ criteria of the Convention.
The ENMOD Convention is not limited to international armed conflicts. However its 
application to non-international armed conflicts is limited by the requirement that 
damage must be caused to another State Party. The Convention would nevertheless 
cover the situation where an environmental modification technique was used 
intentionally against a domestic opponent, but caused cross-border environmental
*y I
damage to another State Party.
1.3. Other Protections
The environment is also protected by general rules relating to the protection of 
civilian objects, proportionality and military necessity. The relevance of the general 
principles of proportionality and necessity for the protection of the environment were 
underscored by the International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on Nuclear 
Weapons'.22
“States must take environmental considerations into account when assessing w hat is 
necessary and proportionate in the pursuit o f  legitimate m ilitary objectives. Respect 
for the environm ent is one o f  the elements that go to assessing whether an action is 
in conformity with the principles o f necessity and proportionality” .
In addition, the U.N. General Assembly has stated that the destruction of the 
environment not justified by military necessity and carried out wantonly, is clearly
20 A scenario very similar to this was created by BBC’s drama ‘Spooks’ when the Thames Barrier was 
overrun by environmental terrorists; the addition of computer network attacks to manipulate the gates 
is new. Spooks: Series 5, Episode 10 (BBC, 13 November 2006)
21 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 189.
22 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 30.
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01contrary to existing international law. The International Court of Justice cited this 
passage in the Nuclear Weapons case, noting that although General Assembly 
resolutions are not binding as such, “they provide evidence of the existence of a rule 
or the emergence of opinio j u r i s 24 This has led commentators to confirm that the 
protection of the environment is a norm of customary international law applicable in 
both international and non-international armed conflicts.
The Rome Statute of 1998 incorporates some of the prohibitions contained in 
Additional Protocol I. For instance, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction 
in respect of war crimes that consist of “[ijntentionally launching an attack in the 
knowledge that such attack will cause incidental... widespread, long-term and severe 
damage to the natural environment which would be clearly excessive in relation to 
the concrete and direct overall military advantage anticipated”.26 
Protection of the environment is also inferred from the provisions relating to 
protection of civilian objects and protection of objects indispensable to the civilian 
population. Civilian objects are defined as all objects which are not military 
objectives, and while in some cases the environment could by its use constitute a 
military objective (for example by providing cover for troops), as a general matter it 
is likely to be considered a civilian object. Indeed, in some circumstances it may be 
considered an object indispensable to the civilian population (for example natural 
water reservoirs) and thus be provided protection under Article 54 and Article 14 of 
Additional Protocol I and Additional Protocol II respectively. Article 14 of 
Additional Protocol II is perhaps of more importance in protecting the environment 
as Additional Protocol II, unlike Additional Protocol I, does not protect civilian 
objects in general.27 The International Committee of the Red Cross has also issued a 
set of Guidelines for Military Manuals and instructions on the protection of the
23 Protection of the Environment in Times of Armed Conflict, U.N. GAOR, 47th Sess., Agenda Item 
136, UN Doc A/Res/47/37 (1992).
24 The Court also noted that “Addressing the reality that certain instruments are not yet binding on all 
States, the General Assembly in this resolution "[a]ppeals to all States that have not yet done so to 
consider becoming parties to the relevant international conventions." Nuclear Weapons Case, para 32.
25 See for example,Dinstein, Conduct o f Hostilities, 193; Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary 
International Humanitarian Law, Vol 1, 143.
26 Art. 8(2)(b)(iv) Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court 1998 (entered into force 1 July 
2002). Note that knowledge in this instance means actual knowledge not reasonable forseeability (Art. 
30(3) of the Rome Statute).
27 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 4794.
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environment in times of armed conflict.28 While not formally approved by the U.N. 
General Assembly, the Assembly did invite all States to give due consideration to the 
possibility of incorporating the guidelines into their military manuals and other 
instructions addressed to their military personnel.29
2. Installations containing Dangerous Forces
Until 2002, the idea of a country being attacked through its computer networks as a 
co-ordinated act of war was considered remote and largely dismissed as panic- 
mongering.30 Although United States intelligence agencies were monitoring China, 
Russia and other Nation States on the threat to U.S. information systems, the threat
•y i
from non-state actors was largely underestimated. Then in 2002, troops clearing the 
cave system in the Tora Bora region of Afghanistan uncovered an A1 Qaeda laptop 
which indicated a strong interest in computer network attacks. Computer forensics 
indicated that the laptop had made multiple visits to sites offering sabotage 
handbooks, software and programming instructions on SCADA systems, and other 
‘cracking’ tools. In combination with the Mountain View surveillance program 
which had been uncovered the year before, officials became increasingly 
concerned about A1 Qaeda’s computer network attack capabilities. In January 2002, 
another computer was seized at an A1 Qaeda office in Kabul, Afghanistan. The 
computer contained models of a dam, made with structural architecture and 
engineering software and included geological soil identification software which 
would enable the planners of an attack to simulate the dam’s catastrophic failure and
28ICRC, 'Guidelines for Military Manuals and Instructions on the Protection of the Environment in 
Times o f Armed Conflict' (1996) 311 IRRC 230
<http://wvw.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteengO.nsf7html/57JN38> (last accessed 11 January 2007).; annex to 
UN Doc. A/49/323 (1994).
29 GA Res 49/50, 9 December 1994.
30 See for example, Interviews with John Hamre and James Lewis, PBS Frontline Cyberwar! 24 April 
2003 http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/interviews/ (last accessed 11 January 
2006).
31 Gellman, 'Cyber-Attacks by A1 Qaeda Feared'.
32 In 2001 Mountain View California police began investigating a suspicious pattern o f surveillance 
against silicon valley computers. The visitors were studying emergency telephone systems, electrical 
generation and transmission, water storage and distribution, nuclear power plants and gas facilities. 
While some probes indicated planning for a conventional attack, others honed in on the digital devices 
which run critical infrastructure. Ibid.
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plot the consequences of a breach.33 Although the authorities declined to say whether 
the schematics related to a particular targeted dam, the use of cyberspace to infiltrate 
a dam is not unprecedented. As refered to supra, in 1998, a 12-year-old hacker, 
exploring on a lark, broke into the computer system that controls the Roosevelt Dam 
in Arizona, U.S.A.34 Although he was unaware of the fact, federal authorities claim 
the boy had complete control of the SCAD A system which controls the dam’s 
massive floodgates and the 489 billion gallons of water which it contains. Unleashed, 
the water would course down the Salt River and over a downstream flood plain 
(home to an estimated population of one million people) before reaching the state 
capital, Phoenix.
Dams are not the only installations containing dangerous forces to have been 
compromised via the Internet. In January 2003, the Davis-Besse nuclear power plant 
in Ohio, U.S.A. was hit by the Slammer worm, disabling a safety system for nearly 
five hours and a process computer for nearly six hours.35 Fortunately the power plant 
was offline at the time; however the incident provided a stark reminder of the 
vulnerability of such installations, prompting a review of safety protocols. In the UK, 
the Bradwell nuclear power plant was likewise compromised in June 1999 by a 
security guard who attempted to alter sensitive information, and succeeded in 
deleting records from one of the systems.36 As with the Davis-Besse incident, the 
Bradwell incident prompted a review of security and change of procedures. 
Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions grants special protection to 
installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dykes and nuclear power 
stations. Article 56(1) provides as follows:
W orks or installations containing dangerous forces, nam ely dams, dykes and nuclear 
electrical generating stations, shall not be made the object o f  attack, even where 
these objects are m ilitary objectives, if  such an attack may cause the release o f  
dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population. Other
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid. See also Appendix 1 for queries that have been raised regarding the veracity of some of the 
facts o f this account.
35 Kevin Poulsen, 'Slammer Worm Crashed Ohio Nuke Plant Network' (2003) Security Focus 19 
August 2003 <www.securityfocus.com/print/news/6767> (last accessed 31 October 2006).
36 Kevin Maguire, 'Guard Tried Sabotage at Nuclear Reactor: Security Checks Tightened after High- 
Level Alert', The Guardian (London), 9 January 2001, 2.
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military objectives located at or in the vicinity of these works or installations shall 
not be made the object of attack if such attack may cause the release of dangerous 
forces from the works or installations and consequent severe losses among the 
civilian population.
The first sentence of this Article is repeated verbatim in Article 15 of Additional 
Protocol II relating to non-international armed conflicts. The provisions represent an 
innovation in the laws of armed conflict, and are a reflection of the attempt to limit 
the extent of permissible collateral damage.37
An interesting question arises in the respect of computer network attacks as to 
whether the concept of military objectives “located at or in the vicinity o f’ such 
works and installations will extend to network vicinity as well as physical proximity. 
As has been illustrated in previous chapters, in information age warfare, physical 
distance is no longer a useful yardstick for the amount of damage which can be 
inflicted. While a strict reading of the text of Article 56(1) would tend to indicate 
that the physical location of the objective is the only prerequisite, if the Article is to 
maintain its utility in the Internet age it would seem that it should extend to network 
proximity as well. The operative part of the prohibition being “if such an attack may 
cause the release of dangerous forces.. .and consequent severe losses among the 
civilian population”. As Yoram Dinstein points out, the guiding consideration is the 
protection of the civilian, population from catastrophic collateral damage.38 Where a 
computer network attack is designed to disable an adjacent system or network such 
that it would have a knock-on effect onto a dam, dyke or nuclear generator, causing 
that installation to release its forces, it should not matter that the system or network 
is not physically located in the vicinity of that installation. Where it is reasonably 
foreseeable - using normal network reconnaissance techniques - that the target 
system is connected to the installation, such that making the former the object of an
<JQ
attack would affect the latter, the prohibition should stand. The requirement to take 
suitable precautions in attacks is dealt with in more detail in Chapter 6 supra. Note
37 Oeter, 'Methods and Means of Combat', 194.
38 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 173.; See also Oeter, 'Methods and Means of Combat', 195.
39 Note for example the loss of civilian water distribution, purification and sewerage facilities which 
followed the U.S. destruction of the Iraqi electricity grid in 1991. Given U.S. intelligence and 
reconnaissance capabilities at the time, such a consequence should have been reasonably foreseeable, 
however it appears that the result was unexpected. Arkin, 'Cyber Warfare and the Environment', 781, 
citing Kuehl, 'Airpower vs Electricity'.
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that this issue will only arise in relation to international armed conflicts as the 
relevant sentence is omitted from Article 15 of Additional Protocol II.
While the advent of computer network attacks may remove some military objectives 
from the permissible target list by virtue of their being in close network proximity to 
a work or installation containing dangerous forces, others may become open to 
attack. The commentary to Article 56 cites the case of a hydroelectric power station 
incorporated in a dam or located in the immediate vicinity as an example of a 
military objective which cannot be attacked because of its proximity to the dam.40 
Computer network attacks may allow the attacking force to disengage the power 
station from the dam to deny the opposing force the electricity, without running the 
risk of destroying the dam. Such an action would have severe consequences for those 
countries where the main source of electricity is hydroelectric power.41 
It should be noted that, as with dams, dykes and nuclear power generators, military 
objectives located or in the vicinity of the works or installations lose their special 
protection only if they are used in regular, significant and direct support of military 
operations (a higher threshold than that of effective contribution to military effort) 
and if such an attack is the only feasible way to terminate such support42 Parties also 
have an obligation to endeavour to avoid locating military objectives in the vicinity 
of works or installations 43
3. Objects Indispensable to the Survival of the Civilian Population.
Computer network attacks against systems and networks which are indispensable to 
the survival of the civilian population are prohibited under Additional Protocols I & 
II in the same manner that conventional attacks would be prohibited against such 
objects. Article 54(2) of Additional Protocol I provides:
It is prohibited to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to 
the survival o f  the civilian population, such as foodstuffs, agricultural areas for the 
production o f  foodstuffs, crops, livestock, drinking w ater installations and supplies
40 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2156.
41 For example, Norway produces virtually all of its electricity from hydroelectric sources, while 
Iceland (83%), Austria and Canada (both over 70%) would be hugely effected by denial of 
hydroelectric sources. Notably, China is the world's largest producer of hydroelectric power.
42 Art. 56(2), Additional Protocol I.
43 Art. 56(5), Additional Protocol I.
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and irrigation works, for the specific purpose o f  denying them  for their sustenance 
value to the civilian population or to the adverse party, w hatever the motive, 
w hether to starve out civilians, to cause them to move away, or for any other motive.
Article 14 of Additional Protocol II provides equivalent wording. The list is merely 
illustrative and the Commentary to the provision notes that “it cannot be excluded 
that as a result of climate or other circumstances, objects such as shelter or clothing 
must be considered as indispensable”.44 As has been demonstrated by the Australian 
domestic case of Vitek Boden 45 drinking water installations are particularly 
susceptible to computer network attacks, likewise irrigation works have been 
tampered with in a domestic case,46 as are any other works primarily controlled by 
SCADA systems.
Unlike ordinary civilian objects, Michael Schmitt’s argument distinguishing the 
possibility of targeting objects with computer network attacks not severe enough to 
constitute attacks, would not hold up against objects indispensable to the civilian 
population;47 the words ‘remove’ and ‘render useless’ were added to ‘attack’ and 
‘destroy’ in order to cover all possibilities 48 Attack etc against such objects is only 
prohibited for the “specific purpose of denying them for their sustenance value to the 
civilian population”.49 Note that the Rome Statute only considers depriving civilians 
of objects indispensable for survival a war crime where it constitutes intentional 
starvation as a method of warfare.50
4. Hospitals and other Medical Units
Hospitals, medical units and medical transports (including hospital ships and 
aircraft) all receive special protection from international humanitarian law. Indeed 
they form the basis of the origins of the modem laws of armed conflict, and are
44 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2103.
45 R v Boden. Boden, a disgruntled employee, accessed the Queensland water treatment facilities 46 
times via a stolen laptop and radio transmitter before being caught. See Appendix 1.
46 Dan Goodin, 'Electrical Supe Charged with Damaging California Canal System' (2007) The 
Register 30th November 2007 <http://www.theregister.co.Uk/2007/l l/30/canal_system_hack/>.
47 See Chapter 6, section 4.1 supra.
48 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2100-2101.
49 Ibid.
50 Art. 8(2)(b)(xxv), Rome Statute.
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protected by custom as well as specific lex scripta. For the most part this protection 
does not raise any additional issues in the event of computer network attacks, the 
protection remains regardless of the method of attack. However two issues, the 
location and access to medical databases and the encryption of communications to 
and from hospital ships, require some thought in the information age.
4.1. Location and Access to Medical Databases
In line with the trend towards networked services in both civilian and military life, 
the supply of operational support services to the military, such as medical treatment 
facilities, have also benefited from increased network connectivity. For example, the 
United States military has instituted an information system to provide electronic 
access to medical information and provide the ability to electronically access and 
update medical records of serving personnel.51 The system allows for integrated 
patient care which can keep pace with the patient’s progression from the medic 
located in the field, through combat support hospitals, to medical centres situated far 
away from the fighting. The handheld devices, laptops and database which 
comprise the system undoubtedly form part of the material and supplies of the 
medical units and thus are protected by the Geneva Conventions, Additional 
Protocols and customary international law.54 However, protection only remains in 
place while the system is used exclusively for the treatment of the wounded or sick 
and for the prevention of disease.55 Care must be taken therefore that the medical
51 For a description of the system and its component applications see Sandra Basu, 'Military 
Electronic Medical Records Support Quality Treatment Abroad', US Medicine (Washington, D.C.), 
February 2006, <http://www.usmedicine.com/article.cfm7articlen> 11249&issueID=84> (last 
accessed 7 December 2006).
52 Field medics are given hand held devices to capture medical data about a casualty in-theatre. The 
device is then connected to a laptop where it uploads the information to a centralised database. The 
database can be accessed by treatment facilities anywhere in the world, allowing doctors to see 
exactly what treatment has been provided and what still needs to be done. Ibid.
53 Art. 19, Geneva Convention I requires respect and protection for fixed establishments and mobile 
medical units. Art. 33 provides specific protections for the material and stores of the units, which 
must remain available to the medical personnel to enable them to perform their functions; they may 
not be intentionally destroyed.
54 Art. 12, Additional Protocol I; Art. 11, Additional Protocol II.
55 Art. 21, Geneva Convention I states: “The protection to which fixed establishments and mobile 
medical units of the Medical Service are entitled shall not cease unless they are used to commit, 
outside their humanitarian duties, acts harmful to the enemy. Protection may, however, cease only 
after a due warning has been given, naming, in all appropriate cases, a reasonable time limit and after
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database and the associated information systems are not used for any other purpose. 
For example, in addition to the standard access to medical records for treatment, 
commanders also use the system for medical situational awareness (for instance, to 
access information on incidents of illness in order to assess the need for 
vaccinations) a use which is covered by the disease prevention arm of the 
protections. However, the same broad spectrum use of the database for other 
purposes would not be covered by the Conventions. Using the database to research 
the effects of new weapons systems for example, a standard part of weapons 
development research,56 would risk discontinuance of protection of the systems and 
expose the database to targeting by computer network attack.
In addition, paragraph two of Article 19 of Geneva Convention I contains an 
obligation on parties to ensure that medical units are, as far as possible, situated 
away from military objectives. Bearing in mind that military networks have become 
targets for computer network attack, medical databases and associated information 
systems will need to be isolated from systems which are now considered legitimate 
targets. Marking such systems as medical systems and informing the opposing side 
of their existence would also be required.57 The problem of adapting identification 
techniques to modem methods of warfare is not new. The problem was previously 
struck at the time of drafting the Additional Protocols in respect of medical aircraft. 
Methods of electronic marking of aircraft were discussed and a secondary radar 
system of transponders (to automatically transmit an allocated identification code) 
was adopted.58 This system appears easily adaptable to the computer environment. 
The communications standard over the Internet revolves around the TCP/IP protocol. 
Under this system every packet communicated over the Internet contains data about
such warning has remained unheeded.” Art. 34, Geneva Convention II relating to hospital ships has 
similar wording, as does Art. 19, Geneva Convention IV relating to civilian hospitals.
56 Data on the effects of new weapons are used as part of the so-called Solferino cycle, a development 
cycle which includes providing the observation and documentation of the effects of weapons both to 
weapons designers and to international humanitarian lawyers. See generally Robin M Coupland, 'The 
Effects of Weapons and the Solferino Cycle: Where Disciplines Meet to Prevent or Limit the Damage 
Caused by Weapons' (1999) 319(7214) BMJ 864
<http://www.bmj.com/cgi/content/full/319/7214/864> (last accessed 14 December 2006).
57 Art. 39 Geneva Convention I requires the emblem to be displayed on all equipment employed in the 
medical service.
58 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, paras 4203-4205.
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the originating network and destination network, as well as multiple layers of 
information about the data itself.59 Incorporating information regarding the medical 
nature of the data would not be difficult. Another alternative discussed in Chapter 5 
supra is the designation of certain IP addresses as military networks, although as 
discussed, this proposal is not without difficulty as it marks a network for targeting.60 
The idea may translate more easily for networks that are specifically protected such 
as medical networks. It would however, depend on the network having a fixed IP 
address, a situation which may not prove technologically practical in modern-day 
field operations.
4.2. Hospital Ships
Article 34(2) of Geneva Convention II states that hospital ships may not possess or 
use secret codes for their wireless or other means of communication. Dinstein points 
out that this injunction against secret codes (forcing hospital ships to send and 
especially receive all messages in the clear) has severe practical problems.61 As J 
Ashley Roach notes, technology has changed since 1949; all messages to and from 
warships, including unclassified messages, are now automatically encrypted when 
sent and decrypted when received by communications equipment that includes the 
cryptographic function. This is also true for all network communications with naval 
craft and thus leaves hospital ships with the unattractive alternatives of being 
precluded from reports of movements of the fleet (and particularly advance notice of
/ - l
military operations likely to require their services), or being in breach of their 
obligations under the second Geneva Convention. The San Remo Manual now 
moves in the direction of allowing hospital ships to use cryptographic equipment 
while prohibiting the transmission of intelligence data.64 Without such encryption the
59 For further explanation see the entry for ‘TCP/IP’ and ‘Communication Protocol’ in the techweb 
encyclopedia.; J. Ashley Roach, 'The Law of Naval Warfare at the Turn of Two Centuries' (2000) 94 
AJIL 64.
60 See Chapter 5, section 1.1 supra.
61 Dinstein, Conduct o f Hostilities, 171.
62 Roach, 'The Law of Naval Warfare at the Turn o f Two Centuries', 75.
63 Louise Doswald-Beck, 'Vessels, Aircraft and Persons Entitled to Protection During Armed 
Conflicts at Sea' (1994) 65 BYBIL 211,251; Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 171.
64 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 171.
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hospital ships would prove a dangerous backdoor into military networks, allowing an 
attacker to gain access to other networks to which the ship is connected.
5. Non-defended Localities & Demilitarised Zones
Article 59 of Additional Protocol I prohibits parties to a conflict from attacking any 
non-defended locality by any means whatsoever. Article 60 prohibits the extension 
of military operations to zones which have been agreed between the parties as 
demilitarised zones. While these provisions are undoubtedly broad enough to apply 
to computer network attacks against physical areas, the characterization of non- 
defended localities or demilitarised zones raises an interesting issue in the computer 
age. Can a computer system or network ever be considered in itself a non-defended 
locality or be designated a demilitarized zone?
Non-defended Localities
Article 59 codifies and confirms customary international law and reiterates almost 
entirely Article 25 of the Hague Regulations.65 Article 59 defines the concept of a 
non-defended location as an “inhabited place” near or in a zone where armed forces 
are in contact and which is open for occupation. Likewise the Hague Regulations 
refer to “towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings”, all places of human occupation, 
which cannot easily be equated with computer systems. Traditional customary 
international law refers to open towns and undefended areas,66 and may provide 
more scope for translation to a computer network. However, given the ambiguous 
nature of the characterisation, the parties would be wise to agree between themselves 
that a particular computer system or network constituted such a locality and what 
existing network protections may remain in place without compromising its 
designation as non-defended. The customary law prohibition of attacks against non-
( s idefended localities is also applicable in non-international armed conflicts.
65 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2263.; Art. 25, Hague Regulations states “The attack or 
bombardment, by whatever means, of towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings which are undefended 
is prohibited”.
66 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 124.
67 For example, Art. 3, Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
provides for prosecution of the violations of the laws and customs of war including “attack, or 
bombardment, by whatever means, of undefended towns, villages, dwellings, or buildings”.
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Demilitarized Zones
Of greater interest in computer-age conflict is the parties’ ability to agree to grant 
particular zones the status of demilitarised zones. The subject of the agreement can 
be any zone expressly agreed by the parties, although the Commentary to the 
Additional Protocols states that the essential character of the zones is humanitarian 
and not political -  they are specially intended to protect the population living there 
against attacks.69 While the concept was designed for physical locations, there is no 
reason why the parties could not agree to designate a particular network or system as 
a demilitarised zone.70 Once designated as a demilitarised zone, Article 60(1) of 
Additional Protocol I prohibits parties to the conflict from “extending] their military 
operations to zones on which they have conferred by agreement the status of 
demilitarized zone, if such extension is contrary to the terms of this agreement”. This 
wording is broader than the protection provided under Article 59 relating to non- 
defended localities, discussed supra, which only prohibits attacks against the 
locality. The Commentary to the Additional Protocols states that the expression 
"military operations" should be understood as all movements and activities related to
71hostilities, carried out by armed forces. Thus all use of a particular system for any 
activity relating to hostilities would be prohibited.
68 Art. 60, Additional Protocol I.
69 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2303.
70 Art. 60(3) sets out the general outline for the terms of such an agreement, however as indicated by 
the inclusion of the term ‘normally’, it can be adapted for specific situations. Art. 60(3) provides “The 
subject of such an agreement shall normally be any zone which fulfils the following conditions: (a) all 
combatants, as well as mobile weapons and mobile military equipment, must have been evacuated; (b) 
no hostile use shall be made of fixed military installations or establishments; (c) no acts of hostility 
shall be committed by the authorities or by the population; and (d) any activity linked to the military 
effort must have ceased”.
71 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 2304.
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Chapter 8 -  Protection of Cultural Property
It may seem odd, in a thesis about the most modem of methods of warfare, to 
incorporate a chapter dealing with the protection of some of the most enduring and 
profound symbols of humanity’s accomplishments. After all, a computer network 
attack is scarcely likely to bring down the Sphinx, destroy a Rembrandt or delete the 
Great Mosque at Mecca, Further, where it is possible to cause physical damage to 
such creations, the mere fact of the use of technology to undertake the attack does 
not detract from the illegality of the action under the laws of armed conflict.
However in the modem era, more and more cultural monuments, libraries, and 
scientific collections are digitised and stored on information systems, in some cases 
becoming the only surviving record of a lost art, language or culture. Where 
digitisation takes place, these records and collections become vulnerable to the 
effects of computer network attacks, either through destruction or damage, or by 
misappropriation of cultural works.
The question also arises as to what the cultural legacy of those peoples living in 
States that have fully embraced the information age will be and how the protection of 
that cultural property or heritage will take place. Modem society has utilised the 
networking power of the Internet for almost every aspect of human cultural 
endeavour; from religion to art, science to education. Will the backbone servers of 
the Internet be protected during armed conflicts as the ‘cultural heritage of every 
people’? Will online prayer wheels and other religious networks be protected as 
places of worship?
1. The Legal Framework
The destruction and looting of cultural property has taken place in almost every 
conflict since ancient times; sometimes it occurs as an incidental result of the 
conduct of military operations, other times it is a deliberate attack on the morale and 
culture of a particular people as a show of dominance and subjugation. For a long 
time this was an accepted reality of warfare, however the idea of protecting cultural 
property during times of war began to find favour in the eighteenth century and has
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developed over time, and through the devastation of many wars.1 Cultural property is 
now protected by both specific cultural property conventions and the more general 
framework of the laws of armed conflict. In all cases, the principle of distinction 
applies and cultural property remains protected by virtue of being civilian property.
1.1. Hague Regulations and Geneva Conventions
The Hague Regulations contain the first formal treaty protection for cultural property 
during armed conflict, although the term is not so defined:2
Art. 27. In sieges and bombardments all necessary steps must be taken to spare, as 
far as possible, buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or charitable purposes, 
historic monuments, hospitals, and places where the sick and wounded are collected, 
provided they are not being used at the time for military purposes.
It is the duty of the besieged to indicate the presence of such buildings or places by 
distinctive and visible signs, which shall be notified to the enemy beforehand.
Art. 28. The pillage of a town or place, even when taken by assault, is prohibited.
Art. 56. The property of municipalities, that of institutions dedicated to religion, 
charity and education, the arts and sciences, even when State property, shall be 
treated as private property.
All seizure of, destruction or wilful damage done to institutions of this character, 
historic monuments, works of art and science, is forbidden, and should be made the 
subject of legal proceedings.
The Hague Regulations thus express an obligation to protect, although protection is 
qualified, by the inclusion of the words “as far as possible”, by the dictates of 
military necessity. Protection is accorded to buildings rather than their contents, and
1 For a more complete historical background to the development of the laws relating to the protection 
of cultural property during armed conflict than is possible here, see generally Patrick J. Boylan, 
Review o f  the Convention for the Protection o f  Cultural Property in the Event o f  Armed Conflict 
(UNESCO, 1993), 28; Jirl Toman, The Protection o f  Cultural Property in the Event o f  Armed Conflict 
(Dartmouth : UNESCO, Aldershot; Brookfield, Vt., 1996), 71; Kevin Chamberlain, War and Cultural 
Heritage: An Analysis o f  the 1954 Convention for the Protection o f  Cultural Property in the Event o f 
Armed Conflict and Its Two Protocols (Institute of Art & Law, Leicester, 2004).
2 18 October 1907, Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs o f  War on Land and Its Annex: 
Regulations Concerning the Laws and Customs o f  War on Land.
3 Chamberlain, War and Cultural Heritage, 28.
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the buildings are defined in terms of their purpose rather than their cultural 
importance.4
Although the Geneva Conventions do not specifically address the status of cultural 
property, they do provide some protection to cultural property by virtue of it being 
civilian property. Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV prohibits an occupying power 
destroying real or personal property owned by private persons, the State, public 
authorities or social or co-operative organisations. The provision is subject to the 
requirements of military necessity where “destruction is rendered absolutely 
necessary by military operations”.5
Additional Protocol I continues the protection of civilian objects, defined as all 
objects which are not military objectives, by prohibiting all attacks and reprisals 
against such objects.6 The Protocol also includes specific protections for cultural 
property. Article 53 of Additional Protocol I provides:
W ithout prejudice to the provisions o f  the Hague Convention for the Protection o f  
Cultural Property in the Event o f  Armed Conflict o f  14 M ay 1954, and o f  other 
relevant international instruments, it is prohibited:
(a) to commit any acts o f  hostility directed against the historic monuments, works 
o f  art or places o f  worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage o f  
peoples;
(b) to use such objects in support o f the m ilitary effort;
(c) to make such objects the object o f  reprisals.
Article 16 of Additional Protocol II provides almost identical wording.
Both Article 53 and Article 16 are expressed without prejudice to the 1954 Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(Cultural Property Convention), and in the case of Additional Protocol I, any other
4 Ibid.
5 Art. 53, Geneva Convention IV.
6 Art. 52, Additional Protocol I. Any doubt as to the status of objects normally dedicated to civilian 
purposes is to be resolved in favour of finding that the are civilian objects.
7 Art. 16, Additional Protocol II provides: “Without prejudice to the provisions of the Hague 
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict o f 14 May 1954, it 
is prohibited to commit any acts of hostility directed against historic monuments, works of art or 
places of worship which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples, and to use them in 
support of the military effort”.
211
relevant international instrument.8 In the event of a conflict between the provisions 
of the Additional Protocols and the Cultural Property Convention, or in cases where 
the Cultural Property Convention provides greater detail, the provisions of the 
Cultural Property Convention (or other relevant instrument) take precedence. This is 
particularly important in relation to the exception for instances of military necessity, 
as the Additional Protocols do not allow derogation in the case of imperative military 
necessity as contained in the Cultural Property Convention.9 Although the 
counterpoint to the respect due to the specified cultural objects is a prohibition 
against using such objects “in support of the military effort”, any right to such 
attacks could only be justified where the objects in question were a military objective 
under Article 52(4).10 As the commentary to the Additional Protocol points out, the 
military effort is a very broad concept, encompassing all military aspects connected 
with the conduct of the war. Attacks against historic monuments, works of art or 
places of worship may constitute a grave breach where they result in “extensive 
destruction”.11
Both Article 53 and Article 16 prohibit “acts of hostility directed against” cultural
objects. Accordingly, it is not necessary to cause damage or other deleterious effects
to the objects for this provision to be violated, it is enough merely to direct attacks 
10against them.
1.2. Cultural Property Convention 1954 and its Protocols
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict of 1954 (Cultural Property Convention) is, and remains, the primary
8 The omission of “any other relevant international instrument” from the text of Art. 16, Additional 
Protocol II reflects the fact that the Hague Conventions are not specifically applicable to non- 
international armed conflicts and the Roerich Pact applies in peace as well as war. Although this does 
exclude two UNESCO conventions, the omissions have no material consequences on protection. 
Pilloud, et al., Commentary, 1468, para 4837.
9 Rogers notes that this is suprising given the English-speaking States’ insistence on such a derogation 
in the Cultural Property Convention, but suggests that it may be covered by the principle of necessity. 
Rogers, Law on the Battlefield, 154.
10 For this to take effect the object would by its “nature, location, purpose or use make an effective 
contribution to military action and whose total or partial destruction, capture or neutralization, in the 
circumstances ruling at the time, offers a definite military advantage”
11 Art. 85(4)(d), Additional Protocol I; Pilloud, et al., Commentary, 648, para 2074.Note that to 
constitute a grave breach, an attack against cultural objects must cause “as a result extensive 
destruction thereof’.
12 Ibid., 647 para 2070, 1470 para 4845.
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1 ^convention for the protection of cultural property in times of war. Both the 
subsequent 1999 Protocol II to the Convention and the relevant sections of both 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions are drafted “without prejudice” to 
its terms.14
Drafted in reaction to the terrible damage to and systematic pillage of cultural 
property during WWII, the Convention contains obligations on States to both 
safeguard their cultural property in times of peace and respect such property in the 
event of armed conflict.15 Article 3 requires States to take measures to safeguard the 
cultural property situated in their territory against the foreseeable effects of armed 
conflict. The Convention does not specify the form which such safeguarding should 
take, it merely imposes an obligation on the Parties to take such measures as they 
consider appropriate in peacetime. Article 4(1) of the Convention balances the 
obligation of the attacking State not to make cultural property the target of an attack 
and the receiving State’s obligation not to use such property in a manner that might 
expose the property to destruction or damage:
The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect cultural property situated within 
their own territory as well as within the territory o f  other High Contracting Parties 
by refraining from any use o f  the property and its immediate surroundings or o f  the 
appliances in use for its protection for purposes which are likely to expose it to 
destruction or damage in the event o f  armed conflict; and by refraining from any act 
o f  hostility directed against such property.
The obligations may be waived only in cases “where military necessity imperatively 
requires such a waiver”.16 Paragraph three of the Article further provides:
The High Contracting Parties further undertake to prohibit, prevent and, if  
necessary, put a stop to any form o f  theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any
13 14 May 1954, Convention fo r the Protection o f Cultural Property in the Event o f Armed Conflict, 
249 UNTS 240.
14 Art. 53, Additional Protocol I; Art. 16, Additional Protocol II; Roger O'Keefe, 'The Meaning of 
'Cultural Property' under the 1954 Hague Convention' (1999) XLVI NIL Rev 26, 31.
15 Art. 2, Cultural Property Convention.
16 Art. 4(2), Cultural Property Convention. The reservation of imperative military necessity was 
debated over several meetings and discussed several options. In the end the proposal to delete the 
reference to military necessity was defeated by 22 votes to eight with eight abstentions. See Toman, 
Protection o f  Cultural Property, 72-79.
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acts o f  vandalism directed against, cultural property! They shall, refrain from 
requisitioning movable cultural property situated in the territory o f  another High 
Contracting Party.
The phrase ‘misappropriation’ was deliberately chosen instead of ‘removal of 
property’ as some property may need to be removed for its safeguarding and the
1 7word misappropriation better reflects the intention of the drafters. It should also be
noted that, unlike the obligations contained in paragraph one of the Article, the
obligation to prevent theft, pillage and misappropriation, may not be waived as a
matter of military necessity. The Article also bans any reprisals against cultural 
18property. Another point of note, particularly in relation to precautions in attack as 
we will see with computer network attacks, is the provision in Article 4(5):
N o High Contracting Party may evade the obligations incumbent upon it under the 
present Article, in respect o f  another High Contracting Party, by reason o f the fact 
that the latter has not applied the measures o f  safeguard referred to in Article 3.
Articles 8 and 9 of the Convention provide that certain property may also be granted 
special protection where it is a refuge intended to shelter movable cultural property 
or a centre containing monuments or other immovable cultural property of very great 
importance. These refuges and centres must be located an adequate distance away 
from industrial centres and other military objectives and not be used for military 
purposes, although location does not matter to the granting of special protection as 
long as the refuge is constructed so that in all likelihood it will not be damaged by 
bombs. Cultural property under special protection is designated as such by 
registering the property in the International Register of Cultural Property under 
Special Protection, from which time the property will enjoy immunity from attack 
and use for military purposes.19 Notably, immunity for cultural property under 
special protection can only be waived in situations of “exceptional cases of 
unavoidable military necessity, and only for such time as that necessity continues”.20 
A cultural centre is deemed to be used for military purposes if it is used for the
17 Ibid, 71.
18 Art. 4(4), Cultural Property Convention.
19 Arts. 8 & 9, Cultural Property Convention. *
20 Art. 11, Cultural Property Convention.
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movement, even transit, of military personnel or supplies, activities directly 
concerned with military operations, stationing of military personnel or the
*y 1
production of war material.
The Protocol for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 
(Protocol I) was adopted at the same time as the Cultural Property Convention and 
deals mainly with the protection of cultural property in occupied territory. Boylan 
and Toman both point out that the non-existence of examples of States Parties taking 
actions to bring its provisions into practical effect.22 The almost universal disregard 
for the principles of the Protocol is one of the most serious breaches of the Cultural 
Property Convention 23
The Second Protocol to the Cultural Property Convention (Protocol II) is additional 
to the Convention and does not modify its terms.24 The protocol does however 
clarify that cultural property may only be attacked on the basis of imperative military 
necessity where that property has, by its function, been made into a military 
objective and where there is no feasible alternative available; this change reflects the 
evolution of international humanitarian law with respect to military necessity which 
had occurred between the time of drafting of the Cultural Property Convention in 
1954 and the drafting of the Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions in 
1977. Likewise the exception allowing the use of cultural property in cases of 
imperative military necessity, is further elucidated by allowing the use of cultural 
property for military action “when and for as long as no choice is possible between 
such use of the cultural property and another feasible method for obtaining similar 
military advantage”.26
Protocol II also adds an additional level of ‘enhanced’ protection for property where
77it meets the following three conditions:
a. it is cultural heritage o f the greatest importance for humanity;
21 Art. 8(3), Cultural Property Convention.
22 Boylan, Review, 101; Toman, Protection o f Cultural Property, 349.
23 Boylan, Review, 101; Toman, Protection o f  Cultural Property, 349.
24 Second Protocol to the Hague Convention o f1954for the Protection o f  Cultural Property in the 
Event o f  Armed Conflict, 26 March 1999, UNESCO Doc. HC/1999/7.
25 Art. 6, Second Cultural Property Protocol; Jean-Marie Henckaerts, New Rules for the Protection of 
Cultural Property in Armed Conflict' (1999) 835IRRC 593, 601.
26 Art. 6(b), Second Cultural Property Protocol.
27 Art. 10, Second Cultural Property Protocol.
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b. it is protected by adequate domestic legal and adm inistrative measures 
recognising its exceptional cultural and historic value and ensuring the highest 
level o f  protection;
c. it is not used for military purposes or to shield m ilitary sites and a declaration 
has been made by the Party which has control over the cultural property, 
confirming that it will not be so used.
Interestingly, enhanced protection status does not provide cultural property with any
additional protection from attack; the enhanced status refers to the difference in the
obligations of the holder of the cultural property. In the case of general protection,
the holder of the property has the right, if need be, to convert the property into a
military objective by using it for military action; property under enhanced protection
may never be so used. Doing so would amount to a serious violation of the Protocol
and render the offender liable to criminal sanction as a war criminal.
The Protocol also attaches individual criminal responsibility for the following
offences against cultural property protected under the Convention: attacking;
extensive destruction or appropriation; theft, pillage or misappropriation; and acts of
vandalism.30 The Protocol also provides for specific sanctions for serious violations
of cultural property, and requires States to take necessary measures to establish
11
jurisdiction over, and criminalise the offences. It should also be noted that Protocol 
II applies equally to international and non-international armed conflicts.
1.3. Definition of Cultural Property
Defining just what constitutes protected cultural property is a complex task. Many of 
the treaty regimes covering the protection of cultural property in the event of armed 
conflict use different definitions, so that some objects which are protected under one 
regime may not be granted protection under others.
28 Henckaerts, TSfew Rules', 610.
29 Ibid.
30 Art. 15, Cultural Property Protocol. Note that the offence of theft, pillaging and misappropriation is 
against property protected by the Convention only, rather than “the Convention and this Protocol”, 
unlike the other general offences.
31 Arts. 15(2) and 16, Cultural Property Protocol.
32 Arts. 3 & 22, Second Cultural Property Protocol. The application of the Protocol to all parties to a 
non-intemational armed conflict, whether governmental or insurgent, was clearly acknowledged at the 
final plenary session. Henckaerts, 'New Rules', 617.
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As noted previously, the Hague Regulations do not use the term ‘cultural property’ 
but extend their protections to “buildings dedicated to religion, art, science, or 
charitable purposes and historic monuments” provided that they are not being used at 
the time for military purposes.33 Further property belonging to municipalities and 
that of institutions dedicated to religion, charity and education, the arts and sciences 
are protected, as are historic monuments and works of art and science.34 It is widely 
accepted that the Hague Regulations, and therefore its classification of cultural 
property for the purposes of the convention, has the force of customary international 
law.35
The 1954 Cultural Property Convention defines cultural property (irrespective of 
origin or ownership) as “movable or immovable property of great importance to the 
cultural heritage of every people”.36 The definition includes “monuments of 
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular; archaeological sites; groups 
of buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works of art; 
manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest; 
as well as scientific collections and important collections of books or archives or of 
reproductions of the property defined above”. The definition also includes “buildings 
whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or exhibit the movable cultural 
property” defined above,37 and “centres containing a large amount of cultural 
property”.38
The Protocols to the Cultural Property Convention and the two Additional Protocols 
to the Geneva Conventions all refer to the definition in the Cultural Property 
Convention.
33 Art. 27, Hague Regulations.
34 Art. 56, Hague Regulations.
35 Note that the definition does not extend to archives and it has been concluded that the occupying 
power had the right to seize archives and military plans. Toman, Protection o f Cultural Property, 47.
36 Art. 1(a), Cultural Property Convention.
37 Such as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges intended to shelter 
cultural property in the event of armed conflict. Art. 1(b) Cultural Property Convention.
38 Art. 1(c), Cultural Property Convention.
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2. The Digital Millennium and Protection o f Cultural Property
Cultural property may be covered by two types of protection, the general protection 
provided to civilian objects and specific cultural property protections. Any cultural 
property covered by those protections will be protected from computer network 
attacks as it would be from any other attack. However the evolution of societies into 
the digital age has created a new genus of property, namely digital cultural property; 
some of which will constitute ‘property of great importance to the cultural heritage 
of all peoples’. UNESCO adopted the Charter on the Preservation of the Digital 
Heritage in 2003, recognising that the digital heritage consists of resources which 
have “lasting value and significance, and therefore constitute a heritage that should
TQbe protected and preserved for the current and future generations”. The Charter 
does not refer to the protection of the digital heritage in armed conflict, however it 
sets out measures for protection and preservation of digital heritage and emphasises 
the threat of loss and need for action in protecting it.40 It should be noted that cultural 
heritage is a broader concept than cultural property,41 and any digital property for 
which protection is claimed would need to meet the definition of cultural property 
set out above. Like traditional forms of cultural property, most digital cultural 
property will be covered by the protections afforded to civilian property; some 
however will also be covered by the provisions of the Cultural Property Convention 
and other cultural property instruments. Two main types of digital cultural property 
may be at risk from computer network attacks; works which are digital reproductions 
of pre-existing cultural property and those which are ‘bom-digital’ and exist only in 
digital form 42
39 Art. 1, Charter on the Preservation of the Digital Heritage, Adopted at the 32nd session of the 
General Conference Paris, France, 17 October 2003.
40 Arts. 3-9, Charter on the Preservation of the Digital Heritage.
41 See generally, Manlio Frigo, 'Cultural Property v. Cultural Heritage: A "Battle of Concepts" in 
International Law?' (2004) 86(854) IRRC 367.The Cultural Property Convention notes “damage to 
cultural property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage o f all 
mankind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.” Thus cultural property 
is a subset of cultural heritage,
42 Jean-Michel Rodes, Genevidve Piejut and Emmanu^le Plas, Memory o f the Information Society 
(UNESCO, Paris, 2003), 39.
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2.1. The Digitisation of Cultural Property
A significant part of the current digital heritage consists of the products of digital 
reproduction of pre-existing works.43 Where the original works represent cultural 
property covered by the conventions above, their digital counterparts are to be 
considered reproductions and will be covered by the Cultural Property Convention 
where they are held in important collections. In discussions regarding the protected 
status of reproductions of cultural property at the conference which adopted the 
Convention, the French and Swiss delegates point out that reproductions become of 
even more importance where the original is destroyed 44 However not all 
reproductions are intended to be protected by the Conventions; no-one would 
suggest that the millions of souvenir copies of Michelangelo’s David sold in 
Florence each year are protected under the Convention despite the undoubted 
protected status of the original. An additional problem is that not all digital 
reproductions reproduced for the purpose of conservation form part of collections, 
but are nonetheless important reproductions of protected and highly fragile cultural 
objects. A number of examples of objects reproduced for particular projects will 
illustrate the problem.
Monuments
In 1995 the Getty Conservation Unit sponsored a virtual reality reconstruction of the 
tomb of Queen Nefertari in an effort to prevent further deterioration to the original 
tomb. Now, anyone with a ten-thousand dollar Silicon Graphics computer can “walk 
through” her final resting place miles away from the Theban necropolis in Luxor 45 
Likewise, the Great Sphinx at Giza has been digitally recreated in its original form,
43 Ibid., 37.
44 Intergovernmental Conference on the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed 
Conflict, Records o f  the Conference Convened by the United Nations Educational, Scientific and 
Cultural Organisation and Held at the Hague from 21 April to 14 May 1954 (Government of the 
Netherlands, The Hague Staatsdrukkerij en Uitgeverijbedrijf, 1961). paras 214-215, cited in Toman, 
Protection o f  Cultural Property, 134.
45 The reconstruction was made for the exhibition "Nefertari, Light o f Egypt" organized by the Getty 
Conservation Institute and Fondazione Memmo. The tomb was discovered in 1904 and closed in the 
1950s to avoid further degradation of the frescoes. Restored between 1986 & 1992, the Tomb was re­
opened in 1995 with strict controls on visitor access. The authority is still try to find a way to permit 
visitors inside the tomb without damaging it; virtual reality gives the visitor this opportunity. See 
http://www.infobyte.it/vartcollection/contenuto_uk.htm#; Alexander Stille, The Future o f  the Past: 
How the Information Age Threatens to Destroy Our Cultural Heritage (Picador, Oxford, 2002), 3.
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nose, royal beard and headdress intact, by computer generation from careful 
scientific measurements;46 scientists are studying erosion patterns on the monument 
to help study and restore the giant edifice. As some of the great monuments of the 
world are being gradually destroyed, both through the natural process of erosion and 
the increased effects of human intervention,47 the digital versions are becoming more 
and more important to researchers and the public alike. However because of the 
nature and scope of the projects involved, and the sheer scale of the projects, it is 
unlikely that any institution will have more than a few such projects at a time. 
Thought will need to be given to the status of these projects and their inclusion as 
part of a collection.48
Digitised libraries & museums
The number of digitisation projects at the world's libraries and museums has 
exploded over the past 10 years. Museums are intensely engaged in the creation of 
digital reproductions from the museums’ collections, which are then archived, 
reproduced and disseminated either through digital media (such as CDs) or via other 
communication technology such as the Internet.49 In fact, the number of visitors to 
New York’s Metropolitan Art Museum collections is now higher over the Internet 
than in person.50 Many art museums also have websites with virtual exhibition space 
in which they display their collections.51 Collections of digital reproductions of
46 Coupled with the data from a fully automated, solar powered monitoring station placed behind the 
Sphinx, the reconstruction relies on the data and images collected by Dr Mark Lehner of the Sphinx 
Mapping Project (http://www.aeraweb.org/sphinx_home.asp), a project designed to survey and record 
the Sphinx using photogrammetric cameras. Ibid.
47 The monuments are gradually being damaged both through pollution and accelerated salt 
crystallisation from increasing numbers of people accessing the sites.
48 The Getty Conservation Unit, forms part of the Getty Institute which possesses a collection of art 
works in its own right, however the example illustrates the point that Institutes involved in digital 
reproductions may not have a collection per se, let alone an 'important collection1 for the purposes of 
the Cultural Property Convention. The reconstruction of Nefertiti’s tomb forms part of the collection 
by Infobyte, along with reconstructions of the Colosseum in Rome, the Basilica of Assisi and other 
important cultural property. See http://www.infobyte.it/vartcollection/contenuto_uk.htm#.
49 Guy Pessach, Digital Art Museums - Legal Perspectives, (2006)
<http://islandia.law.yale.edu/isp/writing%20paper/digital_art.htm> (last accessed 9 June 2006).
50 Carol Vogel, '3 out of 4 Visitors to the Met Never Make It to the Front Door', New York Times 29 
March 2006, Section G 18
<www.nytimes.com/2006/03/29/arts/artsspecial/29web.html?pagewanted=print> (last accessed 12 
August 2006).
51 Pessach, Digital Art Museums - Legal Perspectives.
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major artistic works, architecture and artefacts are also collected and presented for 
educational use in digital collections such as ARTstor.
Major depository libraries such as the British Library, U.S. Library of Congress and 
the Vatican Library are all undergoing extensive digitisation projects in order to 
conserve their collections and increase access to some of their most important and 
fragile works. A study commissioned by the British Library and conducted by 
Electronic Publishing Services found that by 2020, ninety percent of all research 
materials in the United Kingdom will be available digitally; half will be available in 
both print and digital format and forty percent will be digital only.53
Databases, lost languages & other intangible property
Records of languages which have been subsequently lost or are in the process of 
extinction also exist in digital format transferred from tape onto digital media as part 
of preservation efforts. In many cases these are the only surviving records of a 
language or even an entire culture. As more societies feel the effects of globalisation 
increasing numbers of languages will be lost.54 UNESCO has stated that these 
languages form part of the intangible cultural heritage of humanity.55 Other projects 
designed to record and preserve intangible cultural property such as the traditional 
ecological knowledge prior art database (TEK*PAD) have been created with the 
dual purpose of preventing Western pharmaceutical and other companies from taking 
patents over traditional preparations and preventing traditional uses of these 
remedies, as well as forming a world repository of traditional knowledge.56 Although
52 http://www.artstor.org/info/
53 Sylvia Carr, 'British Library Prepping for Digital Future' (2005) Siliconcom 30 June 2005 
<http://networks.silicon.eom/webwatch/0,39024667,39131513,OO.htm> (last accessed 9 June 2006).
54 There are roughly 6,000 languages in the world, yet 95% of the population speaks just 15 of them. 
Economic imperialism has gone hand-in-glove with linguistic imperialism, as people abandon their 
mother tongues in favour of the globally dominant English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Chinese and 
Russian. As a result, hundreds of languages have disappeared in the past 50 years, and experts predict 
there will be fewer than 3,000 languages left by the turn of the next century. John Crace, 'Silence 
Falls: Documenting the Extinction of Languages', The Guardian (London), 5 November 2002, 
Education <http://education.guardian.co.uk/egweekly/story/0„825613,00.html> (last accessed 28 June 
2006).
55 Convention for the Safeguarding o f  the Intangible Cultural Heritage, 17 October 2003, UNESCO 
General Conference UNESCO MISC/2003/CLT/CH/14.
56 TEK*PAD is a database of publicly available information concerning indigenous knowledge and 
plant species’ uses intended to assist in research into prior art in the patent process and also to act as a
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as noted above, care must be taken not to confuse the term cultural heritage with
C7 .
cultural property protected under the Cultural Property Convention, archives of 
these materials are nevertheless archives which would be protected under the 
Convention.
2.2. ‘Born Digital9 - The Cultural Property of the Digital Age.
A second question which arises is what will constitute the cultural property of digital 
societies. Works which exist only in digital form are generally referred to as ‘bom 
digital’. These works result from an all digital process of initial production, the work 
being digitally encoded at the moment of its creation -  for example a collection of 
digital photographs of planet earth.58 Bom digital works include art works completed 
and shown in digital format,59 documents and archives stored only in electronic 
format, digital recordings, etc. It incorporates those digital works associated with a 
physical medium on which the file is recorded and stored, and also those works 
whose constituent parts are stored on physical media but where the work in question 
only reconstitutes itself in the digital environment.60 Art museums are now 
exhibiting new digital art works by artists who specialise in the digitized virtual 
medium,61 and many film makers now shoot only in digital mediums.
2.3. Attacks on, and Damage to, Digital Works
International humanitarian law prohibits attacks on, and damage to, cultural property 
except in cases of imperative military necessity. This prohibition will apply despite 
translation to a digital environment. However, while digital works may still 
constitute cultural property, the digital environment operates in a different way to the 
physical one. The degree and necessary consequences of the attacks required to
resource for anyone researching traditional ecological knowledge, including scientists, health 
professionals: http://ip.aaas.org/tekindex.nsf (last accessed 26 June 2006).
57 See generally Frigo, 'Cultural Property v. Cultural Heritage: A "Battle of Concepts" in International 
Law?'
58 Rodes, Piejut and Plas, Memory o f  the Information Society, 39.
59 See for example the works o f artists submitted for the UNESCO digital art awards 
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/ev.php-URL_ID=29021 &URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201 .html
60 Rodes, Piejut and Plas, Memory o f the Information Society, 39.
61 Pessach, Digital Art Museums - Legal Perspectives.
62 Art. 51, Hague Regulations; Art. 51, Additional Protocol I; Art. 4, Cultural Property Convention.
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constitute an infringement may need reanalysis. The integrity of digital records is 
more fragile than that of their physical counterparts thus making the risk, and 
consequences, higher. The digital environment provides a forum in which records 
can be restored to their original form from backups without any trace that the record 
was ever changed. While this is one of the great strengths of digital media, it also 
represents one of its greatest threats; it means that records may also be changed 
unnoticed without leaving a trace of their amendments, leaving open the possibility
fkXof an Orwellian rewriting of history. The defacement of websites has occurred on 
an increasing scale during diplomatic incidents over the past decade. While such 
actions would not be sufficient to constitute an attack, could drawing a moustache on 
a digital copy of the Mona Lisa be sufficient to breach the cultural property 
conventions? Will altering the work constitute damage -  is it still an offence when 
digital property is not harmed permanently but can easily be restored to the original 
standard using backups? As seen in Chapter 6 supra, it is no defence to argue that
Ni
the work or site in question was not protected.
The wording contained in the relevant conventions is fairly broad. Article 56 of the 
Hague Regulations provides that property belonging to institutions dedicated to 
religion, charity and education, and the arts and sciences are protected as private 
property and further “seizure of, destruction or wilful damage” to these institutions, 
historic monuments, works of art and science is forbidden.64 The protection is part of 
customary international law, and presumably extends to the digital assets of those 
institutions and to digital monuments, works of art and science as well as any 
tangible works.
Article 4(1) of the Cultural Property Convention and both Article 53 of Additional 
Protocol I and Article 16 of Additional Protocol II, require State Parties to the 
Conventions to refrain from “any act of hostility” directed against cultural property. 
The obligation under the Cultural Property Convention may be waived only when 
military necessity imperatively requires such a waiver.65 The broad language
63 George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984 describes a department of a government ministry (the 
Ministry of Truth) which is responsible for rewriting segments o f history (for example newspaper 
reports) which no longer fit with official policy. The slogan of the regime being “Who controls the 
past controls the future; who controls the present controls the past”.
64 Art. 56, Hague Regulations.
65 Art. 4(2), Cultural Property Convention. It should also be noted that the territoriality principle was 
specifically removed from the article in order to affirm that cultural property is to be respected
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contained in the Additional Protocols was discussed in the ICRC commentary on the 
Additional Protocols and confirmed by the Trial Chamber in Jokic which held that, 
according to the Additional Protocols, it is prohibited to direct attacks against 
“historic monuments, works of art or places of worship which constitute the cultural 
or spiritual heritage of peoples” whether or not the attacks result in actual damage.66 
However, the Appeals Chamber in Kordic & Cerzec subsequently held that, while 
recognising that attacks in violation of Articles 51 and 52 of Additional Protocol I
cm
are clearly unlawful even without causing serious harm, the broad wording used in 
the above articles has been tempered by attaching individual criminal liability only to
/TO
those acts which result in damage or destruction of the property.
“ ...deliberate attacks on civilian objects such as historic monuments, works o f  art 
and places o f  worship are considered to be grave breaches o f the Additional Protocol 
only insofar as the attack results in extensive destruction.”
It would appear that while attacks on digital works would constitute a breach of the 
Convention and/or Protocols, they would not rise to the level of grave breaches (and 
thus incur individual criminal liability) without resulting in substantial damage. 
However, one of the defining aspects of digital works is that a copy, for example a 
backup copy, is identical to the original, meaning that in many instances a digital 
work may be restored completely with no lasting damage. It remains to be seen 
whether damage to a digital work must be irreparable, but it would seem in line with 
the reasoning of the Appeals chamber in Kordic & Cerzec that it would not 
constitute a grave breach to damage a digital work which can be completely and
wherever it is situated. The amendment was tabled by Belgium, France, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland “Our amendment has been designed to break with the territorial concept and to affirm the 
principle that cultural property, wherever situated, must be respected by all States. It is important to 
break away from the notion of frontiers as, in time of war, military vicissitudes may lead to a State’s 
overflowing its frontiers” Records, 136, para 247, cited in Toman, Protection o f Cultural Property,
69.
66 ICRC Commentary to Additional Protocol I, para 2067,2069-72; Prosecutor v Miodrag Jokic 
(Sentencing Judgement) (2004) Case No IT-01-42/1-S, International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia - Trial Chamber I, §50.
67 Prosecutor v Dario Kordic and Mario Cerkez (Appeal) (2004) Case No IT-95-14/2-A, International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Appeals Chamber, §65.
68 Ibid., para 65.; Art. 85(4)(d), Additional Protocol I; Art. 3(d), Statute of the International Criminal 
Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia.
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identically restored from backup copies.69 The maintenance of such backups would
presumably fall within the measures taken by the victim State under its obligation to
safeguard cultural works.70 Whether or not those measures had been taken by the
victim State would have to fall within the foreseeable harm analysis of the attacking
State. Recent domestic criminal hacking cases have attempted to raise the lack of
security on compromised systems in mitigation of the expected severity of the 
* 1
sentence. However such a defence would have the opposite effect in the case of 
cultural property. Article 85 of Additional Protocol I makes it a grave breach of the 
Protocol to make a non-defended locality the object of an attack.
2.4. Theft, Pillage or Misappropriation of Digital Works
The Cultural Property Convention 1954 and its later protocol contain absolute 
prohibitions against “any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation” of cultural
77property; the prohibition may not be derogated from through military necessity. 
Further, the Hague Regulations make all property belonging to cultural institutions 
private property and forbids the seizure of any such institution, historic monument or 
work of art or science; pillage is prohibited absolutely.73
As discussed in Chapter 9 infra regarding pillage generally, the intangible nature of 
digital works will not create an issue for international law; courts and tribunals have 
had no problem in finding pillage involving intangible property such as shares and 
property rights.74 Thus where a State has digital reproductions of cultural property or 
bom-digital works which constitute cultural property, those works would also be 
subject to the prohibition against theft, pillage and misappropriation.
69 Ibid.
70 Art. 3, Cultural Property Convention.
71 'UK Hacker 'Should Be Extradicted", BBC News (London), 10 May 2006, Technology 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/technology/4757375.stm> (last accessed 6 July 2006).
72 Art. 4(3), Cultural Property Convention; Art. 15, Second Cultural Propery Protocol.
73 Arts. 47 & 56, Hague Regulations.
74 See for example, tria l o f Carl Krauch and Twenty-Two Others (I.G. Farben Trial) (1948) X Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1, United States Military Tribunal, Nuremburg; Trial o f Alfied 
Felix Alwyn Krupp Von Bohlen Und Halbach and Eleven Others (the Krupp Trial) (1948) X Law 
Reports of Trials of War Criminals 69, United States Military Tribunal, Nuremburg.
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2.4.1. Unauthorised Copying of Works
Once stored in digital format, not only do works constituting cultural property 
become exposed to the risk of damage from computer network attacks as seen above, 
they may also be copied for use for the attacking State’s own purposes. As the Titan 
Rain incidents show, vast amounts of such copying can occur in minutes. One of the 
defining characteristics of digitally stored information is that any number of copies 
may be made, at negligible cost, without in any way degrading the original.75 This 
feature makes unauthorised copying of digital cultural property perhaps the most 
likely form of theft or misappropriation to affect digital works. Not only is it now 
possibile that the reproduction of Nefertiti’s tomb may be copied in its entirety to be 
reproduced and displayed in a museum somewhere else, a more mundane use may be 
made of such digital works. Take the following hypothetical example, Arcadia is at 
war with Mesopotamia and subsequently occupies a portion of the territory of 
Mesopotamia. During the occupation, an enterprising group of soldiers copy digital 
art works from Mesopotamia’s national gallery collection and place them on carpets, 
selling them in Arcadia. The art works copied are some of the most sacred and 
important cultural works of Mesopotamia’s indigenous people and the resulting 
carpets cause great offence by having the ‘enemy’ literally walk on the spiritual 
traditions of the occupied territory.
Leaving aside the issue of residual copyright in a digital reproduction as a work 
itself,77 the question must be asked whether mere copying of a digital work, original 
or reproduction, leaving the digital ‘master’ unaltered and unharmed will constitute 
theft, pillage or misappropriation. Understandably, the conference which drafted the 
Convention did not consider the meaning of the words theft, pillage and
75 In fact, one of the greatest paradoxes of digital cultural property is that preservation relies on 
multiple copies being made. Computing reverses those very propositions which seemed the most 
certain: the survival of a document is not dependant on how long the medium carrying it will last, but 
on the capacity of that document to be transferred from one medium to another as often as possible: 
Rodes, Piejut and Plas, Memory o f the Information Society, 35.
76 This example is a variant on the facts of an Australian copyright case of Milpurrurru v Indofurn Pty 
Ltd  (1994) 54 FCR 240 in which Indofurn appropriated and simplified sacred aboriginal designs and 
reproduced them on carpets manufactured in Vietnam.
77 A digital work is likely to have the protection of the relevant intellectual property act of the 
jurisdiction of origin. The unauthorised copying of the work would thus be considered a breach of 
copyright and be actionable under the domestic jurisdiction of the relevant State. However this section 
will deal only with the digital work’s relevance as cultural property for the purposes o f the laws of 
armed conflict.
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misappropriation -  all presumably deemed self explanatory. In determining 
whether illegal copying may amount to theft, pillage or misappropriation, two 
questions must be answered. First, must the owner of the property be deprived of it 
entirely, or is it sufficient that the owner’s property rights, namely the right to control 
the use made of the work, are infringed? And second, with regard to pillage, must the 
property be acquired through threats or use of violence?
The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia held in the Celebici 
case stated that “the prohibition against the unjustified appropriation of public and 
private enemy property is general in scope, and extends both to acts of looting 
committed by individual soldiers for their private gain, and to the organized seizure 
of property undertaken within the framework of a systematic economic exploitation
70of occupied territory.” The Nuremburg cases, applying the Hague Regulations, 
tended to group property crimes together under a general heading of spoliation, and 
in some case it can be very difficult to establish which crime forms the basis of the
OA
charges. However the phrase ‘other misappropriation’ contained in the Cultural 
Property Convention is a similarly broad based charge which would encompass the 
crimes set out by the military tribunals which included the offence contained in 
Article 46 of the Hague Regulations, namely respect for private property.
The Flick Trial convicted Friedrich Flick of crimes against property in a case which 
perhaps maps most closely to unauthorised copying of a digital work. Flick’s offence 
consisted of operation of a plant in occupied territory of which he was not the owner
78 The word misappropriation was added to replace the term 'removal o f property' in regard to a 
party’s obligation not to requisition property however its basic meaning was not discussed. Toman, 
Protection o f Cultural Property, 71.
79 The Prosecutor v. Zejnil Delalic et al. (Celebici) (1998) Case No. IT-96-21-T, International 
Criminal Tribunal for die Former Yugoslavia, para 590.
80 For example, it is not completely clear which offence against private property Flick is found guilty 
of. The acts in question related to the seizure and operation of the Rombach plant in occupied France; 
however the Tribunal held that none of the defendants were shown to have been “responsible for any 
act of pillage as that word is commonly understood.. .Flick’s acts and conduct contributed to a 
violation of Hague Regulation 46, that is that private property must be respected. Of this there can be 
no doubt. But his acts were not within his knowledge intended to contribute to a programme of 
‘systematic plunder’ conceived of by the Hitler regime... ”80 the analysis concludes that Flick must 
therefore have been found guilty either of an offence other than spoliation or a particular type of 
pillage.... it may be that Flick’s offence is to be regarded as an offence against property in occupied 
territories other than plunder or spoliation. The Trial o f  Friedrich Flick and Five Others (the Flick 
Trial) (1947) IX Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals 1, United States Military Tribunal, 
Nuremburg, 40.
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and without the consent of the owner.81 It is interesting to note that the Tribunal 
regarded his acts as illegal despite the fact that (a) “the original seizure may not have 
been unlawful; (b) Flick had nothing to do with the expulsion of the owner; (c) the 
property was left “in a better condition than when it was taken over”; (d) there was 
no exploitation either for Flick’s personal advantage or to fulfil the aims of 
Goering”, there being no proof that the output of the plant went to countries other
ft*?than those who benefited before the war. In a situation such as the hypothetical 
scenario above, where the property is exploited for the personal benefit of the 
perpetrators, it seems certain that a court would have no difficulty in finding that the 
work had been misappropriated. Indeed the commentary to the Krupp Case states 
that the prosecution was probably correct in claiming that violation of Article 46 of 
the Hague Convention [respect for private property] “need not reach the status of 
confiscation. Interference with any of the normal incidents of enjoyment of quiet 
occupancy and use, we submit is forbidden. Such incidents include, inter alia, the 
right to personal possession, control of the purpose for which the property is to be 
used, disposition of such property, and the right to the enjoyment of the income 
derived from the property”.83
3. Case Study: Places of Worship & Religion on the Web
Places of worship are one of the earliest forms of protected cultural property. The 
digital environment has also allowed places of worship to become established on the 
Internet in both digitised and bom digital forms. While some sites merely use the 
web as a broadcast tool, providing access to religious services over the Web and 
making information available to a global audience, other sites seek to create purely 
virtual churches,84 where web casts of services are available live,85 and prayer circles
81 Ibid.
82 Ibid. (footnotes removed)
83 The Krupp Trial, 16, fii 15.
84 See for example http://www.stpixels.com. St Pixels was, at the time of writing, in the process of 
being constructed as the successor site to Church of Fools which closed its virtual doors in May 2006 
(http://www.churchoffools.com). See also The Godweb (http://www.godweb.org/) which is the 
successor to the First Church of Cyberspace.
85 See for example http://www.hotworship.com/ (The site provides links to both live and recorded 
services).
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and Quaker meetings meet in online forums to pray together. Are these protected 
by cultural property laws? The capacity of a particular religion to use the Internet as 
sacramental space (and therefore as a place of worship which may be subject to 
protection in times of armed conflict) is, of course, dependent on the particular 
religion's conceptualisation of the Internet. Heidi Campbell has explored these 
different conceptualisations in her 2005 paper "Spiritualising the Internet". Two of 
the discourses she outlines in particular are useful as a foundation for viewing these 
sites as a protected place of worship: the first, as a spiritual network, a conduit for
o n
the sacred created by the wires and connections of the technology itself; or 
secondly as a worship space with the potential to be constructed and consecrated for
OQ
religious use by its users. The latter concept is illustrated by the examples of virtual 
churches above and is the approach adopted by most mainstream religions utilising 
this technology.90 This view sees the potentially sacred space located at a particular 
website or IP address although the entire Internet may be consecrated or blessed as 
part of the process. According to Jeff Zaleski, Buddhists were the first members of a 
major world religion to both consecrate the Internet as a sacramental space and to 
duplicate online and in full a traditional form of religious practice.91 Since then, 
other religious groups have also conducted rituals to consecrate cyberspace as holy 
space.92
86 http://worship.quaker.org/ (Online Quaker Meeting); http://www.myprayercircle.com/ (Online 
Prayer Circle); although the above examples are all based on Christian traditions of worship, other 
religions also utilise the Internet for worship, (all sites last accessed 14 July 2006)
87 Heidi Campbell, 'Spiritualising the Internet: Uncovering Discourses and Narratives of Religious 
Internet Usage' (2005) 1(1) Online - Heidelburg Journal o f  Religions on the Internet 1 
<http://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/archiv/5824> (last accessed 27 January 2007).
88 See Jennifer J. Cobb, Cybergrace: The Search fo r God in the Digital World (Crown, New York, 
1998). cited in Campbell, 'Spiritualising the Internet'. These themes have been explored by Heidi 
Campbell in discussing how the Internet is written about and used in practice for religious purposes.
89 See Margaret Wertheim, The Pearly Gates o f  Cyberspace: A History o f Space from Dante to the 
Internet (W.W. Norton, New York, 1999). cited in Campbell, 'Spiritualising the Internet'.
90 Note that not all mainstream religions are comfortable with virtual churches, requiring the physical 
presence of people to perform rituals. Further, those religions which require an intermediary between 
the individual and God (for example Roman Catholicism) struggle with the distinctly non-hierarchical 
nature o f the Internet. Jeffrey P. Zaleski, The Soul o f  Cyberspace: How New Technology Is Changing 
Our Spiritual Lives (HarperEdge, San Francisco, 1997).
91 The Buddhists interviewed by Zaleski engaged in Dharma Combat online. Dharma Combat is an 
unrehearsed dialogue in which Zen practitioners test and sharpen their understanding of Zen truths. 
Ibid., 160.
92 Campbell, 'Spiritualising the Internet', 16.
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However, in the same way that artisans have created bom digital works, other 
religious traditions have used the power of the Internet to create new forms of ritual, 
incorporating the nature of the Internet into the ritual itself. For example, in 1995 a 
group of technopagans celebrated a CyberSamhain,93 utilising the networking power 
of the web to create a sacred space online; other pagans may code their workings in 
HTML.94 Where as the mainstream religions focus the creation of sacred space 
online, the pagan traditions (and hence the technopagans) view the connection 
between members as the essential element, although each member creates their own 
personal sacred space, the spirituality of the group comes from the flow of energy 
around the circle.95 A similar view of the importance of connection and the flow of 
energy can be found in other spiritualist traditions such as Sufism, the mystical 
branch of Islam.96
So what does this online spirituality mean for the protection of these places of 
worship from computer network attack; are they entitled to special protection as 
cultural property?
The Hague Regulations state that all necessary steps must be taken to spare buildings 
dedicated to religion in sieges and bombardments 97 The term ‘buildings dedicated to 
religion’ covers buildings of all religious persuasions, both Christian and non-
Q Q
Christian, churches, places of worship, mosques, synagogues and so forth. Further, 
in relation to occupied territories, the property of institutions dedicated to religion is 
to be treated as State property, and all seizure, destruction or wilful damage done to 
institutions of this character is forbidden 99 While the websites, servers and other 
property used for conducting online worship would undoubtedly be protected in
93 Zaleski, The Soul o f  Cyberspace, 262. Technopaganism is a belief or cultural movement which 
combines an engagement with applied (esp. computer) technologies with spiritual and religious 
elements, typically derived from pre-Christian nature worship: Oxford English Dictionary; Samhain is 
the Pagan new year celebrated on 31 October.
94 Lisa McSherry, The Virtual Pagan: Exploring Wicca and Paganism through the Internet (Red 
Wheel/Weiser, 2002). Interestingly, this is not a concept which is accepted by other religions. For 
example Judaism requires the physical presence of 10 adult males to create the minyam (or quorum) 
to create the 'higher level of godliness' for worship. Zaleski, The Soul o f  Cyberspace, 18-19.
95 McSherry, The Virtual Pagan, 64.
96 Zaleski, The Soul o f  Cyberspace, 61-68.
97 Art. 27, Hague Regulations.
98 Toman, Protection o f Cultural Property, 11.
99 Art. 56, Hague Regulations. Note that this protection is absolute without any reservations on the 
grounds of military or other necessity: Ibid.
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occupied territories, the case for their general protection is harder to make. In short, 
servers are not buildings. Even by analogy, the difficulties are numerous. Where the 
place of worship sought to be protected is situated on one particular site, these sites 
are generally hosted by an ISP, on servers which host multiple sites, not merely 
religious ones. While these individual sites may qualify for protection, the server 
itself would not.
Under the theory of networked spirituality advanced by Cobb and practised by the 
technopagans, the sacred space is formed by the network created between individuals 
(and their own technology) rather than any one site. Thus the protected space would 
come into existence only when the members are online for spiritual purposes and 
would only relate to those connections which make up the circle at any one time; 
those connections change with each meeting.
While some religions have purported to consecrate the whole of cyberspace (an act 
which would presumably incorporate all connections to the Internet), as a matter of 
practicality this cannot literally be the case.100 Indeed even within religions, and 
within denominations of those religions, there is no agreement as to the validity of 
any act of consecration or of the resulting sacredness of any online religious site.101 
Under the Cultural Property Convention, places of worship are only protected where 
they amount to a monument of historic or artistic interest, or where they contain
1CY)objects of historic or artistic interest. Online religious forums do not fit
comfortably into either category. The mere fact of their consecration for religious 
purposes does not automatically provide special protection from attack. During the 
preparatory work for the conference which resulted in the Convention it was 
proposed to classify all religious buildings as cultural property, regardless of their 
artistic or historic interest. This idea was abandoned in the UNESCO draft, as there 
was no wish to broaden the framework of protection to include other elements such 
as schools and laboratories.103 Similar reasoning was also used in the drafting of the 
Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions. Although Article 53 of Additional
100 The act of consecration is to dedicate or set something (or somewhere) apart for a sacred purpose. 
Given the ubiquitous nature of the Internet it is impossible that the whole of the Internet is 
consecrated.
101 See generally Zaleski, The Soul o f Cyberspace.
102 Art. 1, Cultural Property Convention.
103 Toman, Protection o f  Cultural Property, 48.
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Protocol I refers only to places of worship (and not to buildings specifically), special 
protection is only granted to those places of worship which possess cultural or 
spiritual value independently of their consecrated status and thus constitute the 
“spiritual heritage of people”.104
“The conference rejected the idea which was put forward by some delegations o f 
including any and all places o f  worship, as such buildings are extremely numerous 
and often have only a local renown o f  sanctity which does not extend to the whole 
nation. Thus the places referred to  are those which have the quality o f  sanctity 
independently o f  their cultural value and express the conscience o f  the people.
Interestingly, it was stated that the cultural or spiritual heritage covers objects whose 
value transcends geographical boundaries, and which are unique in character and are 
intimately associated with the history and culture of a people.105 While these new 
forms of online worship certainly transcend boundaries and are a unique form of 
worship, in the decade since the first consecration of cyberspace, they have yet to 
become entrenched in the history and culture of any particular people. It would seem 
that under these provisions, places of worship on the Internet are not yet at a stage 
where they receive special protection.
104 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, 647, para 2067.
105 Ibid., para 2064.
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Chapter 9 -  Means & Methods of Warfare
While predominately viewed as a method of attack, computer network attack 
scenarios may represent both means and method of attack depending on the attack 
being executed. According to the ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocols the 
term "means of combat" or "means of warfare" generally refers to the weapons being 
used, while the expression "methods of combat" generally refers to the way in which 
such weapons are used.1 For example, a worm in and of itself is usually a method of 
attack, it is designed as a means to distribute malicious code, or alternatively to cause 
generalised damage by overwhelming the networks with packets of information 
causing massive denial of service. To take one instance, the Slammer/Sapphire worm 
contains an algorithm designed to self-replicate and randomly generate addresses in 
order to spread itself as rapidly as possible. Other forms of attack contain specific 
malicious code which is designed to cause damage to the computer, system or 
network directly. Trojans designed specifically to destroy hard drives or information 
are examples, a more indirect example is the code inserted into the Canadian pipeline 
software which resulted in the ‘Farewell Dossier’ incident, a huge explosion 
involving the Soviet Trans-Siberian gas pipeline. Such malware fits the definition of 
a weapon far more closely than merely a method of attack. The more recent attacks 
have combined malicious code with a means of propagation such as a worm to form 
blended attacks. For example the Storm worm which was discovered in the wild in 
January 2007, combines multiple components; a component to steal email addresses 
and redistribute itself, a backdoor Trojan to allow subsequent access to the 
compromised machine, a bot recruiter to incorporate the machine into the Storm 
botnet, coding to allow remote control of the compromised machine across peer-to-
1 Ibid., para 1957. Note however that the term method and means of warfare includes weapons in the 
widest sense, as well as the way in which they are used; para 1402.
2 The Slammer/Sapphire worm hit the Internet in January 2003 and to date is the fastest spreading 
worm found in the wild. It infected more than 90% of vulnerable hosts (at least 75,000 hosts) in ten 
minutes. David Moore, et al., The Spread o f the Sapphire/Slammer Worm, (2003) 
<http://www.caida.org/publications/papers/2003/sapphire/sapphire.html> (last accessed 9 November 
2007). Other viruses may have different propogation techniques.
3 See Appendix I.
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peer networks (which morphs every few minutes to avoid detection), and a denial of 
service attack tool in a rootkit payload.4
1. Law of Weaponry
Article 22 of the Hague Regulations sets out the basic principle that “the right of 
belligerents to adopt means of injuring the enemy is not unlimited”.5 This concept of 
limited warfare, repeated almost verbatim in Additional Protocol I and the 
Conventional Weapons Convention,6 constitutes the basis for the legal regulation of 
means and methods of warfare employed. As with the rest of the laws of armed 
conflict, the law of weaponry represents a balancing act between the principle 
military necessity, that is, what is required to efficiently conduct military operations, 
and what is required by humanitarian considerations; in the words of the St 
Petersburg Declaration of 1868 to fix ‘the technical limits at which the necessities of 
war ought to yield to the requirements of humanity’. The law of weaponry consists 
of general principles, such as those prohibiting indiscriminate weapons or 
unnecessary suffering, and a number of specific rules prohibiting or limiting the use
o
of certain weapons or methods of warfare. As Christopher Greenwood has 
remarked, the general principles tend to refer to the effects produced by the use of 
weapons or methods of warfare, whereas the specific provisions usually concentrate 
on the means employed.9 Although only a few of the specific provisions are relevant 
to computer network attacks, the same general principles apply regardless of the 
style of weapon employed. As demonstrated by the discussion of the legality of 
nuclear weapons by the International Court of Justice, these principles established in
4 For further details of the Storm worm see Joe Stewart, Storm Worm DDoS Attack, Secure Works 
(1997) <http://www.secureworks.com/research/threats/storm-worm> (last accessed 23 November 
2007). Thorsten Holz, et al., 'Measurements and Mitigation of Peer-to-Peer-Based Botnets: A Case 
Study on Stormworm' (Paper presented at the First USENIX Workshop on Large-Scale Exploits and 
Emergent Threats (LEET '08), San Francisco, <http://honeyblog.org/junkyard/paper/storm- 
leet08.pdf> (last accessed 31 August 2008).
5 Art. 22, Hague Regulations.
6 Art. 35(1), Additional Protocol I; Preamble, Conventional Weapons Convention.
7 Preamble, St Petersburg Declaration.
8 Greenwood, 'Law of Weaponry', 192.
9 Ibid.
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the last century are capable of being applied well into the next, even to methods of 
warfare undreamed of when those principles were being formulated.10
1.1. General Principles
Flowing from the principle of ‘limited warfare’ several sub-principles have 
developed historically, giving the rule of military necessity its specific contours.11 
Not all of these will raise specific issues for computer network attacks, however a 
number require additional consideration as to their interpretation in the modem 
battlespace. In particular, the principle regarding unnecessary suffering and the 
prohibition against indiscriminate weapons; other general principles which form part 
of the law of weaponry are examined elsewhere in the relevant sections of this thesis, 
for example those dealing with environmental protection in Chapter 7 supra, and 
perfidy in section 2 infra.
Superfluous Injury & Unnecessary Suffering
The International Court of Justice has confirmed that the prohibition of means and 
methods of warfare which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary
t
suffering is one of the cardinal principles of international humanitarian law. Article 
35(2) of Additional Protocol I represents one of the most recent statements of the
13prohibition:
It is prohibited to employ weapons, projectiles and material and methods of warfare 
of a nature to cause superfluous injury and unnecessary suffering.
It follows and clarifies similar statements in the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868 
and Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations.14 The prohibition of methods of warfare
10 Ibid., 186.
11 Oeter, 'Methods and Means of Combat', 112.
12 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 238.
13 Art. 35(2) Additional Protocol I; the language is repeated in the preamble to the Conventional 
Weapons Treaty.
14 The wording ‘of a nature to cause’ clarifies the English translations in previous incarnations of this 
provisions which used the words ‘calculated to’ and had occasionally been taken to mean the 
unnecessary suffering would have to be proved intentional. Hans Blix, 'Means and Methods of 
Combat' in UNESCO (ed) International Dimensions o f  Humanitarian Law (Martinus Nijhoff, 
Dordrecht, 1998) 135-151, 138.
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which are of a nature to cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering was first 
introduced in Additional Protocol I, however the commentaries note that this change 
of language does not alter the principle which represents customary international 
law.15 The principle is also applicable in conflicts not of an international character.16 
In its advisory opinion in the Nuclear Weapons case the Court defines unnecessary 
suffering as a ‘harm greater than that unavoidable to achieve legitimate military 
objectives”.17 Inescapably, the test is valid only for weapons designed exclusively 
for anti-personnel purposes, in as much as anti-materiel weapons may be expected to 
cause injury to personnel in the vicinity of the target that would be more severe than
152necessary to render the combatants hors de combat. In this respect, it is the use of 
computer network attacks as a method of warfare which must be assessed, as 
malicious code cannot (at the current state of technology) act directly on an 
individual, but rather on the physical and technological environment in which that 
person is situated. However, even in relation to weapons designed for other than 
anti-personnel purposes, the application of the unnecessary suffering principle 
requires a balancing of the military advantage which may result from the use of a 
weapon with the degree of injury and suffering which it is likely to cause.19 As 
computer network attacks are varied as to their use and execution, each attack will 
need to be assessed separately to ensure that the balance is maintained. Greenwood 
notes that while there is general agreement that the character and effect of anti­
materiel weapons differ from those commonly used against personnel, such weapons 
do not violate the unnecessary suffering principle, because the advantages they offer
(for example, to destroy materiel) means that the additional suffering they may cause
00cannot be classed as unnecessary.
15 See for example, Bothe, et al., New Rules, 194. Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 1417.
16 The Appeals Chamber of the ICTY has held that the weapons prohibited in international armed 
conflicts are also prohibited in internal armed conflicts, stating “what is inhumane, and consequently 
proscribed, in international wars, cannot but be inhumane and inadmissible in civil strife”: Tadic 
(Interlocutory Appeal), para 119.
17 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 238.
18 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 196; Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 60. Although the deliberate 
employment of an anti-materiel weapon against people, might also fall foul of this principle.
19 Greenwood, 'Law of Weaponry', 195. Although the use of an anti-materiel weapon, employed 
deliberately against people might also fall foul of this principle.
20 Ibid., 196. In this respect, Greenwood notes the use of inflammable bullets which came to be 
accepted as lawful against aircraft, despite the effect that they may have on an aircrew, but remain 
unlawful in a simple anti-personnel role: 225, fii 61.
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As it is unlawful to use a weapon which causes more suffering or injury than another
which offers the same or similar military advantage, the classification necessarily
1involves a comparison between different weapons systems. This is perhaps one of 
the most interesting aspects of law of weaponry in relation to computer network 
attacks, namely the effect that access to these techniques will have on the legality of 
the parties’ choice of other weapons. One of the advantages of computer network 
attack is that it allows neutralisation and destruction of targets with fewer casualties 
and less physical destruction, and in many cases more accuracy, than conventional 
weapons. For example, there is no need to bomb an electrical grid if you can simply 
turn it off for the desired period of time. This ability may have the effect of making 
other, more conventional methods of warfare, illegal as the damage caused by those 
methods becomes subsequently ‘unnecessary’. However as Greenwood points out, it 
is not enough simply to compare the immediate effects of the two weapons (or 
methods of warfare); the availability (including the expense) of both types of 
weapon, the logistics of supplying the weapon and its ammunition at the place where 
it is to be used, the security of the troops which employ it are all additional factors to 
be taken into account. While these would tend to resolve in favour of using computer 
network attack methods, there are also factors which may advocate against using 
such techniques in a given situation. As discussed in Chapter 6 supra, given that 
some computer network attack methods can only be used once before effective 
counter-measures are put in place, the likely future need for such an attack will also 
be a factor to be considered by commanders, as would the difficulty in ascertaining 
knock-on effects of a particular attack.
Indiscriminate weapons
The International Court of Justice in its advisory opinion on the Threat or Use o f 
Nuclear Weapons held the principle of discrimination as a cardinal principle of 
international humanitarian law and held that States “must consequently never use 
weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets”. 
Although the principle prohibiting the use of weapons which are inherently
21 Blix, 'Means and Methods of Combat', 138-139.
22 Greenwood, 'Law of Weaponry', 198.
23 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 78.
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indiscriminate or the indiscriminate use of any weapon falls mainly in the area of 
targeting and is discussed in Chapter 6 supra, it also has an effect on the law of 
weaponry.24 Although many computer network attacks are targeted very specifically 
against the particular system or network to be attacked, the effects of an attack and 
the methods by which it is spread may be indiscriminate (for example, most 
computer viruses currently in the wild are coded to spread in precisely this 
manner).25 Computer network attacks that cannot distinguish between civilian and 
military networks and systems are inherently indiscriminate, therefore where they 
cause physical injury or destruction, their use in armed conflict is unlawful. Further, 
malicious code or network attacks which are capable of being utilised in a 
discriminating manner but are delivered in an indiscriminate way are also prohibited. 
As with the principle of unnecessary suffering, where the same military advantages 
can be achieved in different ways, one of which involves likely civilian casualties 
whereas the other does not, then the choice of the first route will entail a violation of 
the principle.26 This means that computer network attacks may in many cases result 
in the prohibition of other methods of attack.
As Christopher Greenwood points out the 1991 Gulf Conflict illustrates that the 
proportionality test, at least at the strategic level, requires that less immediate 
damage such as that inflicted on the Iraqi population by the destruction of the power
77generating system and other infrastructure, must be taken into account. Such 
knock-on effects must be taken into effect in the targeting calculations by 
commanders.
Martens Clause
The Martens Clause was first included in the preambular provisions of the Hague 
Convention of 1899 and a modem formulation is expressed in Article 1 (2) of 
Additional Protocol I:
24 Greenwood, 'Law of Weaponry', 200.
25 For example the Storm worm is hard-coded with a sample set of addresses and a random dialling 
algorithim which enables it to spread from computer to computer.
26 Greenwood, 'Law of Weaponry', 201.
27 Ibid., 202.
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In cases not covered by this Protocol or by other international agreements, civilians 
and combatants remain under the protection and authority of the principles of 
international law derived from established custom, from the principles of humanity 
and from the dictates of public conscience.
As the Court in the Nuclear Weapons case noted, the clause has proved to be an
n o
effective means of addressing the rapid evolution of military technology. Thus 
although there is currently no rule or agreement in international humanitarian law 
which expressly bans or restricts the use of computer network attacks, where a 
particular type of computer network attack per se would have results which violate 
the principles of humanity or dictates of public consciousness, it would contravene
nn
the Martens Clause. As Greenwood notes, one effect of the Clause is that the 
absence of a specific treaty provision does not mean that a weapon must be lawful; 
the Clause makes clear that the general principles embodied in customary law still 
apply and that the use of a weapon contrary to those principles will be unlawful.
1.2. Explicit prohibitions of weapons.
The International Court of Justice in the Nuclear Weapons case stated that the 
illegality of certain weapons is formulated in terms of prohibition rather than absence 
of authorisation. As noted above, there is currently no rule or agreement in 
international humanitarian law which explicitly bans or restricts the use of computer 
network attacks. However because computer network attacks can cause a 
multiplicity of effects, some attack techniques may fall within the definitions of 
other weapons conventions which may restrict or ban their use. Care must be taken, 
however, not to misunderstand the underlying principles behind the prohibitions of
28 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 78.
29 See generally, Isabelle Daoust, Robin Coupland and Rikke Ishoey, 'New Wars, New Weapons? The 
Obligation o f States to Assess the Legality of Means and Methods of Warfare' (2002) 84(846) IRRC 
345, 351; ICRC, A Guide to the Legal Review o f New Weapons, Means and Methods o f  Warfare: 
Measures to Implement Article 36 o f  Additional Protocol I  o f1977, ICRC (2006) 17.
30 Greenwood, 'Law of Weaponry', 206.
31 Nuclear Weapons Case, para 52.
32 In 1998, and every year since, the Russian Federation has tabled a draft resolution for the 
investigation into communications technologies and information security which would address these 
issues. To date, it has not been adopted. See for example, Draft resolution A/C.1/55/L. 6 Introduced 
by the Russian Federation, 18th mtg., 19 October 1998.
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specific weapons. While the law of weaponry seeks to protect core humanitarian 
values, it is also used to affect disarmament objectives which are not directly 
relevant to computer network attacks, and aspects of fair dealing which are discussed 
in section 2 on perfidy infra.34
Protocol II and Amended Protocol II of the Conventional Weapons Convention may 
restrict the use of some forms of computer network attack. The definition of a 
booby-trap is wide enough to encompass computer network attacks which are 
‘designed, constructed or adapted to kill or injure’. For example, a file or device 
may be rigged to execute some form of malicious code on access which would fool 
the surge protectors into thinking there was a lightning strike and shutting off the 
power. When the power is restarted the additional power surge would overload the 
distribution node causing the computer monitor to explode and destroying all data on 
the computer. While the primary purpose of such a device would be to destroy the 
data on the system and prevent unauthorised access to information, where it is 
certain that the computer would explode and cause injury, it may be prohibited by 
Amended Protocol II. It is important to note however that the Protocols only apply 
to booby-traps which kill or injure, thus the use of booby-traps which merely destroy 
information or render a system useless would not be covered by the Conventions. 
Booby traps are prohibited if, by their nature or employment, their use violates the 
legal protection accorded to a protected person or object by another customary rule 
of international law. Thus any code which is capable of falling within the definition 
which disguises itself as an email from the ICRC for instance, would automatically 
be banned. It is also prohibited to design and manufacture certain booby-traps to
33 For example, Brown has proposed that certain attacks i.e. logic bombs, are analogous to landmines 
and should therefore be prohibited: Brown, 'Proposal for an International Convention', 197.
34 For a discussion of the objectives of the law of weaponry see generally, Greenwood, 'Law of 
Weaponry', 189.
35 Art. 2 of both Protocols defines booby-traps as “any device or material which is designed, 
constructed or adapted to kill or injure, and which functions unexpectedly when a person disturbs or 
approaches an apparently harmless object or performs an apparently safe act”.
36 Whether or not a computer would in fact explode or otherwise cause injury is dependent on a 
number of variables, for instance the type of monitor used by the rigged system -  a plasma screen 
would melt rather than explode, or whether back-up generators were in place etc.
37 Henckaerts and Doswald-Beck, Customary International Humanitarian Law, 278.
38 This would undoubtedly constitute an act of perfidy in any event, and the misuse of protected 
symbols is covered more fully in section 2 on perfidy infra.
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look like harmless portable objects, although it is not prohibited to convert an 
existing harmless object into a booby-trap.39 However, although the definition of a 
booby-trap is broad enough to encompass a computer network attack specifically 
designed to cause injury, the wording of these particular provisions refer expressly to 
objects constructed to contain explosive material and thus would not be applicable to 
malicious code. In the event that the principle was applied by analogy, it would mean 
that rootkit malware (which inserts itself into existing code) would be a valid form of 
attack whereas a separate file disguised as a harmless email attachment or other such 
item would not. This would be in keeping with the prohibition which applies to letter 
bombs.40 Such prohibitions would be better dealt with in terms of the principle 
against perfidy and aspects of fair dealing which are discussed in section 2 on 
perfidy infra.41
1.3. Article 36 Obligations
Article 36 of Additional Protocol I imposes an obligation on contracting parties to 
perform legal reviews of new weapons, means and methods of warfare:
In the study, development, acquisition or adoption of a new weapon, means or 
method of warfare, a High Contracting Party is under an obligation to determine 
whether its employment would, in some or all circumstances, be prohibited by this 
Protocol or by any other rule of international law applicable to the High Contracting 
Party.
Although a new obligation to international humanitarian law, this obligation follows 
in the footsteps of the St Petersburg Declaration of 1868,42 and is an ‘obvious and 
indispensable corollary’ to Article 23(e) of the Hague Regulations and Article 35(2) 
of Additional Protocol 143 The ICRC Commentary to the Additional Protocol states 
that the words ‘methods and means’ include weapons in the widest sense, as well as
39 Art. 6(1) Protocol II, Art. 7(2) Amended Protocol II.
40 See generally Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 65.
41 For a discussion of the objectives of the law of weaponry see generally, Greenwood, 'Law of 
Weaponry', 189.
42 Whereby parties were to come to an understanding about advances in armaments to maintain the 
principles which they had established and to “conciliate the necessities o f war with the laws of 
humanity”: St Petersburg Declaration.
43 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 199.
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the way in which they are used.44 Further, the meaning of the phrase ‘some or all 
circumstances’ is to require a determination whether the employment for its normal 
or expected use would be prohibited under some or all circumstances, not to foresee 
or analyse all possible misuse of the weapon.45
The ICRC notes that the faithful and responsible application of its international law 
obligations would require a State to ensure that the new weapons, means and 
methods of warfare it develops or acquires will not violate these obligations 46 This 
obligation to review undoubtedly also applies to new computer network attack 
techniques and States will be required to assess the legality of each type of attack as 
they are developed. As with conventional weapons’ development and review, 
assessment of computer network attacks under this provision will remain largely a 
matter of trust. As noted previously in this thesis, many computer network attacks 
will only work once before counter-measures are developed and installed, therefore 
any international scrutiny of the technique would render them useless before they 
have been used.
2. Perfidy & Ruses of War
Advanced network technology provides new opportunities for parties to deceive and 
mislead the adversary. Additional Protocol I confirms that ruses of war are not 
prohibited. Article 37(2) defines them as.:47
acts which are intended to mislead an adversary or to induce him to act recklessly 
but which infringe no rule of international law applicable in armed conflict and 
which are not perfidious because they do not invite the confidence of an adversary 
with respect to protection under that law. The following are examples of such ruses: 
the use of camouflage, decoys, mock operations and misinformation.
Advances in computer network technology have enabled twenty-first century ruses 
to develop in twin-step with advancements in attack scenarios. Many of the options 
available to armed forces for modem day mses of war fall into the category of
44 Pilloud, et al., Commentary, para 1402.
45 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 200.
46 ICRC, Legal Review o f New Weapons, 4.
47 Art. 37(2), Additional Protocol I.
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electronic warfare,48 however militaries are increasingly adopting more sophisticated 
techniques which utilise computer network attack capabilities in order to mislead and 
deceive their adversaries. For example, basic jamming of radar signals would 
constitute an electronic attack, however the recent use of an airborne network attack 
system by Israel in the air strike against a target in northern Syria shows other 
possibilities. U.S. aerospace industry and retired military officials have indicated that 
the Israelis utilised a system like the U.S. ‘Suter’ system to allow their fighters to 
approach undetected by Syrian defences.49 The U.S. Suter system enables users to 
invade communications networks, see what the enemy sees and even take over as the 
systems administrator so that sensors can be manipulated into positions where 
approaching aircraft cannot be seen.50 An example of a permissible ruse of war 
would be to infiltrate the targeting data on the adversary’s computer and enter false 
information.51
Routing an attack through multiple hosts in multiple countries to disguise the origin 
of an attack is common practice in computer network attacks outside the military 
context. Any number of stepping stone hosts (whether routers, servers, or individual 
computers) may act as conduits for an attack effectively ‘laundering’ the packets of 
information and making tracing the path and the ultimate origin of the attack 
extremely difficult. Because the purpose of such tactics is to obfuscate the source of 
the attack, use of any stepping stone host which is part of a civilian network or a 
neutral state network runs the risk of the victim State retaliating against the apparent 
source. As Michael Schmitt points out, such retaliation may be kinetic in nature.
The question is whether this use of civilian networks is analogous to using civilian
48 For example jamming, electromagnetic pulse (EMP), high energy radio frequency weapons are 
examples of electronic warfare and while raising interesting issues for LOAC will not be dealt with in 
this thesis. For a general overview of electronic warfare techniques see Wilson, Information 
Operations, Electronic Warfare, and Cyberwar: Capabilities and Related Policy Issues.
49 Fulghum and Barrie, 'Israel Used Electronic Attack in Air Strike against Syrian Mystery Target'.
50 Ibid. See Appendix 1 for details of the development of Suter system.
51 For example, all U.S. target data for Operation Allied Force in Kosovo was stored on and accessed 
through a classified computer system. The information contained imagery, descriptions of the facility 
and its functions, analysis on impact (military advantage anticipated) if destroyed, possible collateral 
damage concerns and historical information on the target. Tony Montgomery, 'Legal Perspective from 
the EUCOM Targeting Cell' in A E Wall (ed) Legal and Ethical Lessons o f  NATO's Kosovo 
Campaign (Naval War College, Newport, RI, 2002) 189, 192.
52 Schmitt, 'Wired Warfare', 206.
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aircraft or vehicles to transport military cargo, or whether it amounts to feigning 
civilian status which would be a prohibited act.
Such measures will be permitted ruses of war as long as they do not cross the line 
into perfidy. The prohibition against perfidy is expressed in Article 23(b) of the 
Hague Regulations and expanded on by Article 37(1) of Additional Protocol I.54 
Perfidy is defined by the Additional Protocol as:
[a]cts inviting the confidence of an adversary to lead him to believe that he is 
entitled to, or is obliged to accord, protection under the rules of international law 
applicable in armed conflict, with intent to betray that confidence.
The application of the prohibition of perfidy to internal armed conflicts has also been 
confirmed by the Appeals Chamber in Tadic.55 The prohibition against perfidy has 
two purposes: first it seeks to protect those who genuinely wish to surrender, possess 
protected status or who are injured by prohibiting the misuse of them on the 
understanding that abuse will erode respect for immunity in future cases; it also 
seeks to impose a minimum level o f ‘fairness’ to dealings between combatants even 
where the act endangers no one else.56 Manipulating information systems so that 
enemy forces wrongly believe that troops are surrendering rather than gathering for 
an attack would be perfidious, as would causing them to believe that combat vehicles
CH
were medical vehicles or those of neutrals. Similarly, manipulating an enemy's 
targeting database so that it believed that an army division headquarters was. a 
hospital would be wrong.58 Using protected symbols such as the U.N. Symbol or the
53 Note that this analogy is in respect of the laws of war on land. Naval vessels may fly false colours 
under certain circumstances without it constituting perfidy. See generally, Dieter Fleck, 'Ruses of War 
and Prohibition of Perfidy' (1974) 13 Revue de Droit Penal Militare et de Droit de la Guerre 269,
292.
54 Art. 23(b) states that it is especially forbidden “to kill or wound treacherously individuals belonging 
to die hostile nation or army”.
55 Tadic (Interlocutory Appeal), para 125. citing the Supreme Court of Nigeria in Pius Nwaoga v The 
State (1972) 52 ILR 494,496-97 (Nig. S. Ct.).
56 Greenwood, 'Law of Weaponry', 190.
57 Greenberg, Goodman and Hoo, Information Warfare and International Law, 13.
58 Ibid.
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emblem of the Red Cross would be prohibited acts of perfidy as well as constituting 
a misuse of the symbols under Article 38 of the Additional Protocol.59 
The feigning of civilian, non-combatant status is one of the examples given in 
Article 37(1) of perfidious acts. This has led some commentators to state incorrectly 
that the use of emails purporting to be from Microsoft support which in actuality 
contain viruses or executable software patch designed to wreck the targeted 
computer system would be perfidious.60 This misunderstands the limitations of the 
prohibition contained in the Additional Protocol. Perfidy is only prohibited in so far 
as it results in the killing, injuring or capture of an adversary. Although this 
limitation has been criticized,61 beyond this restrictive definition, such acts are not 
prohibited under international law.62 However, depending on the payload of the virus 
or other malware, this would not be prohibited by the Additional Protocol. Sabotage 
or the destruction of property as such, through the use of perfidious deception is not 
prohibited by the Article; there must be a direct proximate causation between the act 
of perfidy and the killing, injury or capture of the adversary to breach Article 37.
A further question arises over whether States have legitimate expectation of 
authenticity of emails. Because of the longstanding view that communications may 
be disrupted, and because, unlike uniforms, information systems are in no way 
required by the laws of war but are rather combat aids, such tactics might seem less 
treacherous than would taking advantage of the requirement that troops wear distinct 
uniforms to set themselves off from their foes and civilians.64
Misuse o f Protected Symbols
Article 38 of Additional Protocol I prohibits any improper or deliberate misuse of 
internationally recognized signs, symbols or signals including those of the Red Cross
59 As well as breaching Arts. 38 & 39 on misuse of protective symbols, see infra. Note that use of the 
U.N. symbol is only considered perfidy where the United Nations is not engaged in combat.
60 Shulman, 'Discrimination in the Laws of Information Warfare', 959. See also DOrmann, 'Additional 
Protocols', 152.
61 Oeter, 'Methods and Means of Combat', 202; Knut Ipsen, 'Perfidy' in R Bernhardt (ed) Encylopedia 
o f Public International Law (Max-Planck Institute, Amsterdam; New York, 1997) 978-981.
62 Oeter, 'Methods and Means o f Combat', 201.
63 Bothe, et al., New Rules, 204. Although as Bothe et al point out, the saboteur would not be entitled 
to POW status and may also be guilty of a breach of Art. 44(3) API for failing to distinguish 
themselves from the civilian population.
64 Greenberg, Goodman and Hoo, Information Warfare and International Law, 13.
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and associated symbols, the flag of truce, cultural property or of the emblem of the 
United Nations except as authorized by the U.N.65 An equivalent provision relating 
to the red cross, crescent, lion or sun exists in Article 12 of Additional Protocol II for 
internal armed conflicts. This is an absolute prohibition which does not require any 
link to killing, injuring or capture. Thus, a clearer example of a prohibited act would 
be if the email purported to be from a U.N. representative or Red Cross or Crescent 
society and misused the protected emblem. By extension it is likely that a spoofed 
email address would also be protected although it does not fall within the category of 
protective emblems, signs or signals.
3. Destruction & Seizure of Property
The laws regulating the treatment of an adversary’s property in times of armed 
conflict raise interesting issues for networked societies and knowledge economies. 
The basic principle is set out in Article 46 of the Hague Regulations which provides 
that private property must be respected and cannot be confiscated. Further, Article 
23(g) provides that it is forbidden to “destroy or seize the enemy's property, unless 
such destruction or seizure be imperatively demanded by the necessities of war”.66 
Article 8(2)(b)(xiii) of the Rome Statute makes such destruction or seizure a war 
crime.67 Pillage also is formally prohibited by the Hague Regulations, Geneva 
Convention IV, Additional Protocol II, and made a war crime under the Rome 
Statute.68 However, the protections for property are subject to several exceptions, 
some of which are particularly relevant to communications networks and digital 
property.
Before turning to the exceptions, two preliminary matters call for comment. First, as 
indicated in Chapter 8 supra in relation to the protection of cultural property, the fact
65 Note that the emblem of the U.N. is only protected where the U.N. is not a party to the conflict.
66 Art. 23(g), Hague Regulations.
67 An almost identical provision exists in Art. 8(2)(e)(xii) of the Rome Statute in relation to armed 
conflicts not o f an international character.
68 Arts. 28 & 47, Hague Regulations; Art. 33(2), Geneva Convention IV; Art. 4(2)(g), Additional 
Protocol II; Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi), Rome Statute for international armed conflicts and Art. 8(2)(e)(v) for 
armed conflicts not of an international character. It is also an offence under Art. 4(f) of the ICTR 
Statute, Art. 3(e) of the ICTY Statute (referring to plunder, although the French text still refers to 
pillage) and Art. 3(f) of the SCSL Statute.
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that property may be intangible is not a unique issue for armed conflict involving 
information technology. The Nuremburg war crimes tribunals in both the Krupp and 
I.G. Farben trials were in no doubt that the property offences set out by the Hague 
Regulations were broad enough to encompass the acquisition of intangible property 
by a number of means.69
“Property offences recognised by modem international law are not, however, limited 
to offences against physical tangible possessions or to open robbery in the old sense 
of pillage, but include the acquisition of intangible property and the securing of 
ownership, use or control of all kinds of property by many ways other than open 
violence.”
The Tribunal in the LG. Farben Trial held that “In our view, the offences against 
property defined in the Hague Regulations are broad in their phraseology and do not 
admit of any distinction between ‘plunder’ in the restricted sense of acquisition of 
physical properties,.. .the plunder or spoliation resulting from acquisition of 
intangible property such as is involved in the acquisition of stock ownership, or of
7fiacquisition of ownership or control through any other means.. Further, following 
the invasion of Germany in the Second World War, Allied Forces had no difficulty 
with acquiring such intangibles as technical and scientific information and military 
expertise in varying forms including patents and documentation, both as booty and
71‘intellectual reparations’.
The second preliminary issue to be dealt with is the concept of seizure. While 
destruction of property is fairly unambiguous even in respect of computer systems,
77networks and the information contained on them, what is not clear is what actions 
will constitute seizure of those items. There are two separate aspects to this issue, the 
first is the remote appropriation of a system or network while leaving its physical
691.G. Farben Trial, 46; The Krupp Trial, 129. United Nations War Crimes Commission, Law 
Reports o f  Trials o f  War Criminals (H.M.S.O. for the United Nations War Crimes Commission, 
London, 1949), Vol XV, 129. citing the Krupp Trial which dealt in part with transfer of shares, 
transfer of corporate property, contractual transfer of property rights and the like.
701.G. Farben Trial, 46.
71 See generally, John Farquharson, 'Governed or Exploited? The British Acquisition of German 
Technology, 1945-48' (1997) 32(1) Journal o f  Contemporary History 23.
72 Although a question may be raised as to whether destruction of information can be established if it 
can be restored or reconstructed, albeit with effort & expenditure from backups.
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components in place, and the second is the copying of information located on that 
network or system. The issue is relevant both for property captured by a party on the 
battlefield as booty of war and for property seized in occupied territory; for both 
questions however it should be noted that it is sufficient that the property in question 
is located in the battlespace, the location of the actor is not of primary importance.73 
Although the tangible aspects of a system or network may be physically seized,74 it 
is possible to assume control of a network without doing so. No formal definition of 
seizure appears in international instruments or in decisions before international 
tribunals, however the Military Tribunal in the Krupp Trial held that the offence of 
spoliation was achieved even if no definite alleged transfer of title was accomplished 
stating:75
“However, if, for example, a factory is being taken over in a manner which prevents 
the rightful owner from using it and deprives him from lawfully exercising his 
prerogative as owner it cannot be said that his property ‘is respected’ under Article 
46 as it must be.”
William Downey has argued that effective seizure requires that the property is placed 
under substantial guard and is in the ‘firm possession’ of the capturing State.76 
Although there is conflicting case law on what is required in order to reduce property 
to firm possession, Downey cites an opinion by the Legal Advisor of the Office of
77Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) as the preferable view. The 
OMGUS opinion concludes:
73 See above discussion on location of offences in section 1.2.1 of Chapter 5, relating to sabotage, 137 
supra.
74 It may be questioned whether the cable element of a fibre-optic network would be considered 
‘movable’ property for the purposes of seizure or booty. However it would appear that the distinction 
is to refer to personal property or chattels (as distinguished from real property) rather than any 
requirement for actual movability: William Gerald Downey, Jr., 'Captured Enemy Property: Booty of 
War and Seized Enemy Property' (1950) 44 AJIL 488, 489.
75 The Krupp Trial, 623-624 The tribunal was responding to a Defence argument that the laws and 
customs of war do not prohibit seizure and exploitation of property in belligerently occupied territory, 
so long as no definite transfer of title is accomplished.
76 Downey, 'Captured Enemy Property', 492.
77 Legal Advisor of the Office of Military Government for Germany (OMGUS) DC Selected Opinions, 
OMGUS, 57, 60, cited Ibid., 493. Cf. an alternate opinion cited by Downey which dealt with a case of 
U.S. Civil War era confederate cannon found at the bottom of a river in Arkansas during WWII. It 
was held in 1947 that the cannon became the property of the United States when the area in which the 
cannon were located was captured by Federal forces, i.e. mere seizure and occupation of the territory
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“It appears that ‘firm possession’ requires some manifestation of intention to seize 
and retain the property involved and some affirmative act or declaration of a 
possessory or custodial nature with respect to the property. The circumstances which 
will satisfy these two elements of firm possession will, of course, vary in each case.
It is, however, our conclusion that the general occupation of an area by a belligerent 
is not of itself sufficient to satisfy either of the two elements of the doctrine of firm 
possession”.
In 1985 the Israeli Supreme Court confirmed this approach in Al Nawar v Minister o f  
Defence et al, although the Court noted the practical impossibility of seizing all 
property at once and stated that in order to effect seizure, it would suffice to arrange
7JIfor a general guarding or patrolling of the area where the property was located. 
Following this reasoning, in order to seize a network or other system remotely, it 
would be necessary to access the system or network and change the access codes in 
order to prevent the original owner from accessing and controlling their system or 
network. This already happens to a certain extent with computers which are
70compromised by malicious software and recruited to a botnet. In the case of 
criminal use of infected computers the author or controller of the botnet leaves the 
owner’s access and control intact, however once the controller has access to the 
system or network as an administrator it would be possible to change the access 
permissions so that the system or network is under the sole control of the accessing 
party and remove all access rights of the original owner. This appears to satisfy the 
requirements of firm possession set out above, as the act of excluding the original 
owner manifests the intention of the controller to retain control of the network or 
system. Placing the network or system under guard may be as simple as changing 
passwords and ensuring that the system is running up-to-date virus protection 
software and that all program updates and patches are installed.
was enough to transfer title: 6 Bull JAG (1947) 238-289, cited in Downey, 'Captured Enemy 
Property', 493.
78 A l Nawar v Minister o f Defence et al (1985) 39(3) Piskei Din 449, Israel Supreme Court. Excerpted 
in English in F Domb, 'Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel' (1986) 16 Israel YB Hum Rts 321, 
326.
79 See for example, the Storm Worm which was first detected in the wild on 17 January 2007.
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Mere copying of data and information resident on systems poses a slightly more 
difficult analysis.80 The nature of digital information is such that copying renders an 
identical copy capable of being used by the capturing party for any purpose that the 
original would have been, thus the requirement of intention to seize and retain would 
still be met. Generally speaking, property is seized for one of two purposes; either to 
deprive the opposing forces of its use, or to turn it to the capturing State’s 
advantage.81 While copied information may fulfil the latter purpose, it would not 
deny the use of the property to the opposing forces. This ‘seizure by copying’ is not 
a new phenomenon, following the invasion of Germany in the Second World War 
significant documents programs were put in place by the Allied Forces. Vast 
amounts of technical information, research facilities, and prototypes were 
confiscated as booty by the American and British authorities, with much of the 
documentation being acquired by way of extensive microfilming projects that left the 
original documents in place. Historian John Farquharson notes that by mid 1947, 
five million pages were available on microfilm in the U.S. to businesses and 
academic institutions comprised entirely of documents, patents etc found by the 
occupying powers in Germany.83 However one of the difficulties that arises with this 
form of seizure is the differing treatment of seized property under the laws relating to 
booty and military necessity on the one hand, and that of seizure of property in an 
occupied area on the other. Both Article 23(g) and Article 53 of the Hague 
Regulations refer to property being seized but the treatment (inferred in the case of 
Article 23(g) and specified in the case of Article 53) is very different. Under Article 
53 ownership rights are not transferred to the occupying party, the property may be 
seized but must be returned when peace is made and compensation paid. However, 
property seized for military operations or under the law of booty becomes the
80 It should be noted that there is considerable disagreement at present in domestic jurisdictions 
concerning the appropriate property rights, other than intellectual property rights, to be granted over 
information. See for example the discussion on theft of information in Ian J. Lloyd, Information 
Technology Law (4th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004), 315-321. comparing England, 
Scotland, the United States and Canada. Database rights in particular are particularly contentious.
81 Lauterpacht (ed) Oppenheim's International Law, 152.
82 Farquharson, Gimbel 60-74. There is controversy over the extent of the documentation programs 
put in place in respect of the type of information confiscated which included large-scale acquisitions 
from private industry. However much was taken of purely military usage and was nearly all taken as 
booty: Farquharson, 'Governed or Exploited', 37.
83 Ibid., 23.
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property of the seizing party. Title passes on effective seizure for purposes of booty 
and the previous owner is completely divested of all rights in the property.
Logically it would seem that in terms of seizure under those conditions, the 
affirmative action or declaration must incorporate the ‘right to exclude’ or in some 
other way deprive the original owner of their rights over the information. Thus, mere 
copying would not constitute valid seizure as it only succeeds in depriving the 
original owner of the right to exclude vis-a-vis the seizing State. As this is 
inconsistent with state practice, it would appear that seizure may mean different 
things with respect to booty than its does to occupation and that any action with 
respect to such property would be prohibited if it entailed the party to act in a manner 
inconsistent with the property rights which continue to vest in the original owner.
3.1. Booty
In accordance with customary international law, all movable State property captured 
on the battlefield may be appropriated as booty of war. The seized property becomes 
the property of the capturing State rather than the individual soldier or unit seizing it,
Of
and title passes on seizure. Title to the property is acquired automatically by the 
belligerent State whose armed forces have seized it, irrespective of the military 
character of the property (not only weapons and ammunition, but also money, food
Of
and stores). This would undoubtedly apply to all government owned systems and 
networks, as the computers, servers and routers would all fall in the category of 
movable property. Although the issue has not been formally addressed in 
international law, it would seem that all information resident on such computers, 
networks and other devices could also be lawfully appropriated in a similar way to 
the information, technical documents, patents and other intellectual property which 
were seized by the Allied Powers after World War II. However, as discussed in
84 Yoram Dinstein, 'Booty in Land Warfare' in R Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopedia o f  Public International 
Law (Max Plank Institute; North Holland, Amsterdam, 1992) 432-434, 432.
85 Downey, 'Captured Enemy Property', 500; Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 215. Dinstein, 'Booty in 
Land Warfare', 432.
86 Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 215.
87 Although there was significant discussion over the extent and type of property which could be 
confiscated (in terms of much of it being from private firms), none of the discussion appears to have 
focussed on the intellectual nature of the property. Following March 1946, a narrow definition of 
booty was adopted by the Allied powers limiting booty to ‘arms, munitions and implements of war, 
and all research and development facilities (including documents, material and training devices)
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Chapter 8 supra, any property which would amount to cultural property would not be 
subject to seizure.
While private property is generally immune from seizure on the battlefield, any 
private property actually used for hostile purposes may be appropriated by the 
belligerent State.88 In Al Nawar the Court held that Article 23(g) of the Hague 
Regulations does not accord protection to property used for hostile purposes; such 
property enjoys protection from arbitrary destruction, but it is still subject to the
O Q
enemy’s right of appropriation as booty. The Court also held that the distinction 
between state and private property should be based on the functional test applied in 
the 1921 Arbitral Award in the Cession o f Vessels and Tugs for Navigation on the 
Danube Case which determines the nature of the property in question based on its 
actual use.90 Thus any commercial network, system or computer that is utilised by 
the opposing State for military operations may also be seized, a significant concern 
given the large percentage of military communications which travel over civilian 
networks.91
Further, it is permissible to seize any weapons, ammunition, military equipment, 
military papers and the like, regardless of whether it can be used for military 
operations or not, even though they constitute private property. In an age of 
computer network attack this is an extremely broad exception. Practically all 
networks operating in the battlespace will be liable to be appropriated as well as 
most systems which are capable of being used in a computer network attack. As the 
average home computer or laptop with an Internet connection has this capacity, and 
may already be leveraged as part of a botnet (with or without the owners consent or 
knowledge), it would seem that any computer would be open to seizure by the armed 
forces. Likewise any information resident on networks or computers would be able
relative thereto’: John Gimbel, Science, Technology, and Reparations: Exploitation and Plunder in 
Postwar Germany (Stanford University Press, Stanford, Calif, 1990), 172-175; Farquharson, 
'Governed or Exploited', 33.
88 Al Nawar. Excerpted in English in Domb, 'Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel', 324.
89 Domb, 'Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel', 324.
90 Ibid., 325. citing Cession o f Vessels and Tugs for Navigation on the Danube Case (1921) 1 RIAA 
97.
91 In 1996 the percentage was quoted at 95% of all military communications passed over commercial 
networks: Aldrich, 'International Legal Implications', 105.
92 Downey, 'Captured Enemy Property', 494.
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to be seized insofar as it amounts to military papers (in the case of documents or 
databases) or military equipment (in respect of software).
The term ‘battlefield’ is commonly used in describing where property may be seized 
in accordance with the law of booty in warfare; however as Dinstein points out, the 
term is to be understood very broadly and is perhaps better to be understood in terms 
of ‘combat’ or ‘military engagement’. The Supreme Court of Israel held in Al 
Nawar that the entire theatre of operations may be regarded as the battlefield for the 
purposes of the law of booty in land warfare.94 This raises interesting questions for 
computer network attack as the battlespace is much larger than traditionally 
contemplated. Taken to its logical conclusion this would mean that any network, 
computer, router, server or mobile satellite command station utilised in military 
operations may be appropriated as booty of war,95 as well as any information 
resident on those devices (unless they amount to cultural property). Given the ability 
to seize such networks remotely, it would appear that a belligerent party could seize 
systems or networks in the territory of an adversary regardless of the size, or indeed 
fact of, their physical presence in the adversary State. For example, it is possible that 
any attacks launched against Iraq from U.S. military bases on United States soil, 
would open U.S. networks to seizure as booty by Iraq.
93 Dinstein, 'Booty in Land Warfare', 433; Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 215.
94 Al Nawar. Excerpted in English in Domb, 'Judgements of the Supreme Court of Israel', 324.
95 An interesting issue arises over whether the satellite’s space architecture would be considered 
‘movable’ property for the purposes of seizure. Where it is possible to access and obtain control of the 
thrusters and inclination of the satellite it follows logically that it may be moved. As the traditional 
battlefield is now thought of in terms of battlespace any satellite which is actually used by the parties 
to the conflict must necessarily form part of that battlespace. Note however the exclusion o f this right 
for occupied territory. See generally, Thomas C. Wingfield, 'Legal Aspects of Offensive Information 
Operations in Space' (1998) 9 J  Legal Stud 121; Michel BourbonniSre, 'Law of Armed Conflict 
(LOAC) and the Neutralisation of Satellites or Ius in Bello Satellitis' (2004) 9 JC&SL 43; Michael N. 
Schmitt, 'International Law and Military Operations in Space' (2006) 10 Max Planck UNYB 89.
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3.2. Occupied Territory
Exceptions to the prohibition against destruction or seizure of an adversary’s 
property also exist for occupied territories which are of particular relevance for 
computer networks. Article 53 of the Hague Regulations allows parties to take 
possession of communications equipment in occupied territory, stating:
An army o f  occupation can only take possession o f  cash, funds, and realizable 
securities which are strictly the property o f  the State, depots o f  arms, means o f  
transport, stores and supplies, and, generally, all movable property belonging to  the 
State which may be used for military operations.
All appliances, whether on land, at sea, or in the air, adapted for the transm ission o f 
news, or for the transport o f  persons or things, exclusive o f  cases governed by naval 
law, depots o f  arms, and, generally, all kinds o f  m unitions o f  war, may be seized, 
even if  they belong to private individuals, but m ust be restored and compensation 
fixed when peace is made.
Computer networks and other IT systems undoubtedly fall within this provision. 
However, where these means of communication take the form of submarine cables 
or satellites specific laws apply. Submarine cables (including fibre-optic cables) 
connecting the occupied territory to a neutral territory may only be seized or 
destroyed in cases of absolute necessity and must be restored and compensation 
fixed when peace is restored.96 Further, the space architecture of satellite 
communications systems would also fall outside the Article 53 exception. Outer 
space is not subject to appropriation by any State though occupation,97 therefore the 
laws regulating seizure of property in occupied territories does not apply. This would 
not prevent the seizure of the ground-based control centres however, so the point
96 Art. 54, Hague Regulations. See for example Eastern Extension, Australasia and China Telegraph 
Co. Claim (1923) 6 RIAA 112; Cuba Submarine Telegraph Co. (1923) 6 RIAA 118. cited in Leslie C. 
Green, The Contemporary Law o f Armed Conflict (2nd ed, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 
2000), 152.
97 Art. 2, Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities o f  States in the Exploration and Use o f  Outer 
Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Vol. 610 No. 8843. Note that the Hague 
Regulations do not apply per se to space-based conflict as they are only applicable to the law of war 
on land. Their application is based on their status as customary international law; the International 
Court of Justice has indicated on several occasions the principles contained in the Hague Regulations 
constitute “intransgressible principles of international customary law”: See for example Nuclear 
Weapons Case, para 79.
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may be moot, subject to prohibited interference with the physical aspects of the 
satellite (i.e. the altitude and orbit control subsystems which control the thrusters and 
inclination of the satellite itself), exclusive control of information passing through 
the satellite would still be possible.
Article 53 of Geneva Convention IV relating to protection of civilian persons in 
occupied territory also prohibits the destruction of property, both state-owned and 
private, except where it is absolutely necessary for military operations.98 However, 
this provision only applies to destruction of property not seizure. The occupying 
authorities have a recognized right, under certain circumstances, to dispose of 
property within the occupied territory - namely the right to requisition private 
property, the right to confiscate any movable property belonging to the State which 
may be used for military operations and the right to administer and enjoy the use of 
real property belonging to the occupied State.99 Extensive destruction is considered a 
grave breach of the Convention and may be prosecuted as a war crime under Article 
8(2)(a)(iv) of the Rome Statute.100
3.3. Pillage & Plunder
The prohibition against pillage is firmly rooted in both customary international law 
and treaty law.101 Traditionally, pillage meant the looting or plundering of enemy
i mproperty (public or private) by individuals for private ends, and incorporated an 
element of violence in the appropriation of such property. The trial Chamber of
98 Art. 53, Geneva Convention IV provides: Any destruction by the Occupying Power of real or 
personal property belonging individually or collectively to private persons, or to the State, or to other 
public authorities, or to social or cooperative organizations, is prohibited, except where such 
destruction is rendered absolutely necessary by military operations.
99ICRC ‘Article 53’ Commentary to Geneva Convention IV, 301; Pictet, Commentary.
100 Art. 147, Geneva Convention IV; 8(2)(a)(iv) Rome Statute.
101 "Celebici" Judgement, para 315. Art. 28,47 (concerning occupied territory), Hague Regulations 
1907; Art. 33(2), Geneva Convention IV; Art. 4(2) of Additional Protocol II; Art. 8(2)(b)(xvi) & Art. 
8(2)(e)(v), Rome Statute, make “pillaging a town or place, even when taken by assault” a war crime; 
The ICTR and SCSL Statutes both include the crime of pillage while the ICTY Statute prohibits 
plunder. Interestingly the official French version of both the ICTR and ICTY Statutes use the term ‘le 
pillage’.
102 Annin A. Steinkamm, 'Pillage' in R Bernhardt (ed) Encyclopedia o f  International Law (Max Plank 
Institute; North Holland, Amsterdam, 1982) 1029-1030, 1029; Dinstein, Conduct o f  Hostilities, 214.
103 Trial o f Alois and Anna Bommer and Their Daughters (1947) IX Law Reports of the Trials of the 
War Criminals 62, Permanent Military Court at Metz.
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the ICTY in Naletilic and Martinovic found that the Statute proscribes plunder 
committed on the entire territory of the parties to a conflict.104 However a number of 
these elements have been brought into question in recent judgements. There are two 
particular questions which arise in respect of pillage of digital property. First, must 
the owner of the property be dispossessed of it entirely, or is it sufficient that certain 
of the owner’s property rights, namely the right to exclude, and the right to control 
the use made of the property and the profit from it, are infringed? And secondly, 
with regard to pillage, must the property be acquired through threats or use of 
violence?
In the Flick trial, Flick was found guilty of war crimes for inter alia the plunder of 
public and private property and spoliation in the countries and territories occupied by 
Germany. However the Tribunal stated that “no defendant is shown by the evidence 
to have been responsible for any act of pillage as that word is commonly 
understood”.105 It is not clear from the judgement whether this is was a result of the 
lack of violence involved, or the fact that the property was returned to the owners in 
a better condition than when it was appropriated. Other courts have not separated the 
offences in the same manner.
The trial chamber of the Sierra Leone Special Court in the Fofana & Kondewa Case 
were of the view that the inclusion of the requirement that the appropriation be for 
personal or private use is an unwarranted restriction on the application of the offence 
of pillage.106 However this statement seems to stem from the conflation of the terms 
‘pillage’, ‘plunder’ and ‘spoliation’, and the fact that the Statute for the International 
Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia contains the offence of plunder rather 
than pillage.
Computer network attacks designed to appropriate property are generally non-violent 
in nature. Noting that the concept of pillage in the traditional sense implied an
104Prosecutor v Mladen Naletilic and Vinko Martinovic (2003) Case No. IT-98-34-T, International 
Criminal Court for the Former Yugoslavia, para 615., noting that Geneva Convention IV indicates 
that the prohibition of pillage is not limited to acts committed in occupied territories.
105 The Flick Trial
106 Prosecutor v Moinina Fofana and Allieu Kondewa (Decision on Preliminary Motion Based on 
Lack o f Jurisdiction (Child Recruitment)). (2004) SCSL-04-14-T, Special Court for Sierra Leone, 49.
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1 (\Helement of violence, the Court in the Celebici judgement declined to decide
whether the terms pillage and plunder were synonymous stating that the term plunder 
embraces “all forms of appropriation of property in armed conflict for which 
individual criminal liability attaches under international law, including those acts 
traditionally described as ‘pillage’.108 However courts have been happy to consider 
property seized by enemy forces as pillage even when violence is not used.109
3.4. Enemy Owned Property on the Territory of a Belligerent
Enemy owned public property in the territory of a belligerent is subject to seizure, 
although diplomatic buildings are placed under protection.110 Thus, any State owned 
websites hosted in the adversary State or other digital assets would be liable to be 
seized in the event of an armed conflict breaking out between the States. For 
example, the government of East Timor is hosted on sites in the Republic of Ireland 
and would be subject to seizure or freezing should the two States engage in an armed 
conflict with one another. Likewise any work that has been outsourced offshore to a 
belligerent State would be subject to seizure. In an age of increased civilian 
outsourcing of government work (including defence acquisitions), and offshore 
outsourcing in the commercial sector, knowledge and control over where the actual 
work will be performed will be important. While it may also be possible to argue that 
information merely passing over a server in a belligerent State is sufficient to qualify 
as being on the territory of a belligerent and therefore subject to seizure, most 
information accessed in this manner could presumably be seized as intelligence 
gathering which is expressly permitted under Article 24 of the Hague Regulations. 
The situation with regard to private property is more complex. The protections for 
civilian property provided by Article 23(g) of the Hague Regulations apply equally 
to property on the territory of both belligerent parties. In addition, Article 38 of 
Geneva Convention IV provides that “the situation of protected persons shall
107 The requirement of violence in pillage is brought into question by the case o f Trial o f  Alois and 
Anna Bommer and their Daughters (1947) IX Law Reports of the Trials of the War Criminals 62, 
Permanent Military Court at Metz.
108 "Celebici" Judgement, § 591. citing Law Reports, Vol IX, pg 64.
109 See for example, in re Otto Wallemar [1948] ADIL 619 (removal of goods during occupation), 
Mazzoni v Ministry o f  Finance [1927-1928] AD Case No. 384 (on seizure of bonds & shares 
abandoned by the owner in occupied territory).
110 Green, The Contemporary Law o f  Armed Conflict, 155.
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continue to be regulated, in principle, by the provisions governing aliens in time of
peace” with the exception of measures of internment, assigned residence or other
exceptional measures for control and security necessitated by the war.111 These
measures have been considered by the Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission in its
partial awards in respect of some of Eritrea’s Civilian Claims and its claim for Loss
11*)o f Property in Ethiopia. The decision of the Commission in its partial award for
Eritrea’s Civilian Claims noted that belligerents have “substantial latitude to place 
freezes or other discriminatory controls on the property of the nationals of the enemy 
State or otherwise to act in ways contrary to international law in time of peace.”113 
While observing that the control measures were necessary to deny the enemy access 
to economic resources which might otherwise be potentially available to support its , 
conduct of the war, the Commission commented that States have not consistently 
done so, and that where States have vested the assets of enemy nationals it has been 
done under controlled conditions and for reasons directly tied to higher State 
interests.114 The Commission went on to find:115
“a belligerent is bound to ensure insofar as possible that the property o f  protected 
persons and o f  other enemy nationals are not despoiled and wasted. I f  private 
property o f  enemy nationals is to be frozen or otherwise impaired in wartime, it 
m ust be done by the State, and under conditions providing for the property’s 
protection and its eventual disposition by return to  the owners or through post-war 
agreem ent.”
The Commission noted that such limitations on the vesting of property have been 
emphasised by commentators.116 Digital property or assets in the territory of the
111 Art. 27, Geneva Convention IV.
112 Partial Award, Civilians Claims, Eritrea's Claims 15, 16, 23 & 27-32 between the State o f  Eritrea 
and the Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia (2004), Eritrea Ethiopia Claims Commission; 
Partial Award, Loss o f  Property in Ethiopia Owned by Non-Residents, Eritrea's Claim 24 between the 
State o f  Eritrea and the Federal Democratic Republic o f Ethiopia (2005), Eritrea Ethiopia Claims 
Commission.
113 Partial Award in Eritrea's Civilians Claims, para 124.
114 Ibid., para 127-128.
115 Ibid., para 151.
116 Ibid., para 128. citing Lauterpacht (ed) Oppenheim's International Law, 326-331; Ian Brownlie, 
Principles o f  Public International Law (6th ed, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003), 514. 
brownlie principles, 514; oppenheims international law, 326-331.
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belligerent may be frozen by that party in the same way that tangible property or 
funds may be frozen, and would be subject to the same conditions to ensure 
protection of the assets and for reasons of State interest.
4. Conclusion
Of all of the principles which govern modem armed conflict, it is those relating to 
the means and methods of warfare which have the most uneasy fit in respect of 
computer network attacks. One thing is certain, the general principles of the law of 
weaponry will continue to apply however their specific application will only become 
apparent with the details of a particular computer network attack. The application of 
Article 36 obligations to assess individual attack techniques should mitigate against 
these problems.
Perfidy is one of the most difficult concepts to translate into an online environment 
where anonymity is the norm. However, it must be bome in mind that it only applies 
to attacks that result in the killing, injuring or capture of the adversary. Because 
standard practice in computer network attacks is to disguise the origin of the attack, 
States will need to take particular care to ensure that sure mses do not cross the line 
into perfidy.
The changing conceptions of property and the increasing reliance of economies on 
intellectual property and intangibles raises serious issues in terms of the mles 
regarding the protection of property in armed conflict. Some issues do not readily fit 
within the current framework, others reflect the difficulties found in international 
criminal law in respect of computer crime generally. Concepts such as pillage raise 
difficulties with the possible requirement that the owner must be permenantly 
deprived of the property, thus the copying of files (and even their subsequent 
deletion, in circumstances where back-up copies exist) may mean that liability is 
avoided. However the frequent conflation of property offences by international 
courts may mean that this is less of a difficulty in practice.
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Concluding Remarks
The advent of computer network attacks poses new challenges for the international 
law regulating force and international humanitarian law. Not only do computer 
network attacks represent a fundamentally different method of warfare, they come at 
a time when the laws of armed conflict are struggling to meet the challenges of 
greater than ever civilian participation in conflict, increased asymmetry and 
technological advance. However despite these challenges, the author believes that 
the underlying framework and general principles of the laws of armed conflict 
remain applicable to conflicts involving computer network attacks. Some adaptations 
in detail will be required, as always happens with law over time,1 however the 
underlying principles of the laws of armed conflict are aimed at the fundamental 
nature of war, which remains unchanging. The exact content and contours of the 
laws will determined by the prevailing principles of the societies that shape them.
At present, examination of the legality of computer network attacks under 
international law results in a complex picture. Under the jus ad bellum, the need for a 
physical effect, namely death, injury or destruction of physical property appears to 
remain constant, although it may be achieved indirectly. The perceived intent of the 
attacker will play a large role in determining the victim State’s response. Certainly 
for a computer network attack to qualify as an armed attack triggering the right of 
self-defence under international law, the attack must result in consequences of a 
sufficient scale and effect. Adopting a restrictive approach to computer network 
attacks in respect of the jus ad bellum also serves to act as a restraint on the right to 
resort to traditional force in self-defence.
It is perhaps the jus in bello, which shows more clearly the complex relationship 
between fundamental principles and specific applications of the laws of armed 
conflict in regard to computer network attacks. Principles such as the distinction 
between combatants and civilians, proportionality in attack and the prohibition 
against causing unnecessary suffering, remain at the core of the commitment to the
1 Oeter, 'Comment: Is the Principle of Distinction Outdated?' with regard to the changes wrought by 
increasing asymmetry.
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law, regardless of the technology employed. It is in the specific applications of the 
laws where the effects of technology and the changing values and conceptions 
brought about by the information revolution are seen. One of the most significant is 
the increased value that information societies place on intangible property and 
information. It will have an impact on the application of the laws governing the 
conduct of hostilities in relation to targeting analysis, protection of cultural property 
and property offences generally.
Despite the attempt to adopt a comprehensive approach, as always, there remain a 
few areas which require further research. As stated in the introduction, this thesis 
does not examine the law of neutrality, or look in any meaningful way at the effects 
of computer network attacks on the law of naval warfare (other than a brief mention 
to draw a comparison in the text). There are other questions which have been raised 
in the course of this thesis and will require future investigation. Some are raised by 
the nature of digital property and the protection to be provided to it; for example, in a 
format capable of perfect digital copies, what criteria will be used to determine 
which copies of cultural property are worthy of protection as reproductions.
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Appendix 1 - Selected Computer Network Attack Examples
1982 Trans-Siberian Pipeline - the ‘Farewell Dossier’. Following the theft of 
technology from Western powers by the Soviet KGB, the Central 
Intelligence Agency (CIA) of the United States and a Canadian firm 
planted a Trojan horse in the control software for the pipeline system 
which a KGB operative had been sent to steal. Once installed “the pipeline 
software that was to run the pumps, turbines, and valves was programmed 
to go haywire, after a decent interval, to reset pump speeds and valve 
settings to produce pressures far beyond those acceptable to pipeline joints 
and welds. The result was the most monumental non-nuclear explosion 
and fire ever seen from space”.2 The explosion happened in a remote area 
of Siberia and there were no physical casualties from the attack, however 
it is not clear from the documents publicly available, whether this was by 
fortunate happenstance or design.
1997 Eligible Receiver. Eligible Receiver is the code name of a 1997 internal 
exercise initiated by the U.S. Department of Defense. A ‘red team’ of 
hackers from the National Security Agency (NSA) was organized to 
infiltrate the Pentagon systems. The red team was only allowed to use 
publicly available computer equipment and hacking software. Although 
many details about Eligible Receiver are still classified, it is known that 
the red team was able to infiltrate and take control of the Pacific command 
center computers, as well as power grids and 911 systems in nine major 
U.S. cities. The red team intruded computer networks, denied services,
1 See Gus W. Weiss, The Farewell Dossier: Duping the Soviets' (1996) 35(5) Studies in Intelligence 
121,269 <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi- 
studies/studies/96unclass/farewell.htm> (last accessed 29 June 2008); Matthew French, 'Tech 
Sabotage During the Cold War' (2004) Federal Computer Week 26 April 2004 
<http://www.fcw.com/print/10_12/news/82709-l.html> (last accessed 29 June 2008); Reed, At the 
Abyss.
2 Reed, At the Abyss, 269.
3 PBS Frontline, Cyberwar! The Warnings
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/wamings/> (last accessed 21 September 
2008); William M. Arkin, Code Names: Deciphering US Military Plans, Programs, and Operations 
in the 9/11 World (Steerforth Press, Hanover, NH, 2005), 358.
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changed removed and read emails, and disrupted phone services; they also 
gained super user access in over 36 computer systems which meant they 
could have created new accounts, deleted accounts, turned the system off 
or reformatted the server hard drives.
In October 2002, a subsequent no-notice mock attack against military 
computers, titled ‘Eligible Receiver 2003’ indicated a need for greater 
coordination between U.S. military and non-military organisations to 
deploy a rapid military computer counter-attack.4
1998 Solar Sunrise. In February 1998, a number of U.S. Department of
Defence networks were attacked using a well-known vulnerability in the 
operating system (the UNIX-based Solaris). The attacks were widespread 
and appeared to come from multiple servers in the U.S. as well as the 
United Arab Emirates, Israel, France, Taiwan & Germany. Although the 
targeted systems were all reported as unclassified, many key support 
systems reside on unclassified networks (for example the global 
transportation system, Defence Finance System, medical personnel, 
logistics and email).5 The attacks came at a time when the U.S. was 
preparing for potential military action against Iraq due to UN weapons 
inspection disputes and raised fears that the attacks were aimed at 
disrupting deployments and operations. Investigators eventually traced the 
attacks to two California teenagers, directed by an Israeli teenaged mentor, 
who were subsequently arrested and charged.6
1998 Roosevelt Dam, Arizona. In 1998 a 12 year-old U.S. hacker, exploring 
for fun, broke into the computer system that runs Arizona’s Roosevelt
4 Clay Wilson, 'Information Operations and Computer Network Attack Capabilities of Today' (Paper 
presented at the International Expert Conference on Computer Network Attacks and the Applicability 
of International Humanitarian Law, Stockholm, 17-19 November 2004) 28-79,64. Citing a U.S. DoD 
Briefing for the Congressional Research Service, 9 January 2003.
5 ‘Solar Sunrise’ GlobalSecurity.org <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/solar-sunrise.htm> 
(last accessed 23 September 2008).
6 Ibid; John A. Serabian, Jr, Cyber Threats and the US Economy: Statement for the Record before the 
Joint Economic Committee on Cyber Threats and the US Economy (23 February 2000), transcript 
available in <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches- 
testimony/2000/cyberthreats_022300.html> (last accessed 15 August 2008).
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Dam.7 Although he was unaware of the fact, federal authorities claim he 
had complete control of the SC AD A system which controls the dam’s 
massive floodgates and the 489 billion gallons of water which it contains. 
Unleashed, the water would course down the Salt River and over a 
downstream flood plain (home to an estimated population of one million 
people) before reaching the state capital, Phoenix.
The facts of this incident have since been disputed in an article claiming 
that although a hacker did break into the computers of an Arizona water 
facility, the Salt River Project in the Phoenix area. But he was 27, not 12, 
and the incident occurred in 1994, not 1998. And while clearly trespassing
o
in critical areas, the hacker never could have had control of any dams.
1998 Electronic Disturbance Theatre. Electronic Disturbance Theatre 
launched denial of service attack on U.S. Department of Defense in 
support of Mexico’s Zapatista rebels. The attack was in protest at alleged 
support by the U.S. government for the Mexican Government who were 
accused of serious human rights abuses in the Chiapas region of Mexico. 
When users logged on to an EDT website, the Zapatista Floodnet software 
was downloaded to their computer. As with most DDoS attacks, the 
software is designed to initiate automatic and repeated requests to reload 
an IP address, in this case the Pentagon’s website DefenceLink. As 
Floodnet performs automatic reloads of the site, it slows or halts access to 
the targeted server and clogs bandwidth.9 The attack is interesting 
primarily for the Pentagon’s response to an attack that they knew was 
coming. On 9 September 1998, the Pentagon responded in kind by sending 
a java applet back to the originating computer and disabling the browser of 
the computer initiating the attack.10 The action caused a storm of
7 Gellman, 'Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared'.
8 ZDNet, 'Cyberterrorism: The Real Risks', 27 August 2002,
<http://news.zdnet.co.Uk/internet/0,1000000097,2121358,00.htm> (last accessed 21 September 2008).
9 The Electronic Disturbance Theatre views this act as performance art, hence the term theatre in their
title and classifies the FloodNet action as virtual or electronic civil disobedience.Fusco, 'Performance
Art in a Digital Age'.; see also Shawhan "Vital Interests, Virtual Threats"
10 Friel, 'DoD Launches Internet Counterattack'. According to the EDT only 2 computers of the
80,000-plus who participated were crashed by the DoD counterattack.
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controversy on the Internet as it involved an offensive attack on civilian 
servers. The incident sparked a joint task force to investigate the legalities 
involved.11
1998 Indonesia and East Timor.12 East Timor (now Timor Leste), occupied by 
Indonesia since 1975, declared its virtual independence in 1998 and 
established its own Country Code Top Level Domain and website hosted 
by an Irish Internet Service Provider (ISP), Connect-Ireland. Following the 
launch of the domain, the Indonesian embassy relayed its concerns 
regarding the launch to the Irish Times, complaining that the site 
represented misuse of computer freedom to campaign against Indonesia. In 
January 1999, Connect-Ireland because the focus of a coordinated attack 
on its servers. Martin Maguire, Founder and managing director of Connect 
Ireland believed the attacks were perpetrated by the Indonesian 
Government and complained to the embassy. Maguire asserted “the 
attacks were systematic and took place over a long period of time, from 18 
different locations, and were targeted at the .tp domain name”. Attacks 
took the form of buffer overflow attacks, defacement of web pages, denial 
of service attacks. A spokesperson for the Indonesian embassy denied the 
claims.
1999 Moonlight Maze. The code name for the investigation into a highly 
classified incident of early 1999 electronic assault involving hackers based 
in Russia. In this attack, U.S. officials accidentally discovered a pattern of 
probing of computer systems at the Pentagon, NASA, Energy Department, 
private universities, and research labs that had begun in March 1998 and 
had been going on for nearly two years. Intruders accessed unclassified but 
highly sensitive DOD science and technology information, systematically 
marauding through tens of thousands of files - including maps of military 
installations, troop configurations and military hardware designs. The
n Seffers, 'Legalities Cloud Pentagon's Cyber Defence', cited in Shawhan "Vital Interests, Virtual 
Threats", 37
12 'Indonesia, Ireland in Info War?' Wired News 27 January 1999,
<http://www/wired.cora/news/print/0,1294,17562,OO.html> (last accessed 4 April 2003); Arthur, 'The 
Day East Timor Was Deleted'; Nuttall, 'Virtual Country 'Nuked' on Net'.
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Defense Department traced the trail back to a mainframe computer in the 
Russian Academy of Science, a government organization that interacts 
closely with the Russian military,13 but the sponsor of the attacks is 
unknown and Russia denies any involvement. Moonlight Maze is still 
being actively investigated by U.S. intelligence.14
1999 U.K. MOD Satellite Hack.15 (March) A group of hackers is alleged to
have seized control of British military communications satellite. The 
hackers apparently intercepted the link between the Skynet satellite’s 
control centre and the ground station and accessed the control system of 
the satellite, using it to change the characteristics of the channels used to 
convey military communications, satellite television and telephone calls. 
As there is only one news report of this incident, care should be taken in 
relying on this report.
1999 Kosovo -  Operation Allied Force. The United States used computer
network attacks to confuse and disable the Yugoslav air defence systems. 
Used in combination with jamming and other electronic warfare 
techniques, computer network attacks were used to insert misleading 
messages and false targets into the Yugoslav computer systems. While it is 
not clear what method was used by the U.S. Air Force to do so, they have 
two aircraft capable of intercepting and amending data before 
retransmission to the enemy system.16
13 Inside Defense, Defense Information and Electronics Report 1 (22 Oct. 1999). In James P. Terry, 
'The Lawfulness of Attacking Computer Networks in Armed Conflict and in Self-Defense in Periods 
Short of Armed Conflict: What Are the Targeting Constraints?' (2001) 169 Mil L Rev 70.
14 PBS Frontline, Cyberwar! The Warnings (last accessed 21 September 2008).
15 'British Hackers Attack MoD Satellite', Telegraph (London), March 1999, 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/connected/main.jhtml7xmWconnected/1999/03/04/ecnhack04.xml> 
(last accessed 23 September 2008).
16 For fuller details see William M. Arkin, 'The Cyber Bomb in Yugoslavia', Washington Post 
(Washington D.C.), 25 October 1999, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp- 
srv/national/dotmil/arkin.htm> (last accessed 21 September 2008); David A. Fulghum, 'Yugoslavia 
Successfully Attacked by Computers' (1999) 151(8) Aviation Week and Space Technology 23 August 
1999 31; David A. Fulghum, 'Data Link, Ew Problems Pinpointed by Pentagon' (1999) 151(10) 
Aviation Week and Space Technology 6 September 1999 87; Arkin and Windrem, 'The Other Kosovo 
War'.
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2000 Queensland Water Supplies - Vitek Boden. In April 2000 Vitek Boden 
was arrested after being caught using a stolen computer and radio 
transmitter to gain access to a water sewerage treatment system. Over the 
previous two month period Boden had accessed the system 46 times, 
gaining complete control of treatment of the region’s sewerage and 
drinking water facilities and dumping 250 million tonnes of putrid sludge 
into the area’s rivers and parks, killing wildlife and plants.17
2001 Code Red. Code Red was a worm with multiple variants that first 
appeared in July 2001 and ultimately affected nearly 300,000 computers in 
the U.S. Exploiting a hole in Microsoft's IIS Web servers, it was time 
sensitive based on the date: From days 1-19 of the month the worm would 
propagate; from days 20-27 it would launch a denial of service attack 
against a particular site, and from day 27 through the end of the month the 
worm would "sleep," dormant in the computer. In Code Red's first 
variation, the affected computers were programmed to launch a denial of 
service attack against the White House Website at a certain date and time. 
If the assault worked, the hundreds of thousands of pings would have 
overwhelmed the Internet in nanoseconds. Richard Clarke, the president's 
adviser for cyberspace security, worked with the nation's Internet 
providers to thwart the attack by blocking traffic to the White House site. 
Other Websites were shut down, however, and replaced by a message that 
read “Hacked by Chinese”.18
2001 Mountain View. In the summer of 2001, the coordinator for the city of 
Mountain View, California's website noticed a suspicious pattern of 
intrusions. The FBI investigated and found similar "multiple casings of 
sites" in other cities throughout the U.S. The probes were seemingly 
emanating from the Middle East and South Asia, and the visitors were 
looking up information about the cities' utilities, government offices, and 
emergency systems. This information took on a new significance when
17 R v Boden; Gellman, 'Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared'.
18 PBS Frontline, Cyberwar! The Warnings (last accessed 21 September 2008).
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U.S. intelligence officials examined computers seized from Al Qaeda 
operatives after the 11 September 2001 attacks and discovered what 
appeared to be a broad pattern of surveillance of U.S. infrastructure.19
“I think the bottom line on the Mountain View case is the ease with 
which people can do virtual reconnaissance from overseas on our 
physical infrastructure and on our cyber infrastructure, and the difficulty 
that we have in knowing what is being done. We were lucky in the case 
of Mountain View, that there were good people watching. It's probably 
occurring in lots of other places around the country, and we don't have 
people who are catching it.”20
2001 Houston Port Authority: Aaron Caffrey, 19, was accused of launching a 
denial of service attack that hampered operations at the Port of Houston, 
Texas, on 20 September 2001 by crippling its web-based systems which 
contained crucial information on navigation, tides, water depths and 
weather. Caffrey, who allegedly launched the attack against a female 
internet chatroom user who had insulted his American girlfriend, used a 
list of unpatched servers downloaded from the Internet to hijack the 
machines and launch a denial of service attack. But it almost ended in 
disaster when it crashed the Port of Houston's systems under the weight of
100,000 requests to ping data at the girl's computer, leaving vital
91navigation and weather data inaccessible.
2002 Al-Qaeda Laptops. U.S. troops clearing the cave system in the Tora Bora 
region of Afghanistan uncovered an Al Qaeda laptop which indicated a 
strong interest in computer network attacks. Computer forensics indicated 
that the laptop had made multiple visits to sites offering sabotage
19 Ibid.
20 PBS Frontline, Interview with Richard Clarke - Cyberwar!
<http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/cyberwar/interviews/clarke.html> (last accessed 21 
September 2008).
21 Rebecca Allison, 'Hacker Attack Left Port in Chaos: Busiest US Port Hit after Dorset Teenager 
Allegedly Launched Electronic Sabotage against Chatroom User', The Guardian (London), 7 October 
2003, Home 7; Andy McCue, "Revenge* Hack Downed U.S. Port Systems', ZDNet News 7 October 
2003, <http://news.zdnet.co.Uk/security/0,1000000189,39116978,00.htm> (last accessed 17 March 
2008); Rebecca Allison, 'Youth Cleared of Crashing American Port's Computer', The Guardian 
(London), 18 October 2007, Guardian Home Pages 7.
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handbooks, software and programming instructions on SCADA systems, 
and other ‘cracking’ tools. In January 2002, another computer was seized 
at an Al Qaeda office in Kabul, Afghanistan. The computer contained 
models of a dam, made with structural architecture and engineering 
software and included geological soil identification software which would 
enable the planners of an attack to simulate the dam’s catastrophic failure
7 7and plot the consequences of a breach.
2002 Attack on DNS Root servers. A massive denial of service attack of
unknown origin briefly interrupted traffic on nine of the 13 DNS ‘root’ 
servers that control the Internet but the overall threat was dismissed as
7*1‘minimal’. The attack took place over a one-hour window and appeared 
to be the work of experts. It is interesting as it is an attack on the Internet 
itself, rather than particular websites.
2000- Suter Systems.24 In 2000, 2002 and 2004, the U.S. military tested the
2006 capability for U.S. forces to secretly enter an enemy computer network
and monitor what their radar systems could detect. Further experiments 
tested the added capability for U.S. Forces to take over the enemy 
computers and start manipulating their radar to show false images. Suter 
1,2 & 3 progressively enabled information warfare experts to penetrate 
anti-aircraft defense networks, using radar and radio antennas and 
microwave relays as portals. Once inside, Suter operators could see what 
the enemy radars saw, then jam and spoof the flow of information or even 
take over as system administrator to control movement of radar antennas. 
By the 2006 joint forces exercise, the Suter series of communications 
network invasion and exploitation capabilities, were absent. Senior Air 
Force officials stated that this change in emphasis was because the 
technology was no longer experimental and had been moved into
22 Gellman, 'Cyber-Attacks by Al Qaeda Feared'.
23 Naraine, Massive DDoS Attack Hit DNS Root Servers (last accessed 6 September 2007)
24 David Fulghum, 'Sneak Attack' (2004) Aviation Week & Space Technology 28 June 2004 34; David 
Bond, 'The Dog That Didn't Bark' (2006) 164(19) Aviation Week & Space Technology 8 May 2006 
19.
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operational use in Iraq and Afghanistan.
2003 - Titan Rain. Titan Rain is the code name given to a series of computer
intrusions originating in Guangdong province, China. The attacks were 
significant for the high speed and technical skill of the intrusions although 
the motivation behind them remains unknown as does the identity of the 
perpetrators. It has been speculated that these were Chinese military 
attacks. The code name has since been changed from Titan Rain but the 
new designation remains classified.
2004 Mydoom & Variants. The original Mydoom virus began circulating 
around email systems and peer-to-peer networks at the end of January
Of*2004. The original virus contained a mass-mailing worm, which set up a 
backdoor into the infected computer by opening TCP ports. These 
backdoors potentially allow an attacker to connect to the computer either 
to gain access to its network resources, or to make the computer follow 
remote commands from the attacker to launch attacks on other computers. 
In the case of the Mydoom virus, it was the latter. The original virus was 
programmed to launch Denial of Service attacks at US company SCO over 
a period of 12 days, apparently as part of an ongoing battle over control of 
Unix source code.27 The Mydoom variant, Doomjuice launches a similar 
attack at the Microsoft website. However, unlike the original virus 
Doomjuice does not travel by email. Instead, both Doomjuice and its
ORcounterpart Deadhat, randomly scan net addresses and upload 
themselves to any infected machines they find, through the backdoor
25 Graham, 'Hackers Attack Via Chinese Web Sites'.
26 A mass mailing worm arrives an email attachment which sends itself out to all other addresses in 
the compromised computers address book.
27 'Mydoom Cripples US Firm's Website', BBC News 1 February 2004, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/technology/3449931.stm> (last accessed 10 February 2008).
28 The Deadhat virus is designed to find machines infected with the Mydoom virus, it removes any 
copies of Mydoom. A and Mydoom.B that are resident, installs itself and then attempts to stop the 
computer running anti-virus software or getting updates to protect itself against future infections.
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90opened by the original virus.
2007 Attack on DNS Root Servers.30 On 6 February 2007 a distributed denial 
of service attack was launched against three DNS root servers including 
one operated by the U.S. Defense Department (the others were operated by 
the Internet's oversight body ICANN (Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers) and UltraDNS (which manages traffic for websites 
ending in "org" and some other suffixes) respectively. There was no 
evidence of damage to the servers.
2007 ‘Aurora’. In March 2007 researchers from the Idaho National Laboratory
launched an experimental cyber attack, hacking into a replica of a power
i
plants control system and changing the operating cycle of a generator.
The attack sent the generator out of control and ultimately causing the 
generator to self destruct, alarming the federal government and electrical 
industry about what might happen if such an attack were carried out on a
9^larger scale.
2007 DDoS Attacks against Estonia.33 In May 2007, Estonia became the
victim of a prolonged series of denial of service attacks which brought the 
banking system, many government services and much of the media to a 
halt. Although no critical infrastructure was compromised, for a highly 
technology dependent State like Estonia that depends on the Internet for 
everything from parking to banking to voting, the attacks caused serious 
disruption and caused an estimated tens of millions of euros worth of
29 Security firms suspect that Doomjuice was written by the author of the original Mydoom virus. 
'Mydoom Mutants Launch New Attacks', BBC News 10 February 2004, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/technology/3475235.stm> (last accessed 20 February 2008).
30 'Hackers Attack Heart of the Net', BBC News 1 February 2007, 
<http://news.bbc.co.Uk/l/hi/technology/6338261.stm> (last accessed 21 September 2008).
31 Meserve, 'Staged Cyber Attack Reveals Vulnerability in Power Grid'.
32Ibid., footage of the generator is also available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fJyWngDco3g.
33 See generally, 'The Cyber Raiders Hitting Estonia'; AFP, 'Cyber Attacks on Estonia Are Security 
Issue: NATO Chief; Tony Halpin, 'Putin Accused of Launching Cyber War', The Times (London), 18 
May 2007, Overseas News 46; Traynor, 'Russia Accused of Unleashing Cyberwar to Disable Estonia'; 
Traynor, 'Web Attackers Used a Million Computers, Says Estonia'.
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damage.34 Despite earlier explicit accusations that Russia was behind the 
offensive, the Estonian government backed away from directly accusing 
the Kremlin of launching the attacks,35 but requested assistance from its 
NATO allies under the terms of that alliance.
2007 Israeli Attack on Suspected Syrian Nuclear Site. On 6 September 2007 
Israel penetrated of Syrian air defences in order to bomb a suspected 
nuclear site at Dayr az-Zawr, without being engaged or even detected.36 
That attack combined electronic attack techniques in the form of brute- 
force jamming, precision missiles to eliminate the facility itself, and 
computer network attack techniques. The ability of non-stealthy Israeli 
aircraft to penetrate without interference rests in part on technology, 
carried on board modified aircraft, that allowed specialists to hack into
7^Syria’s networked air defence system. “Network raiders can conduct 
their invasion from an aircraft into a network and then jump from network 
to network until they are into the target’s communications loop”.
34 Traynor, 'Web Attackers Used a Million Computers, Says Estonia'.
35 Ibid. Russia categorically denies any involvement and no concrete evidence has been found to 
substantiate those claims. While technical data shows that some of the attacks came from IP addresses 
allocated to the Russian Government, there is no evidence that these computers were involved in 
initiating the attacks, or that they had not been compromised or spoofed.
36 Fulghum, Wall and Butler, 'Israel Shows Electronic Prowess'.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid.
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Appendix 2 - Glossary of Selected Computing Terms1
Applet A program designed to be executed from within
another application (they cannot be executed directly 
from the operating system). Web browsers, which are 
often equipped with Java virtual machines, can 
interpret applets from Web servers. Because applets 
are small in file size, cross-platform compatible, and 
highly secure (can't be used to access users' hard 
drives), they are ideal for small Internet applications 
accessible from a browser.
Backdoor Also called a trapdoor. An undocumented way of
gaining access to a program, online service or an 
entire computer system.
Bitstream A bitstream is a contiguous sequence of bits (Os & Is),
representing a stream of data, transmitted continuously 
over a communications path, serially (one at a time).
Botnet Also called a Zombie net. A group of compromised
computers controlled by a master computer and used 
primarily for DDoS attacks or spam.
According to the Independent, a reasonable-sized 
botnet of 8,000-10,000 computers may rented for £200 
an hour.3
1 Definitions are primarily taken and adapted from the Webopedia: Online Dictionary o f  Computing 
& Internet <http://www.webopedia.com/> (last accessed 30 November 2007). and the Department o f  
Defense Dictionary o f  Military and Associated Terms, (Government Reprints Press, Washington, DC, 
2001).
2 SearchNetworking.com Definitions
<http://searchnetworking.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0„sid7_gci213496,00.html> (last accessed 13 
August 2008).
3 Sarah Amott, 'How Cyber Crime Went Professional', The Independant (London), 13 August 2008, 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/analysis-and-features/how-cyber-crime-went- 
professional-892882.html> (last accessed 20 August 2008).
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Computer network attack
Denial of Service Attack
Distributed Denial Of 
Service Attack
DNS Server
Electronic warfare
Hard coded 
In the wild
Operations designed to disrupt, deny, degrade, or 
destroy information resident in computers or computer 
networks, or the computer networks themselves.
A type of attack on a network that is designed to bring 
the system or network to its knees by flooding it with 
useless traffic.
An attack where multiple compromised systems 
(which are usually infected with a Trojan) are used to 
target a single system causing a Denial of Service 
attack. Victims of a DDoS attack consist of both the 
end targeted system and all systems maliciously used 
and controlled by the hacker in the distributed attack.
Domain Name Service Server. DNS is an Internet 
service that translates domain names into IP addresses. 
For example, the domain name www.example.com 
might translate to 198.105.232.4. If one DNS server in 
the network doesn't know how to translate a particular 
domain name, it asks another one, and so on, until the 
correct IP address is returned.
Military action involving the use of electromagnetic 
and directed energy to control the electromagnetic 
spectrum or to attack the enemy.
A feature which is built into the hardware or software 
in such a way that it cannot be modified.
in order for a virus to be considered in the wild, "it 
must be spreading as a result of normal day-to-day 
operations on and between the computers of 
unsuspecting users." Although there are an estimated
47,000 computer viruses, fewer than 600 are said to be 
circulating outside of laboratories and research
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Information 
Information operations
IP Address
ISP
Logic bomb 
Malware
facilities - hence, in the wild. Experts say these wild 
viruses pose the most significant threat to computers.4
Facts, data or instructions in any medium or form.
The integrated employment of the core capabilities of 
electronic warfare, computer network operations, 
psychological operations, military deception, and 
operations security, in concert with specified 
supporting and related capabilities, to influence, 
disrupt, corrupt or usurp adversarial human and 
automated decision making while protecting our own.
An identifier for a computer or device on a TCP/IP 
network. Networks using the TCP/IP protocol route 
messages based on the IP address of the destination. 
The format of an IP address is a 32-bit numeric 
address written as four numbers separated by periods. 
Each number can be zero to 255. For example, 
1.160.10.240 could be an IP address.
Internet Service Provider. A company that provides 
access to the Internet.
Malicious programming code which is inserted into 
application software or an operating system. The code 
lies dormant until a predetermined period of time has 
elapsed, or a triggering event (or series of events) 
occurs, at which time the code activates.
Malicious software, i.e. software designed specifically 
to damage or disrupt. E.g. Trojan horse, virus etc.
4 SearchSecurity.com definitions
<http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/sDefinition/0„sidl4_gci511204,00.html> (last accessed 2 
December 2007).
Peer-to-peer
Rootkit
Shareware
Spoof
Peer-to-peer (P2P) architecture is a type of network in 
which each workstation has equivalent capabilities 
and responsibilities. Often used to describe one user 
linking with another user to transfer information and 
files through the use of a common P2P client to 
download MP3s, videos, images, games and other 
software. This, however, is only one type of P2P 
networking. Generally, P2P networks are used for 
sharing files, but a P2P network can also mean Grid 
Computing or Instant messaging.
Type of malicious software that is activated each time 
a system boots up. Rootkits are difficult to detect 
because they are activated before the system's 
Operating System (OS) has completely booted up. A 
rootkit often allows the installation of hidden files, 
processes, hidden user accounts, and more in the 
system’s OS. Rootkits are able to intercept data from 
terminals, network connections, and the keyboard.
Software distributed on the basis of an honor system. 
Usually free of charge, but with the request that if the 
user likes the program and uses it regularly the author 
is paid a small fee. This may entitle the user to service 
assistance and updates. Shareware may be copied and 
shared with the same fee expectation.
To fool or deceive. Although many things can be 
spoofed, it generally refers to IP spoofing which 
allows the sender of data to forge the source address in 
the header of the IP packet. The receiving computer 
will then send all replies to the forged address rather 
than the actual computer. This technique is often used 
in denial of service attacks.
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Trapdoor See ‘Backdoor’.
Trojan horse
URL
Virus
Worm
Malicious programming code disguised to look like a 
harmless application. Trojans are further broken down 
in classification based on how they breach systems 
and the damage they cause.
Universal Resource Locator. A global address of 
documents and other resources on the world wide 
web. A web address
Malicious programming code written to replicate itself 
and attaches to another file or program in order to 
spread from one computer to another. They may also 
cause damage or destruction as they travel. Unlike a 
worm, a virus cannot travel without human 
intervention.
A sub-class of virus which does not require human 
intervention to spread from host to host. A worm takes 
advantage of file or information transport features on 
the computer system, to allow it to travel unaided.
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Appendix 3 - Abbreviations Used
ADIL
Additional Protocol I 
also API
Additional Protocol II 
also APII
AFJ Log 
AFL Rev 
AJIL
ASIL Proc
BFSP
BMJ
BU Int’l LJ 
BUJ Sci & Tech L 
BYBIL
Case W Res J Inti L 
CNA
Col J Trans L 
Conventional Weapons
Annual Digest & Reports of Public International Law 
Cases
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), 8 June 1977.
Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 
August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of 
Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), 8 June 
1977.
Air Force Journal of Logistics
Air Force Law Review
American Journal of International Law
r
American Society of International Law Proceedings
British and Foreign State Papers.
British Medical Journal
Boston University International Law Journal
Boston University Journal of Science & Technology
British Yearbook of International Law
Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 
Computer Network Attack
Columbia Journal of Transnational Law
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of 
Certain Conventional Weapons Which May Be Deemed
Treaty
CPU
DCS
DDoS
EJIL
EMP
FRY
Geneva Convention I
Geneva Convention II
Geneva Convention III
Geneva Convention IV
GJIA
GovExec
Hague Convention 1899 
Hague Regulations
to Be Excessively Injurious or to Have Indiscriminate 
Effects, 10 October 1980.
Central Processing Unit
Distributed Control System.
Distributed Denial of Service.
European Journal of International Law
Electromagnetic Pulse.
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of the Sick and Wounded in Armed Forces in the Field of 
August 12,1949.
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition 
of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed 
Forces at Sea of August 12,1949.
Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners 
of War of August 12,1949.
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian 
Persons in Time of War of August 12,1949.
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs
Government Executive
Hague Convention Concerning the Laws and Customs of 
War on Land
Regulations Annexed to the 1907 Hague Convention IV 
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land.
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Harv Int’l LJ Harvard International Law Journal
Hous J Int'l L Houston Journal of International Law
HPCR Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and Conflict
Research
ICJ International Court of Justice
ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross
ICTR International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
ICTY International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia
IFF Identification Friend or Foe
10 Information Operations
IP Address Internet Protocol Address
IRRC International Review of the Red Cross
Israel YB Hum Rts Israeli Yearbook of Human Rights
IW Information Warfare
JC&SL Journal of Conflict & Security Law
JSTARS Joint Surveillance Target Attack Radar System
Keesings Keesings Record of World Events
Ottawa Convention Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling,
Production and Transfer of Anti-Personnel Mines and on 
Their Destruction.
LOAC Laws of Armed Conflict
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NIL Rev 
NZLR 
OAU 
PMC
Recueil des Cours
RIAA
SCADA
SCSL
Stan J Int'l L
Stud Confl & Terror
T. Jefferson L Rev.
UAV
U.N.
UNCIO Docs.
UNTS
URL
U.S.
US AF Acad J Legal 
Stud
Netherlands International Law Review 
New Zealand Law Reports 
Organisation of African Unity 
Private Military Company
Recueil des cours de I ’Academie de droit international de 
La Haye, Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law (Leyden)
Reports of International Arbitral Awards
Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition
Special Court for Sierra Leone
Stanford Journal of International Law
Studies in Conflict & Terrorism
Thomas Jefferson Law Review
Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
United Nations
Documents of the United Nations Conference on 
International Organisation
United Nations Treaty Series
Universal Resource Locator (a web address)
United States (of America)
U.S. Air Force Academy Journal of Legal Studies
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Vand J Transnat'l L Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law
Yale Hum Rts & Dev LJ Yale Human Rights and Development Law Journal
Yale J Int’l L Yale Journal of International Law
ZaoRV Zeitschrift fur auslandisches offentliches Recht und
Volkerrecht
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